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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates specialist and multiple dealer markets. In the first o f 
four essays, simultaneous trading in two market structures on the Paris Bourse is used to 
evaluate intraday price formation. Specialists are found to exacerbate the end o f day 
price rise. Stock volatility and bid-ask spreads are found to be larger when a specialist is 
present, in contrast to existing literature that compares market structures on different 
exchanges.
The second essay estimates the components o f the bid-ask spread and trade 
execution costs on the Paris Bourse. Estimates o f  the adverse selection cost component 
do not resolve the conflicting findings in existing literature regarding the relative size o f 
this component in different market structures. A larger inventory holding cost 
component is identified for stocks that trade with the aid of a specialist, confirming the 
specialists' cost of maintaining an inventory. Higher trading costs are found for those 
stocks that trade with the aid o f a specialist in contrast to existing literature, suggesting 
previous findings are exchange-specific. Long-term inventory changes are investigated 
and the impact on the inventory holding cost component is found to be twice as large for 
those stocks with a specialist.
The third essay examines specialist firms on the New York Stock Exchange. 
Differences are observed in the bid-ask spread, volatility and bid and ask depths.
Likewise, final transaction returns differ across specialist firms indicating that the end of 
day price rise may be a method used by specialist firms to manage end of day prices.
This is corroborated by observing minimal differences within each specialist firm. Short­
term changes in inventory are investigated and extreme inventory changes are shown to
vui
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have smaller bid-ask spreads. Depletion of inventory is associated with a larger bid-ask 
spread than a build-up.
Essay four investigates the change in the rules governing market on close orders 
on the New York Stock Exchange. The new rules require earlier submission o f orders. 
Minimal differences in the end o f day price rise are found between the period before and 
after the rule change, however, volatility levels are found to decline for nine o f thirty- 
seven specialist firms.
ix
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CHAPTER 1 
AN OVERVIEW
1.1. Introduction
The trading mechanism for stocks varies across exchanges with the individual 
specialist system on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock 
Exchange (ASE) and the multiple market maker arrangement on Nasdaq being two o f  the 
most common market structures. The relative merits o f the two systems have been 
investigated in a number o f  ways both theoretically and empirically. Empirical tests 
include comparing the magnitude and the components o f the bid-ask spread o f stocks o f  
firms on different exchanges or those firms that move their listings between exchanges.
A finding o f large bid-ask spreads on Nasdaq has even led to an investigation of possible 
collusion which culminated in some changes to that trading system. The question o f  how 
to structure trading is especially important given the competition between exchanges for 
new listings. Furthermore, the continued shift to a more competitively-based world 
economy will result in more trading in equities and an even greater emphasis on 
designing optimal structures for trading stocks.
This dissertation investigates market structures, focusing on comparing specialist 
versus multiple dealer markets and their impact on both intraday price formation and the 
components o f the bid-ask spread. Intraday price formation is o f interest following the 
finding of several empirical regularities in trading volume, volatility, bid-ask spreads and 
mean returns. The continued existence o f patterns or regularities that are economically 
exploitable is o f  interest since this is contradictory to market efficiency. The theoretical 
components o f the bid-ask spread are o f interest in determining the composition of 
trading costs using different market structures.
1
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The first essay (Chapter 3) examines data from the Paris Bourse where some 
stocks have multiple dealers while others also have an individually assigned market 
maker. This provides an opportunity to analyze how intraday price formation is affected 
by the different market structures. This unique dual market structure is also used to 
investigate the components o f the bid-ask spread and execution costs. In the second 
essay (Chapter 4) Huang and Stoll’s (1997) general bid-ask spread decomposition model 
and Bessembinder and Kaufman’s (1997) empirical measures o f trading costs are used to 
identify the components in both segments o f this market.
Individual specialist firms may have different levels o f  risk aversion, skill or 
capitalization that manifest themselves in characteristics that are not easily observable.
In the third essay (Chapter 5) the intraday patterns in price formation characteristics are 
compared across specialist firms.
In June 1995, the rule governing the handling o f market on close orders was 
altered by the NYSE in an effort to reduce volatility at the end of the day. The 
effectiveness o f the rule change in aggregate and across specialist firms is the focus o f  the 
fourth essay (Chapter 6). In addition, the impact of the rule change on end o f day pricing 
is examined.
1.2. Market Structure and Intraday Price Formation
The first essay examines the effect o f a specialist market structure on intraday 
price formation. Recent empirical research on equity markets has revealed intraday 
regularities in bid-ask spreads, volatility and measures o f trading in a variety of 
institutional settings. A U-shaped pattern in intraday bid-ask spreads and volume is 
found for stocks on the specialist market o f  NYSE. A similar U-shaped pattern in
2
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volume is found on the multiple dealer structure of Nasdaq; however, bid-ask spreads 
have a declining pattern, being widest immediately following the open and then 
decreasing throughout the day. The Paris Bourse is an order-driven market with multiple 
dealers similar to Nasdaq. However, for stocks in the continuously-traded lower-liquidity 
trading group, there is also one dealer acting as a market maker for each stock similar to 
the specialist structure o f the NYSE. The simultaneous trading o f stocks, some with an 
assigned market maker in addition to the multiple dealers and some with only multiple 
dealers, provides an excellent opportunity to examine the effect o f market structure on 
intraday price formation. Using all o f the securities continuously traded on the Paris 
Bourse during the last 84 trading days o f 1995, intraday price formation is investigated 
both with and without the assigned market maker. This essay examines volume, 
volatility and bid-ask spread patterns as well as the day end effect.
1.3. Market Structure and the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread
On exchanges with a single trading system, higher bid-ask spreads are expected 
on lower liquidity stocks for a number o f reasons. One potential explanation is that the 
possibility o f an inventory imbalance over a long period o f time influences the specialist 
to increase the bid-ask spread to compensate for the additional holding cost. Another 
explanation suggests the market power o f  the specialist causes the large spread. A third 
explanation is information-based and suggests that low volume stocks have a higher 
probability o f informed trading with the increased bid-ask spread set to compensate for 
these anticipated losses.
The second essay uses Paris Bourse data to compare the components of the bid- 
ask spread o f  those firms with and without an assigned market maker. The impact of
3
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assigned market makers to medium liquidity stocks on the Paris Bourse is examined via 
the general bid-ask spread decomposition model o f Huang and Stoll (1997) and 
Bessembinder and Kaufman’s (1997) empirical measures o f trading costs. The various 
possible explanations are tested by comparing the estimated inventory, order processing 
and adverse selection components o f the bid-ask spread and the execution costs between 
the groups o f stocks with and without an assigned market maker. The inventory 
accumulation explanation o f  inventory holding costs is tested by examining the estimated 
inventory holding cost component across groups of stocks partitioned by the amount o f 
inventory accumulated in the previous trading sessions.
1.4. Specialist Firms and Intraday Price Formation
In the third essay the intraday price formation is further investigated by examining 
differences across individual specialist firms on the NYSE. Some explanations of price 
formation patterns involve the impact o f the specialist. For example, the specialist may 
be able to capitalize on traders’ inelastic demand at various times during the day.
Another possibility is that the specialist may allow window dressing more readily in 
certain stocks. These explanations assume that the specialist is in a key position to 
impact the price formation patterns. Each specialist’s expertise, however, is not likely to 
be similar and this may result in differing impacts on price formation characteristics.
Also, volume may impact price formation since it impacts on the profitability o f trading 
stocks through the capture o f  bid-ask spreads. Different patterns may exist in low 
volume stocks since they may be less important in day to day income o f the specialists. 
Finally, high volume/high price stocks may be prone to more attention because of 
institutional investors’ interest in stocks with higher market capitalization. This chapter
4
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investigates the differences among specialists in order to determine the impact on patterns 
in intraday price formation characteristics.
1.5. Market on Close Order Rule Change and Intraday Price Formation Across
Specialist Firms
The fourth essay investigates the impact o f the June 1995 NYSE rule change on 
the entering o f market on close orders. The rule was intended to reduce volatility at the 
end o f the trading day and prevent a last minute influx of orders from causing large shifts 
in prices. Effective June 5,1995, the rule required that all stocks have market on close 
orders in ten minutes before the close (3:50 pm) on all days. This essay tests the 
effectiveness o f this rule change by examining the volatility in the month before and the 
month after the rule change. The effectiveness of the rule change is also examined across 
specialist firms to determine the impact o f the specialist on the implementation o f the rule 
change. The impact on intraday price formation and especially end o f day pricing is also 
examined and compared across specialist firms. Additionally, some stocks fall into a 
special category where all large order imbalances in the market on close orders are 
reported and additional compensating orders are allowed after the 3:50 pm cutoff time. 
The impact o f this policy is examined by comparing the group of stocks that allow the 
order imbalance publication and additional subsequent orders with the group o f  stocks 
that do not permit this practice.
5
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Introduction
The stock market structure literature is examined first and detailed descriptions o f  
the NYSE, Nasdaq and Paris Bourse are provided. Next, the extant theoretical and 
empirical literature regarding market structure is detailed. The intraday price formation 
literature which examines patterns in volume, volatility, bid-ask spreads and end o f day 
pricing is reviewed. Finally, literature regarding the components of the bid-ask spread 
and differences across specialist firms is examined.
2.2. Stock Market Structures
Interest in the market structure for trading equities on various stock exchanges has 
increased as the volume o f shares traded has increased and the competition among 
exchanges to procure new listings has risen. The debate about the competitive 
advantages o f specialist versus dealer markets depends on the criteria used to measure 
optimality. Measures o f  optimality include operational efficiency and pricing efficiency, 
as well as the depth o f  the available number o f shares to buy or sell at the prevailing 
quotes. Before examining the relevant literature a simple description o f the major stock 
exchange structures in the United States is provided. Also, a description o f  the Paris 
Bourse market structure, the source o f the data used in Chapters 3 and 4, is given.
2.2.1. New York Stock Exchange
The primary United States stock exchange in terms o f market capitalization is the 
NYSE. The NYSE trading floor is organized so that an individual specialist is in charge 
o f several stocks at the same time, all at the same post and panel. Each stock is traded at
6
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one specific panel on one post. The individual specialist is a member o f  a specialist firm 
usually organized as a partnership with all members located at the same post on the floor 
o f the exchange.
The specialist is charged with opening trading in his stocks at 9:30 am or as close 
thereafter as possible. This is done by the means o f a call auction whereby all the orders 
placed before the open are matched. A clearing price is established such that the 
specialist draws on inventory or accumulates inventory (depending on the relative 
number of buy or sell orders). For the remainder of the day the specialist is responsible 
for maintaining an orderly flow o f transactions without wide fluctuations in price. The 
specialist does this by matching buy and sell orders or by taking the opposite side of the 
transaction and placing stock into or taking stock out of inventory. This is done by 
providing quotes at a price at which the specialist is willing to sell shares (the ask price)
• and buy shares (the bid price). The specialist also indicates the depth o f  the shares 
available to be traded at these quotes. For example, the specialist may have a  bid quote at 
$16.50 and a depth of 5 indicating a willingness to buy a maximum o f 500 shares at a 
price of $16.50 per share. Simultaneously, the specialist may have an ask quote, of 
perhaps $16.75 with a depth o f 30, indicating a willingness to sell a maximum of 3000 
shares at a price of $16.75 per share. In this example, the bid-ask spread is $0.25 or 
1.5%.
Orders are submitted electronically over the Super Designated Order Turnaround 
(DOT) system or handled by floor brokers. Market orders are executed against limit 
orders that were placed in the limit order book or against prevailing quotes provided by 
the specialist. Rules o f price and time priority prevent the specialist from trading ahead
7
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
o f any limit order at the same price. Undisclosed limit orders may be available from 
other brokers around the post and panel.
The execution of a market order is not automatic. The market order is exposed to 
other orders and the specialist or other brokers have the ability to better the standing 
quote or to let the order be executed against the standing quote. I f  the quote is bettered 
then the transaction occurs inside the quotes; hence, the effective spread may be lower 
than the posted spread. The effective spread may also be lower than the quoted spread if 
the specialist “stops the stock” whereby the specialist guarantees for that order a price at 
least as good as the prevailing quotes. When the stock is “stopped” the order remains 
unexecuted until another order comes in to take the opposite side o f  the transaction or the 
specialist executes the order into or out of inventory.
The trading day ends at 4:00 pm. Prior to June 5, 1995, trades could be placed 
until 3:59:59, including market on close (MOC) orders that will be the last executed trade 
o f the trading day. The rules differed on the one day a month when standardized 
contracts expire (‘expiration days’). On expiration days MOC orders are required to be 
submitted at 3:40 pm. On June 5 the rules were altered for non-expiration days. Orders 
can still be placed up to 3:59:59, but after June 5 MOC orders were required to be 
submitted ten minutes in advance o f the close (by 3:49:59). Further details o f  these 
changes and their effect on volatility at the close are given in Chapter 6.
2.2.2. Nasdaq
The Nasdaq trading system consists o f brokers and market makers that are linked 
via computers. Market makers post their best bid and ask quotes into the system and 
these quotes are electronically disseminated to all the other brokers. There is a wide
8
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variety in the number o f dealers for each individual stock with the number o f dealers in 
an active stock often exceeding thirty. Unlike NYSE, the market makers are not required 
to maintain an orderly market and they can exit or enter the market on short notice.
Each dealer in an active stock is obligated to trade a m inim um o f  1,000 shares at 
his or her prevailing quotes. Incoming market orders are executed against the inside 
dealer quotes. Inside quotes are the best bid and the best offer quotes that are available; 
thus, the bid and ask quotes are not necessarily from the same dealer.
2.2.3. Paris Bourse
The new Paris Bourse is a nationwide electronic market merging the old floor- 
trading Paris Bourse with the operations o f the regional Bourses. The modernization 
began in the late 1980s and now the trading system (under the name “Cotation Assistee 
en Continu” or C AC) is fully-computerized and includes data dissemination, clearance 
and settlement. The system is operated using workstations installed at 135 member 
firms. On June 26, 1995, the CAC system was replaced with an even more efficient 
system appropriately named SUPERCAC. The Paris Bourse is unique in that its structure 
embodies various characteristics o f other existing of securities markets. For instance, 
there is continuous as well as batch trading. Also, the market may be characterized as a 
dealership as well as an auction market.
There are two trading compartments on the Paris Bourse. The first is the official 
list which includes large French and foreign companies. This compartment requires that 
at least 25% o f a firm’s total equity must be offered to the public. The official list has 
two divisions: the “Reglement Mensuel” (RM) contains the most active stocks where 
settlement is made monthly and the “Comptant” contains the less active stocks where
9
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settlement is on the cash basis. The other trading compartment is referred to as the 
second market or “Second Marche”. The second market is set up for medium-sized 
companies and requires only that 10% o f a firm’s equity be held by the public. Only a 
small number o f foreign companies list on the second market.
For securities traded on the “Second Marche” or the “C om ptanfsettlem ent is on 
a cash basis. This is effected three days after the trade. For stocks on the “Reglement 
Mensuel” settlement occurs monthly, six business days before the end o f the month, with 
delivery o f the security required five days later. To place an order in this market the full 
amount o f the transaction does not have to be put up, only an initial margin deposit is 
required. This deposit may be satisfied with 20% cash, French Treasury bills or money 
market funds, with 25% in listed bonds, commercial paper or bond funds, or with 40% in 
listed shares or equity funds. On the settlement day investors who have not closed their 
positions may carry their positions over to the next account period through the “contango 
market” . This special market occurs the day after the settlement day and determines the 
rate at which buyers can obtain the cash and sellers can buy the securities they need to 
meet their obligations at the end of the month and, thus, carry over to the settlement day 
o f the following month.
Transactions that are reported on the Paris Bourse can occur on the exchange or 
o ff the exchange as prearranged trades between two customers of the same broker or 
between a customer and the broker acting as principal. Transactions o ff the exchange are 
called cross-trades or pass-throughs.
Electronic trading is performed by 135 member firms. The market’s central order 
book is maintained by the SUPERCAC electronic trading system and order matching is
10
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automatic. Cross-trades can be placed onto the system by an intermediary or by a 
member firm if they are acting as a principal. Orders are ranked by price limit as they 
enter the system; within each, limit orders are ranked chronologically. Clients can 
specify a date beyond which unexecuted orders are not valid, but if  the order is entered 
into the system without a specified validity date it is considered “Good ‘Til Canceled” 
(GTC or “revocation”). For securities traded on the cash market these GTC orders are 
valid until the last day o f the current month. For securities traded on the monthly 
settlement market GTC orders remain valid until the next settlement month.
The Paris Bourse offers a number of different types o f orders. Orders must either 
specify the execution price or be market orders. A market order placed before the open 
will be filled at the price set by the system during the opening stage. A market order 
during the remainder o f the trading session will be executed at the best price on the 
opposite side of the market. If the entire quantity o f the market order is not filled at the 
best price then the remaining shares from the market order are transformed into a limit 
order at the transaction price. Limit orders specify a price limit. “At best orders” were 
introduced in late 1995 and have no price limits. Such orders will match best prices until 
executed in full. If the total quantity can not be served at the time o f its entry in the 
system then a trading halt will occur. “Fill or kill” orders can only be executed when 
entered into the system. If the order is not executed immediately, either wholly or 
partially, the whole or remaining quantity is automatically canceled. “Quantite cache”
(or hidden) orders which are fractions o f larger orders are allowed on the exchange, but 
the disclosed amount must be ten times the stock’s usual trading lot. The hidden part 
loses time priority as disclosed orders at the same price are executed before the hidden
11
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quantity. As the visible portion is executed a portion of the hidden order becomes 
visible. Hidden orders are typically used by investors who wish to trade a large quantity 
or shares with minimal market impact. They represent from 20% to 40% o f the disclosed 
quantity for active stocks; therefore, actual market depth may be much greater than 
observed depth.
Securities are traded on a continuous basis begun with an opening batch auction 
or in batch auctions only. The continuously traded securities are classified as either 
“Continuous A” securities that have high liquidity or “Continuous B” securities that have 
average liquidity. From 8:30 am to 10:00 am the market for continuous securities is in its 
pre-opening phase and orders are accumulated in the centralized order book without any 
transactions taking place. The market opens at 10:00 am with a batch auction. The 
opening price is automatically calculated to be the price at which the largest number o f  
bids and asks can be matched. From 10:00 am until 5:00 pm, trading takes place on a 
continuous basis and the arrival o f  a new order will trigger one or more transactions if  
matching orders exist on the centralized book.
Securities traded only in batch auctions are those securities with low liquidity that 
are on the official list or the second market. This group is classified as the “Fixing A” 
group since the price is fixed twice daily. Orders are managed through an order book that 
operates continuously from 8:30 am until 4:00 pm, with batch auctions occurring at 11:30 
am and 4:00 pm.
Price fluctuations are limited in various ways depending on the trading group.
For Continuous A stocks, the initial allowed price change is plus or minus 10% from the 
prior day’s close with subsequent changes o f plus or minus 5% permitted. I f  these limits
12
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
are reached then trading halts o f fifteen minutes occur. The maximum change in any one 
day is arbitrarily set at +21.25% or -18.75% from the previous day’s close. The 
Continuous B group has an initial change limited to plus or minus 5% and subsequent 
changes limited to plus or minus 2.5%. In this group, trading halts occur for 30 minutes 
if  these triggers are reached. The maximum one day change is +10.25% or -9.65%. For 
the Fixing A group, the price at the 11:30 am fixing must be within 5% of the prior day’s 
close, and similar restrictions apply to the 4:00 pm fixing relative to the 11:30 am price.
Member firms are authorized to offer brokerage activities as well as dealership 
activities. They can execute buy and sell orders for clients on the market or may act as 
principals and deal in net prices to clients within the framework o f the central market. 
Principal trading can occur during or outside the trading session. If  the principal trade 
occurs during the trading session then it is reported on the computer system at a  price that 
must be within or at the existing spread. If the principal trade occurs outside the trading 
session then it must be carried out at a price that is within 1% of the best bid or offer 
existing at the close o f the previous trading day.
In order to enhance the liquidity o f certain medium-sized stocks special 
agreements were implemented in 1992. These special agreements known as “Trading 
Animation Contracts” or “contrats d ’animation” apply to stocks in the Continuous B and 
Fixing A group. They allow member firms to act as market makers under certain 
conditions. To comply with the rules governing these contracts, a member firm must 
agree to quote spreads on the market’s central order book and to stand ready to buy and 
sell a minimum quantity o f shares for their own account. Furthermore, they are required 
to maintain a market presence in the fifteen minutes immediately prior to opening, (or
13
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throughout the day for Continuous B shares), and in the 15 minutes preceding each fixing 
for the Fixing A group shares. The maximum relative spread that can be quoted is 5%  
and minimum quantities are FF 50,000 for the Continuous B shares and FF 20,000 for the 
Fixing A shares. A single assigned “animateur” (or market maker) is appointed for each 
security and investors are informed o f participating securities through the press. Market 
makers also agree to execute, insofar as possible, orders that were partially or totally 
unmatched at the market’s opening price. Having an assigned market maker does not 
preclude the interest o f other dealers. In fact, the assigned market maker remains in 
competition with the other dealers that may have an interest in the stock.
Each category of stocks is partitioned into individual trading groups that reflect 
the characteristics o f  that group. Besides differences in whether there is an assigned 
market maker, the stocks are divided according to whether there is regular or cash 
trading, foreign stocks or French stocks, primary versus secondary issues and even an 
individual trading group for those stocks that comprise the CAC-40 index. Appendix A 
lists the various trading groups.
Block trading rules were also revised in 1994. Member firms are now allowed to 
buy and sell large blocks in a single transaction and with a set price. The transaction 
must be larger than the “Normal Market Size” which is a figure based on the average 
trade volume in that stock and must be no less that FF 1 million. The block trades must 
be carried out at a price which falls within a weighted average spread calculated by 
weighting all orders on the order book. All block trades must be immediately reported to 
the Paris Bourse by the brokerage firm. Disclosure to the market is immediate when a 
member firm acts as a broker between two clients. Otherwise, timing of the disclosure
14
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depends on the transaction’s size. Transactions less than five times the normal market 
size are disclosed within two hours o f being reported. Transactions more than five times 
the normal market size are disclosed when the market opens on the following business 
day.
2.2.4. Theoretical Literature on Market Structure
The differences across markets using specialists and those using market makers 
are examined theoretically in a number of papers. Ho and Stoll (1981) show that 
competition among market makers leads to a more liquid market in the sense that the 
average bid-ask spread is smaller with competing market makers. Ho and Stoll (1983) 
model quote setting in a competing dealer market from an inventory perspective and 
compare their predictions to those o f  a model with a single specialist. Their model 
predicts that the bid-ask spread on multiple dealer markets will be higher than on 
specialist markets because the multiple dealer market has significantly greater depth.
This greater market depth is also shown by Grossman and Miller (1988). They find that 
the depth is greater because inventory holdings are larger with multiple dealers. As a 
result o f these larger inventories and competition from other market makers, individual 
market makers may not be able to experiment with prices to the same extent as specialists 
on the NYSE or ASE. However, Leach and Madhavan (1993) show that losses incurred 
by the specialist during the price discovery process will be recovered by later order flow. 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) concur by suggesting that the specialist can average profits 
over time. This allows trading to continue in the specialist market even in the event of 
other traders who possess superior information. In contrast, a multiple dealer market may
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shut down temporarily when there is an influx o f new information possessed by other 
traders.
The liquidity in each market structure may vary based on order size. Seppi (1997) 
develops a model in which a specialist with market power competes against a competitive 
limit order book. He finds that a hybrid specialist/limit order market provides better 
liquidity to small orders, but a pure limit order market may offer better liquidity on mid­
size orders.
2.2.5. Empirical Literature on Market Structure
A number of studies measure the cost o f execution on a particular market, without 
comparing the costs across markets. For example, Roll (1984) develops a method for 
measuring the effective spread and provides such estimates for exchange-listed stocks. 
Christie and Schultz (1994) and Christie, Harris and Schultz (1994) find that odd-eighth 
quotes are absent in 70 out of 100 Nasdaq stocks. This minimum spread o f two-eighths 
($0.25) suggests that Nasdaq market makers may tacitly collude to maintain wide 
spreads. This hypothesis is supported by empirical findings that spreads fell by 
approximately 50% for some of these stocks shortly after the release o f the first study in 
May 1994. However, additional studies have offered explanations other than implicit 
collusion. Godek (1996) suggests share preferencing is a possible explanation for the 
large bid-ask spreads. The Christie and Schultz findings are corroborated in a direct 
comparison between Nasdaq and NYSE by Huang and Stoll (1996). Huang and Stoll 
find that the execution costs1 for their sample o f Nasdaq stocks are twice as large as that 
o f  the NYSE sample. In addition, they suggest that the internalization and preferencing 
o f order flow and the presence of an alternative interdealer trading system results in a
1 Execution costs are measured by the quoted spread, the effective spread, the realized spread, the Roll 
(1984) implied spread and post-trade variability.
16
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
disincentive to reduce spreads. The incentive system has recently been altered by an 
adjustment in the treatment o f limit orders as a result of the United States Department o f 
Justice investigation following the Christie and Schultz papers.
A study by Affleck-Graves, Hedge and Miller (1994) is inconclusive as to 
whether the NYSE or Nasdaq market structure has lower total costs. In investigating the 
components o f the bid-ask spread, they document lower order processing costs for 
NYSE, but higher adverse selection and possibly higher inventory holding costs. In 
contrast, Jones and Lipson (1997) document gradual price adjustments on Nasdaq and a 
larger adverse selection component than on NYSE. Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995b) 
suggest that the adverse selection component o f the bid-ask spread should be higher on 
exchanges that have a specialist since the specialist is constrained from obtaining security 
analysis. Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) find that effective bid-ask spreads are only 
slightly smaller on the NYSE, but realized bid-ask spreads are two to three times lower.
Other studies compare the cost o f trading the same stocks on competing markets. 
Lee (1993) and Petersen and Fialkowski (1994) measure the costs o f trading NYSE 
stocks on regional exchanges and Nasdaq. They find that costs on the competing markets 
are slightly higher than on the NYSE. Their results are similar to De Jong, Nijman and 
Roell (1995) who investigate stocks o f French and German companies traded in their 
home country auction market and on the London dealer market. They find the bid-ask 
spreads on the London market to be consistently larger. Christie and Huang (1994) 
investigate firms that move from Nasdaq to the NYSE or ASE. They find that average 
costs fall 4.7 cents for transfers to the NYSE and 5.2 cents for transfers to the ASE. They 
find that the largest improvements in liquidity are for the less liquid stocks that become
17
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listed. Blume and Goldstein (1997) find that most o f the time, the NYSE quotes match or 
better the existing quotes on other exchanges; however, other factors such as payment for 
order flow explain the ability o f  other exchanges to attract order flow.
2.3. Intraday Patterns in Volume, Volatility, Bid-Ask Spreads and Prices
This section reviews the theoretical and empirical literature regarding the pattern 
in intraday pricing documented by Wood, Mclnish and Ord (1985). They find that 
average stock price volatility and volume are highest at the beginning and end o f the 
trading day. Also, they find that average returns are highest at the opening and closing of 
trading. Also in this section the end o f day pricing literature is reviewed.
2.3.1. Intraday Patterns: Theoretical Literature
Two papers develop models that show that information is incorporated into 
security prices through the strategic activities o f informed traders. Admati and Pfleiderer
(1988) predict that informed traders will concentrate their trades in periods where 
liquidity trading is concentrated. This presumably occurs at the open and close o f trading 
when trading costs are the lowest. Foster and Viswanathan (1990) suggest that 
uninformed traders will avoid the open and close o f trading since these periods are 
anticipated to have the largest amount o f private information. Foster and Viswanathan 
(1993) show that the anticipated private information costs and return volatility are the 
highest at the open. Brock and Kleidon (1992) suggest that the specialist is the cause of 
wider bid-ask spreads near the close o f trading.
2.3.2. Intraday Patterns: Empirical Literature
Berry and Howe (1994) suggest that patterns in intraday volume are related to 
public information arrival as measured by news releases. They find a systematic intraday
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pattern in Reuter’s news releases that explains the trading volume. Trading volatility is 
examined by Gerety and Mulherin (1994) who use forty years o f hourly observations of 
the Dow Jones 65 Composite Index levels to show that transitory volatility declines 
steadily during the day. They suggest that this is consistent with the notion that trading 
aids price formation. A U-shaped volatility pattern is also observed on the futures market 
by Chang, Jain and Locke (1995) who find that the S & P 500 futures market has a U- 
shaped pattern after the close in underlying stock trading. Stoll and Whaley (1990) report 
evidence o f greater volatility in NYSE stock returns at the open and close o f trading than 
at other points during the trading day. Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995a) show that the 
information component during the day for NYSE firms is largest at the beginning o f the 
day and lowest at the end o f the day for all but the largest trades.
Finally, researchers have found intraday patterns in the bid-ask spread that differ 
across market structures. For example, Mclnish and Wood (1992), Brock and Kleidon 
(1992) and Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) document that the intraday width o f bid-ask 
spreads for NYSE stocks follow a U-shaped pattern, where spreads are widest 
immediately following the open, and immediately preceding the close. This contrasts 
with the multiple market maker structure on Nasdaq where Chan, Christie and Schultz 
(1995) find that bid-ask spreads decline near the close.
2.3.3. End of Day Pricing
A general increase in prices on the last trade o f the day results in a higher than 
average final transaction return. This result has puzzled researchers since it was first 
identified by Harris (1986) and Wood, Mclnish and Ord (1985) on NYSE. The pattern is 
also found on the Toronto Stock Exchange (Mclnish and Wood (1990)), on the ASE
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(Gosnell (1995)) and on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Mok (1988), Ho and Cheung 
(1991) and Cheung (1995)).
Several explanations for these findings have been offered, but all appear to 
explain only a portion of the effect. Harris (1989) suggests that the tendency for a 
transaction to be at the ask price may be the reason for the price rise. However, he finds 
that this explains only approximately half o f  the effect. Porter (1992) investigates this 
issue, but again, finds that only a portion o f the end-of-day price anomaly can be 
explained by a tendency to close at the ask. Keim and Stambaugh (1984) use bid-to-bid 
returns and still find the phenomenon present, indicating that the bid-ask spread is not the 
sole reason for the price rise. Even if the bid-ask spread could completely explain the 
end-of-day price anomaly, this would merely beg the question o f why there is a tendency 
for transaction prices to move to the ask price at the end o f the day.
Keim (1989) and Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) suggest that the price rise may 
be due to a systematic shift in buying and selling. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and 
(1989) suggest that informed traders and liquidity traders concentrate their buy and sell 
volume in distinct periods during the day. Each type o f trader tends to favor activity at 
certain times, with the informed traders wanting to trade when the market is thick so their 
trading will have little effect. They suggest that if  this is at the end o f the day, then the 
informed traders would also try to trade at that time, thereby impounding information in 
the prices, which may account for the wider bid-ask spread. This, in turn, accounts for 
the price rise if  there is a tendency to focus on the ask price.
The propensity for the number of buy transactions near the close to explain the 
end-of-day price change identified by Gosnell (1995) is another empirical explanation
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that is subject to different interpretations. The increase in the number o f  buy transactions 
could be related to inelastic demand at the end of the day and the monopoly power o f  the 
specialist or to an attempt by traders to influence the closing price.
Brock and Kleidon (1992) hypothesize that the partial monopoly power o f  the 
specialist and the specialist’s ability to capitalize on traders’ inelastic demand at the end 
o f  the day results in wider bid-ask spreads. If the tendency to shift to the ask price is true, 
then this would increase the price. In the Brock and Kleidon model, investors, faced with 
the prospect o f  not being able to trade overnight, adjust their portfolios near the close, 
thereby creating inelastic demand. Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) also suggest that 
inelastic demand may be caused by speculators who prefer to “go home flat” rather than 
maintaining an unhedged position overnight. Speculators would face more risk holding 
an unhedged short position overnight (since there is an unlimited risk o f  loss) than an 
unhedged long position; hence, the greater impetus to cover short positions may explain 
the inelastic demand to purchase near the close of trading. Inelastic demand may also be 
generated by fund managers who want to trade at a price as near to the closing price as 
possible. This may be done in order that the trades be completed at prices close to the 
end o f day net asset value used in assessing the market value of the portfolio.
A large number o f buy transactions near the close may also be indicative o f  price 
manipulation. Harris (1989) indicates that the end-of-day price rise may be related to the 
tum-of-the-month anomaly, suggesting window-dressing may be the cause of the price 
rise. Since portfolio returns are often calculated using the closing prices there may be an 
incentive to engage in price manipulation.
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Other explanations for the increase in price at the end o f the day involve the 
actions of the specialist. Miller (1989) proposes that the specialist will attempt to raise 
the closing price if he expects that the price will rise overnight. The opening trade is 
usually large and any order imbalances must come out o f  the specialist’s inventory. 
Thus, if exchange continuity requirements force the opening price to be lower than the 
equilibrium price, the specialist stands to lose money. Since prices tend to rise over the 
long term, the specialist may, on average, raise prices more frequently than lowering 
them in advance o f the opening trade. A related explanation by Hatheway (1994) 
proposes that the specialist will raise the price at the end o f the day to induce the 
maximum information release the next morning. By closing with a price increase, short 
sales and the information provided by short sales are not constrained at the open by the 
NYSE uptick rule that prevents short sales when prices are falling.
2.4. Components of the Bid-Ask Spread
Investors face a number o f transaction costs: explicit costs such as commissions 
and implicit costs such as the spread between the bid and ask prices in the market. The 
bid-ask spread represents compensation to the market makers. Extant market 
microstructure literature identifies three components of the bid-ask spread: order 
processing costs, inventory holding costs and adverse selection costs. Tinic (1972) 
defines order processing costs to be those fees that are charged by market makers for 
matching buy and sell orders. These costs also include any fees or opportunity costs for 
time used to complete the transaction. Stoll (1978) and Ho and Stoll (1981) define 
inventory holding costs as the portion of the bid-ask spread that compensates dealers for 
holding inventories that are not well-diversified. The adverse selection component is 
defined by Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) as the
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compensation for taking on the risk o f dealing with traders that may possess superior 
information.
Stoll (1989) develops a model based on the Roll (1984) estimator that is used to 
infer the components of the bid-ask spread on Nasdaq. The components are estimated 
using slope coefficients from a regression of the serial covariance in the percentage price 
change series on the bid-ask spread. He finds that 43% of the quoted spread for Nasdaq 
stocks represents adverse selection costs, and that compensation for order processing and 
inventory control costs account for 47% and 10% o f quoted spreads, respectively. 
George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991) extend Stoll’s methodology to allow for time- 
varying expected returns except they assume zero inventory costs. Affleck-Graves, 
Hedge and Miller (1994) also use this methodology and examine the impact o f  the 
agency/auction trading mechanism versus the use o f competitive dealers. Using their full 
sample, they find that the order processing component is lower for stocks traded on the 
NYSE and the ASE. Using a matched sample design, they find smaller adverse selection 
costs for Nasdaq stocks. Conclusions about the inventory holding costs are limited2. It 
appears that any differences between exchanges may be due to differences in the 
characteristics of firms that choose to list on the exchange.
Contrary to Affleck-Graves, Hedge and Miller’s (1994) conclusions about the 
adverse selection component, Jones and Lipson (1997) find that the adverse selection 
component is larger on Nasdaq. Krinsky and Lee (1996) also analyze bid-ask spreads 
around earnings releases. They find that the adverse selection component o f the bid-ask 
spread increases around earnings announcements, but the other components decrease.
2
Other research about inventory holding costs by Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) and Madhavan and 
Smidt (1993) indicates that it takes a specialist approximately one week to reduce inventory by one-half.
23
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Foster and Viswanathan (1993) investigate intraday variation in the components 
of the bid-ask spread and find that the order processing cost component o f  the bid-ask 
spread varies little during the trading day. Alternatively, the adverse selection component 
varies within the day and across days and is usually larger when there is higher trading 
volume. Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995a) show that the adverse selection component is 
largest near the open and smallest near the close for all but the largest trades. They also 
find that the trade size affects the adverse selection component: the adverse selection 
component increases uniformly with trade size.
2.5. Differences Across Specialists
Differences in trading behavior across specialists may be associated with 
characteristics such as the skill or experience of the specialist, the risk o f  the specialist’s 
portfolio, the degree o f risk aversion, the number and characteristics o f the stocks traded 
by the firm, the capital backing o f the firm, and other businesses in which the firm is 
involved. These differences have been shown to manifest themselves in stock volatility 
(Bamea (1974)), inventory holding costs (Coughenour and Deli (1996)), and execution 
costs (Cao, Choe and Hatheway (1997)). Corwin (1996) tests for differences across 
specialist firms and finds no differences in specialist behavior in terms o f  quoted bid-ask 
spreads, but significant differences in other, less easily monitored performance areas such 
as transitory volatility, trading halt probability and trading halt duration. He concludes 
that specialist firms have a significant effect on both the amount of noise in security 
prices and the continuity of trading. He suggests that these effects are not completely 
eliminated by competition or NYSE’s monitoring mechanisms.
Differences in specialist participation rates are found by Madhavan and Sofianos 
(1998). They find wide fluctuations from less than 10% to over 60% across specialists.
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Differences are found to be related to the composition o f volume and other stock-specific 
characteristics. They find participation rates are positively related to non-block volume, 
but negatively related to block volume. The likelihood o f  participation is larger for 
smaller trades and wider bid-ask spread. Furthermore, the specialist's purchases are 
found to increase (decrease) with low (high) inventory levels.
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CHAPTER 3 
ESSAY ONE:
MARKET STRUCTURE AND INTRADAY PRICE FORMATION
3.1. Introduction
No accepted explanation o f patterns in intraday price formation has been 
universally accepted in finance. Intraday U-shaped patterns have been documented for 
volume, volatility and bid-ask spreads. These patterns are not, however, identical across 
different market structures. The U-shaped pattern has been found on the NYSE for 
volume, volatility and bid-ask spreads while bid-ask spreads on Nasdaq have been found 
to decline near the close.
End o f trading day pricing also shows a pattern in a consistent, abnormally large 
final transaction return. This suggests that closing prices may not consistently represent 
stock values. This is particularly disturbing given the high degree o f importance placed 
on closing prices, not only for valuation, but also for information dissemination and use 
in academic studies.
The Paris Bourse invites analysis of intraday price formation since it involves the 
simultaneous trading of some stocks with a single market maker acting as a specialist and 
multiple dealers and others with only multiple dealers. After the batch open, high 
liquidity stocks are purely order driven and trade in a multiple dealer market, while 
medium liquidity stocks have a single market maker standing ready to buy and sell a 
minimum quantity o f shares for his own account. The market maker also executes orders 
that were partially or totally unmatched at the market’s opening price.
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Through the analysis of transactions data for September through December 1995,
this chapter investigates whether the patterns in volume, volatility, bid-ask spreads and
end o f day pricing reported for other exchanges also hold for the unique institutional
arrangements of the Paris Bourse. The simultaneous trading o f one group of stocks
supported by a single market maker and multiple dealers and another group o f stocks
supported by only multiple dealers allows a clean comparison o f the effect o f  differences
in markets structures to be identified. This avoids the possible confounding influence of
regulatory or other operational differences between markets, such as those between the
NYSE and Nasdaq. These findings have general implications regarding the efficiency of
different institutional arrangements.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. Section 3.2. details the
hypotheses to be tested. Section 3.3. describes the data and statistical tests. Section 3.4.
discusses the results of these tests. Conclusions are offered in section 3.5.
3.2. Hypotheses
The unique institutional arrangement o f the Paris Bourse invites a comparison
between those stocks with and those without a single assigned market maker. Intraday
price formation as evidenced by the pattern in volume, volatility, bid-ask spreads and end
of day prices can be examined within the two groups. The specific hypotheses that can
be applied to each of the price formation characteristics listed are as follows:
Hlo: The price formation characteristic observed is the same in both the group 
with and the group without an assigned market maker.
HI a: The price formation characteristic observed in not the same in both the 
group with and the group without an assigned market maker.
As described in section 2.2.3., cross trades are those trades that occur off the
exchange. If these cross-trade transactions are driving any price formation patterns or are
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being used to influence the end of day pricing for window-dressing purposes then 
intraday price formation as evidenced by the pattern in volume, volatility, bid-ask spreads 
and end o f day prices should be different across these two groups. The specific 
hypotheses that can be applied to each o f the price formation characteristics listed are as 
follows:
H2o: The price formation characteristic observed is the same in both the group o f 
cross trades and the group o f transactions that occur on the exchange.
H2a: The price formation characteristic observed is not the same in both the 
group o f cross trades and the group of transactions that occur on the exchange.
A specific test of the end of day price rise can be performed by including the
timing of the final transaction. The proximity to the close may impact on the final
transaction return since it is with those transactions near the close that there may be
inelastic demand. The specific hypotheses are as follows:
H3o: The final transaction return is not affected by the proximity to the close o f  
trading.
H3a: The final transaction return is larger when it has a closer proximity to the 
close o f trading.
The window dressing explanation can be tested by observing the cross-trades that occur
on month-ends as the effect may be more pronounced on these days. The specific
hypotheses are as follows:
H4o: The end of day price rise is the same on month-end days as on any other day 
during the month.
H4a: The end o f day price rise is larger on month-end days than on other day 
during the month.
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Additionally, price formation patterns may be influenced by the day o f the week.
Friday returns have been shown to be larger than other days o f the week3; a  large end o f
day price increase could be the cause. Likewise, intraday volume, volatility or the bid-
ask spread patterns identified by Wood, Mclnish and Ord (1985) may be influenced by
the day o f the week. Intraday price formation as evidenced by patterns in volume,
volatility, bid-ask spreads and end of day prices can be examined across the days of the
week. The specific hypotheses that can be applied to each o f the price formation
characteristics listed are as follows:
H5o: The price formation characteristic observed is the same across the days o f 
the week.
H5a' The price formation characteristic observed in not the same across the days 
of the week.
H5o is written as a two-tailed test, however there may be situations in which a one-tail 
test may be appropriate. For example, in examining the bid-ask spread, Brock and 
Kleidon’s (1992) model suggests inelastic demand may be greater on Friday and this 
could influence the size o f the bid-ask spread. In this case, a one-tail test is more 
appropriate, with the alternative hypothesis stating that the bid-ask spread is larger at the 
Friday close.
The price o f the stock may be a factor in any observed pattern in price formation 
characteristics. For example, a shift in the price from the bid to the ask at the end of the 
day would generate a larger return for low priced stocks. This could manifest itself in a 
larger end o f day price increase, yet be merely a function o f the price o f the stock. 
Likewise, a lower priced stock may have a higher observed volatility due solely to the 
larger percentage bid-ask spread bounce. Intraday price formation as evidenced by the
3 See Cross (1973), French (1980), Rogalski (1984), Harris (1986).
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pattern in volume, volatility, bid-ask spreads and end of day prices can be examined
across price levels. The specific hypotheses that can be applied to each o f  the price
formation characteristics are as follows:
H6o: The price formation characteristic observed is the same across price levels.
H6a: The price formation characteristic observed in not the same across price 
levels.
3.3. Data and Statistical Tests
The data used in this research is supplied by the Paris Bourse. The price, time, 
number o f shares traded, and a classification identifying if  the trade was a cross-trade 
transaction that occurred outside the exchange are provided. There is also descriptive 
data that identifies the trading compartment o f the stock. The trading period examined 
includes September 1995 through December 1995. In total, there are 3,189,976 
transactions for 458 firms over this 84 trading day period. Only those securities that are 
in the continuously trading compartment are retained for the present analysis. 
Additionally, if  there is no previous price then any return calculation is not possible and 
this observation is deleted. For all returns that exceed 50% or are less than negative 50% 
the individual transactions are examined for data errors and these observations are 
deleted.
Table 1 presents a summary of the number of firms listed daily, both on an overall 
basis, and divided into groups based upon whether the firm has a single assigned market 
maker or not. In Table 2 further division is made into two groups: one group of firms 
where the final transaction was on the exchange and one group where the final 
transaction was an off-exchange cross-trade. In Table 2, an additional variable is
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Table 1 Summary statistics for the 84 trading days (September - December 1995) on the Paris 
Bourse. The summary statistics are calculated for each firm over the trading period and then 
averaged across all firms.
standard
mean deviation minimum maximum
ALL FIRMS (458)
number of firms trading per day 413.50 19.31 377 433
closing share price (FF) 493.18 676.39 1.27 5180.97
firm size (million FF) 24,272 67,681 5.1 680,431
daily volume (shares) 39,991.58 231,971.31 3 4,602,201
number of trades per day 80.88 195.67 1 1819.92
mean transaction size 233.27 342.18 3 3619.17
no assigned market maker (311)
number of firms trading per day 282.83 16.73 255 301
closing share price (FF) 527.94 697.57 2.01 5180.97
firm size (million FF) 35,321 79,814 55.4 680,431
daily volume (shares) 57,860.21 279,762.15 58.94 4,602,201
number of trades per day 115.07 229.72 1.61 1819.92
mean transaction size 280.33 394.69 6.98 3619.97
assigned market maker (160)
number of firms trading per day 130.67 4.22 122 140
closing share price (FF) 447.84 657.70 1.27 5053.75
firm size (million FF) 1,019 1,522 5.1 13,543
daily volume (shares) 2,421.88 11,181.21 3 139,973
number of trades per day 9.51 7.17 1 43.25
mean transaction size 138.21 147.86 3 1377.56
calculated, the frequency o f occurrence when the cross trade is the last trade o f the day. 
This occurs, on average, for 9.94 days during the sample period of 84 days for each firm, 
although the range of occurrences reported is 1 to 61. The true range is 0 to 61 since 18 
firms do not have any days where the last trade is a cross trade.
Table 1 shows that firms with an assigned market maker appear to be smaller, 
have a lower stock price, a lower daily volume, a lower number of trades per day and a 
smaller transaction size. Table 2 partitions the sample into those firms with final 
transactions that occurred on and off the exchange. For each day, the final return is 
placed in one of the two categories based on the location o f the final transaction. The
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Table 2 Summary statistics for the 84 trading days (September - December 1995) on the Paris 
Bourse. The summary statistics are calculated for each firm over the trading period and then 
averaged across firms after partitioning the firms into based on if  the last trade is on the 
exchange.
standard
mean deviation minimum maximum
FIRMS WITH THE LAST TRADE OF THE DAY ON THE EXCHANGE
all firms (458)
number of firms trading per day 361.44 24.36 311 392
closing share price (FF) 493.43 676.79 1.27 5158.34
firm size (million FF) 24,255 67,538 5.1 679,171
daily volume (shares) 39,572.46 226,097.08 3 4,469,901
number of trades per day 80.61 194.01 1 177429
mean transaction size 226.71 338.19 3 3491.89
no assigned market maker (311)
number of firms trading per day 253.30 20.83 213 281
closing share price (FF) 528.06 697.61 2.02 5158.34
firm size (million FF) 35,293 79,641 5.5 679,171
daily volume (shares) 57,201.88 272,603.61 65.42 4,469,901
number of trades per day 114.58 227.74 1.61 1774.29
mean transaction size 275.75 387.94 6.84 3,491.89
assigned market maker (160)
number of firms trading per day 108.14 5.95 95 124
closing share price (FF) 448.30 658.81 1.27 5,065
firm size (million FF) 1,023 1,551 5.1 14,047
daily volume (shares) 2,494.10 12,336.66 3 154,657
number of trades per day 9.67 7.11 1 44.41
mean transaction size 127.40 151.16 3 1,504.15
FIRMS WITH THE LAST TRADE OF THE DAY A CROSS TRADE
all firms (4401
number of firms trading per day 52.06 9.57 27 70
freq last trade=cross trade per firm 9.94 8.23 1 61
closing share price (FF) 495.80 683.14 1.89 5348.50
firm size (million FF) 25,229 70,572 34.3 692,247
daily volume (shares) 47,538.73 325,752.09 1 6,421,329
number of trades per day 89.47 244.48 1 244725
mean transaction size 289.43 449.84 1 4382.81
no assigned market maker (301)
number of firms trading per day 29.53 6.95 15 43
freq last trade=cross trade per firm 8.24 6.20 1 53
closing share price (FF) 535.35 704.68 1.89 5,348.50
firm size (million FF) 36,468 82,981 54.6 692,247
daily volume (shares) 68,741.73 392,238.85 11 6,421,329
number of trades per day 127.04 288.04 1.10 2,447.25
mean transaction size 324.22 502.77 3.17 4,382.81
(table con'd)
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(Table 2 continued)
standard
mean deviation minimum maximum
assigned market maker (151}
number of firms trading per day 22.52 5.03 10 33
freq last trade=cross trade per firm 12.53 10.67 1 61
closing share price (FF) 442.56 663.98 6 5,050
firm size (million FF) 1,022 1,500 34.3 13,084
daily volume (shares) 1,940.57 3,051.14 1 20,859
number of trades per day 9.11 8.14 1 46.25
mean transaction size 219.11 305.98 I 2,198
observations are similar on an overall basis as well as in either o f the groups as 
determined by location (on or off-exchange) o f  the final trade.
For each trading day and each security the last transaction return o f the day is 
calculated as:
(/>,.,- P , . , - i )
f t .  / =  --------------------------------
P i . , - 1
where rj,t is the transaction return for firm i on trade t, and Pt and Pt-i are the prices of the 
trades at times t = last and t-1 = previous to last, respectively. The previous to last 
transaction must have occurred during the same trading day.
The return calculation is stated in simple percentage terms in order to provide a 
convenient interpretation o f the magnitude of the return. Other researchers (Harris 
(1989) and others) use the natural log of the ratio o f the last price over the penultimate 
price. For short return intervals and small price changes, the difference in methods is 
immaterial.
The end-of-day transaction returns will be classified on the basis o f several
calendar time and security characteristics. Statistical testing o f differences between the
means of the classified group returns will be done using an analysis o f variance
framework, whereby the total variance of a sample is partitioned into the variance within
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each group and the variance between groups. The larger the variance between groups 
relative to the variance within groups, the greater the probability that the underlying 
population means are not equal.
The distributional assumptions underlying variance analysis may be questioned, 
thus non-parametric tests will also be presented. Specifically, the Wilcoxon rank sums 
test is performed whereby returns are ranked and these ranks are summed and compared 
to a distribution that has no difference in the means. The larger the differences, the 
greater the probability that the groups are not from the same population. When only two 
groups are present the same analysis is performed but the test itself is called a Wilcoxon 
scores test.
Comparisons are initially made using the entire sample o f firms, but there is a 
large disparity in the volume as shown by Table 1. A sample o f firms that are matched 
by volume level is created to facilitate a better comparison and obtain a reasonable 
sample size. Results using the reduced sample are similar to the full sample except for 
some reduction in significance for cross-trade transactions. The matched sample includes 
those firms that have total volume during the four-month period that is between 100,000 
and 200,000 shares. This includes 57 firms: 25 firms that have no assigned market maker 
and 32 with an assigned market maker. In a parametric ANOVA test and a non- 
parametric Wilcoxon rank sums test there is no statistically significant difference 
between the group in terms o f level o f volume.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the matched volume sample. The details 
are presented both on an overall basis for all 57 firms, and for each o f the two groups 
based on the presence or absence o f an assigned market maker. The closing share price 
for the group o f stocks with an assigned market maker is about half the magnitude o f the
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Table 3 Summary statistics for the 84 trading days (September - December 1995) on the 
Paris Bourse. This table uses a matched sample o f firms (Inclusion if  total volume is in 
the range o f 100,000 to 200,000 shares during September-December 1995). Summary 
statistics are calculated for each firm over the trading period and then averaged across 
firms.
standard
mean deviation minimum maximum
ALL FIRMS ('571
number of firms trading per day 54.93
closing share price (FF) 451.02
firm size (million FF) 23,167
daily volume (shares) 1,899
number of trades per day 14.98
mean transaction size 148.02
no assigned market maker (251 
number of firms trading per day 24.35
closing share price (FF) 601.88
firm size (million FF) 51,085
daily volume (shares) 1,821.18
number of trades per day 18.3 8
mean transaction size 106.96
assigned market maker (32) 
number of firms trading per day 30.58
closing share price (FF) 333.16
firm size (million FF) 1,355
daily volume (shares) 1,960.36
number of trades per day 12.32
mean transaction size 180.11
1.26 53 57
482.05 1.27 2,707.54
92,832 5.1 680,431
1,070 1,216 8,232
8.99 3.04 43.25
93.24 45.54 570.04
0.50 23 25
593.36 61.98 2,707.54
136,581 322 680,431
838.72 1,216 5,536
8.51 5.68 40.40
41.72 45.54 209.95
0.93 29 32
338.38 1.27 1,867.27
2,413 5.1 13,543
1,231.09 1,228 8,232
8.57 3.04 43.25
109.25 61.04 570.04
group of stocks without an assigned market maker. The firm size variable also shows a 
difference between the two groups with the group o f stocks without an assigned market 
maker approximately ten times larger. The daily volume is very similar between the two 
groups, but the number of trades is smaller and the average transaction size is larger for 
the group of stocks with an assigned market maker.
3.4. Results
Results are presented first for the end of day price rise, with other price formation 
characteristics in the following sections: intraday volume is examined in section 3.4.2.,
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intraday volatility is examined in section 3.4.3., intraday bid-ask spreads are examined in 
section 3.4.4. and intraday returns are examined in section 3.4.5.
3.4.1. End of Day Price Rise
The final intraday transaction return is examined to determine if  there is a 
difference between those stocks with an assigned market maker and those without an 
assigned market maker. Table 4 presents the overall final intraday transaction return. 
There are a total of 32,647 final intraday transaction returns in the sample: 28,964 occur 
on the exchange and 3,683 occur off the exchange as cross-trades. On average, the final 
intraday transaction is found to generate a return o f 0.13%, which is significantly 
different than zero at the 1% level. This compares to a mean return o f all transactions 
(excluding first and last transactions each day) o f negative 0.0011%, which is 
significantly different than zero at the 1% level, for the 3,087,696 transactions4 within 
trading days that occurred on the Paris Bourse in continuous trading groups during the 
sample period.
On average, the final intraday transaction return has a magnitude approximately 
one hundred times that o f the average return within the trading day and is positive while 
the within day return is negative. The mean return o f the final transaction in Harris’
(1989) study of the last transaction return for all NYSE stocks during the period 
December 1, 1981 to January 31, 1985 is 0.05%. Similarly, Gosnell (1995) finds that the 
mean return on the NYSE and ASE for all closing transactions during the 1985 to 1991 
period is 0.054%.
Over the calendar period studied, the Paris market experienced a return o f -1.04% 
on the CAC-40 index and -0.68% on the SBF-120 index. Over the four month period
4 Given the large number of observations, conventional significance levels may not be appropriate. The p- 
value of this return is 0.0001.
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Table 4 Transaction to transaction returns (in percent) for the final transaction o f the day 
are provided both on an overall basis and by dividing the returns into two groups based 
on if  the stock has an assigned market maker. Additionally, returns are divided into those 
that occurred on the exchange and o ff the exchange as cross trades. Differences between 
the groups are tested by using parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank 
scores tests.
Overall On Exchange Cross Trades ANOVA
(Wilcoxon)
mean 0.1271 0.0952 0.3780
/-statistic 20.35 14.72*“ 17.69*“ 206.35***
n 32647 28964 3683
% positive 29.7 28.0 43.3 (279.45***)
% zero 46.6 47.8 36.7
% negative 23.7 24.2 20.0
without an assigned market maker
mean 0.0539 0.0354 0.2182
/-statistic 9.30 5.96’“ 10.01*“ 90.81*’*
n 23168 20830 2338
% positive 27.4 26.2 38.5 (135.20*“ )
% zero 48.7 49.5 41.7
% negative 23.9 24.3 19.8
with an assigned market maker
mean 0.3063 0.2485 0.6557
/-statistic 19.07*’’ 14.46*” 15.04*“
_ _ _ _••• 
78.95
n 9479 8134 1345
% positive 35.3 32.6 51.5 (113.60***)
%zero 41.3 43.5 28.0
% negative 23.4 23.9 20.4
tests of difference
ANOVA 339.94*** 220.64 99.70***
Wilcoxon 174.58*“ 100.27’’’ 70.04**’
‘significant at a level of a  = 10% 
“ significant at a level of a  = 5% 
“ ’significant at a level of a  = 1%
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studied the mean compound return is -2.9% for all 458 firms. If final intraday transaction 
returns are excluded then the four month compound return is -8.5%.
The overall final intraday transaction return is also divided into subgroups based 
on the presence or absence o f a single assigned market maker. The mean final intraday 
transaction return for the group of stocks with single market makers and multiple dealers 
is seven times larger in magnitude than that of the trading groups with only multiple 
dealers (0.2485% versus 0.0354%) for on exchange transactions. For cross-trade 
transactions the magnitude is three times larger (0.6557% versus 0.2182%). Using 
parametric and non-parametric two-tailed tests, hypothesis one (HI), that the means o f 
the two groups are identical, is rejected for the final intraday transaction return at the one 
percent level. The final intraday transaction return is larger for those stocks with an 
assigned market maker both for on exchange and off exchange cross-trades.
The difference in magnitude does lend support to the suggestion that specialists 
do contribute to the effect. However, these initial results suggest that the end-of-day 
effect is present in both the trading groups with and without an assigned market maker. 
And it is present for trades that don’t even occur on the exchange. This indicates that the 
hypotheses that center on the actions o f the specialist do not fully explain the end-of-day 
return phenomenon. Further analysis is warranted to determine if the difference between 
the groups is due to factors other than the structure o f the market (assigned dealer versus 
not) in which the stocks trade.
Table 5 reproduces these results using the reduced sample that is constrained to 
include only those securities that had total volume during the four-month period that is 
between 100,000 and 200,000 shares. Despite the reduced number of observations (4,608
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T able 5 This table uses a matched sample o f securities that had total volume during the 
September-December 1995 period that totaled 100,000 to 200,000 shares. Transaction to 
transaction returns (in percent) for the final transaction of the day are provided both on an 
overall basis and by dividing the returns into two groups based on if  the stock has an 
assigned market maker. Additionally, returns are divided into those that occurred on the 
exchange and off the exchange as cross trades. Differences between the groups are tested 
by using parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank scores tests.
Overall On Exchange Cross Trades ANOVA
(Wilcoxon)
mean 0.1534 0.1191 0.3984
/-statistic 8.59*" 6.39 6.92 26.5"'
n 4608 4042 566
% positive 29.8 27.3 47.3 (44.5***)
% zero 46.3 48.6 29.7
% negative 23.9 24.1 23.0
without an assigned market maker
mean 0.0420 0.0188 0.2460
/-statistic 2.03** 0.89 3.01**’ 11.08"*
n 2044 1835 209
% positive 27.5 25.1 48.8 (30.06***)
% zero 45.4 47.1 30.1
% negative 27.1 27.8 21.1
With an assigned market maker
mean 0.2422 0.2025 0.4877
/-statistic .  *  . • • •8.84
.  *  ,  •  • •6.94 _ _  _  • • •6.29 13.05"*
n 2564 2207 357
% positive 31.6 29.1 46.5 (15.44*")
% zero 47.0 49.9 29.4
% negative 21.4 21.0 24.1
Tests of difference
ANOVA 31.22*" 24.24"’ 4.13"
Wilcoxon 29.96*" 28.52"* 0.96
'significant at a level of a  = 10% 
"significant at a level of a  = 5% 
'"significant at a level of a  = 1%
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versus 32,647), the same pattern, magnitudes and levels o f significance are reported 
between all groups with only one exception. For cross-trades, the difference between the 
presence and absence o f  an assigned market maker is significant using a parametric test at 
a level of only five percent versus one percent for the entire sample, and the difference 
using a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums test is not statistically significant.
3.4.I.I. Location of Final Intraday Transaction
In Table 6, end o f  day institutional cross-trades are further examined in each 
trading group to determine if  they have significantly different characteristics than on- 
exchange trades. Trades in each individual trading group are divided into subgroups 
based on whether the transaction is identified as a cross-trade, indicating the trade 
occurred off the exchange (also known as a pass-through). Cross-trades occurred with 
much less frequency than on exchange transactions, ranging from 1% of the secondary 
issues cash market trading group to 15% o f the medium liquidity stocks that are traded on 
a cash basis. In total, 3,683 of the 32,647 final transactions in the sample are cross­
trades. In eight o f the ten trading groups examined, the cross trades have a higher mean 
return that was statistically more significant than exchange trades. There is a statistical 
difference in the mean o f  the final intraday transaction return between cross-trades and on 
exchange trades; therefore hypothesis two (H2) is rejected. This suggests that cross­
trades may not be as competitive and may be used to influence end-of-day pricing for 
window dressing purposes. For example, outside sellers may be able to obtain higher 
prices near the close if  the broker is interested in buying the shares to influence the price 
near the close. Another example may be a negotiated price for a small number o f  shares 
between two individuals that is reported through a broker.
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Table 6 Transaction to transaction returns (in percent) for the final transaction o f the day 
are reported for each trading group. The continuous trading groups are subdivided into 
two groups depending on whether the transaction was a cross-trade or not. Tests of 
differences are performed using parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank 
scores tests.
Overall Exchange trades Cross-trades Tests of
Difference
ANOVA
(Wilcoxon)
Continuous A R&glement Mensuel (trading group 11): High liquidity stocks traded on the Riglement 
Mensuel
Mean 0.0661 0.0465 0.2196
/-statistic 8.49*’* 5.83**’ 7.74*** 49.86*’*
# obs (# firms) 9482(163) 8410(163) 1072(156)
% positive 25.4 24.1 35.7 (55.43***)
% zero 54.1 55.1 46.6
% negative 20.5 20.8 17.6
Continuous A Reglement Mensuel (trading group 15): High liquidity stocks traded on the Riglement 
Mensuel (index component stocks)
mean 0.0281 0.0225 0.0802
/-statistic 3.02*” 2.34“ 2.36*** 3.36*
# obs (# firms) 3865 (66) 3491 (66) 374 (26)
% positive 21.4 21.0 25.4 (3.95")
% zero 59.7 59.9 58.6
% negative 18.8 19.1 16.0
Continuous A Reglement Mensuel - foreign stocks (trading group 21): High liquidity foreign stocks 
traded on the Reglement Mensuel
mean 0.0085 -0.0048 0.1623
/-statistic 0.73 -0.41 2.81” * 15.20***
# obs (# firms) 6475(83) 5963 (83) 512(81)
% positive 33.2 31.6 50.8 (39.03***)
% zero 34.3 35.5 20.1
% negative 32.6 32.9 29.1
Continuous A cash market (trading group 16): High liquidity stocks traded on the cash market
mean 0.1675 0.1231 0.4475
/-statistic 6.92*” 4.82 6.33*” 21.40*”
# obs (# firms) 2369 (35) 2045(35) 324 (32)
% positive 30.4 28.6 42.3 (27.98***)
% zero 48.7 49.6 42.9
% negative 20.9 21.8 14.8
‘significant at a level of a = 10% 
’’significant at a level of a  = 5% 
’’’significant at a level of a  = 1%
(table con'd)
41
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(Table 6 continued)
Overall Exchange trades Cross-trades Tests of
Difference
ANOVA
(Wilcoxon)
Continuous A cash market - foreign stocks (trading group 22): High liquidity foreign stocks traded on the 
cash market
mean -0.081 -0.1043 0.2145
/-statistic -2.24 *  _  _ • • •-2.97 1.02 5.37
# obs (# firms) 569 (9) 527 (9) 42(8)
% positive 25.3 23.9 42.9 2.23
%zero 42.9 44.6 21.4
% negative 31.8 31.5 35.7
Continuous A cash market secondary issues (trading group 31): High liquidity secondary issues traded
on the cash market
mean 0.5381 0.5240 2.7287
/-statistic 1.99 1.93* 0.42
# obs (# firms) 156(4) 155(4) 1(1)
% positive 19.2 18.7 100.0 (2.63)
% zero 68.0 68.4 0
% negative 12.8 12.9 0
Continuous A RM secondary issues (trading group 32): High liquidity secondary issues traded on the
Rdglement Mensuel
mean 0.0913 0.0755 0.3825
/-statistic ^  •••2.73 2.22“ 2.39“ 4.18"
# obs (# firms) 252 (3) 239 (3) 13(3)
% positive 27.8 26.4 53.8 (3.98**)
% zero 48.4 49.4 30.8
% negative 23.8 24.3 15.4
Continuous B cash market (trading group 12): Medium liquidity stocks traded on the cash market
mean 0.3251 0.2679 0.6620
/-statistic 19.18*“ 14.69*“ 14.78” * 67.12*“
# obs (# firms) 8698 (147) 7434(147) 1264(138)
% positive 35.9 33.2 51.7 (102.09*“ )
% zero 41.4 43.6 28.5
% negative 22.7 23.2 19.8
Continuous B cash market foreign (trading group 17): Medium liquidity stocks traded on the cash 
market
mean 0.0959 0.0425 0.5572
/-statistic 2.02** 0.89 2.94*** 11.04*“
# obs (# firms) 781(13) 700(13) 81(13)
% positive 28.8 26.6 48.1 (7.23***)
% zero 40.7 43.0 79.0
% negative 30.5 30.4 30.9
significant at a level of a  = 10% 
“ significant at a level of a  = 5% 
‘“ significant at a level of a  = 1%
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3.4.I.2. Timing of the Final Transaction
Other researchers5 have found that the larger final intraday returns occur during 
the last five minutes o f trading. Tables 7, 8 and 9 further examine final intraday 
transaction returns by dividing the final intraday transaction returns into individual 
trading groups and into pre-4:55 pm and post-4:55 pm subgroups6. On the Paris Bourse, 
trading occurs from 10 am to 5 pm with the final trades in our sample recorded at two 
minutes after five. Individual minute by minute returns are calculated for each minute 
after 4:00 pm but are not shown here. Starting at 4:00 pm, no individual minute has a 
mean transaction return that is statistically different than zero at a level o f significance 
greater than 1% until 4:42 pm. Then all minutes except 4:48,4:49 and 4:54 maintain that 
level o f significance. This is also true for 5:00, but then the level o f significance falls for 
5:01 and 5:02. For this first look at the different trading groups, the division into pre- 
4:55 pm and post-4:55 pm is consistent with other researchers. O f interest are the high 
returns in the two trading groups that have a single market maker, the Continuous B 
groups. These groups have the largest and third largest mean returns in the post-4:55 pm 
category, and the second largest and fourth largest mean returns in the overall category. 
Although the multiple dealer in the cash market for secondary issues (trading group 31) 
has a relatively high post-4:55 pm average return, the sample size is relatively small.
Many of the other trading groups have mean final intraday transaction returns that 
are significant. The division into pre-4:55 pm and post-4:55 pm groups shows that in 
most o f  the cases the significance is a result o f  the final few minutes o f the trading day.
5 See Gosnell (1987) and Harris (1989).
6 Trades are time-stamped to the nearest second. All returns using last transactions occurring later than 
4:54:59 are included in the post-4:55 pm subgroup.
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Table 7 Transaction to transaction return (in percent) for the final transaction o f the day 
are reported for each trading group. Returns are reported on an overall basis as well as 
divided into two groups dependent on whether the final transactions occurred before or 
after 4:55 pm. This table includes exchange and cross-trade transactions for continuously 
trading compartments o f the Paris Bourse. Tests o f difference are performed using 
parametric ANOVA tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank scores tests.
Overall Before 4:55pm After 4:55pm Tests of
Difference
ANOVA
(Wilcoxon)
Multiple Dealer Continuous A Rgglement Mensuel (trading group 11): High liquidity stocks traded on 
the Rgglement Mensuel
mean 0.0661 0.0430 0.0764
/-statistic 8.49’** 2.40** _ _ _ •••9.63 3.92”
# obs (# firms) 9482(163) 2922(130) 6560(163)
% positive 25.4 29.4 23.6 (3.31*)
% zero 54.1 44.1 58.6
% negative 20.5 26.5 17.8
Multiple Dealer Continuous A R&glement Mensuel (trading group 15): High liquidity stocks traded on
the Reglement Mensuel (index component stocks)
mean 0.0281 -0.0216 0.0426
/-statistic 3.02*** -0.90 3.64*” 8.32” *
# obs (# firms) 3865 (66) 872 (54) 2993 (66)
% positive 21.5 26.6 20.0 (2.11)
% zero 59.7 47.0 63.5
% negative 18.8 26.4 16.6
Multiple Dealer Continuous A Rgglement Mensuel - foreign stocks (trading group 21): High liquidity
foreign stocks traded on the Reglement Mensuel
mean 0.0085 -0.0224 0.1297
/-statistic 0.73 -1.78* 4.56*”
_ _ _ _••• 27.98
# obs (# firms) 6475(83) 5163 (83) 1312(83)
% positive 33.2 31.6 39.3 (35.92***)
% zero 34.3 34.7 32.8
% negative 32.6 33.7 28.0
Multiple Dealer Continuous A cash market (trading group 16): High liquidity stocks traded on the cash
market
mean 0.1675 0.0864 0.2626
/-statistic 6.92*** 2.39” 6.51*" 13.25**’
# obs (# firms) 2369(35) 1279(35) 1090(34)
% positive 30.4 30.4 30.6 (16.45***)
% zero 48.7 43.9 54.3
% negative 20.9 25.7 15.1
Multiple Dealer Continuous A cash market - foreign stocks (trading group 22): High liquidity foreign
stocks traded on the cash market
mean -0.081 -0.0885 0.0625
/-statistic -2.24** -2.43” 0.30 0.85
# obs (# firms) 569 (9) 540 (9) 29 (8)
% positive 25.3 24.6 37.9 (0.09)
% zero 42.9 43.9 24.2
% negative 31.8 31.5 37.9
significant at a level of a  = 10% ’ significant at a level of a  = 5% significant at a level of a  = 1%
(table con'd)
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(Table 7 continued)
Overall Before 4:55pm After 4:55pm Tests of
Difference
ANOVA
(Wilcoxon)
Multiple Dealer Continuous A cash market secondary issues (trading group 31): High liquidity 
secondary issues traded on the cash market
mean 0.5381 0.6273 0.4577
/-statistic 1.99 1.17 2.61" 0.10
# obs (# firms) 156(4) 74(4) 82(4)
% positive 19.2 27.0 12.2 (0.72)
% zero 68.0 47.3 86.6
% negative 12.8 25.7 1.2
Multiple Dealer Continuous A RM secondary issues (trading group 32): High liquidity secondary issues
traded on the Reglement Mensuel
mean 0.0913 0.1062 0.0762
/-statistic 2.73 2.20 1.64 0.20
# obs (# firms) 252 (3) 127 (3) 125 (3)
% positive 27.8 27.6 28.0 (0.41)
% zero 48.4 44.1 52.8
% negative 23.8 28.3 19.2
Single Market Maker Continuous B cash market (trading group 12): Medium liquidity stocks traded on
the cash market
mean 0.3251 0.1895 0.6926
/-statistic 19.18"* 9.83 20.42'" 176.89
# obs (# firms) 8698(147) 6353 (147) 2345 (138)
% positive 35.9 31.2 48.7 (250.62***)
% zero 41.4 43.4 35.9
% negative 22.7 25.4 15.4
Single Market Maker Continuous B cash market foreign (trading group 17): Medium liquidity stocks
traded on the cash market
mean 0.0959 0.0302 0.3432
/-statistic 2.02 0.58 3.14'" 7.25*"
# obs (# firms) 781 (13) 617(13) 164(13)
% positive 28.8 27.7 32.9 (4.17")
% zero 40.7 40.7 40.9
% negative 30.5 31.6 26.2
'significant at a level of a  = 10% "significant at a level of a  = 5% '"significant at a level of a  = 1%
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Table 8 Transaction to transaction return (in percent) for the final transaction o f  the day 
is reported for each trading groups. Returns are reported on an overall basis as well as 
divided into two groups dependent on whether the final transactions occurred before or 
after 4:55 pm. This table includes only on exchange transactions for stocks traded in a 
continuous compartment. Cross trades are deleted. Differences are tested by parametric 
ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank scores tests.
Overall Before 4:55pm After 4:55pm Tests of
Difference
ANOVA
(Wilcoxon)
Multiple Dealer Continuous A R&glement Mensuel (trading group 11): High liquidity stocks traded on 
the Reglement Mensuel
mean 0.0465 0.0263 0.0560
/-statistic 5.83*”  1.47 _ _ _ • • •6.89 3.03’
# obs (# firms) 8410(163) 2697(128) 5713(163)
% positive 24.1 28.0 22.3 (2.77*)
% zero 55.1 45.5 59.6
% negative 20.8 26.5 18.1
Multiple Dealer Continuous A Reglement Mensuel (trading group 15): High liquidity stocks traded on
the Rgglement Mensuel (index component stocks)
mean 0.0225 -0.0225 0.0365
/-statistic 2.34”  -0.91 3.64’” 6.78” *
# obs (# firms) 3491(66) 828(54) 2663(66)
% positive 21.0 26.0 19.5 (1.78)
% zero 59.9 47.8 63.6
% negative 19.1 26.2 16.9
Multiple Dealer Continuous A Reglement Mensuel - foreign stocks (trading group 21): High liquidity
foreign stocks traded on the Reglement Mensuel
mean -0.0048 -0.0246 0.0784
/-statistic -0.41 -1.95*
_ _ . •  •  •2.81 12.41’”
# obs (# firms) 5963 (83) 4816(83) 1147(82)
% positive 31.6 30.5 36.5 (20.44’“ )
% zero 35.5 35.7 34.7
% negative 32.9 33.8 28.8
Multiple Dealer Continuous A cash market (trading group 16): High liquidity stocks traded on the cash
market
mean 0.1231 0.0497 0.2194
/-statistic 4.82*”  1.35 6.51’” 10.87*”
# obs (# firms) 2045(35) 1160(35) 885 (34)
% positive 28.6 28.5 28.6 (12.48’” )
% zero 49.6 45.4 55.1
% negative 21.8 26.0 16.3
Multiple Dealer Continuous A cash market - foreign stocks (trading group 22): High liquidity foreign
stocks traded on the cash market
mean -0.1043 -0.1027 -0.1445
/-statistic -2.97 -2.85 -1.01 0.05
# obs (U firms) 527 (9) 507 (9) 20(6)
% positive 23.9 23.7 30.0 (0.11)
% zero 44.6 45.2 30.0
% negative 31.5 31.3 40.0
’significant at a level of a  = 10% ’’significant at a level of a  = 5% ’’’significant at a level of a  = 1%
(table con'd)
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(Table 8 continued)
Overall Before 4:55pm After 4:55pm Tests of
Difference
ANOVA
(Wilcoxon)
Multiple Dealer Continuous A cash market secondary issues (trading group 31): High liquidity 
secondary issues traded on the cash market
mean 0.5240 0.6273 0.4296
/-statistic 1.93* 1.17 2.45“ 0.13
# obs (# firms) 155(4) 74(4) 81(4)
% positive 18.7 27.0 11.1 (0.57)
%zero 68.4 47.3 87.7
% negative 12.9 25.7 1.2
Multiple Dealer Continuous A RM secondary issues (trading group 32): High liquidity secondary issues
traded on the R&glement Mensuel
mean 0.0755 0.1009 0.0484
/-statistic 2.22“ _ _ 2.05 1.04 0.60
# cbs (# firms) 239 (3) 123 (3) 116(3)
% positive 26.4 26.8 25.9 (0.08)
% zero 49.4 45.5 53.4
% negative 24.3 27.7 20.7
Single Market Maker Continuous B cash market (trading group 12): Medium liquidity stocks traded on
the cash market
mean 0.2679 0.1428 0.6592
/-statistic 14.69“ ’ _ _ _ • • •7.05 16.80 150.13’“
# obs (# firms) 7434(147) 5633 (147) 1801 (135)
% positive 33.2 29.0 46.3 (197.55’“ )
% zero 43.6 45.5 37.6
% negative 23.2 25.5 16.1
Single Market Maker Continuous B cash market foreign (trading group 17): Medium liquidity stocks
traded on the cash market
mean 0.0425 -0.0193 0.2943
/-statistic 0.89 -0.37 2.45“ 6.83’“
# obs (# firms) 700(13) 562(13) 138(13)
% positive 26.6 25.3 31.9 (4.45” )
%  zero 43.0 43.1 42.8
% negative 30.4 31.6 25.3
‘significant at a level of a  = 10% “ significant at a level of a  = 5% ‘“ significant at a level of a  = 1%
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Table 9 Transaction to transaction return (in percent) for the final transaction o f  the day 
divided into trading groups. Returns are reported on an overall basis as well as divided 
into two groups dependent on whether the final transactions occurred before or after 4:55 
pm. This table includes only cross-trades for those stocks traded in a  continuous trading 
compartment. Tests o f difference are performed using parametric ANOVA and non- 
parametric Wilcoxon rank scores tests.
Overall Before 4:S5om After 4:55nm Tests of
Difference
ANOVA
(Wilcoxon)
Multiple Dealer Continuous A Reglement Mensuel (trading group 11): High liquidity stocks traded on
the R&glement Mensuel
mean 0.2196 0.2428 0.2134
/-statistic 7.74'" 2.73*" 7.88 0.18
# obs (# firms) 1072(156) 225(87) 847 (143)
% positive 35.7 46.7 32.8 (1.01)
% zero 46.6 28.0 51.6
% negative 17.6 25.3 15.6
Multiple Dealer Continuous A Reglement Mensuel (trading group 15): High liquidity stocks traded on
the Reglement Mensuel (index component stocks)
mean 0.0802 -0.0049 0.0916
/-statistic 2.36"' -0.04 2.59 0.84
# obs (# firms) 374 (26) 44(26) 330 (26)
% positive 25.4 38.6 23.6 (0.00)
% zero 58.6 31.8 62.1
% negative 16.0 29.6 14.3
Multiple Dealer Continuous A Reglement Mensuel - foreign stocks (trading group 21): High liquidity
foreign stocks traded on the Reglement Mensuel
mean 0.1623 0.0084 0.4861
/-statistic _ „ . • • •2.81 0.13 4.31'" 15.32"*
# obs (# firms) 512(81) 347 (81) 165 (58)
% positive 50.8 47.3 58.2 (15.66"*)
% zero 20.1 20.5 19.4
% negative 29.1 32.2 22.4
Multiple Dealer Continuous A cash market (trading group 16): High liquidity stocks traded on the cash
market
mean 0.4475 0.4444 0.4493
/-statistic 6.33"' 3.09'"
. _ _ • • •6.03 0.01
# obs (# firms) 324 (32) 119 (28) 205 (27)
% positive 42.3 47.9 39.0 (0.01)
% zero 42.9 29.4 50.7
% negative 14.8 22.7 10.3
Multiple Dealer Continuous A cash market - foreign stocks (trading group 22): High liquidity foreign
stocks traded on the cash market
mean 0.2145 0.1304 0.5227
/-statistic 1.02 0.60 0.89 0.58
# obs (# firms) 42 (8) 33 (8) 9(5)
% positive 42.9 39.4 55.6 (0.07)
% zero 21.4 24.2 11.1
% negative 35.7 36.4 33.3
‘significant at a level of a  = 10% “ significant at a level of a  = 5% '"significant at a level of a  = 1%
(table con'd)
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(Table 9 continued)
Overall Before 4:55pm After 4:55pm Tests of
Difference
ANOVA
(Wilcoxon)
Multiple Dealer Continuous A cash market secondary issues (trading group 31): High liquidity 
secondary issues traded on the cash market
mean 2.7287 2.7287
/-statistic
# obs (# firms) I d ) K D
% positive 100.0 100.0
% zero 0 0
% negative 0 0
Multiple Dealer Continuous A RM secondary issues (trading group 32): High liquidity secondary issues 
traded on the R&glement Mensuel
mean 0.3825 0.2673 0.4336
/-statistic 2.39" 0.94 2.15* 0.22
# obs (# firms) 13(3) 4(3) 9(3)
% positive 53.8 50.0 55.5 (0.39)
% zero 30.8 0 44.5
% negative 15.4 50.0 0
Single Market Maker Continuous B cash market (trading group 12): Medium liquidity stocks traded on 
the cash market
mean 0.6620 0.5551 0.8034
/-statistic 14.78'" 9.28” * 11.98*** 7.58*"
# obs (# firms) 1264(138) 720 (135) 544(108)
% positive 51.7 48.1 56.6 (16.42***)
% zero 28.5 27.4 30.0
% negative 19.8 24.5 13.4
Single Market Maker Continuous B cash market foreign (trading group 17): Medium liquidity stocks 
traded on the cash market
mean 0.5572 0.5358 0.6025
/-statistic 2.94"* a  . *  • •2.13 2.31*" 0.03
# obs (# firms) 81(13) 55(10) 26(8)
% positive 48.1 52.7 38.4 (0.07)
% zero 79.0 16.4 30.8
% negative 30.9 30.9 30.8
'significant at a level of a  = 10% "significant at a level of a  = 5% '"significant at a level of a  = 1%
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These results indicate that the end-of-day effect is pervasive across the trading groups, 
but that the effect is a function of the proximity o f the last trade to the close and to the 
presence o f a single market maker. This is confirmed on an overall basis as well as when 
dividing the transactions into on-exchange and o ff exchange cross-trades as shown in 
Tables 8 and 9. This rejects (H2) and the alternative hypothesis that the final intraday 
transaction return is larger when it has closer proximity to the close o f trading is 
accepted.
Table 10 presents the mean final intraday transaction returns categorized by the 
time o f the final transaction. The timing of the final transaction is divided into hourly 
periods as well as quarterly-hour periods within the trading day. The only fifteen minute 
periods with transaction returns that are significantly different from zero at a high level of 
significance are those that occur after 4:30 pm.
Intuition would suggest that relatively few firms would have last trades that occur 
before 2:00 pm, with a high concentration of final transactions in the final hour o f 
trading. This indicates a relatively high degree o f liquidity or frequency of trading. It is 
interesting to note that when the final return occurs during the first hours o f the trading 
day, average returns are negative. However, only the fifteen minute intervals from 10:30 
am-10:44 am and from 11:30 am-11:44 am are significantly different than zero. Analysis 
o f variance and non-parametric tests are performed to test the significance of the 
differences in mean returns among the fifteen minute intervals. When all the intervals are 
included the hypothesis that the means o f the groups are identical is rejected both 
parametrically (with an F test of 9.36) and non-parametrically with a Wilcoxon rank sums 
test (with a chi-square equal to 252.8). Both tests are significant at the 1% level. In order
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Table 10 Transaction to transaction return (in percent) for the final transaction o f  the 
day. All cross-trades are deleted. The time of the last trade is specified classified by 
hour of the trading day (10AM - 5PM). The transactions are also divided into fifteen 
minute intervals within each hour. Tests for significant differences are performed across 
all the fifteen minute trading intervals both including and deleting the last three fifteen 
minute periods.
ALL 10am-l 1 11-12 12-1pm
mean 0.0952 -0.0924 -0.0578 0.0458
r-stat 14.72’” -1.36 -1.10 0.77
N 28964 519 797 634
%pos. 28.0 25.6 23.8 29.2
% zero 47.8 43.6 46.4 44.8
%neg. 24.2 30.8 29.8 26.0
first fifteen minutes o 0 1 £
mean 0.0446 -0.0600 -0.0661 -0.0993
r-stat 4.90*” -0.41 -0.57 -1.00
N 9758 117 171 204
%pos. 21.1 21.4 21.6 28.9
% zero 59.6 51.3 49.7 40.7
%neg. 19.3 27.3 28.7 30.4
second fifteen minutes (:15-:29)
1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 after 5
-0.163 0.0068 0.0287 0.1545 0.0706
-2.43” 0.18 1.32 16.84*” 8.54’”
501 1334 3203 14938 7038
22.8 28.9 27.9 32.6 18.9
42.7 43.6 42.2 41.4 66.0
34.5 27.5 29.9 26.0 15.1
0.0465 0.0118 -0.0861 0.0124 0.0706
0.27 0.11 -1.48 0.42 8.54’”
89 213 541 1385 7038
29.2 30.5 25.3 27.7 18.9
42.7 41.8 42.5 41.9 66.0
28.1 27.7 32.2 30.3 15.1
mean 0.0177 -0.1020 0.0798 0.0399 -0.2564 0.0423 0.0315 0.0242
r-stat 0.81 -0.82 0.62 0.33 -1.71* 0.55 0.64 0.89
N 3438 120 180 163 106 290 644 1935
%pos. 27.8 21.7 30.6 27.0 21.7 27.9 29.5 27.8
% zero 42.5 51.6 34.4 46.6 43.4 44.8 42.9 41.8
%neg. 29.7 26.7 35.0 26.4 34.9 27.3 27.6 30.4
third fifteen minutes (:30-:44)
mean 0.0433 -0.2511 -0.2459 0.1011 -0.1283 -0.0498 0.0447 0.0947
r-stat 2.63’” -1.84* -2.61” * 0.79 -0.87 -0.77 1.15 5.06
N 4897 143 219 151 128 382 894 2980
%pos. 29.0 26.6 20.1 29.8 21.1 27.2 29.3 30.2
% zero 42.9 40.5 49.8 47.0 44.5 42.4 40.6 42.9
%neg. 28.1 32.9 30.1 23.2 34.4 30.4 30.1 26.9
last fifteen minutes (:45-:59)
Mean 0.1886 0.0520 0.0210 0.2372 -0.2366 0.0295 0.0697 0.2270
r-stat 16.80*” 0.39 0.24 1.68’ -2.51” 0.46 1.92* 18.65*”
n 10871 139 227 116 178 449 1124 8638
%pos. 33.7 31.7 23.8 31.9 21.3 30.1 27.0 35.3
% zero 41.2 33.1 50.2 46.5 41.0 44.8 42.9 40.7
%neg. 25.1 35.3 26.0 21.6 37.6 25.2 30.1 24.0
’significant at a level of a  = 10% ’’significant at a level of a  = 5% ’’’significant at a level of a  = 1%
(table con'd)
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(Table 10 continued)
Ho: the mean value of the last transaction return is the same for all of the 29 fifteen minute intervals during 
the trading day
Hi: at least one of the fifteen minute intervals does not have the same mean
F-value for ANOVA test 9.36***
Chi-square approximation for Wilcoxon rank sums non-parametric test 252.8***
Ho: the mean value of the last transaction return is the same for all of the 26 fifteen minute intervals during 
the trading day before 4:30pm
Hi: at least one of the fifteen minute intervals during the trading day before 4:45pm does not have the same 
mean
F-value for ANOVA test 1.69**
Chi-square approximation for Wilcoxon rank sums non-parametric test 33.0
‘significant at a level of a  = 10% ‘‘significant at a level of a  = 5% “ 'significant at a level of a  = 1%
to test if  there is any differences for those intervals before the end o f  the day the last three 
fifteen minute intervals are excluded and the parametric and non-parametric tests are 
performed again. With the reduced period of 26 intervals, the same tests fail to find 
significant differences among the groups. The parametric test has a  significance level o f 
5%, but the non-parametric test fails conventional significance levels. These results 
indicate that the proximity to the close is still important, even with the cross-trades 
removed. This rejects hypothesis three (H3) and confirms that the end o f day price rise is 
due largely to last returns occurring within the last fifteen minutes o f  trading, with some 
effect also occurring in the previous fifteen minutes. Interestingly, trades reported within 
the first few minutes following the close have a significant positive return, yet a 
disproportionate proportion o f zero returns.
3.4.I.3. Window Dressing
The window dressing hypothesis is tested in Table 11 by examining final intraday 
transaction returns on month-ends since there may be a greater incentive to affect the
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Table 11 Transaction to transaction return (in percent) for the final transaction o f the day 
is provided for non-month end and month end days on an overall basis and by dividing 
the returns into two groups based on if  the transaction occurred with or without an 
assigned market maker. Tests of difference between the groups are done using 
parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank scores tests.
Overall No Assigned Assigned ANOVA
Market Makers Market Maker (Wilcoxon)
mean 0.1271 0.0539 0.3063
/-statistic 20.35” ’
.  • • •9.30 19.07 339.94*”
n 32647 23168 9479
% positive 29.7 27.4 35.3 (174.58” *)
% zero 46.6 48.7 41.3
% negative 23.7 23.9 23.4
non-month end davs
mean 0.1247 0.0516 0.3042
/-statistic 19.66*” 8.78 18.59” *
n 31111 22097 9014 329.55*”
% positive 29.7 27.4 35.3
% zero 46.4 48.6 41.1 (165.61*’’)
% negative 23.9 24.0 23.6
month end davs
mean 0.1749 0.1008 0.3455
/-statistic 5.28*” 3.17*“ .  __•••4.27
n 1536 1071 465 11.58"*
% positive 30.2 28.1 35.1
% zero 49.8 51.6 45.6 (8.47’” )
% negative 20.0 20.3 19.3
tests of difference
ANOVA 2.98* 3.19* 0.38
Wilcoxon 5.28** 4.78” 1.17
’significant at a level of a  = 10% 
’’significant at a level of a  = 5% 
’’’significant at a level of a  = 1%
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price at the close of trading on these days. The results show that there is a statistically 
significant difference between non-month end day’s final intraday transaction return and 
month end day’s final intraday transaction return (0.1749% versus 0.1247%). This, 
however, occurs only for multiple dealers where the month-end return is twice as large as 
non-month end day’s final intraday transaction return (0.1008% versus 0.0516%). The 
month-end explanation is also tested in Table 12 by dividing the return into exchange 
trades and cross-trades. Within each o f  these groups there is modest statistical difference 
between the final intraday transaction return at month end and the final intraday 
transaction return on other days.
Based on the results o f the two tests there appears to be little difference on month- 
end days within the group o f stocks with assigned market makers, within the group o f 
cross-trades and within the group of on exchange trades. It is only for the group of 
multiple market makers with no assigned dealer where the final intraday transaction 
return on month-end days is statistically different from non-month-end-days both 
parametrically and non-parametrically. Hypothesis four (H4) fails to be rejected and the 
end of the day price rise is concluded to be the same on month-end days as on any other 
day during the month.
3.4.I.4. Day of the Week
Table 13 examines the relationship between the magnitude of the final intraday 
transaction return and the day of the week. Harris (1989) fails to find any differences in 
weekday final transaction returns, while Gosnell (1987) observes significant differences 
in the final returns across the days o f the week. Specifically, Gosnell finds that final 
transaction returns are higher on Friday due to an increase in the number o f  buy orders on
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Table 12 Transaction to transaction return (in percent) for the final transaction o f the day 
is reported for the last trading day o f the month both on an overall basis and by dividing 
the returns into two groups based on if  the transaction occurred on the exchange or as a 
cross-trade. Tests o f  difference between the groups are done using parametric ANOVA 
and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank scores tests.
Overall On Exchange Cross-Trade ANOVA
(Wilcoxon)
mean 0.1271 0.0952 0.3780
/-statistic 20.35 14.72'" 17.69'" 206.35*"
n 32647 28964 3683
% positive 29.7 28.0 43.3 (279.45***)
% zero 46.6 47.8 36.7
% negative 23.7 24.2 20.0
non-month end davs
mean 0.1247 0.0938 0.3690
/-statistic 19.66"* 14.26**’ 17.04"*
n 31111 27610 3501 188.86***
% positive 29.7 28.0 43.3
% zero 46.4 47.6 36.6 (266.63***)
% negative 23.9 24.4 20.1
month end davs
mean 0.1749 0.1244 0.5508
/-statistic 5.28 3.65*** 4.78
n 1536 1354 182 17.47*"
% positive 30.2 28.5 42.8
% zero 49.8 51.3 38.5 (12.57***)
% negative 20.0 20.2 18.7
tests of difference between the two erouDS
ANOVA 2.98* 0.99 3.40*
Wilcoxon
_ _ 5.28 5.69" 0.55
'significant at a level of a  = 10% 
"significant at a level o f a  = 5% 
'"significant at a level of a  = 1%
55
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
R
eproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright 
ow
ner. 
Further 
reproduction 
prohibited 
w
ithout 
perm
ission.
Table 13 Final intraday transaction returns are reported across the days of the week. The returns are also divided into transactions 
that occurred before and after 4:55 pm. Parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums tests are performed to test the 
hypothesis that the means across the days of the week are equal. Parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon ranks scores tests 
are performed to test the hypothesis that the means in both subperiods are equal.
All Days Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday F test
Overall
mean 0.0952 0.0977 0.0712 0.0965 0.0949 0.1149
(Wilco
1.204
/-statistic 14.72” ’ 6.65*” 5.00 6.82” ’ 6.56’” 7.83’”
n 28964 5520 5840 5503 5891 6210 (7.66)
% positive 28.0 28.0 27.6 28.2 26.9 29.2
% zero 47.8 48.1 47.1 47.2 49.4 47.4
% negative 24.2 23.9 25.3 24.6 23.7 23.5
Overall - Trading Groups
mean 0.0354
Without Market Makers
0.0427 0.0206 0.0447 0.0163 0.0527 1.48
/-statistic ,  .  .M l5.96 3.10*” 1.53 3.54’” 1.23 3.98’”
n 20830 3999 4214 3954 4215 4448 (6.81)
% positive 26.2 26.5 26.1 26.9 24.4 27.0
% zero 49.5 49.8 48.5 48.5 51.2 49.5
% negative 24.3 23.8 25.4 24.6 24.4 23.5
Overall - Trading Groups 
mean 0.2485
With Market Makers
0.2423 0.2023 0.2288 0.2925 0.2720 0.87
/-statistic 14.46*” 6.23 5.42” * 5.96” * _  M l7.71 .  _ . I I I6.94
n 8134 1521 1626 1549 1676 1762 (6.45)
% positive 32.6 32.0 31.3 31.6 33.2 34.8
%zero 43.5 43.6 43.7 43.8 44.8 41.8
% negative 23.9 24.4 25.0 24.6 22.0 23.4
test for difference between trading groups: 
F test 68.91’*’ 37.02*” 32.95’” 34.42**’ 75.09*” 45.67'”
Wilcoxon 106.31*’* .  a »«♦**13.28 12.91*” 10.18’*’ 44.47’” 27.06*"
* significant at a level of a  = 10%, '* significant at a level of a  = 5%, significant at a level of a  = 1%
(table con'd)
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(Table 13 continued)
All Days Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday
Before 4:55PM
mean 0.0483 0.0626 0.0202 0.0670 0.0511 0.0429
/-statistic 5.09 _ __•••2.83 1.00 3.23 2.29*’ 2.07”
n 16400 3144 3375 3166 3232 3483
% positive 28.8 28.9 28.4 29.2 27.0 30.1
% zero 42.6 43.3 41.9 42.2 44.6 41.4
% negative 28.6 27.8 29.7 28.6 28.4 28.5
Before 4:55PM - Trading Groups Without Market Makers
mean -0.0001 0.0241 -0.0296 0.0192 -0.0174 0.0052
/-statistic -0.02 1.00 -1.40 0.93 -0.74 0.24*"
n 10205 1949 2117 1962 1994 2183
% positive 28.8 29.3 28.7 29.6 26.5 29.9
% zero 41.0 41.8 39.8 40.4 42.9 40.5
% negative 30.2 28.9 31.5 30.0 30.6 29.6
Before 4:55PM - Trading Groups With Market Makers
mean 0.1281 0.1253 0.1042 0.1449 0.1615 0.1064
/-statistic - _ .* M6.73 2.93 2.57 3.40” * 3.66*” _ _ _ 2.50
n 6195 1195 1258 1204 1238 1300
% positive 28.7 28.3 28.0 28.6 27.9 30.5
% zero 45.2 45.8 45.4 45.0 47.3 42.9
% negative 26.1 25.9 26.6 26.4 24.9 26.5
tests for difference between trading groups in the before 4:55pm subgroup:
ANOVA 43.09*** 4.94 10.34*** 8.69* 15.25*”  5.57**
Wilcoxon 18.69*** 1.69 4.32*’ 1.83 9.49**’ 3.38*
’significant at a level of a  = 10%, ' ‘significant at a level of a  = 5%, ’’’significant at a level of a  = 1%
ANOVA
(Wilcoxon)
0.77
(3.21)
1.09
(5.09)
0.34
(0.54)
(table con'd)
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Friday rather than to a shift in the equilibrium prices. Using the Paris Bourse data, there 
are no differences across the days o f the week for the overall final intraday transaction 
return. Both parametric and non-parametric tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the 
mean o f  the final intraday transaction return is the same across the days of the week. 
When the transaction returns are subdivided into those that occurred in trading groups 
with an assigned market maker and those without an assigned market maker, the mean 
transaction return does not differ significantly across the days o f the week for either 
grouping. However, there are very significant differences between the trading groups, 
with the means o f the group with a single market maker five to fifteen times larger, 
depending on the day o f  the week being examined. Thus, the end o f  day price rise on the 
Paris Bourse is not due to peculiarities on a single day o f  the week.
The timing o f  the last trade is addressed by examining last trades that occur before 
4:55 pm and those that occur after 4:55 pm across the days o f the week. Tests for a 
difference in means across the days o f the week fail to find any significant differences for 
stocks with final transactions that occurred before 4:55 pm, but there are marginally 
significant differences in the post-4:55 pm group. For these trades, the Friday mean 
return (0.207%) is somewhat higher than the final transaction return on the other days 
which is (approximately 0.14%). The level o f significance is 5% for the parametric test 
and 10% for the non-parametric test.
The final day-of-the-week test examines pre-4:55 pm and post-4:55 pm final 
trades for those stocks with versus those without an assigned market maker. The means 
in each group fail to show any significant differences across the days of the week. A 
comparison between stocks with an assigned market maker versus those without an
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assigned market maker shows generally significant differences across all days o f the 
week. Furthermore, the magnitude o f  the difference between the groups is much more 
pronounced in the post-4:55 pm subgroup. For the transactions that occurred after 4:55 
pm, the hypothesis that the group with an assigned market maker and the group without 
an assigned market maker have the same mean is rejected each day o f the week with a 
parametric analysis o f variance F-test statistic ranging from 76.54 to 193.24 and a non- 
parametric Chi-square test statistic ranging from 38.88 to 113.18. The pre-4:55 pm 
transactions also reject the hypothesis that stocks with an assigned market maker and 
those without an assigned market maker have identical means. For this hypothesis the 
parametric analysis o f  variance F-test statistics range from 4.94 to 15.25 and the non- 
parametric Chi-square test statistics range from 1.69 to 9.49. In sum, this analysis 
confirms that the final intraday transaction return anomaly is robust across days o f the 
week on the Paris Bourse. This does not reject hypothesis five (H5) and it is concluded 
that the end o f the day price rise observed is the same across the days of the week.
3.4.I.5. Price Groupings
One hypothesis advanced to explain the high final intraday transaction return is 
that there is a shift to the ask price at the end o f the day. This would suggest that low 
price stocks (with relatively high percentage bid-ask spreads) will exhibit a larger effect. 
Harris (1989) and Gosnell (1987) both divide transactions into price groups to investigate 
whether low priced securities could be driving the overall results. They find that the 
effect is slightly larger for low-priced firms, but is present for all price levels. Table 14 
addresses this issue on the Paris Bourse by dividing transactions into several price level 
groupings. Each stock is assigned to a price level group based upon its price at the
60
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Table 14 Final transaction return reported for price level groups and divided into 
subperiods before and after 4:55 pm. Returns are also divided into those with and 
without an assigned market maker. All cross-trades are deleted. Tests of difference used 
are the parametric ANOVA and the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums (in parentheses) 
tests.
<FF 100 100-250 250-400 400-600 600-900 900-1500 >1500 Tests of 
Diff.
Overall
mean 0.0858 0.1185 0.0882 0.1294 0.0824 0.0674 0.0048 3.39***
/-statistic 4.02*** 7.59 6.76*** 8.82*** 5.74*** 3.39 0.26
n 3910 6815 6427 4785 3547 1933 1547 (26.3***)
% pos. 28.1 28.6 27.7 29.2 26.8 26.6 26.6
% zero 45.8 46.7 46.9 49.0 51.6 50.0 46.3
% neg. 26.1 24.7 25.4 21.8 21.6 23.4 27.1
Overall -Trading Groups Without An Assigned Market Makers
mean 0.0181 0.0328 0.0195 0.0719 0.0489 0.0428 -0.0010
/-statistic 0.97 2.22" 1.46 5.42*** 4.00 2.73 -0.05
n 2957 4548 4259 3639 2739 1341 1347
% pos. 27.2 26.3 26.0 27.2 24.3 24.7 26.5
% zero 45.5 48.9 47.6 51.2 54.6 53.8 47.1
% neg. 27.3 24.8 26.4 21.6 21.1 21.5 26.4
Overall - Trading Groups With Market Makers
mean 0.2957 0.2904 0.2232 0.3118 0.1957 0.1232 0.0437
/-statistic 4.53*** 8.04**' _7.89 7.08 4.15*** 2.27** 0.72
n 953 2267 2168 1146 808 592 200
% pos. 30.6 33.3 31.0 35.7 35.5 31.1 27.5
% zero 46.9 42.3 45.5 42.1 41.7 41.4 41.0
% neg. 22.5 24.4 23.4 22.2 22.8 27.5 31.5
test for difference between the trading groups with and without an assigned market maker: 
ANOVA 31.49’*’ 60.99*”  54.91*’ 49.23*** 18.50*’* 3.47* 0.66
Wilcoxon 13.94*** 32.40*’* 28.86*** 20.73*** 17.18*** 0.19 0.15
2.09
(22.09***)
2.22
(14.73**)
’significant at a level of a  = 10% 
’’significant at a level of a  = 5% 
“ ‘significant at a level of a  = 1%
(table con'd)
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(Table 14 continued)
<FF 100 100-250 250-400 400-600 600-900 900-150CI >1500 Tests of
Diff.
BEFORE 4:55pm
Mean 0.0067 0.0741 0.0449 0.1086 0.0527 0.0152 -0.0505 2.85*”
/-statistic 0.27 3.25*” 2.50 4.49*” 2.01 0.51 -1.83*
N 2749 3922 3956 2290 1574 1063 846 (20.0***)
%pos. 26.1 29.6 28.6 30.6 29.9 28.6 27.8
% zero 45.7 41.2 41.8 43.7 42.6 43.2 39.6
% neg. 28.2 29.2 29.6 25.7 27.5 28.2 32.6
BEFORE 4:55pm - Trading Groups Without an Assigned Market Maker
Mean -0.0163 -0.0001 -0.0304 0.0373 0.0527 0.0500 -0.0573 1.60
/-statistic -0.73 -0.00 -1.46 1.56 2.02 1.74* -1.86*
N 1998 2175 2255 1491 1000 606 680 (14.54**)
% pos. 26.7 30.0 29.2 29.2 29.0 30.2 27.8
% zero 44.1 38.5 37.8 44.0 43.0 43.1 39.6
% neg. 29.2 31.5 33.0 26.8 28.0 26.7 32.6
BEFORE 4:55pm - Trading Groups With an Assigned Market Maker
Mean 0.0680 0.1665 0.1446 0.2417 0.0526 -0.0308 -0.0229 1.86*
/-statistic 0.97 4.27 4.63*” 4.58*” 0.95 -0.53 -0.37
N 751 1747 1701 799 574 457 166 (15.31**)
% pos. 24.5 29.1 27.7 33.2 31.4 26.5 27.7
% zero 49.7 44.6 47.1 43.1 42.0 43.3 39.8
% neg. 25.8 26.3 25.2 23.7 26.7 30.2 32.5
test for difference between the trading groups with and without an assigned market maker before 4:55pm:
ANOVA 2.20 13.24 23.42” * 16.31 0.00 1.78 0.25
Wilcoxon 0.15 7.23” * 12.85*” 7.64*” 0.37 2.84* 0.03
AFTER 4:55pm
Mean 0.2728 0.1787 0.1576 0.1484 0.1061 0.1312 0.0716 5.40*’*
/-statistic 6.92*** 8.98*”
_ _ _ • • •8.77 8.61*” 7.02*** 5.32 3.10*”
N 1161 2893 2471 2495 1973 870 701 (13.3” )
% pos. 32.7 27.2 26.3 28.0 24.4 24.3 25.2
% zero 46.2 54.3 55.1 53.9 58.8 58.3 54.5
% neg. 21.1 18.5 18.9 18.1 16.8 17.4 20.3
AFTER 4:55pm - Trading Groups Without an Assigned Market Maker
mean 0.0897 0.0630 0.0756 0.0959 0.0468 0.0369 0.0564 1.35
/-statistic 2.70*** 4.35*” 4.77*” 6.35*” 3.87 2.29” 2.54”
n 959 2373 2004 2148 1739 735 667 (8.33)
% pos. 28.4 22.8 22.4 25.8 21.6 20.1 25.2
% zero 48.2 58.5 58.7 56.2 61.2 62.6 54.9
% neg. 23.4 18.7 18.9 18.0 17.2 17.3 19.9
AFTER 4:55pm - Trading Groups With an Aassigned Market Maker
mean 1.1423 0.7067 0.5092 0.4732 0.5469 0.6448 0.3686 4.66*’*
/-statistic 7.69*** ^  . •••8.31 7.97 5.97 6.42*” 5.21*” 2.01*
n 202 520 467 347 234 135 34 (26.51***)
% pos. 53.5 47.3 43.0 41.5 45.7 46.7 26.5
% zero 36.6 34.8 39.6 39.8 41.0 34.8 47.0
% neg. 9.9 17.9 17.4 18.7 13.3 18.5 26.5
test for difference between the trading groups with and without an assigned market maker in the after
4:54pm subgroup:
ANOVA 112.16*** 163.12” * 92.62*“ 58.64*” 121.48” * 87.72*’* 8.55***
Wilcoxon 72.76” * 98.83’” 59.72*" 26.38*” 60.17*” 26.35*” 0.01
’significant at a level of a  = 10% “ significant at a level of a = 5% " ’significant at a level of a = 1%
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beginning o f the sample period. On an overall basis, using both parametric and non- 
parametric tests, there are noticeable and significant differences between the different 
price groups. As the price increases the mean return o f  the final transaction generally 
declines, with the most notable differences for stocks priced above FF 900 
(approximately US $180 in the sample period).
Again, transactions are divided into groups based upon the presence or absence o f 
an assigned market maker. The group without an assigned market maker rejects the 
hypothesis that the mean of the final transaction return is equal across all the price 
groups. The level of significance is alpha = 5% for the parametric test and alpha =1%  
for the non-parametric test. However, there is no clear relationship between price level 
and the magnitude of the final transaction return. The group with the assigned market 
maker also rejects this hypothesis, but at a lower significance level of 10% for both the 
parametric and non-parametric tests. For this group, there is a  decline in the magnitude 
o f the final intraday transaction return for high priced stocks.
Next, the hypothesis that the means o f the trading groups (with versus without an 
assigned market maker) are identical is examined within each price level group. The 
difference between the two trading groups is significant in all but the largest price 
grouping. In each case, the group with an assigned market maker has a larger mean final 
return than the comparison group without an assigned market maker. This multiple 
ranges from three times larger for the largest price range (>FF 1500) to fifteen times 
larger for the second smallest price range (FF 100-249).
All transactions are grouped based on the time o f  the transaction (before 4:55 pm 
or after 4:55 pm) and the hypothesis that the mean o f all the price groups is identical
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within each time period is tested. The hypothesis is rejected both parametrically and non- 
parametrically in each time period. Comparing the magnitude of the means shows that 
the high final intraday transaction return is affected by the proximity to the end o f the 
trading day for all price level groups. In each price group the mean o f the returns o f  the 
transactions that occurred before 4:55 pm is smaller than the mean in the comparable 
price group o f transactions that occurred after 4:55 pm.
Finally, the groups based upon the time of the transaction are further subdivided 
into groups based on the presence or absence of an assigned market maker. For the time 
period before 4:55 pm, there is a significant difference between groups with an assigned 
market maker and groups without an assigned market maker only for the second (FF 100- 
250), third (FF 250-400) and fourth (FF 400-600) price ranges. By contrast, for the after 
4:55 pm time period, the difference between groups with and without an assigned market 
maker is highly significant, with all but the largest (>FF 1500) price range having large 
parametric and non-parametric test statistics. For the price group over FF 1500 the non- 
parametric test does not find a difference in the means, but the parametric tests indicate 
the means are statistically significantly different.
The differences between stocks with an assigned market maker and those without 
an assigned market maker indicates that the effect o f the assigned market maker is to 
exacerbate the end-of-day effect regardless of price level or the time o f the last 
transaction. The price groupings indicate that the low price groups do indeed have larger 
final transaction returns, but the differences between the pre-4:55 pm and post-4:55 pm 
means indicate that the end-of-day effect is influenced by the timing o f transactions along 
with the price o f the stock. Finally, the largest end-of-day transaction returns (1.1591%)
64
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
are observed for those stocks with assigned market maker that have low stock prices and 
last trades occurring after 4:55 pm. This rejects hypothesis six (H6) that the magnitude of 
the final transaction return is the same across price levels and results in the acceptance of 
the alternative hypothesis that the magnitude o f the final transaction return decreases with 
an increase in the price of the stock.
3.4.1.6. Volume Groupings
In order to determine the effect o f the level o f volume on the final intraday 
transaction return five groups are created by dividing the stocks based on mean daily 
volume. Table 15 reports that the large final intraday return is present and statistically 
significant in all volume groups on an overall basis. This is also true for the individual 
volume groups with and without an assigned market maker except for both the low 
volume group for stocks without an assigned market maker and the high volume group 
for stocks with an assigned market maker.
The magnitude is larger for the lower volume groups on an overall basis, as well 
as for those stocks with an assigned market maker. For those stocks without an assigned 
market maker the pattern is an inverse-U shape. In each of the volume groups, except for 
the high volume group, there is a statistically significant difference (both parametrically 
and non-parametrically) between the mean final intraday return for those stocks with an 
assigned market maker and those without an assigned market maker. The stocks with an 
assigned market maker have magnitudes three to four times larger than those stocks 
without an assigned market maker.
This differences across volume levels is also tested by examining final intraday 
transaction returns that occur on and off the exchange. The final intraday return o f those
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Table 15 The final intraday transaction return across average volume levels. Parametric 
ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums tests are performed to test the 
hypothesis that the means across the volume groups are equal. Parametric ANOVA and 
non-parametric Wilcoxon ranks scores tests are performed to test the hypothesis that the 
means in both trading groups are equal.
ANOVA 
(Wilcoxon)
32.10*“
(57.76*“ )
6.45
low volume medium low medium medium high
volume volume high volume volume
Overall
mean 0.2452 0.1741 0.1419 0.0828 0.0271
/-statistic 10.14“ * 11.25*“ . . _ _ • •• 10.22 8.52 3.83
n 4786 6653 7210 7478 6520
% positive 34.6 34.5 31.0 29.5 20.1
% zero 37.9 39.1 44.9 47.2 61.7
% negative 27.5 26.4 24.1 23.3 18.2
Overall - Trading Groups Without an Assigned Market Maker
mean -0.0186 0.0622 0.0826 0.0716 0.0276
/-statistic -0.49 3.63*“ 6.19*** 7.41’“ 3.90
n 1708 3073 5077 6848 6462
% positive 31.6 32.8 29.6 29.2 20.1
% zero 35.4 36.8 45.7 47.3 61.8
% negative 33.0 30.4 24.7 23.5 18.1
(27.10 )
Overall - Trading Groups With an Assigned Market Maker
mean 0.3916 0.2701 0.2829 0.2044 -0.0274
/-statistic 12.65*“ 10.98 .  * . • • •8.24 4.31“ * -0.26
n 3078 3580 2133 630 58
% positive 36.2 35.9 34.1 32.2 24.1
% zero 39.4 41.1 43.0 46.4 44.9
% negative 24.4 23.0 22.9 21.4 31.0
test for difference between trading groups:
ANOVA 66.90*”  45.13*’* 43.63*
Wilcoxon 56.61*** 45.52**’ 24.10*
14.42
6 . 12-
0.54
1.06
4.23*
(6.43)
Overall - Trading Groups Where Last Trade is On-Exchange
mean 0.1736 0.1512 0.1004 0.0583 0.0204 6.45***
/-statistic 6.77 _ _ _ • • •9.29 6.96 5.84*“ _ _ . • • •2.84
n 4105 5957 6325 6692 5885 (27.10***)
% positive 31.3 32.9 28.9 28.1 19.6
% zero 40.3 40.1 46.5 48.0 62.1
% negative 28.4 27.0 24.6 23.9 18.3
Overall - Trading Groups
mean 0.6770
Where Last Trade is a Cross-Trade
0.3697 0.4386 0.2918 0.0886 4.23*“
/-statistic 9.88 7.51“ *
_ _ _ • • •9.66 8.16*“ 3.14*”
n 681 696 885 786 635 (6.43)
% positive 54.5 48.3 46.1 41.0 24.7
% zero 23.9 30.6 33.0 40.3 57.6
% negative 21.6 21.1 20.9 18.7 17.7
test for difference between trading groups: 
ANOVA 66.90*** 45.13*“ 43.63“ * 14.42*“ 0.54
Wilcoxon 56.61 45.52*" 24.10**’ 6.12*“ 1.06
’significant at a level of a  = 10% “ significant at a level of a  = 5% “ 'significant at a level of a  = 1%
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transactions that occur o ff the exchange as cross-trades is at a magnitude that is two to 
five times larger than on-exchange returns. Both groups show an inverse relationship 
between volume and return, with statistically significant differences from zero in all 
groups.
Table 16 analyzes only those stocks where the final trade was on the exchange. 
For stocks without an assigned market maker there are significant final intraday 
transaction returns for all volume groups except the low volume group. The magnitude is 
about the same for the middle three groups with an average return o f approximately 0.05 
percent. The high volume stocks have a slightly lower average return o f approximately
Table 16 The final intraday transaction return across average volume levels. Parametric 
ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon ranks sums tests are performed to test the 
hypothesis that the means across the volume groups are equal. Parametric ANOVA and 
non-parametric Wilcoxon ranks scores tests are performed to test the hypothesis that the 
means in both trading groups are equal. Only those trading groups are included when the 
final trade is on the exchange.
low volume medium low medium medium high ANOVA
volume volume high volume volume (Wilcoxon)
Trading Groups Without an Assigned Market Maker
mean -0.0175 0.0414 0.0544 0.0471 0.0197 2.84“
/-statistic -0.45 2.36“ 3.96 4.78 _ _ •••2.73
n 1557 2808 4503 6129 5833 (18.53***)
% positive 29.8 31.5 27.8 27.9 19.6
% zero 37.0 37.6 46.8 48.0 62.2
% negative 33.2 30.9 25.4 24.1 18.2
Trading Groups With an Assigned Market Maker
mean 0.2904 0.2492 0.2140 0.1803 0.0997 1.08
/-statistic 8.63*“
_ . . 9.44 5.85*“ 3.58“ * 1.12
n 2548 3149 1822 563 52 (3.08)
% positive 32.1 34.2 31.3 30.7 26.9
% zero 42.4 42.3 46.1 47.3 46.2
% negative 25.5 23.5 22.6 22.0 26.9
test for difference between trading groups:
ANOVA 34.20 40.89 25.23"* 13.78*“ 1.08
Wilcoxon 28.04*“ 38.31*“ 16.35*“ 4.86** 0.00
‘significant at a level of a  = 10% “ significant at a level of a  = 5% ‘“ significant at a level of a  = 1%
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0.02 percent. There is a statistically significant difference between the various volume 
groups both parametrically and non-parametrically. The statistically significant 
difference between the groups does not hold for the stocks with assigned market makers. 
For these stocks the magnitude of the average return is between 0.2 and 0.3 percent for all 
but the high volume group, with no statistical difference among groups either 
parametrically or non-parametrically. Tests of difference are also performed within each 
volume group between the stocks with and without an assigned market maker. For all 
except the high volume stocks the difference between the two groups is statistically 
significant both parametrically and non-parametrically.
Table 17 examines the final intraday transaction return for those stocks where the 
final trade is an off-exchange cross-trade. The magnitude o f the returns is much larger 
for cross-trades than for the on-exchange trades. For stocks without an assigned market 
maker the range of final intraday transaction returns is 0.1 to 0.3 percent for all the 
groups excluding the lowest volume group. The range is 0.4 to 0.9 percent, excluding the 
high volume group, for the stocks with an assigned market maker. In both groups there 
are statistically significant differences both parametrically and non-parametrically across 
the volume groups. Differences across the stocks with and without assigned market 
makers are not statistically significant for the medium low volume group and the medium 
high volume group, but are statistically significant parametrically and non-parametrically 
for the other three volume groups.
The mean final intraday returns across the volume groups show that the 
differences between the groups with and without assigned market makers is not solely 
due to volume and is robust to different levels of volume.
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Table 17 The final intraday transaction return across average volume levels. Parametric 
ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon ranks sums tests are performed to test the 
hypothesis that the means across the volume groups are equal. Parametric ANOVA and 
non-parametric Wilcoxon ranks scores tests are performed to test the hypothesis that the 
means in both trading groups are equal. Only those trading groups are included when the 
final trade is an off-exchange cross-trade.
low volume medium low medium medium high ANOVA
volume volume high volume volume (Wilcoxon)
Trading Groups Without an Assigned Market Maker
mean -0.0301 0.2832 0.3042 0.2811 0.1002 5.96“ *
r-statistic -0.20 4.68 ,  „ .id6.48 7.62 3.61” *
n 151 265 574 719 629 (28.35"*)
% positive 49.7 47.5 43.7 40.6 25.0
% zero 19.2 28.7 37.3 40.5 57.9
% negative 31.1 23.8 19.0 18.9 17.1
Trading Groups With an Assigned Market Maker
mean 0.8784 0.4230 0.6866 0.4066 -1.1291 7.30***
r-statistic 11.71*” 6.31“ * 7.28 2.92 -2.37*
n 530 431 311 67 6 (20.58***)
% positive 55.8 48.7 50.5 44.8 0
% zero 25.3 31.8 25.1 38.8 33.3
% negative 18.9 19.5 24.4 16.4 66.7
test for difference between trading groups:
ANOVA 31.68 1.90 16.46*“ 0.96 18.23“ *
Wilcoxon 17.07*“ 2.25 7.15*“ 1.29 9.35*“
‘significant at a level of a  = 10% “ significant at a level of a  = 5% ‘“ significant at a level of a  = 1%
3.4.1.7. Subsequent O vernight Returns
One final set o f tests regarding returns is performed in order to gain a further 
understanding of the end-of-day effect. Specifically, overnight returns are examined in 
order to determine if  there is a systematic continuation or reversal after the large price 
rise at the end of the day. Table 18 shows the overnight return following the final 
intraday transaction return averages -0.0487%. The final intraday transaction return is 
divided into two groups based on the median final return of all stocks on that trading day. 
The overnight return is shown to be 0.0529% for the lower half of the final transaction
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Table 18 Close to open return (in percent) for the overnight period is provided both on 
an overall basis and by dividing the returns into two groups based whether the final 
transaction return was above or below that day’s median return for all firms. Tests o f 
difference between the groups is done using parametric ANOVA and non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank scores tests.
Overall On Exchange Cross Trades
mean -0.0487 -0.0310 -0.2070
r-statistic -4.32 -2.57 -5.90
n 32191 28508 3246
% positive 40.1 40.7 35.0
% zero 17.1 16.8 19.4
% negative 42.8 42.5 45.6
closing return below the median day’s return
mean 0.0529 0.0878 -0.1160
r-statistic 3.91**’ 5.86*” -2.18
n 21555 16640 1791
% positive 43.3 44.6 36.1
% zero 17.3 16.8 19.0
% negative 39.4 38.6 44.9
closing return above the median day’s return
mean -0.2545 -0.1974 -0.3190
r-statistic -12.61’” -10.01’” -7.45’”
n 10636 11868 1455
% positive 33.8 35.2 33.7
% zero 16.6 16.7 19.8
% negative 49.6 48.0 46.5
tests of difference
ANOVA 165.61*” 137.35’” 8.31” *
Wilcoxon 417.99’” 369.40’” 6.04’”
’significant at a level of a  = 10% 
’’significant at a level of a  = 5% 
’’’significant at a level of a  = 1%
70
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
returns and -0.2545% for the larger half o f the final transaction returns. The positive 
close to open return observed for smaller final intraday transaction returns may indicate a 
slower adjustment to information near the end o f the trading day.
The negative means observed for all final intraday transaction returns when the 
final intraday transaction is a cross-trade indicates that the cross-trades may be reversed 
overnight. Somewhat more o f the cross-trade final intraday transaction return is reversed, 
on average, than for on-exchange final intraday transaction returns. For cross-trades, the 
final intraday transaction return is 0.3780% (from Table 4) and the reversal during the 
subsequent overnight period is 0.2070%. For on-exchange transactions, the final intraday 
transaction return is 0.0952% (from Table 4) with a reversal o f  0.0310% during the 
subsequent overnight period. This represents a reversal o f  55% for cross-trades but only 
33% for on-exchange transactions.
Table 19 further examines the overnight return by dividing the transactions into 
two groups based on the timing o f the final transaction. I f  the transaction occurs before 
4:55 pm then the delayed response explanation may be more valid since this indicates the 
liquidity o f the stock may contribute to the effect. When the final transaction return 
occurs before 4:55 pm on exchange transactions are significantly positive with a mean 
overnight return o f 0.0358% that is significantly different than zero. For on exchange 
transactions that occur after 4:55 pm there is an overnight return o f negative 0.1167%.
For off exchange cross-trades, the overnight return is negative and there is no statistical 
difference between those transactions that occur before or after 4:55 pm. The observation 
that when the final transaction is a cross-trade the subsequent overnight return is on 
average negative, irrespective o f the time o f the cross-trade, suggests window dressing 
may be a valid explanation (see section 3.4.1.3.).
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T able 19 Close to open return (in percent) for the overnight period is provided both on 
an overall basis and by dividing the returns into two groups based whether the final 
transaction return was before or after 4:55 pm. Tests o f difference between the groups is 
done using parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank scores tests.
Overall On Exchange Cross Trades
mean -0.0487 -0.0310 -0.2070
r-statistic -4.32*“ -2.57 -5.90
n 32191 28508 3246
% positive 40.1 40.7 35.0
% zero 17.1 16.8 19.4
% negative 42.8 42.5 45.6
closing return before 4:55 pm
mean 0.0143 0.0358 -0.1897
r-statistic 0.90 2.15“ -3.35*”
n 17942 16020 1675
% positive 41.0 41.7 35.0
% zero 19.2 18.9 21.7
% negative 39.8 39.4 43.3
closing return after 4:55 pm
mean -0.1280 -0.1167 -0.2254
r-statistic -8.11*“ -6.78 -5.62*“
n 14249 12488 1571
%  positive 39.0 39.4 35.0
% zero 14.4 14.1 16.9
% negative 46.7 46.6 48.1
tests of difference between the two groups
ANOVA 39.40*“ 39.66*“ 0.26
Wilcoxon 84.26*“ 86.12*** 0.66
‘significant at a level of a  = 10% 
“ significant at a level of a  = 5% 
’“ significant at a level of a  = 1%
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In summary, for cross-trades, there is a subsequent overnight reversal o f  the final 
intraday transaction return for the group o f stocks with an average final intraday return 
both above and below the median return for that day. This reversal represents 
approximately 55% of the final intraday transaction return. For on-exchange final 
intraday transactions the subsequent overnight reversal is only observed in those stocks 
with returns above the median final intraday return for that day. On average, the 
subsequent overnight return for these stocks represents a 33% reversal o f the final 
intraday transaction return.
3.4.2. Intraday Volume
Intraday volume is examined to determine if  there is a difference between those 
stocks with an assigned market maker and those stocks without an assigned market 
maker. The total volume traded for stocks with an assigned market maker is 
approximately one tenth the volume traded for the stocks without an assigned market 
maker. Table 20 reports the mean volume in terms of number o f  shares and the mean 
number o f transactions for each thirty minute time interval during the trading day. Also, 
the mean percentage of each day’s volume is also reported for each interval. The results 
show that volume follows a re verse-J pattern during the day, with the first interval 
(10:00-10:307) having the largest amount o f volume both in number o f transactions and 
in total number of shares traded. This is true for both the group o f stocks with an 
assigned market maker and those without an assigned market maker. In terms o f the 
number o f shares, the stocks without an assigned market maker had 22.2% o f  the day’s 
volume during the first interval, while the stocks with an assigned market maker had
7 The precise timing of the interval is from 10:00:00 to 10:29:59.
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31.0% of the day’s volume during this period. The difference between the stocks with 
and without an assigned market maker in terms of percentage o f day’s volume during the 
half-hour is statistically significant in all half-hour periods except for 11:00-l 1:30 am and 
11:30-12:00 am. During these two half-hour periods the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank 
sums test is still statistically significant at a level o f one percent, however, the parametric 
ANOVA test has no or little statistical significance.
Table 20 also examines volume across half-hour periods for on-exchange and off- 
exchange cross-trades. On-exchange trades have a similar reverse-J pattern in terms o f 
the mean number o f transaction, the mean total share volume, and the mean percentage of 
the day’s volume in each half-hour period. Cross-trades exhibit a similar pattern across 
the half-hour periods, however, the transactions that occur after 5 pm are larger, 
proportionally, than on-exchange transactions. This could be the result o f an inability to 
trade on the exchange, an attempt to influence the closing price or an agreement to 
transact after the close8.
Table 21 also investigates intraday volume, but uses the reduced sample o f  firms 
that had a total volume during the period o f 100,000 to 200,000 shares. There are 
considerably fewer mean number o f transactions during each period and the total mean 
volume each period is also lower. The same pattern in relative volume each period, as a 
percentage o f the day’s total volume, is apparent with the same reverse-J shape. This 
indicates that the differences between the group o f stocks with and without assigned 
market makers are not due to differences in overall level of volume.
8 An agreement to transact after the close may be especially appealing to mutual fund managers that use 
closing prices as the basis for fund redemptions and purchases.
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Table 20 This table reports volume that occurs within each thirty-minute time interval during the trading day. The mean number of 
transactions, the mean total share volume and the mean percentage of each day’s total share volume are reported. This is done on an 
overall basis as well as for those stocks with and without an assigned market maker.
Overall overall 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00- 4:30-
10:30 11:30 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30 5:00
mean # trans. 9.5 14.9 5.6 5.3 4.7 3.5 2.3 2.0 2.4 3.0 4.0 4.3 5.0 5.0 7.1
mean total 4546 5355 2732 2614 2485 1910 1267 1179 1217 1376 2004 2262 2571 2852 3872
volume
mean % of 25.1 8.0 
day’s volume
Stocks without an assigned market maker:
7.5 6.7 4.9 3.0 2.3 2.7 3.7 5.3 5.9 6.7 6.9 10.3 0.8
mean # trans. 6.7 20.8 8.0 7.6 6.7 5.1 3.3 2.9 3.5 4.2 5.7 6.1 7.2 7.2 10.1 2.8
mean total 3305 7851 3993 
volume
3825 3353 2808 1866 1744 1801 2023 2926 3323 3787 4183 5689 391
mean % of 22.2 7.8 
day’s volume
Stocks with an assigned market maker:
7.4 6.8 5.0 3.2 2.6 3.0 3.9 5.7 6.2 7.3 7.4 10.7 0.9
mean # trans. 0.7 2.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.3
mean total 158 296 179 
volume
162 126 94 55 35 36 64 137 116 n o 159 196 11
mean % of 31.0 8.5 
day’s volume
Transactions that occur on the exchange:
7.7 6.6 4.7 2.6 1.8 2.1 3.4 4.6 5.3 5.5 5.9 9.7 0.6
mean # trans. 4.7 15.0 5.6 5.3 4.7 3.5 2.3 2.0 2.4 2.9 4.0 4.2 5.0 5.0 7.1 1.9
mean total 2007 5112 2491 
volume
2190 2153 1607 1085 978 1079 1229 1744 1969 2216 2441 3557 264
mean % of 25.5 7.9 7.4 
day’s volume
Transactions that occur off the exchange as cross-trades:
6.7 4.9 3.0 2.3 2.8 3.8 5.3 5.8 6.6 6.8 10.4 0.8
mean # trans. 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
mean total 575 680 564 
volume
901 725 647 395 425 311 333 571 644 773 888 752 14
mean % of 17.7 8.1 
day’s volume
7.2 6.5 4.8 3.1 2.7 2.6 3.7 5.4 7.0 7.4 7.9 12.7 3.1
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Table 21 This table uses a reduced sample of only those firms with total volume between 100,000 and 200,000 shares over the 
sample period September-December 1995. This table reports volume that occurs within each thirty-minute time interval during the 
trading day. The mean number of transactions, the mean total share volume and the mean percentage of each day’s total share volume 
are reported. This is done on an overall basis as well as for those stocks with and without an assigned market maker.
Overall overall 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00- 4:30- after
10:30 11:30 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30 5:00 5:00
mean # trans. 2.7 4.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.4 0.5
mean total 329 353 146 155 126 100 53 53 38 50 102 102 141 149 185 13
volume
mean % of 28.0 8.0 7.5 7.9 4.9 2.6 2.0 2.3 3.2 4.8 5.2 6.1 6.7 10.1 0.9
day’s volume
Stocks without an assigned market maker:
mean # trans. 1.2 5.0 1.4 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.7 0.7
mean total 115 404 129 136 114 115 58 38 54 55 93 93 120 133 164 18
volume 
mean % of 27.6 7.6 7.5 6.5 5.0 2.7 2.2 2.9 3.2 5.1 5.2 7.1 6.5 9.7 1.2
day’s volume
Stocks with an assigned market maker: 
mean ft trans. 0.8
mean total 120
volume 
mean % of 
day’s volume
Tests of difference 
ANOVA 
Wilcoxon
3.4 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.2 0.3
313 159 169 137 89 50 64 26 45 110 109 157 162 202 8
28.3 8.2 7.5 9.0 4.8 2.5 1.8 1.8 3.1 4.6 5.2 5.3 6.9 10.3 0.6
313 159 169 137 89 50 64 26 45 110 109 157 162 202 8
28.3 8.2 7.5 9.0 4.8 2.5 1.8 1.8 3.1 4.6 5.2 5.3 6.9 10.3 0.6
3.4.3. Intraday Volatility
Differences in volatility between those stocks with assigned market makers and 
those stocks without assigned market makers are tested using several definitions o f 
volatility. Volatility is measured both by the difference between the high and the low 
transaction prices as a percentage o f  the mean price and by the standard deviation o f 
intraday return as measured on successive midpoints o f the bid-ask spread. Table 22 
reports these measures within half-hour intervals during the trading day.
The average difference between the high and the low price each interval is largest 
at the open and close and follows a U-shaped pattern throughout the day. This is true on 
an overall basis as well as for both the stocks with an assigned market maker and the 
stocks without an assigned market maker. The magnitude of this measure is 34% to 82% 
greater for stocks without an assigned market maker as compared to the stocks with an 
assigned market maker during all half-hour periods during the trading day except after 
5:00 pm. The difference is statistically significant at a level o f one percent in all periods 
except after 5:00 pm using both parametric and non-parametric tests (not shown).
The standard deviation of the returns based on successive midpoints between the 
bid and the ask prices are also reported in aggregate and for stocks both with and without 
an assigned market maker. On an overall basis, the standard deviation is higher during 
the first half-hour (10:00-10:30) o f trading than at any other half-hour during the trading 
day. Stocks without an assigned market maker have a standard deviation that is 
approximately one-half of the standard deviation o f those stocks with assigned market
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Table 22 Volatility is reported for each thirty-minute time interval during the trading day. The volatility is reported as the difference 
between the high and low prices (divided by the mean price of the stock and reported in percent) during each interval, as well as the
standard deviation (in percent) of the transaction return based on successive midpoints of the bid-ask spread. This is done on an 
overall basis as well as for those stocks with and without an assigned market maker.
Overall 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00- 4:30- al\er
10:30 11:30 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30 5:00 5:00
Overall:
high minus 0.433 0.635 0.517 0.470 0.418 0.347 0.277 0.249 0.282 0.313 0.378 0.398 0.422 0.431 0.613 0.288
low price
stdard dev. 0.219 0.508 0.236 0.212 0.198 0.167 0.153 0.154 0.149 0.169 0.178 0.183 0.189 0.186 0.232 0.101
midpoint
Stocks without an assigned market maker:
high minus 0.459 0.731 0.559 0.503 0.445 0.369 0.286 0.261 0.296 0.331 0.400 0 426 0.456 0.458 0.649 0.285
^  low price
stdard dev. 0.179 0.442 0.181 0.164 0.152 0.139 0.128 0.132 0.131 0.142 0.152 0.151 0.160 0.150 0.192 0.086
midpoint
Stocks with an assigned market maker:
high minus 0.319 0.415 0.346 0.325 0.292 0.229 0.209 0.151 0.177 0.205 0.262 0.255 0.250 0.290 0.485 0.312
low price
stdard dev. 0.516 0.816 0.546 0.491 0.503 0.398 0.463 0.468 0.404 0.455 0.408 0.441 0.434 0.472 0.462 0.330
midpoint
makers during the first half-hour o f  trading (0.442 percent versus 0.816 percent). For 
those stocks without an assigned market maker the standard deviation drops in the second 
half-hour to 0.181 percent, while the stocks with an assigned market maker drop to 0.546 
percent. The stocks without an assigned market maker exhibit a reverse-J shape in terms 
o f magnitude of standard deviation, with a slight increase in the 4:30-5:00 pm half-hour 
approaching the magnitude of the 10:30-11:00 am half-hour. Stocks with an assigned 
market maker also have standard deviations with a reverse-J shape, however, the pattern 
is less noticeable with magnitudes ranging from 0.398 to 0.546 percent. The volatility, as 
measured by the standard deviation o f midpoint returns, differs between the stocks with 
and without assigned market makers and this differences is statistically significant at a 
level o f  one percent in each of the half-hour periods both parametrically and non- 
parametrically.
The two measures o f volatility appear to contradict each other with respect to 
which group of stocks has the higher volatility. Table 23 uses the reduced sample of 
firms that have a total volume during the four-month period that is between 100,000 and 
200,000 shares. For these stocks the volatility using both o f the measures exhibits a 
reverse-J pattern and is larger in magnitude for the group o f stocks with an assigned 
market maker. This is true for all subperiods using the standard deviation measure and 
for nine o f the subperiods for the mean difference measure. Statistical significance of the 
difference between the two measures is present for all subperiods for the standard 
deviation measure using the parametric ANOVA test and for ten o f the fifteen subperiods 
using the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums test. For the mean difference measure 
there is no statistical significance in any of the parametric tests. The non-parametric
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Table 23 This table uses a reduced sample o f only those firms with total volume between 100,000 and 200,000 shares over the 
sample period September - December 1995. Volatility is reported for each thirty-minute time interval during the trading day. The 
volatility is reported as the difference between the high and low prices (divided by the mean price of the stock and reported in percent) 
during each interval, as well as the standard deviation (in percent) of the transaction return based on successive midpoints of the bid- 
ask spread. This is done on an overall basis as well as for those stocks with and without an assigned market maker.
Overall 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00- 4:30- after
5:00
Overall:
10:30 11:30 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30 5:00
high minus 
low price
0.395 0.646 0.527 0.478 0.226 0.340 0.287 0.261 0.293 0.323 0.387 0.405 0.432 0.264 0.603
stdard dev. 
midpoint
Stocks without
0.345
assigned
0.644
market
0.339
maker:
0.342 0.326 0.269 0.257 0.287 0.224 0.299 0.286 0.315 0.291 0.273 0.325
high minus 
low price
0.321 0.486 0.338 0.296 0.293 0.234 0.181 0.138 0.212 0.217 0.267 0.293 0.332 0.289 0.468
stdard dev. 
midpoint
Stocks with an
0.254 0.538 0.206 
assigned market maker:
0.225 0.179 0.192 0.152 0.192 0.194 0.244 0.242 0.240 0.241 0.193 0.262
high minus 
low price
0.336 0.507 0.319 0.326 0.293 0.235 0.196 0.148 0.164 0.190 0.271 0.263 0.272 0.259 0.530
stdard dev. 
midpoint
0.497 0.786 0.525 0.500 0.527 0.394 0.474 0.533 0.305 0.419 0.374 0.447 0.397 0.419 0.418
Wilcoxon rank sums test is also used to test the means of the two groups. For the nine 
subperiods that had a higher mean difference measure for the stocks with an assigned 
market maker, four (six) subperiods had statistically significant differences at a level o f 
one (five) percent. For the five subperiods that had a higher mean difference in the group 
o f stocks without assigned market makers, the non-parametric tests all were significant at 
a level o f  one percent. These five periods that have higher mean differences in stocks 
without assigned market makers are all between 1:30 and 4:30, with only the 2:30-3:00 
subperiod not in this group.
3.4.4. Intraday Bid-Ask Spread
The intraday bid-ask spread is examined to determine if  there is a difference 
between those stocks with and those stocks without an assigned market maker. The 
average absolute and percentage bid-ask spread are provided for each half-hour during 
the trading day. These averages are determined by computing the bid-ask spreads that is 
outstanding at the beginning o f the half-hour period and weighting this and every new 
bid-ask spread quote by the number o f seconds outstanding during the half-hour period. 
The period after 5 pm is treated differently, as trading technically ceases at 5 pm, but 
there are quotes reported after this time. The average outstanding bid-ask spread up to 
the final quote is computed for the period after 5 pm. Additionally, the number o f quote 
revisions during each period is also reported.
In Table 24, the mean percentage bid-ask spread is 1.62% while the mean 
absolute bid-ask spread is FF 6.58. When the stocks are divided into those with an 
assigned market maker and those without an assigned market maker, the magnitude o f the 
means is significantly greater for those stocks with an assigned market maker. The mean
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Table 24 This table reports the bid-ask spread that occurs within each thirty-minute time interval during the trading day. The time- 
weighted bid-ask spread is reported on an absolute and a proportional basis. Also, the number of quote revisions is also reported. This 
is done on an overall basis as well as for those stocks with and without an assigned market maker.
Overall
overall 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00- 4:30- after
10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30 5:00 5:00
absolute 6.58 6.96 
bid-ask sp.
6.87 6.72 6.58 6.50 6.51 6.50 6.52 6.52 6.50 6.49 6.45 6.47 6.55 6.55
% bid-ask 1.62 1.70 
spread
1.68 1.65 1.61 1.59 1.59 1.60 1.60 1.61 1.60 1.61 1.60 1.61 1.62 1.62
# of quote 8.65 10.50 9.68 
revisions
Stocks without an assigned market maker:
9.24 8.42 7.15 6.02 5.65 6.25 6.70 8.42 8.69 10.04 9.68 11.85 7.57
overall 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00- 4:30- after
10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30 5:00 5:00
absolute 4.88 5.26 
bid-ask sp.
5.13 4.95 4.81 4.75 4.78 4.77 4.82 4.83 4.82 4.83 4.78 4.81 4.90 4.90
00K> % bid-ask 1.14 1.23 spread
1.19 1.15 1.12 1.10 1.11 1.11 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.14 1.13 1.14 1.16 1.16
# of quote 10.09 12.98 11.74 
revisions
Stocks with an assigned market maker:
11.13 10.01 8.25 6.72 6.25 6.93 7.63 9.75 10.11 11.76 11.28 14.34 8.06
overall 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00- 4:30- after
10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30 5:00 5:00
absolute 9.90 10.28 
bid-ask sp.
10.26 10.16 10.04 9.92 9.88 9.87 9.84 9.81 9.78 9.74 9.71 9.71 9.76 9.75
% bid-ask 2.55 2.63 
spread
2.64 2.61 2.58 2.56 2.54 2.55 2.54 2.54 2.53 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.53 2.52
# of quote 2.17 2.67 
revisions 
'significant at a level of a  = 10% 
"significant at a level of a = 5% 
"'significant at a level of a  = 1%
2.37 2.25 2.13 1.93 1.71 1.52 1.64 1.78 1.97 2.10 2.05 2.11 2.51 3.22
percentage bid-ask spread is 2.55% for those stocks with an assigned market maker, 
versus 1.14% for those stocks without an assigned market maker. The mean absolute 
bid-ask spread is FF 9.90 for those stocks with an assigned market maker, versus FF 4.88 
for those stocks without an assigned market maker. Using a t-test, the means have a 
difference that is statistically significant at a level o f 1%.
Analyzing the mean bid-ask spread during each half-hour shows that both the 
percentage bid-ask spread and the absolute bid-ask spread demonstrate a reverse-J 
pattern. This is similar to the U-shaped pattern on the NYSE observed by Wood, 
Mclnish and Ord (1985), Brock and Kleidon (1992) and Lee, Mucklow and Ready 
(1993). This does not match the pattern observed by Chan, Christie and Schultz (1995) 
on Nasdaq where there is a declining bid-ask spread near the close.
The reverse-J pattern does not differ in shape between stocks on the Paris Bourse 
that trade with and without an assigned market maker. The magnitudes, however, are 
significantly different. The stocks with an assigned market maker have percentage and 
absolute bid-ask spreads that are approximately twice as large as those stocks without an 
assigned market maker. A parametric t-test compares the means in each o f the two 
groups within each individual half-hour time period and the difference is statistically 
significant at a level of 1%.
The number of quote revisions in each period follows a U-shaped pattern. This is 
true on an overall basis, as well as for those stocks with and without an assigned market 
maker. For stocks without an assigned market maker the number o f quote revisions is 
approximately five times larger than for those stocks with an assigned market maker.
This difference is statistically significant at a level of 1% on an overall basis and within
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each o f the half-hour periods. In the period after 5 pm, the multiple between the two 
stock groups differs. For stocks without an assigned market maker, the number o f quote 
revisions falls from 14.34 in the previous half-hour (4:30-5:00) to 8.06. For stocks with 
an assigned market maker the number of quote revisions increases from 2.51 in the 
previous half-hour (4:30-5:00) to 3.22. This represents a decrease in the multiple from 
five in each o f the half-hours during the day to less than three after 5 pm. The lower 
multiple than average for quotes after 5 pm indicates that those stocks with an assigned 
market maker have more activity, proportionally, at the end of the trading day. This may 
be due to the assigned market makers adjusting the closing prices, or may be a result o f 
increased attention by traders at the end of the trading day. An increase in volume does 
not appear to explain this phenomenon since Table 20 shows that volume for stocks with 
an assigned market maker falls from 9.7% (in the previous half-hour) to 0.6% while the 
volume for stocks without an assigned market maker falls from 10.7% to 0.9%.
The difference between the stocks with an assigned market maker and those 
without an assigned market maker may be partially due to the difference between the 
stocks in each of the categories. One such difference may be a stock’s price since this 
impacts on the percentage bid-ask spread and the absolute bid-ask spread. In order to 
facilitate an improved comparison, stocks are divided into seven groups based on their 
price at the beginning o f the period.
Table 25 examines the percentage bid-ask spread across the price groups. The 
percentage bid-ask spread is expected to decline as the price o f the stock increases 
because o f the fixed priced component o f transaction costs. Including all stocks, on an 
overall basis and in each o f  the half-hour periods, there is a monotonic decline in the
84
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Table 25 This table reports the time-weighted percentage bid-ask spread that occurs across price levels within each thirty-minute time 
interval during the trading day. This is done on an overall basis as well as for those stocks with and without an assigned market 
maker.
Overall
price overall 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00- 4:30- after
10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30 5:00 5:00
< FF 100 2.26 2.35 2.34 2.29 2.26 2.24 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.24 2.24 2.23 2.23 2.24 2.26 2.26
100-250 1.78 1.87 1.84 1.81 1.76 1.74 1.75 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.77 1.77 1.78 1.80 1.79
250-400 1.57 1.64 1.60 1.57 1.54 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.55 1.57 1.57 1.59 1.57 1.57 1.59 1.59
400-600 1.44 1.53 1.53 1.49 1.46 1.44 1.42 1.42 1.43 1.43 1.42 1.42 1.41 1.41 1.42 1.42
600-900 1.07 1.14 1.13 1.10 1.07 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.04 1.07 1.07
900-1500 1.61 1.69 1.66 1.64 1.61 1.60 1.61 1.61 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.59 1.59 1.60 1.61
>1500 1.04 1.11 1.11 1.07 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.01
ocks without an assigned market maker:
overall 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00- 4:30- after
10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30 5:00 5:00
< FF 100 1.62 1.71 1.69 1.63 1.61 1.59 1.62 1.63 1.63 1.60 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.60 1.64 1.64
100-250 1.23 1.32 1.27 1.23 1.19 1.16 1.18 1.19 1.21 1.21 1.22 1.24 1.23 1.25 1.27 1.27
250-400 1.12 1.19 1.14 1.10 1.06 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.09 1.13 1.15 1.18 1.13 1.14 1.17 1.17
400-600 1.13 1.22 1.21 1.17 1.13 1.11 1.10 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.11 1.12 1.10 1.10 1.11 1.11
600-900 0.75 0.83 0.80 0.78 0.76 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.76
900-1500 0.82 0.90 0.86 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.83
>1500 0.92 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.92 0.90
Stocks with an assigned market maker:
overall 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00- 4:30- after
10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30 5:00 5:00
< FF 100 3.50 3.58 3.58 3.56 3.51 3.48 3.47 3.46 3.47 3.50 3.50 3.48 3.46 3.47 3.46 3.45
100-250 2.71 2.79 2.80 2.78 2.74 2.71 2.69 2.71 2.71 2.69 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.68 2.68 2.68
250-400 2.28 2.35 2.34 2.31 2.31 2.29 2.28 2.27 2.26 2.26 2.25 2.24 2.25 2.26 2.26 2.25
400-600 2.11 2.20 2.21 2.17 2.14 2.12 2.11 2.10 2.09 2.08 2.07 2.07 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08
600-900 2.05 2.13 2.15 2.08 2.07 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.03 2.01 2.05 2.04
900-1500 3.04 3.10 3.11 3.10 3.06 3.06 3.04 3.03 3.01 3.02 3.02 3.01 3.01 3.01 3.00 3.00
>1500 1.43 1.54 1.51 1.51 1.48 1.44 1.43 1.43 1.44 1.41 1.41 1.40 1.37 1.37 1.38 1.39
’significant at a level o f  a  = 10% ’’significant at a level o f  a  = 5% ’’’significant at a level o f  a  = 1%
percentage bid-ask spread as the price rises for all stocks priced below FF 900. The 
percentage bid-ask spread for the group o f stocks priced between FF 900-1500 is larger 
than those stocks priced lower and higher than the group. In fact, the percentage bid-ask 
spread for stocks priced between FF 900-1500 is larger than all other price grouping 
except those stocks priced below FF 250.
In order to examine this phenomenon in more detail, stocks are divided into 
groups with and without assigned market makers in order to determine if  the pattern is 
robust across the groups. For stocks without an assigned market maker, the pattern 
across price levels is U-shaped with the lowest percentage bid-ask spread for those stocks 
priced between FF 600-900. For stocks with an assigned market maker the pattern is 
similar to the overall pattern, with a monotonic decline in the percentage bid-ask spread 
as the stock’s price increases, except for those stocks priced between FF 900-1500. The 
two groups have a large difference in magnitude, with the group o f stocks with an 
assigned market maker having a mean percentage bid-ask spread that is approximately 
twice as large as the group o f stocks without an assigned market maker.
The pattern across half-hour intervals exhibits a reverse-J pattern. For those 
stocks with an assigned market maker, the end of day increase in the percentage bid-ask 
spread is less pronounced than for those stocks without an assigned market maker. The 
lack o f increase in the percentage bid-ask spread at the end of the day for those stocks 
with an assigned market maker may be because the stocks with an assigned market maker 
already have a large percentage bid-ask spread. Another possibility is that the assigned 
market maker can simply shift the entire bid-ask spread to adjust for inventory with a 
minimal effect on the percentage bid-ask spread. If  this were the case there would likely
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be a noticeable increase in volatility at the end o f the day for these stocks. As shown in 
Table 22, this is not the case. Volatility as measured by the standard deviation of the 
midpoint does not noticeably increase at the end of the day, while volatility as measured 
by the high minus the low price increases, but only in a similar proportion to both the 
group of stocks with an assigned market maker and the group o f stocks without an 
assigned market maker.
The absolute bid-ask spread is also examined across price groupings. Table 26 
shows the monotonic increase in the absolute bid-ask spread as price increases on an 
overall basis and across groups o f stocks with and without an assigned market maker.
The magnitude o f the difference between the two stock groups is consistent with that 
observed when examining the percentage bid-ask spread. The absolute bid-ask spread is 
approximately twice as large for those stocks with an assigned market maker. For stocks 
priced under FF 100, the magnitude is approximately three times larger for the absolute 
bid-ask spread, but since there is a large range o f stock prices in this group, a direct 
comparison of the absolute bid-ask spread is not as relevant as when using the percentage 
bid-ask spread.
Examining the pattern across half-hour intervals shows a U-shaped pattern on an 
overall basis, with the absolute bid-ask spread near the beginning of the day larger than at 
the end of the day. This is consistent with the percentage bid-ask spread pattern. 
Examining stocks with and without an assigned market maker also shows that the same 
overall pattern is observed for both groups of stocks. Those stocks with an assigned 
market maker do, however, show a gradual decline during the day, with no increase in the 
bid-ask spread at the end of the day. This is consistent with the percentage bid-ask 
spread patterns as well.
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Table 26 This table reports the time-weighted absolute bid-ask spread that occurs across price levels within each thirty-minute time 
interval during the trading day. This is done on an overall basis as well as for those stocks with and without an assigned market 
maker.
Overall
price overall 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00- 4:30- after
10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30 5:00 5:00
< FF 100 1.35 1.40 1.38 1.36 1.34 1.34 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.34 1.33 1.34 1.33 1.34 1.35 1.35
100-250 2.87 3.01 2.95 2.89 2.82 2.78 2.80 2.82 2.84 2.84 2.84 2.86 2.85 2.87 2.91 2.90
250-400 4.96 5.19 5.06 4.96 4.87 4.81 4.80 4.82 4.89 4.97 4.99 5.04 4.96 4.99 5.05 5.04
400-600 6.45 6.86 6.84 6.66 6.50 6.41 6.36 6.36 6.38 6.38 6.37 6.37 6.29 6.32 6.35 6.38
600-900 7.26 7.79 7.69 7.48 7.33 7.16 7.17 7.16 7.14 7.10 7.09 7.06 7.12 7.10 7.24 7.26
900-1500 18.01 18.80 18.51 18.23 17.93 17.89 18.04 18.00 17.90 17.87 17.87 17.78 17.72 17.76 17.90 17.97
>1500 28.84 31.05 30.66 29.89 29.26 28.90 28.91 28.68 28.85 28.50 28.23 27.97 27.69 27.72 28.26 28.12
Stocks without an assigned market maker:
overall 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00- 4:30- after
10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30 5:00 5:00
< FF 100 0.69 0.72 0.72 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.70 0.69
100 - 250 2.07 2.22 2.12 2.05 1.98 1.94 1.98 1.99 2.03 2.05 2.06 2.10 2.08 2.12 2.17 2.16
250-400 3.54 3.77 3.58 3.47 3.34 3.27 3.26 3.31 3.45 3.59 3.63 3.74 3.60 3.63 3.71 3.72
400-600 5.21 5.62 5.57 5.39 5.22 5.11 5.08 5.08 5.13 5.16 5.14 5.16 5.08 5.10 5.12 5.14
600-900 5.30 5.84 5.65 5.51 5.34 5.23 5.23 5.23 5.21 5.15 5.16 5.10 5.15 5.16 5.28 5.32
900-1500 9.43 10.33 9.87 9.48 9.17 9.12 9.42 9.40 9.38 9.28 9.25 9.20 9.19 9.24 9.50 9.63
>1500 22.79 24.50 24.36 23.36 22.87 22.76 22.96 22.64 22.78 22.56 22.30 22.12 21.92 22.04 22.50 22.27
Stocks with an assigned market maker:
overall 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00- 4:30- after
10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30 5:00 5:00
< FF 100 2.63 2.70 2.68 2.66 2.63 2.62 2.61 2.61 2.61 2.62 2.62 2.62 2.60 2.63 2.62 2.62
100-250 4.21 4.34 4.35 4.31 4.25 4.20 4.18 4.21 4.20 4.18 4.15 4.13 4.15 4.15 4.15 4.15
250-400 7.21 7.45 7.42 7.32 7.29 7.23 7.22 7.20 7.17 7.16 7.13 7.09 7.12 7.14 7.16 7.12
400-600 9.09 9.47 9.52 9.34 9.21 9.14 9.07 9.05 9.00 8.95 8.94 8.95 8.83 8.90 8.95 8.98
600-900 13.37 13.89 14.05 13.65 13.52 13.19 13.22 13.18 13.17 13.18 13.14 13.18 13.27 13.15 13.38 13.32
900-1500 33.43 33.97 34.06 33.96 33.68 33.65 33.54 33.48 33.22 33.32 33.36 33.18 33.04 33.07 32.98 32.94
>1500 50.66 54.64 53.31 53.43 52.26 51.03 50.39 50.48 50.74 49.95 49.65 49.05 48.50 48.24 49.03 49.21
‘significant at a level of a  = 10% “significant at a level of a  = 5% “'significant at a level of a  = 1%
The number o f quote revisions across price groups is shown in Table 27. The 
number o f quote revisions does not appear to have a relationship with the price grouping. 
On an overall basis, the number o f quote revisions is approximately nine per period. For 
the low priced stocks (below FF 100) the number o f quote revisions per half-hour appears 
slightly lower at 6.51, while the high priced stocks also appear slightly lower with a mean 
o f 7.48. Parametric and non-parametric tests find that there is a difference within each 
half-hour period across the price groups that is significant at a level o f 1%.
The pattern across price levels is also examined for those stocks with and without 
an assigned market maker. For those stocks without an assigned market maker, there are 
some differences across the price groups, with the mean number o f quote revisions 
slightly lower for those stocks priced below FF 100 and above FF 1500. This is not as 
apparent, however, in the stocks with an assigned market maker. For these stocks, the 
magnitude o f quote revisions is much lower, as expected based on the lower liquidity of 
the stocks placed in this group.
Parametric ANOVA tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums tests are 
performed to tests the differences across the price groups. For the stocks without an 
assigned market maker, in each of the half-hour periods the differences between the price 
groups are statistically significant at a level o f 1% using both parametric and non- 
parametric tests. For the stocks with an assigned market maker, there are differences that 
are statistically significant at a level o f  1% for all half-hour periods except 1:00-l :30 and 
1:30-2:00. For the 1:00-l :30 period, the parametric test is significant at a level o f  5%, 
while the non-parametric test is significant at a  level o f 1%. In the 1:30-2:00 period the
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parametric test is not significantly different, while the non-parametric test shows that the 
difference is statistically significant at a level of 10%.
On an overall basis, the pattern across the half-hour periods exhibits a well- 
defined U-shape, with the mean number o f quote revisions lowest during the 1:00-l :30 
half-hour period. For the most part, the mean number o f quote revisions in the final full 
half-hour o f trading is larger than during the first half-hour o f trading. This does not hold 
for the group o f stocks with prices below FF 100 and prices above FF 1500. For these 
groups the mean number o f quote revisions is larger in the first half-hour of trading.
For stocks without an assigned market maker, the pattern across the half-hour 
periods is well-defined. Again, the minimum mean number o f quote revisions is in the 
1:00-l :30 period, and the mean number o f quote revisions in the final full half-hour of 
trading is larger than the first half-hour for all price groups except those with prices 
below FF 100 and above FF 1500. The pattern is similar for those stocks that have an 
assigned market maker, however, the relative mean number of quote revisions at the 
beginning and end of the day differs. For stocks with an assigned market maker, the 
mean number of quote revisions in the final full half-hour of trading is less than the mean 
in the first half-hour o f trading for all price groups except those stocks with prices 
between FF 400 - 600. For this group, the mean number o f quote revisions is the same in 
the two periods.
The number o f quote revisions that occur after trading differs between those 
stocks with and without an assigned market maker. For those stocks without an assigned 
market maker, the mean number o f quote revisions is approximately half the number in 
the after 5:00 period as compared to the final full half-hour of trading. For those stocks
91
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with an assigned market maker that are priced below FF 600 there is an increase in the 
number of quote revisions after 5 pm. Those stocks priced between FF 600-900 have 
approximately the same number o f mean quote revisions, and those stocks above FF 900 
have a slightly smaller number o f quote revisions after 5 pm. The difference in mean 
number of quote revisions after 5:00 pm may indicate that the stocks with an assigned 
market maker gamer more attention because o f the presence o f  an assigned market 
maker. This is consistent with explanations involving the specialist-like market maker 
influencing the closing prices. It also may indicate that the assigned market maker 
adjusts prices to take advantage o f the after-hours trading, since it is likely that the 
assigned market maker will have more of this trading than any other market maker, and 
thus has more o f an incentive to influence the closing quotes.
3.4.5. Intraday Return
Table 28 examines the intraday return over half-hour intervals. Returns are 
calculated using the final transaction within each half-hour period. Including all stocks, 
the intraday half-hour returns are negative for all half-hours except the two half-hours 
after 4:30. The first two half-hours have the highest magnitude o f  negative return during 
the day. A parametric ANOVA test (F = 109.7) and a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank 
sums test (chi-square = 1,547.4) show significant differences between the half-hour 
intervals during the day. When the last two periods are excluded, the tests are repeated 
and the parametric and non-parametric tests remain statistically significant at a level of 
one percent, however, the values drop to 7.6 and 146.6, respectively. When the first two 
half-hours and the last two half-hours are removed, the statistical significance o f tests 
across the remaining half-hour periods stays at one percent, but the value o f the
92
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Table 28 Intraday returns within each thirty minute time interval are calculated for transactions on the Paris Bourse during the period 
September-December 1995. Returns are calculated using the last transaction within each half-hour period.
Overall
overall 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00- 4:30- after
10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30 5:00 5:00
return -0.0065 -0.0780 -0.0552 -0.0600 -0.0325 -0.0105 -0.0122 -0.0176 -0.0461 -0.0370 -0.0320 -0.0336 -0.0167 -0.0035 0.2668 0.1510
r-stat ■2.8*** -7.8*** -6.1*** -7.1*** -4.2*** -1.4 -1.5 -2.1** -5.9*** -5.0*** -4.3*** -4.6*** -2.2** -0.5 28.4*** 15.4***
n 259007 31132 20792 19966 19364 16662 12782 11202 12646 14933 16738 17470 18030 17965 20968 8357
%pos. 36.0 38.8 34.8 33.8 34.2 34.4 34.5 34.2 32.7 33.7 34.0 34.8 36.5 36.0 46.5 34.1
% zero 26.6 16.4 26.4 27.5 29.0 30.6 30.6 29.4 29.9 29.6 28.0 26.7 25.5 26.0 21.1 43.0
%neg. 37.4 44.8 38.8 38.7 36.8 35.0 34.9 36.4 37.4 36.7 38.0 38.5 38.0 38.0 32.4 22.9
Stocks without an assigned market maker:
overall 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00- 4:30- after
10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30 5:00 5:00
return -0.0021 -0.0630 -0.0353 -0.0312 -0.0054 0.0107 -0.0037 -0.0128 -0.0327 -0.0335 -0.0188 -0.0218 -0.0024 -0.0024 0.1688 0.1099
r-stat -0.9 -5.3*** -4.7*** -4.1*** -0.8 1.4 -0.5 -1.7* -4.4*** -4.7*** -2.7*** -3.1*** -0.3 -0.4 20.0*** 12.3***
n 215562 22122 17004 16554 16126 14226 11288 10063 11288 12984 14305 14886 15321 15247 16626 7522
%pos. 36.9 41.2 36.3 34.9 35.4 35.6 35.3 35.0 33.5 34.8 35.2 36.1 37.9 37.1 45.5 33.1
% zero 25.2 11.9 24.8 26.3 27.6 29.4 29.5 28.3 29.0 27.9 26.1 24.8 23.7 24.1 19.9 43.3
%neg. 37.9 46.9 38.9 38.8 37.0 35.0 35.2 36.7 37.5 37.3 38.7 39.1 38.4 38.7 34.6 23.6
Stocks with an assigned market maker:
overall 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00- 4:30- after
10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30 5:00 5:00
return -0.0286 -0.1146 -0.1443 -0.1999 -0.1675 -0.1348 -0.0765 -0.0597 -0.1575 -0.0602 -0.1097 -0.1020 -0.0967 -0.0093 0.6419 0.5210
r-stat -3.5*** -6.3*** -4.9*** -6.0*** -5.9*** -4.5*** -1.7* -1.2 -3.8*** -1.9* -3.7*** -3.6*** -3.3*** -0.3 20.6*** 9.7***
n 43445 9010 3788 3412 3238 2436 1494 1139 1358 1949 2433 2584 2709 2718 4342 835
%pos. 31.6 33.0 28.1 28.5 28.2 27.8 28.4 27.4 26.4 26.5 27.3 27.5 28.6 30.0 50.4 43.0
%zero 33.5 27.2 33.5 33.3 35.8 37.3 38.6 38.7 38.0 40.6 38.9 37.2 35.4 36.4 25.8 40.5
%neg. 34.9 39.8 38.4 38.2 36.0 34.9 33.0 33.9 35.6 32.9 33.8 35.3 36.0 33.6 23.8 16.5
Tests of difference:
ANOVA 18.3*** 5.5** 21.7*** 56.0*** 62.7*** 43.6*** 7.9*** 2.7* 23.6*** 1.5 18.6*** 15.4*** 19.7*** 0.1 425.6*** 162.3***
Wile. 31.9*** 1.0 37.2*** 28.4*** 29.7*** 29.0*** 5.6** 5.3** 12.0*** 4.8** 8.0*** 14.2*** 20.1*** 2.0 314.8*** 78.4***
'significant at a level o f  a  = 10% "significant at a level o f  a  = 5% "'significant at a level o f  a  = 1%
parametric and non-parametric test are at 49 and 60.5, respectively. This indicates that 
the beginning and end of the day exacerbate much o f the variation during the day.
Table 28 also divides stocks into those with an assigned market maker and those 
without an assigned market maker. For both groups the pattern is negative returns for all 
periods except the final two, however, the magnitude o f the final two periods differs. The 
stocks with an assigned market maker have returns that are approximately five times 
larger than the returns for stocks without an assigned market maker. During the day, the 
stocks with an assigned market maker have negative returns that have a higher magnitude 
than the returns for the stocks o f firms without assigned market makers. In eight o f  the 
thirteen half-hour periods (excluding the final two periods) both parametric and non- 
parametric tests show statistically significant differences at a level o f  1 percent.
Table 29 shows the intraday return using the reduced sample of firms that have a 
total volume during the sample period of 100,000 to 200,000 shares. Each half-hour 
return for the entire reduced sample is negative except for the final two half-hour periods. 
When the stocks are divided into those with and without an assigned market maker, there 
are significant differences for only six of the half-hour periods. The most significant 
differences are for the final full half-hour period (4:30-5:00), where both the parametric 
and non-parametric tests are significant at a level o f  1%.
3.5. Conclusion
The end-of-day effect first observed in the U.S. is also evident on the Paris 
Bourse. The contributions o f this essay toward a further understanding of the end-of-day 
effect are: (1) The existence o f a significantly higher magnitude o f the final intraday 
transaction return is found for securities that have an assigned market maker versus those
94
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that do not have an assigned market maker. This is robust across subdivisions based on 
time of day, day of the week as well as the price level of the stock. (2) The existence of 
an impact on the final intraday transaction return by the price o f the stock is in addition to 
the assigned market maker effect, suggesting that the hypothesis regarding the tendency 
to switch to the ask price may have some validity. (3) The proximity o f the last 
transaction to the close o f trading has a significant effect on the magnitude of the final 
intraday transaction return, regardless o f price level or market structure. (4) The end of 
month effect is not observed on the final intraday transaction return for the group o f 
stocks with an assigned market maker suggesting the assigned market makers are not 
involved in window dressing at month end. (5) The final intraday transaction return is 
partially reversed overnight with a magnitude that is proportional to the final intraday 
transaction return suggesting a portion o f the price rise may be temporary. This 
explanation is also consistent with Hatheway’s (1994) explanation that the price rise at 
the end of the day could be used to induce information from short sales the following 
morning. Future research should be directed towards understanding the causes for these 
observed effects.
This essay also finds that volume follows a reverse-J intraday pattern for stocks 
traded with and without an assigned market maker. When cross-trades are examined 
separately, they show the same pattern during the day, however, in trades reported after 5 
pm, there is a larger percentage of cross-trades than in on-exchange transactions. This 
may be a result o f an inability to trade on the exchange or may be an attempt to influence 
the closing price.
Volatility as measured by a high minus low price definition is found to follow a 
U-shaped pattern during the day. When the standard deviation of changes in successive
96
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midpoints is used as the definition then the pattern resembles a reverse-J. Using the full 
sample the two measures appear to contradict each other with respect to whether the 
group o f stocks with or without an assigned market maker has a larger volatility. When a 
reduced sample matched on level o f volume is used the magnitude o f volatility is larger 
for the group of stocks with an assigned market maker.
This chapter shows that the intraday bid-ask spread is larger in magnitude for 
stocks with an assigned market maker, even when controlling for price. The percentage 
and absolute bid-ask spread exhibit a reverse-J pattern during the trading day for stocks 
with and without an assigned market maker. The number o f quote revisions throughout 
the day follows a U-shaped pattern with stocks without an assigned market maker having 
approximately five times more quote revisions, likely reflecting the differences in 
liquidity. The differences are not uniform since after 5 pm the multiple drops from five 
to three, indicating a proportional increase in the attention paid to stocks with an assigned 
market maker in the period near the market close.
The intraday return over half-hour intervals is examined and the beginning and 
end of the trading day are shown to be responsible for most o f the variation during the 
trading day. There are differences between the group o f stocks with and without an 
assigned market maker. For stocks with an assigned market maker the intraday return in 
the final two periods has a magnitude approximately five times larger than the group o f  
stocks without an assigned market maker. The return observed intraday also has a 
magnitude that is larger for those stocks with an assigned market maker.
The direct comparability o f these findings with studies on other exchanges must 
consider the different incentives that exist on the Paris Bourse compared to the US 
exchanges that are the focus o f much of the research in this area. Principal trading on the
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Paris Bourse may be carried out by member firms during or outside the trading session. 
During the trading session the trade must be at a price within or at the existing spread, but 
if the principal trade occurs outside the trading session then it must be carried out within 
the spread or at a price plus or minus 1% o f the best bid or best offer existing at the close 
o f the previous trading day. These differing incentives which affect the closing price 
may impair cross-exchange comparability.
Subsequent to the sample period and notification o f these results to researchers at 
the Paris Bourse, the end of day procedures have been altered by introducing a batch 
auction at the close for all continuously traded securities. Under the new rule instituted in 
May 1996 all trading ceases at 4:55 pm and market orders are accumulated but not 
executed. At 5:00 pm the electronic system matches the orders in a batch auction similar 
to the open and this price is the closing price for the day. The new procedure may 
eliminate concerns that may be created from observing an end o f day transaction price 
anomaly on the Paris Bourse.
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CHAPTER 4 
ESSAY TWO:
MARKET STRUCTURE AND THE CCOMPONENTS OF THE BID-ASK SPREAD 
4.1. Introduction
The rapid structural change in the securities industry caused by expanding 
international markets, technological advances and intermarket competition encourages 
further analysis o f the differences in execution costs between different market structures. 
Execution costs can be divided into direct commissions and indirect fees such as the bid- 
ask spread and market impact. The bid-ask spread is the difference between the price at 
which the market maker is willing to sell and the price at which the market maker is 
willing to buy. This compensation to the market maker has been decomposed into three 
theoretical components: inventory holding costs, order processing costs and adverse 
information costs. The inventory holding cost is the compensation charged by the market 
maker for holding a sub-optimal portfolio. The order processing costs are those fees that 
are charged to compensate for the processing charges involved in a transaction. The 
adverse information (or adverse selection) costs are those costs that compensate the 
market maker for transacting with investors that are better informed.
The relative merits o f alternative trading systems have been questioned in the 
theoretical and empirical literature. Theoretically, the efficiency of the specialist market 
organization is argued by Glosten (1989) and Leach and Madhavan (1993). The ability 
o f the monopolist to suffer losses on individual trades encourages competition among 
informed traders and permits the market to stay open where under other circumstances it 
would be forced to close because of the competitive conditions. Benveniste, Marcus and
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Wilhelm (1992) show that the specialist can induce information release by penalizing 
brokers that attempt to exploit the information. This model o f the specialist’s behavior 
suggests that the specialist is most valuable when there is a tendency for informed 
trading. Additionally, the specialist market has limit orders that can be thought o f as 
providing competition to the specialist (see Harris and Hasbrouck (1996)). Similarly, 
Laux (1997) shows that institutional investors provide outside competition in a dealer 
market, and this can affect the bid-ask spread.
Empirical examinations of the bid-ask spread have compared the speed of 
adjustment to new information and the relative size on different exchanges. Kim, Lin and 
Slovin (1997) show that information is impounded in prices in less trading time after the 
open on NYSE/ASE stocks compared to Nasdaq stocks. This supports Madhavan’s 
(1992) finding that call auctions are more efficient than a dealer system. Conversely, 
Masulis and Shivakumar (1997) find that Nasdaq stocks react faster than NYSE/ASE 
stocks to intraday equity offering announcements.
The size of the bid-ask spread has been the focus o f recent studies. Christie and 
Schultz (1994) and Christie, Harris and Schultz (1994) note a tendency for bid-ask 
spreads on Nasdaq to be larger than spreads on NYSE because of an avoidance o f odd- 
eighth prices. Godek (1996), however, suggests that the larger bid-ask spreads are 
justifiable economic results o f the market structure and the incentive structure. Statistical 
models o f spread components have also been used to compare single dealer and multiple 
dealer markets. Contradictory results have been found in assessing the components of the 
bid-ask spread across exchanges. Widely divergent estimates of the adverse selection 
component have been produced. Glosten and Harris (1988) use 250 NYSE stocks and
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estimate that about 20% o f the total spread is due to adverse information. Stoll (1989) 
finds that the adverse selection component accounts for approximately 43% o f the total 
spread for a sample o f 900 Nasdaq stocks.
Direct comparisons o f bid-ask spread components or trade execution costs are 
also made by Affleck-Graves, Hedge and Miller (1994), Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995b), 
Huang and Stoll (1996), Porter and Weaver (1996), Jones and Lipson (1997) and 
Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997). Affleck-Graves, Hedge and Miller (1994) find that 
order processing costs are lower for NYSE/ASE stocks and adverse selection costs are 
lower for Nasdaq. Conversely, Jones and Lipson (1997) indicate that the adverse 
selection cost component is larger on Nasdaq. They find effective9 bid-ask spreads to be 
only slightly smaller on NYSE, while realized bid-ask spreads are two to three times 
lower. Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) update Huang and Stoll’s (1996) finding o f 
larger execution costs on Nasdaq compared to the NYSE. Bessembinder and Kaufman 
find a smaller differential than Huang and Stoll and this may reflect the timing o f  the 
sample (1994 versus 1991). They find average effective spreads to be approximately 
25% larger for large firms, and approximately twice as large for medium and small firms.
The Paris Bourse provides a unique structure that is well suited to comparing 
different market structures since two market structures coexist: some stocks trade using 
multiple dealers while other stocks also each have an assigned market maker. The price 
effects of trading and the components o f  the bid-ask spread have been studied on the 
Paris Bourse by De Jong, Nijman and Roell (1996). They do not, however, compare the 
two market structures on the Paris Bourse. Using the Glosten (1994) model, extended to
9 All alternate measures of the bid-ask spread are defined in section 4.3.2.
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include order processing costs, they find that the adverse selection component o f the bid- 
ask spread comprises 30-45% of the total spread, with the remainder accounted for by 
order processing costs. They use two different models to estimate the price impacts and 
find that using the Glosten (1994) model generates estimates o f the price impact that vary 
from 25% o f the bid-ask spread for small transactions to 60% for large transactions.
Using a vector autoregression model, they provide estimates o f the permanent price 
impact that vary from 40% to 115% o f the total bid-ask spread.
In this chapter, the general decomposition model o f Huang and Stoll (1997) is 
used to decompose the bid-ask spreads o f stocks traded on the Paris Bourse and a 
comparison is made across the two market structures that coexist. The Huang and Stoll 
model is a reconciliation o f existing covariance and trade indicator models. They show 
that their trade indicator model fully decomposes the bid-ask spread into the three 
components: inventory holding costs, adverse selection costs and order processing costs. 
This chapter will add to the De Jong, Nijman and Roell (1996) findings by using a model 
that decomposes the bid-ask spread into all its components. Furthermore, the data set 
used in this chapter encompasses a larger time period (84 days versus 44 days), is more 
current (September-December 1995 versus May 25 - July 25 1991) and is larger (454 
firms versus ten firms).
This chapter also employs the procedures used by Bessembinder and Kaufman 
(1997) to calculate the execution costs o f  trading on the Paris Bourse and compares these 
estimates across the two market structures that coexist. The Bessembinder and Kaufman 
(1997) method provides a direct measure o f trade execution costs. This is beneficial 
since it does not rely on the assumptions o f a theoretical model.
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4.2. Hypotheses
The unique arrangement o f the Paris Bourse, with two market structures operating 
simultaneously, provides an opportunity to test for differences in the components o f the 
bid-ask spread. The inconclusive findings regarding the relative sizes o f  the adverse 
selection component on NYSE and Nasdaq make prediction difficult. A higher adverse 
selection component may be more likely when one dealer is required to stay in the 
market. This is especially true if  that dealer is constrained from information gathering by 
its research division through rules such as ‘Chinese walls’ that prohibit communication 
between the research division and the dealer. In conjunction to this, Easley, Kiefer, 
O’Hara and Paperman (1996) find that higher volume stocks have a lower probability of 
information-based trading. This may subject the assigned market maker on the Paris 
Bourse to a higher adverse selection component since these stocks have, on average, 
lower volume than stocks without an assigned market maker. The lower volume stocks 
do not necessarily ensure higher adverse selection costs, since the timing o f intraday 
volume may also be important. Foster and Viswanathan (1993) find that high adverse 
selection costs are found at times of the day when there is higher trading volume.
Intraday fluctuations in adverse selection costs are not specifically examined, however, 
an overall comparison is made to determine the relative size o f this component across the 
two market structures.
The specific hypotheses are as follows:
Hlo: The adverse selection component is the same for stocks with and without an 
assigned market maker.
HI a: The adverse selection component is not equal for stocks with and without an 
assigned market maker.
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This requires a two-tailed test. As suggested by the literature, the volume o f  a stock may
impact on the size o f the adverse selection component and this may confound tests across
market structures. Volume levels can be used to rank and group stocks and then
comparisons across market structures may be more informative. Hypothesis one (H I) is
revisited controlling for these volume differences. Additionally, testing o f the adverse
selection component’s variation with volume within each market structure may indicate if
the level o f  volume is a valid explanatory factor. The hypotheses are as follows:
H2o: The adverse selection component o f stocks with or without an assigned 
market maker is the same across volume levels.
H2a: The adverse selection component o f stocks with or without an assigned 
market maker differs across volume levels.
The inventory holding cost component is likely nontrivial for those stocks with an
assigned market maker since the assigned market maker is required to maintain a positive
inventory and may be more sensitive to inventory changes. Thus, those stocks with an
assigned market maker may have a higher inventory holding cost component. This
suggests the following hypotheses to test this proposition:
H3o: The inventory holding cost component is the same for stocks with and 
without an assigned market maker.
H3a: The inventory holding cost component is larger for stocks with an assigned 
market maker than for those stocks without an assigned market maker.
This requires a one-tailed test.
The order processing cost component was found by Affleck-Graves, Hedge and
Miller (1994) to be smaller for those stocks that traded on NYSE/ASE. This may be a
function of the individual stocks under examination or may be a reflection o f the different
costs across exchanges. The Paris Bourse data can be used to identify the source o f the
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difference since any differences are a reflection o f the stocks or the market structure and
not the exchange itself. This suggests the following hypotheses:
H4o: The order processing cost component is the same for stocks with and 
without an assigned market maker.
H4a: The order processing cost component is smaller for stocks with an assigned 
market maker than for stocks without an assigned market maker.
This also requires a one-tailed testing procedure.
The inventory holding cost component may be considered to be a function o f  the
accumulation of inventory. Furthermore, assigned market makers may be more likely to
be affected by inventory changes since they have to maintain a presence in the market.
The effect o f  inventory changes is tested by dividing the period under study. In the first
period buy and sell transactions are netted to create a summation of the accumulated
inventory change, and the total inventory changes are ranked and placed in quintiles.
Then, in the subsequent period, the estimated inventory holding cost component is
compared across the inventory accumulation quintiles. If there are statistically significant
differences across inventory accumulation quintiles, then this demonstrates that inventory
accumulation can be considered to be an explanatory variable in determining the
inventory holding costs. The specific hypotheses are as follows:
H5c>: The inventory holding cost component is the same for groups o f stocks 
determined by the inventory change in the previous period.
H5a: The inventory holding cost component differs across group o f  stocks 
determined by the inventory change in the previous period.
Furthermore, a comparison between stocks with and without an assigned market maker
will determine if the effect o f a large inventory change may be more noticeable for those
stocks with an assigned market maker since the assigned market maker is required to
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maintain a presence in the market. Hypothesis three (H3) will be revisited to test if  the 
difference between the group o f stocks with and without an assigned market maker 
within each o f the groups of stocks determined by the inventory change in the previous 
period.
Since trades are often executed at prices inside the quotes direct trade execution
costs are examined using a number o f measures10 following Bessembinder and Kaufman
(1997). In each of the measures, the difference between the group o f stocks with and
without an assigned market maker provides further information about the performance o f
the alternate trading systems. The hypotheses that are tested are as follows:
H6o: The trade execution cost measure is the same for stocks with and without an 
assigned market maker.
H6a : The trade execution cost measure is not equal for stocks with and without an 
assigned market maker.
4.3. Data and Method of Testing
The data used in this research is supplied by the Paris Bourse. It contains the 
price, time, number o f shares traded, and a classification identifying whether the trade 
was a pass-through transaction that occurred outside the exchange. Quote data is also 
provided that details the best limit orders that were in the system at all times. There is 
also descriptive data that identifies the trading compartment o f the stock. Trading 
compartments are described in Appendix A. Trading is examined over the period 
September through December, 1995. In total, there are 3,189,976 transactions and 
3,301,090 quotes for 458 firms over this 84 trading day period. Only those securities that 
are traded on a continuous basis during the day after the open are retained for the present
10 The measures are defined in section 4.3.2.
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analysis. To ensure trades are only matched with quotes that preceded the trades, any 
quotes must have been outstanding for at least five seconds. This was originally 
suggested by Lee and Ready (1991), specific to the floor o f  the NYSE, however, it is also 
applicable for the Paris Bourse as a conservative measure o f ensuring that trades and 
quotes are reported in the proper causal order. Since it is unlikely that traders react 
within five seconds to a new quote, ensuring quotes are outstanding for five seconds 
forces those trades that occur within five seconds o f a quote revision to be measured 
against earlier quotes that likely were in force when the decision to trade occurred.
Simple statistics are provided in Table 1. A summary o f the number o f firms 
listed daily is provided on an overall basis, as well as divided into groups based on 
whether the firm has an assigned market maker.
Two methods are used in this chapter to examine the properties o f trading costs on 
the Paris Bourse. Estimation o f Huang and Stoll’s (1997) general decomposition model 
is used to test hypotheses one to five. This method is explained in section 4.3.1. The 
trade execution costs measured in Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) are used to test 
hypothesis six. This is explained in sections 4.3.2.
4.3.1. Huang and Stoll's (1997) General Decomposition Model
The bid-ask spread decomposition model o f Huang and Stoll (1997) involves the 
estimation of two equations. The first equation is the conditional expectation of the trade 
indicator at time t-1, given the trade indicator at time t-2.
H(Q,.,| Qt-2) = (1-2tc) Qt-2 (1)
where the subscript t refers to time and n refers to the probability that the trade at t-1 is 
opposite in sign to the trade at t-2. Qt is defined to be the buy-sell trade indicator variable
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for the transaction price, Pt. It equals +1 (-1) if  the transaction is buyer-initiated (seller- 
initiated) and occurs above (below) the midpoint o f the bid-ask spread. It equals 0 if  the 
transaction occurs at the midpoint.
The second equation estimates the components o f  the spread directly from the 
quote-change equation:
AM, = (a  + P) Sm Qm - a (  1-271) S|-2 Q,-2 + e, (2)
2 2
where M, is the bid-ask spread midpoint at time t, S n  is the observed posted bid-ask 
spread at time t-1, a  is the proportion o f  the half-spread attributable to adverse selection, 
and p is the proportion o f the half-spread attributable to inventory holding costs. The 
error term, et, is a serially uncorrelated public information shock that contains rounding 
errors.
These components are estimable because o f assumptions about behavior 
following each transaction. As inventory is accumulated, inventory models assume that 
market makers adjust prices relative to fundamental values in order to induce inventory 
equilibrating trades. This would suggest that following a transaction there should be a 
reversal o f  the direction o f trade to compensate for inventory costs. This is induced by a 
market maker that lowers (raises) prices following a purchase (sale). Therefore the 
component o f the bid-ask spread attributable to inventory holding costs, p, can be 
estimated by observing how the midpoint changes following a transaction.
The adverse selection costs, a ,  are also confounded with the estimate o f  inventory 
holding costs since following a purchase (sale) market makers would lower (raise) prices 
in order to reflect the potential information content o f  the trade. They are differentiated 
in Huang and Stoll’s model by using the negative serial covariance induced by inventory
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adjustments. The probability o f a reversal, n, increases when quotes adjust for inventory 
purposes, but not for adverse selection purposes. In the Huang and Stoll model, the order 
processing component of the bid-ask spread is calculated as the remainder following the 
estimation of the inventory and adverse selection cost components.
Huang and Stoll (1997) estimate the two equations using a generalized method o f  
moments (GMM) procedure. This is done in order to impose weak distributional 
assumptions on the data which is particularly important since the error term includes 
rounding errors due to discreteness in the price data. Furthermore, the GMM procedure 
accommodates conditional heteroskedasticity o f  an unknown form and serial correlation 
in the residuals.
Before the GMM estimation is done a simpler non-linear least squares (NLLS) 
estimation procedure is used in this chapter and the error terms are examined in order to 
test if  the estimation procedure is appropriate. The second equation contains lagged 
versions o f the buy-sell trade indicator variable (Q n and Qt-2) that can be considered to be 
predetermined. This system of equations can be estimated using non-linear least squares 
and the residuals from this estimation procedure should have a zero mean and a positive 
definite covariance matrix. If the residuals are autocorrelated then the standard errors 
may be incorrect. If the residuals are heteroskedastic, then estimation using some 
weighting can be used, or alternatively, without knowing the proper weighting, the GMM 
procedure can be used. Both a GMM and NLLS estimation are used to estimate the 
coefficients. Additionally, the residuals o f the GMM procedure are examined to 
determine if they exhibit autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, since evidence o f these 
two potential problems casts some doubt as to the appropriateness of the NLLS 
estimation.
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4.3.2. Bessembinder and Kaufman’s (1997) Trade Execution Cost Estimates
Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) estimate the quoted, effective and realized 
bid-ask spreads. The quoted half-spread is measured as follows:
Quoted Half-Spreadjt = 100*(Ait - Bjt) /2 M it), (3)
where A;t is the posted ask price for security i at time t, B jt is the posted bid price for 
security i at time t, and M jt is the quote midpoint or mean o f A jt and B jt. This measures 
one-half o f a round-trip execution costs in percent if trades are executed at the quotes. 
The conventional method o f reporting is to use a one-way measure as reported by half o f 
the quoted percentage spread.
The effective half-spread measures trading costs, accounting for the fact that 
trades may occur inside the quoted spread. This is calculated as follows:
Effective Half-Spreadu = 100Dit(Pjt - Mjt)/Mjt, (4)
where Pjt is the transaction price for security i at time t, and Du is a dummy variable that 
equals one for customer buy orders and negative one for customer sell orders. Mu is the 
midpoint o f  the most recently posted bid and ask quotes for security i (interpreted as a 
proxy for the pre-trade value of the asset). The two components o f the effective spread 
are the price impact and the realized half-spread. The price impact is defined as follows: 
Price Impactu = 100Dit(Pjt+n - Mit)/Mjt, (5)
where Pjt+n is the first trade observed at least thirty minutes or one day after the trade for 
which price impact is measured. The price impact represents the private information 
content that is conveyed by the trade. The realized half-spread is defined as follows: 
Realized Half-Spreadjt = 100Djt(Pit - Pu+n)/Mjt (6)
The realized half-spread represents the profit net of adverse selection but prior to order 
processing and inventory costs. This can be considered to be the net revenue.
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Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) recognize that the large number o f data 
observations creates some difficulties arising from data processing limitations. They 
circumvent the problems by calculating mean monthly trade execution cost measures, and 
then averaging across stocks. They use a weighted least-squares regression procedure 
(with the weights being the number of observations) where a dummy variable 
(representing the exchange) is regressed on the mean trade execution cost. They use the 
residuals in a bootstrap procedure consisting of 500 estimates using random sampling of 
300 firm’s residuals to come up with p-values that test the difference between NYSE and 
Nasdaq stocks.
In this chapter, a two-stage computational procedure is also used. Daily averages 
are first calculated for each stock. This is similar to Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), 
and has the added benefit of ensuring that higher frequency stocks do not dominate any 
calculations o f overall means. Means are provided globally as well as after dividing 
stocks into groups with and without an assigned market maker. Differences between the 
two groups are calculated using a parametric ANOVA test and a non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank scores test. All stocks are also divided into price quintiles based on the 
first price of each stock during the period. Testing of the difference between the group of 
stocks with and without an assigned market maker is done in each o f these price quintiles. 
4.4. Bid-Ask Spread Component Results
In this section the Huang and Stoll (1997) general decomposition model is used to 
estimate the components of the bid-ask spread. A simple NLLS estimation procedure is 
used in addition to the GMM procedure employed by Huang and Stoll as explained in
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section 4.3.1. In order to determine the reliability o f  the NLLS estimates, the residuals 
from the GMM method are examined to determine if  the simpler estimation procedure is 
appropriate. The NLLS procedure is considered appropriate if  the residuals from the 
GMM estimation are without serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
The residuals indicate that serial correlation is present for a majority o f the stocks. 
Table 30 reports that o f  the 454 stocks, 452 have usable GMM estimates and residuals. 
Statistically significant serial correlation is found in 339 stocks. The measure o f 
heteroskedasticity is performed in two ways. White’s asymptotically consistent 
covariance matrix is used to test the residuals and statistically significant 
heteroskedasticity is found in 293 stocks. The Goldfeldt-Quandt method is also 
employed, where the residuals are divided into two groups based on the magnitude o f an 
instrumental variable. Statistically significant heteroskedasticity is found in 384, 364 and 
358 stocks, depending on the instrumental variable used to divide the residuals. The 
instrumental variables are chosen following Huang and Stoll (1997). The three 
instrumental variables used are the lagged half-spread multiplied by the lagged buy-sell 
indicator variable, the second lagged half-spread multiplied by the second lagged buy-sell 
indicator variable and the second lagged buy-sell indicator variable.
The overall observance of the presence o f serial correlation and heteroskedasticity 
suggests that the GMM method employed by Huang and Stoll (1997) to correct for these 
problems is appropriate with this data. Both the NLLS and GMM methods o f estimation 
are used and both sets o f  coefficient estimates are provided in all testing. Estimates are 
individually obtained for 452 stocks using the GMM procedure.
112
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 30 This table reports summary statistics for tests o f  serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity. The Huang and Stoll (1997) model, shown as equations (1) and (2), 
are estimated using a GMM procedure for each stock on the Paris Bourse during the 
period September-December 1995. Residuals are analyzed to determine if  serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity are present. The correlation test used is the Pearson 
correlation coefficient o f the residual on the lag o f the residual. Two heteroskedasticity 
tests are used. Estimation o f White’s aymptotically consistent covariance matrix is used 
to estimate the significance o f heteroskedasticity. Additionally, the Goldfeldt-Quant test 
is used where the residuals are divided into two groups based on one o f the instrumental 
variables and the ratio o f the sum or squared errors is computed and compared to the 
probability o f an F-test distribution.
Total Firms Reject at 1% Reject at 5% Reject at 10% Fail to Reject
PANEL A All Observations 
Serial Correlation
Pearson Correlation Coefficient
452 264
Heteroskedasticity
White’s Test 452 178
Goldfeldt-Quant
#1 452 325
#2 452 298
#3 452 275
48 27 113
78 37 159
39 20 68
39 27 88
53 30 94
PANEL B Observations with Bunching 
Serial Correlation
Pearson Correlation Coefficient
387 248
Heteroskedasticity
White’s Test 387 149
Goldfeldt-Quant
#1 387 216
#2 387 187
#3 387 219
33 19 87
59 29 150
45 22 104
46 25 129
45 20 103
113
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A bunching procedure is also used where successive transactions at identical 
prices are combined into one larger trade. This bunching is used by Huang and Stoll 
(1997) in order to account for large trades that are negotiated at a single price, but may be 
reported in a series o f smaller trades. This is a potential source o f positive serial 
correlation and affects the estimates o f the parameters. Bunching reduces the sample size 
o f transactions from 2,454,828 by 1,276,597 to 1,178,231. When bunching is employed 
there are 355 stocks with coefficient estimates using the GMM estimation procedure. 
Some o f the individual coefficients estimates are outside economically meaningful 
ranges. One reason is due to an insufficient number o f observations. To ensure the 
estimates obtained are at the global minimum, a grid search is performed with starting 
values within the bounds of the empirical predictions. Additionally, an increase in the 
maximum number o f iterations is also attempted in order to obtain estimates that 
converge and are economically meaningful.
The serial correlation and heteroskedasticity measures are re-calculated for using 
the bunched observations and reported on Table 30. O f the 387 firms with estimates 
using the GMM procedure, 300 firms exhibit statistically significant serial correlation. 
The tests for heteroskedasticity also show a large percentage o f firms with statistically 
significant estimates. Using White's test, 337 firms show statistically significant 
heterskedasticity. When the Goldfeldt-Quant test and each o f the three instrumental 
variables are used, statistically significant heteroskedasticity is found in 296, 271 and 297 
firms. These results confirm that serial correlation and heteroskedasticity are present in 
the observations both with and without the bunching procedure.
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The estimates are averaged across firms and reported on an overall basis, as well 
as for each group of stocks with and without an assigned market maker. Tests o f 
difference are done between the two groups using a parametric ANOVA test and a non- 
parametric Wilcoxon rank scores test.
In the following sections the individual hypotheses are tested and results are 
presented. While estimates of only one component are required to test each of the 
hypotheses outlined, all are estimated simultaneously and are reported in the resulting 
tables. In all cases, the adverse selection component (a), the inventory holding cost 
component ((3) and the probability of reversal (7t) are presented. The order processing 
component is not shown since it is a remainder, but the exception is in Table 16 where 
the order processing costs are reported in order to test hypotheses four (H4).
4.4.1. Overall Bid-Ask Spread Component Estimates
In this section the individual components o f  the bid-ask spread are estimated and 
hypotheses are tested that involve comparisons across stocks with and without an 
assigned market maker.
4.4.1.1. Adverse Selection Cost Component
Table 16 shows the bid-ask spread component estimates for all transactions and 
those transactions using the bunching procedure in which successive transactions at 
identical prices are combined into a larger trade. The estimates for the adverse selection 
component, a ,  all have non-positive mean values irrespective o f the method of 
estimation. The overall estimates and the estimates for the group of stocks without an 
assigned market maker are all significantly different than zero. The group o f  firms with 
an assigned market maker have estimates that are not significantly different than zero.
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Table 31 This table reports estimates o f  bid-ask spread components. This table uses a 
NLLS and GMM estimation procedure to estimate the Huang and Stoll (1997) model, 
shown as equations (1) and (2), for each firm on the Paris Bourse during the September - 
December 1995 period. Results are shown on an overall basis, as well as for each group 
o f stocks that trade with and without an assigned market maker. Panel A presents the 
results using all observations in the regression, while panel B uses a bunching procedure 
in which successive transactions at identical prices are combined into one larger trade. A 
parametric ANOVA test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums test are used to test 
differences between the means in the two groups.
a  SD (3 SD n  SD
PANEL A All Observations
Overall
NLLS -0.0105” ’ 0.0837 0.0682*** 0.0788 0.2661*’* 0.0485
GMM -0.0078” ’ 0.0541 0.0607*** 0.0472 0.1767**’ 0.0505
Firms Without An Assigned Market Maker
NLLS -0.0125*”  0.0630 0.0616**’ 0.0594 0.2609*“  0.0421
GMM -0.0099"' 0.0436 0.0576"' 0.0415 0.1756**’ 0.0458
Firms With An Assigned Market Maker
NLLS -0.0064 0.1146 0.0813**’ 0.1066 0.2765*’* 0.0581
GMM -0.0037 0.0706 0.0669*** 0.0564 0.1789*** 0.0590
Tests of Difference ANOVA Wilcoxon ANOVA Wilcoxon ANOVA Wilcoxon
NLLS 0.53 0.21 6.35*”  7.38*** 10.58*"’ 25.32*’*
GMM 1.34 0.31 3.91”  4.94*’ 0.45 2.06
PANEL B Observations with Bunching
Overall
NLLS -0.0437” 0.3450 0.1366*’* 0.3391 0.4662*’’ 0.0768
GMM -0.0486*”  0.2597 0.1479*** 0.2523 0.4562*** 0.1215
Firms Without An Assigned Market Maker
NLLS -0.0508” 0.3044 0.1332*** 0.3012 0.4731*“  0.0807
GMM -0.0549*”  0.2447 0.1471*“  0.2418 0.4693*”  0.1234
Firms With An Assigned Market Maker
NLLS -0.0284 0.4201 0.1440*“  0.4101 0.4513*** 0.0657
GMM -0.0353 0.2899 0.1494*“  0.2745 0 4281*“  0.1126
Tests of Difference ANOVA Wilcoxon ANOVA Wilcoxon ANOVA Wilcoxon
NLLS 0.33 0.33 0.08 0.05 6.30‘* 3.94*"
GMM 0.44 0.21 0.01 0.06 9.09*“  9.44
’significant at a level of a  = 10%
“ significant at a level of a  = 5%
“ ‘significant at a level of a  = 1%
(table con'd)
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(Table 31 continued)
1 - a - p  SD
PANEL A All Observations 
Overall
NLLS 0.9423’** 0.0541
GMM 0.9471*** 0.0484
Firms Without An Assigned Market Maker 
NLLS 0.9509’”  0.0485
GMM 0.9523*”  0.0426
Firms With An Assigned Market Maker 
NLLS 0.9251 0.0604
GMM 0.9368 0.0571
Tests of Difference ANOVA Wilcoxon
NLLS 24.04*”  34.02*”
GMM 10.54*”  14.49**’
PANEL B Observations with Bunching 
Overall
NLLS 0.9070’"  0.0719
GMM 0.9008**’ 0.0663
Firms Without An Assigned Market Maker 
NLLS 0.9176’** 0.0599
GMM 0.9077*** 0.0577
Firms With An Assigned Market Maker
0.0887 
0.0799
Wilcoxon 
20.13*” 
6.63” *
’significant at a level of a  = 10%
"significant at a level of a  = 5%
" ’significant at a level of a  = 1%
NLLS 0.8844
GMM 0.8859
Tests of Difference ANOVA
NLLS 17.17*”
GMM 8.55’**
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In order to test hypothesis one (HI) and determine if the estimates for the adverse 
selection component differ between the group of stocks with and without an assigned 
market maker, a parametric ANOVA test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank scores test 
are performed on the means. For all the GMM and NLLS estimates with or without 
bunching, neither the parametric nor the non-parametric test is significant. These results 
indicate that the null hypothesis for hypothesis one (HI) that the adverse selection 
component is the same for those stocks with and without an assigned market maker is not 
rejected.
4.4.I.2. Inventory Holding Cost Component
Hypothesis three (H3) investigates whether the inventory holding cost component, 
P, is larger for stocks with an assigned market maker. Table 16 shows that, without 
bunching, the inventory cost component is larger for stocks with an assigned market 
maker. The mean coefficient estimate is approximately 7-8% for those stocks with an 
assigned market maker versus 6% for those stocks without an assigned market maker.
The difference is significant at a level of 1% for both the parametric and non-parametric 
tests when using the NLLS estimates. When using the GMM estimates, the difference is 
significant at a level o f 5% using both tests of difference.
These estimation results differ when the bunching procedure is used. Without 
bunching, the null o f hypothesis three (H3) is rejected, suggesting that stocks with an 
assigned market maker are compensated for the requirement to maintain inventory.
When bunching is used, the coefficient estimates increase to approximately 13-15%, 
however, there is no statistically significant difference between the coefficient estimates 
of stocks with and without an assigned market maker. This suggests that the difference 
apparent when bunching is not used may be due to the frequency o f similar trades. The
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splitting o f orders could increase the positive serial correlation. The estimation technique 
may over-emphasize continuations instead of reversals, hence increasing the positive 
serial correlation.
4.4.I.3. Order Processing Cost Component
The order processing cost component can be calculated as the remainder from one 
after deducting the adverse selection cost component and the inventory holding cost 
component. Table 16 reports the order processing cost component estimates using the 
GMM and NLLS estimation methods calculated using all the observations with and 
without bunching. The table also reports the mean estimates on an overall basis and 
divided into groups based on if  the stock is traded with or without an assigned market 
maker.
The order processing cost component of the bid-ask spread is calculated to be 
94.71% o f the bid-ask spread when the GMM procedure is used and 94.23% when the 
NLLS procedure is used. With bunching, this falls to 90.08% and 90.70%, respectively. 
In all cases, when the two groups o f  firms with and without an assigned market maker are 
compared, the stocks with an assigned market maker have order processing cost 
components that are smaller than those for the firms that do not have an assigned market 
maker. This is likely due to the increase in the inventory holding cost component that 
was noted in section 4.4.3. The difference between the group o f firms with and without 
an assigned market maker is statistically significant for all parametric and non-parametric 
tests at a level of 1%.
For hypothesis four (H4) the null hypothesis is rejected. This finding o f  a  smaller 
order processing component confirms earlier studies that found the order processing
119
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
component was smaller on NYSE as compared to Nasdaq. This finding, however, is not 
exchange specific and conclusions about the relative size are related to individual stocks 
and the market structure and not to differences particular to the exchanges.
4.4.2. Controlling For Differences in Volume
In this section, differences in volume are controlled by group stocks based on the 
total number o f shares traded during the entire sample period.
4.4.2.I. Adverse Selection Cost Component Controlling For Volume
Hypothesis one (H I) is re-tested when controlling for differences in volume. 
Volume quintiles are determined by using all stocks with and without an assigned market 
maker and ranking stocks based on the total volume for each stock. Without using 
bunching, Table 32 reports coefficient estimates using the GMM method of estimation 
while Table 34 reports the estimates using the NLLS method of estimation. Using the 
bunching procedure, Table 33 reports coefficient estimates for the GMM method o f 
estimation and Table 35 reports coefficient estimates for the NLLS method o f estimation. 
The number o f firms in each quintile differs between these tables because the NLLS 
estimation procedure requires a lower number of observations than the GMM estimation 
procedure.
The number o f firms in each quintile shown in Table 32 differs between the 
groups o f stocks with and without an assigned market maker, with the number o f  firms in 
the group o f stocks with an assigned market maker being concentrated in the quintiles 
with lower volume. There are no stocks with an assigned market maker in the largest 
volume quintile. For the group of firms without an assigned market maker, the two 
largest volume quintiles have statistically significant adverse selection component
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Table 32 This table reports estimates of bid-ask spread components across volume quintiles. This table uses a GMM estimation 
procedure to estimate the Huang and Stoll (1997) model, shown as equations (1) and (2), for each firm on the Paris Bourse during the 
September - December 1995 period. Results are shown on an overall basis, as well as for each group of stocks that trade with and 
without an assigned market maker. This table presents the results without using a bunching procedure in which successive 
transactions at identical prices are combined into one larger trade. Individual stocks are assigned into one of five groups based on the 
number of transactions that occur during the period. Parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums tests are performed 
to test differences across volume quintiles and across groups of stocks with and without an assigned market maker. The non- 
parametric test is reported in parentheses.
Overall without an assigned market maker with an assigned market maker tests of difference
number number a P n number a P n number a P n  a P n
of obs. of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.)
39-489 90 0.0013 0.0729’’’ 0.1820’" 27 -0.0071 0.0859’" 0.1755’“ 63 0.0049 0.0674"’ 0.1848’"0.32 1.17 0.38
(0.0912) (0.0745) (0.0659) (0.0847) (0.0740) (0.0609) (0.0942) (0.0745) (0.0658) (0.92) (0.36) (0.38)
494-969 91 -0.0042 0.0620’" 0.1830"’ 32 -0.0032 0.0506"’ 0.1811"’ 59 -0.0047 0.0682’’’ 0.1816”*0.02 2.37 0.00
(0.0550) (0.0525) (0.0577) (0.0688) (0.0653) (0.0665) (0.0465) (0.0435) (0.0537) (0.51) (2.90’) (0.15)
975-2240 90 -0.0127“ 0.0610"’ 0.1787"’ 65 -0.0076 0.0588’" 0.1836"’ 25 -0.0259" 0.0668’" 0.1658’’’2.70 0.80 2.37
(0.0478) (0.0381) (0.0498) (0.0476) (0.0413) (0.0505) (0.0464) (0.0284) (0.0455) (1.56) (1.56) (2.33)
2268-5281 91 -0.0082” ’ 0.0521*” 0.1716’" 87 -0.0092’" 0.0526’" 0.1736”’ 4 0.0144 0.0412" 0.1292” 3.01’ 0.65 4.52"
(0.0266) (0.0277) (0.0416) (0.0265) (0.0279) (0.0387) (0.0213) (0.0232) (0.0802) (3.10’) (0.41) (1.63)
5304-104027 90 -0.0156’” 0.0557’" 0.1698’’’ 90 -0.0156’" 0.0557’" 0.1698’” 0
(0.0169) (0.0212) (0.0291) (0.0169) (0.0212) (0.0291)
Differences Across Volume Quintiles
Parametric test 1.39 2.57" 1.13 0.64 3.89’’’ 1.02 1.24 0.29 1.63
Non-parametric test (6.45) (6.57) (8.15’) (6.87) (4.46) (5.78) (3.70) (1.70) (4.93)
’significant at a level of a = 10% ” significant at a level of a  = 5% " ’significant at a level of a  = 1%
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Table 33 This table reports estimates of bid-ask spread components across volume quintiles. This table uses a GMM estimation 
procedure to estimate the Huang and Stoll (1997) model, shown as equations (1) and (2), for each firm on the Paris Bourse during the 
September - December 1995 period. Results are shown on an overall basis, as well as for each group of stocks that trade with and 
without an assigned market maker. This table presents the results using a bunching procedure in which successive transactions at 
identical prices are combined into one larger trade. Individual stocks are assigned into one of five groups based on the number of 
transactions that occur during the period. Parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums tests are peiformed to test 
differences across volume quintiles and across groups of stocks with and without an assigned market maker. The non-parametric test 
is reported in parentheses.
Overall without an assigned market maker with an assigned market maker tests o f difference
number number a  p n  number a  p n  number a  p n  a  p n
ofobs. of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.)
16-289 77 -0.0188
(0.2933)
0.1453’"
(0.2866)
290-564 78 -0.0306
(0.3092)
0.1316’"
(0.3033)
565-1266 77 -0.0901"
(0.3461)
0.1849"’
(0.3338)
1273-2644 78 -0.0459
(0.3175)
0.1318"’
(0.3137)
2651-39094 77 -0.0041
(0.2623)
0.1008"’
(0.2593)
Differences Across Volume Quintiles 
Parametric test 0.89 0.79
Non-parametric test (5.17) (3.79)
0.4125*’’ 23 0.0213 0.0879 0.3558’"
(0.1520) (0.3373) (0.3227) (0.1649)
0.4352’" 28 -0.0642 0.1435"’ 0.4347"'
(0.1090) (0.2643) (0.2652) (0.1208)
0.4584’" 61 -0.0537 0.1476’’’ 0.4623"
(0.0822) (0.3521) (0.3372) (0.0877)
0.4701’" 76 -0.0514 0.1365’" 0.4717”
(0.0714) (0.3189) (0.3157) (0.0713)
0.5349” ’ 77 -0.0041 0.1008*’’ 0.5349"'
(0.1279) (0.2623) (0.2593) (0.1279)
13.07’’’ 0.56 0.35 13.92’”
46.47*") (3.89) (2.29) (42.05"’)
-0.0358 0.1698"* 0.4367"*0.61 1.32 4.80"
(0.2740) (0.2694) (0.1408) (0.43) (0.98) (6.78’")
-0.0119 0.1249"’ 0.4355’"0.51 0.07 0.00
(0.3328) (0.3251) (0.1031)(0.36) (0.00) (0.64)
-0.2291" 0.3272’” 0.4438"’3.36’ 3.81’ 0.64
(0.2918) (0.2866) (0.0569) (3.45’)(3.64*) (0.44)
0.1645 -0.0495 0.4124’ 0.90 0.68 1.35
(0.2021) (0.1841) (0.0604) (1.76) (1.68) (1.22)
2.52* 2.27’ 0.05
(7.26*) (6.74’) (1.15)
‘significant at a level o f a  = 10% "significant at a level o f a  = 5% ’"significant at a level o f a  = 1%
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Table 34 This table reports estimates of bid-ask spread components across volume quintiles. This table uses a NLLS estimation 
procedure to estimate the Huang and Stoll (1997) model, shown as equations (1) and (2), for each firm on the Paris Bourse during the 
September - December 1995 period. Results are shown on an overall basis, as well as for each group of stocks that trade with and 
without an assigned market maker. This table presents the results without using a bunching procedure in which successive 
transactions at identical prices are combined into one larger trade. Individual stocks are assigned into one of five groups based on the 
number of transactions that occur during the period. Parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums tests are performed 
to test differences across volume quintiles and across groups of stocks with and without an assigned market maker. The non- 
parametric test is reported in parentheses.
Overall without an assigned market maker with an assigned market maker tests of difference
number number a P n number a P n number a P n  a P n
of obs. of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d)
39-489 91 -0.0103 0.0912"’ 0.2855*" 27 -0.0002 0.0963’" 0.2843’" 64 -0.0146 0.0890"’ 0.2860"‘0.16 0.06 0.01
(0.1548) (0.1299) (0.0622) (0.1153) (0.0921) (0.0518) (0.1693) (0.1434) (0.0665) (0.70) (0.21) (0.38)
494-969 91 -0.0014 0.0735"’ 0.2741’’* 32 -0.0078 0.0707*’’ 0.2726’’’ 59 0.0021 0.0750*" 0.2749’"0.26 0.05 0.03
(0.0884) (0.0856) (0.0602) (0.1100) (0.1076) (0.0671) (0.0750) (0.0720) (0.0567) (0.01) (0.64’) (0.35)
975-2240 90 -0.0192*" 0.0715’" 0.2684"’ 65 -0.0161’ 0.0690"‘ 0.2734’" 25 -0.0272’" 0.0779"’ 0.2555’’’0.56 0.34 3.35’
(0.0629) (0.0650) (0.0420) (0.0678) (0.0655) (0.0388) (0.0480) (0.0647) (0.0477) (0.50) (1.05) (2.70)
2268-5281 91 -0.0101" 0.0520’” 0.2550’’’ 87 -0.0109" 0.0520*" 0.2571"’ 4 0.0064 0.0523’ 0.2091" 0.76 0.00 5.33"
(0.0387) (0.0337) (0.0416) (0.0388) (0.0338) (0.0370) (0.0344) (0.0359) (0.0984) (1.09) (0.02) (0.57)
5304-104027 90 -0.0169"' 0.0519’" 0.2444’" 90 -0.0169’’’ 0.0519’’’ 0.2444’" 0
(0.0206) (0.0241) (0.0244) (0.0206) (0.0241) (0.0244)
Differences Across Volume Quintiles
Parametric test 1.39 2.57" 1.13 0.48 4.07’" 8.55’’’ 0.42 0.28 3.12"
Non-parametric test (6.45) (6.57) (8.15’) (2.25) (8.75’) (50.28’’*) (2.93) (0.97) (11.96’")
‘significant at a level o f a  = 10% “ significant at a level o f  a  = 5% " ‘significant at a level o f  a  = 1%
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Table 35 This table reports estimates of bid-ask spread components across volume quintiles. This table uses a NLLS estimation 
procedure to estimate the Huang and Stoll (1997) model, shown as equations (1) and (2), for each firm on the Paris Bourse during the 
September - December 1995 period. Results are shown on an overall basis, as well as for each group of stocks that trade with and 
without an assigned market maker. This table presents the results using a bunching procedure in which successive transactions at 
identical prices are combined into one larger trade. Individual stocks are assigned into one of five groups based on the number of 
transactions that occur during the period. Parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums tests are performed to test 
differences across volume quintiles and across groups of stocks with and without an assigned market maker. The non-parametric test 
is reported in parentheses.
Overall without an assigned market maker with an assigned market maker tests o f difference
number number a  P n  number a  p n  number a  p n  a  p n
of obs. of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.)
16-289 72 -0.0309
(0.3728)
0.1497’"
(0.3640)
0.4366"’
(0.0855)
22 0.0362
(0.2222)
290-564 78 -0.0111
(0.4023)
0.1226"’
(0.3965)
0.4547’’’
(0.0683)
26 -0.0614
(0.3015)
565-1266 76 -0.1447’’’
(0.3914)
0.2275*"
(0.3826)
0.4647’"
(0.0504)
58 -0.1199"
(0.3937)
1273-2644 74 -0.0494
(0.3376)
0.1237"’
(0.3344)
0.4686’"
(0.0468)
72 -0.0577
(0.3373)
2651-39094 80 -0.0848“
(0.3112)
0.1616’"
(0.3121)
0.5096’"
(0.0905)
80 -0.0848"
(0.3112)
Differences Across Volume Quintiles
Parametric test 0.89 0.79 13.07*** 0.96
Non-parametric test (5.17) (3.79) (46.47*") (4.11)
0.0917" 0.4033’’’ 50 -0.0604 0.1752’" 0.4512’" 1.03 0.80 5.07"
(0.1996) (0.0971) (0.4211) (0.4156) (0.0764) (0.77) (0.61) (7.43’")
0.1503" 0.4517’" 52 0.0141 0.1088’ 0.4563’’’0.61 0.19 0.08
(0.3241) (0.0818) (0.4448) (0.4304) (0.0613) (0.08) (0.01) (2.39)
0.2016" ’ 0.4665’" 18 -0.2246" 0.3110"’ 0.4589’"0.98 1.13 0.31
(0.3796) (0.0551) (0.3835) (0.3909) (0.0315) (0.45) (0.71) (0.04)
0.1309’’’ 0.4694’” 2 0.2518 -0.1383 0.4368" 1.65 1.27 0.95
(0.3351) (0.0469) (0.2431) (0.2204) (0.0405) (2.25) (1.96) (0.87)
0.1616’’’ 0.5096’" 0
(0.3121) (0.0905)
0.60 10.80"’ 1.75 1.41 0.13
(2.13) (37.92’") (4.42) (4.10) (1.84)
’significant at a level o f a  = 10% "significant at a level o f  a  = 5% ’’’significant at a level o f a  = 1%
estimates. For the group of firms with an assigned market maker, only the middle 
quintile has a statistically significant estimate. The parametric and non-parametric tests 
o f difference indicate that there is no statistical difference between the two groups for the 
three lower volume quintiles. The second largest volume quintile has 87 firms in the 
group without an assigned market maker and has an adverse selection component 
coefficient estimate that is -0.0092 and is statistically significant at a level o f  1%. The 
group with an assigned market maker contains four firms and has an adverse selection 
component mean estimate that is slightly positive but not significantly different than zero. 
The parametric ANOVA test comparing the two means has a test statistic o f 3.01 that is 
significant at a level of 10%. The parametric Wilcoxon rank scores test has a test statistic 
of 3.10 that is also significant at a level o f  10%. The importance o f this significance is 
somewhat lessened by the small number o f firms in the group o f stocks with an assigned 
market maker.
Table 34 uses a NLLS method of estimation for the bid-ask spread components.
In each volume quintile there is no statistically significant difference in the estimates of 
the adverse selection component for those stocks with and without an assigned market 
maker, confirming Table 32. There is also no statistically significant differences across 
the volume quintiles and on an overall basis nor within the group of stocks with and 
without an assigned market maker. The pattern of statistical significance o f the 
individual quintile estimates in Table 34 mirrors Table 32. For those stocks with an 
assigned market maker, only those stocks in the middle volume quintile have an adverse 
selection component estimate that is significantly significant. On an overall basis and for 
those stocks without an assigned market maker, only the larger volume quintiles have 
statistically significant adverse selection component estimates.
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Tables 32 and 34 show that the adverse selection component estimates are not 
significantly different from each other when the group o f stocks with and without an 
assigned market maker are compared. The adverse selection component coefficient 
estimates that are significant indicate the estimate is negative, which is economically not 
meaningful. This finding o f negative adverse selection component coefficients is also 
made by Huang and Stoll (1997). They also perform their estimation procedures using a 
bunching procedure where successive transactions at identical prices are combined into 
one larger trade. They do this in order to correct for the splitting up o f large trades that 
could affect the estimation procedures. By bunching identical transactions the estimates 
of the adverse selection component by Huang and Stoll go from 19 o f 20 stocks with 
negative coefficients to only 2 o f 20 with negative coefficients. Using the Paris Bourse 
data, the bunching procedure is performed and the GMM estimates are reported in Table 
17B and the NLLS estimates are reported in Table 17D. Using the bunching procedure, 
the percentage o f individual stocks with positive estimates increases from 152/452 
(168/453) to 171/387 (168/380) for the GMM (NLLS) estimates. The bunching 
procedure reduces the number o f observations by decreasing the number o f stocks for 
which estimates are obtainable.
Using the bunching procedure and examining the individual groups with and 
without an assigned market maker, the coefficient estimates for the adverse selection 
component, a ,  have only one volume quintile with a coefficient that is statistically 
significant for the GMM estimation (Table 33) and three volume quintiles with 
coefficients that are statistically significant for the NLLS estimation (Table 35). The
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GMM estimates have one quintile that has a statistically significant difference between 
the group o f  stocks with and without an assigned market maker. In the middle quintile, 
the parametric and non-parametric tests both indicate that the difference between the two 
groups is significant at a level of 10%. For the NLLS estimates in Table 35 there is no 
statistically significant differences between the group o f stocks with and without an 
assigned market maker in any of the volume quintiles. Even with the bunching 
procedure, the coefficient estimates fail to reject the null of hypothesis one (H I) that the 
coefficient estimates for the adverse selection component are the same for those stocks 
with and without an assigned market maker.
4.4.2.2. Inventory Holding Cost Component Controlling For Volume
One way to explain the conflicting results when comparing estimation with and 
without bunching is to control for volume differences since different volume stocks may 
have different amounts o f  bunching. For example, small volume stocks may have more 
splitting o f orders due to a smaller depth at the inside quotes. Tables 32-35 show the tests 
o f  difference between the group of stocks with and without an assigned market maker.
No observations are in the largest volume quintile for those stocks with an assigned 
market maker. For the other four quintiles, there is very limited statistical significance. 
Only in the middle quintile in Table 33, using the GMM estimation procedure with 
bunching, is there statistically significant differences in both parametric and non- 
parametric tests of difference. And the level of significance in that quintile is at a level of 
10%. This suggests that the difference between the group of stocks with and without an 
assigned market maker shown in Table 31 and discussed in section 4.3.1. may be due to 
differences that are reduced when the volume is controlled. Based on this finding,
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hypothesis three (H3) fails to be rejected and no difference is found in the inventory 
holding cost component between stocks with and without an assigned market maker.
4.4.3. Adverse Selection Across Volume Levels
The literature suggests that larger trades may convey more information and those 
larger trades may have a higher adverse selection component. The effect o f the overall 
volume on the adverse selection component is not as clear. Larger volume stocks may 
provide a greater incentive for informed traders to invest in the stock and consequently 
there may be a larger adverse selection component for these firms. Alternatively, for low 
volume stocks the likelihood o f a trade containing information may be higher since low 
volume stocks may exclude some traders. Hypothesis two (H2) tests whether the adverse 
selection component is the same across volume quintiles.
Table 32 provides the GMM estimates across volume quintiles. Parametric and 
non-parametric tests on the mean coefficient estimates o f the adverse selection 
component indicate that there is no difference across the volume quintiles on an overall 
basis, nor within either the group of firms with or without an assigned market maker.
This finding is shared by the NLLS estimates in Table 34.
Tables 33 and 35 use the bunching procedure where successive transactions at 
identical prices are combined into one larger trade. Table 33 reports that for those stocks 
with an assigned market maker, the GMM coefficient estimates for the adverse selection 
component differ across the volume quintiles. This is confirmed both parametrically and 
non-parametrically at levels o f significance o f 10%. The pattern, however, does not 
support rejecting the null of hypothesis two (H2) since only one o f the quintiles has a 
mean that is statistically significant. The NLLS estimates in Table 35 have no significant
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differences across the volume quintiles, both parametrically and non-parametrically. 
Based on these results, the null o f  hypothesis two (H2) is not rejected.
4.4.4. Inventory Accumulation Quintiles
In this section, the effect o f inventory accumulation is examined on the 
components o f the bid-ask spread. Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) suggest specialists are 
more likely to buy when their inventory is low and sell when their inventory is high. In 
this section, the examination encompasses a long term approach. First, the direction o f 
trade is classified using the Lee and Ready (1991) procedure and then the inventory 
changes are accumulated for the months of September and October 1995. The inventory 
changes are then ranked and placed into five groups and estimates for the components of 
the bid-ask spread are made using the months o f November and December 1995. The 
ranking o f the inventory change groups is done in two ways: First, the ranking is done on 
an overall basis and these results are reported for the GMM estimates in Table 36 and the 
NLLS estimates in Table 38. Second, the ranking is done within the group of firms with 
or without an assigned market maker. These results are reported in Table 37 for the 
GMM estimates and in Table 39 for the NLLS estimates. This is a measure o f the long­
term effect o f inventory changes.
The effect o f  inventory changes on the inventory holding cost component, (3, is 
reported in Tables 36-39. There is no statistically significant differences across inventory 
accumulation quintiles for the group o f stocks with an assigned market maker. This 
indicates that the null o f hypothesis five (H5) that the inventory holding cost component 
is the same for the inventory accumulation quintiles is not rejected.
In Tables 36-39, there are some statistically significant differences in the
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Table 36 This table reports estimates of bid-ask spread components across inventory change quintiles. This table uses a GMM 
estimation procedure to estimate the Huang and Stoll (1997) model, shown as equations (1) and (2), for each firm on the Paris Bourse 
during the November - December 1995 period. Results are shown on an overall basis, as well as for each group of stocks that trade 
with and without an assigned market maker. This table presents the results without using a bunching procedure in which successive 
transactions at identical prices are combined into one larger trade. Individual stocks are assigned into one of five groups based 
accumulated inventory change during the September - October 1995 period. Parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank 
sums tests are performed to test differences across inventory change quintiles and across groups of stocks with and without an 
assigned market maker. The non-parametric test is reported in parentheses.
Overall without an assigned market maker with an assigned market maker tests o f difference
inv. change number a P n  number a P n number a P n  a P n
group of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.)
(average change)
0 (smallest) 84 -0.0154” ' 0.0514'" 0.1747’” 68 -0.0126’’’ 0.0510” 0.1753” ' 16 -0.0273 0.0533'” 0.1722’” 1.38 0.06 0.10
-168,711 (0.0453) (0.0351) (0.0351)-I98,630 (0.0283) (0.0294) (0.0343) -41,554 (0.0871) (0.0544) (0.0396) (0.10) (0.52) (0.24)
1 84 0.0084 0.0642” ’ 0.1743’” 37 0.0134 0.0535” ’ 0.1724’" 47 0.0045 0.0727"’ 0.1759’”0.39 1.69 0.06
-5,664 (0.0648) (0.0676) (0.0632) -5,478 (0.0624) (0.0571) (0.0600) -5,810 (0.0670) (0.0743) (0.0662) (0.01) (1.51) (0.16)
2 84 -0.0068 0.0597’" 0.1744’" 45 -0.0016 0.0515’” 0.1781’” 39 -0.0130 0.0692’” 0.1702’”0.24 0.83 0.27
446 (0.1050) (0.0885) (0.0695) 381 (0.0697) (0.0638) (0.0625) 520 (0.1356) (0.1105) (0.0773) (0.12) (0.64) (0.10)
3 84 -0.0118 0.0557” ’ 0.1779’’’ 61 -0.0102 0.0567’” 0.1750’” 23 -0.0161 0.0528” ' 0.1855” *0.13 0.07 0.52
12,748 (0.0679) (0.0601) (0.0593)14,271 (0.0608) (0.0537) (0.0529) 8,707 (0.0855) (0.0758) (0.0743) (0.49) (0.10) (0.50)
4 (largest) 84 -0.0125’" 0.0547"’ 0.1652"’ 82 -0.0126” ’ 0.0546” ’ 0.1651’” 2 -0.0113 0.0617 0.1718” 0.00 0.16 0.07
501,407 (0.0319) (0.0246) (0.0362)510,358 (0.0323) (0.0247) (0.0366) 134,439 (0.0036) (0.0226) (0.0084) (0.15) (0.25) (0.01)
Differences Across Inventory Change Quintiles
Parametric test 1.65 0.57 0.64 2.22’ 0.17 0.75 0.41 0.31 0.19
Non-parametric test (14.85'”) (1.68) (3.29) (9.54") (2.70) (3.09) (4.32) 0-36) (0.57)
'significant at a level o f  a  = 10% "significant at a level o f  a  = 5% ’"significant at a level o f a  = 1%
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Table 37 This table reports estimates of bid-ask spread components across inventory change quintiles. This table uses a GMM 
estimation procedure to estimate the Huang and Stoll (1997) model, shown as equations (1) and (2), for each firm on the Paris Bourse 
during the November - December 1995 period. Results are shown on an overall basis, as well as for each group of stocks that trade 
with and without an assigned market maker. This table presents the results using a bunching procedure in which successive 
transactions at identical prices are combined into one larger trade. Individual stocks are assigned into one of five groups based 
accumulated inventory change during the September - October 1995 period. Parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank 
sums tests are performed to test differences across inventory change quintiles and across groups of stocks with and without an 
assigned market maker. The non-parametric test is reported in parentheses.
Overall without an assigned market maker with an assigned market maker tests of difference
inv. change number a P n  number a P n number a P n  a P n
group of firms (S.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) M .)
(average change)
0 (smallest) 83 -0.0183” ’ 0.0545’” 0.1756’" 58 -0.0137’” 0.0508” ’ 0.1752"’ 25 -0.0289* 0.0631’” 0.1768” * 1.61 1.41 0.03
-170,080 (0.0502) (0.0436) (0.0415)-230,180 (0.0274) (0.0279) (0.0338) -30,648 (0.0816) (0.0674) (0.0563)(0.37) (0.83) (0.60)
1 84 0.0086 0.0597"’ 0.1701’" 59 0.0064 0.0502’” 0.1686” ’ 25 0.0138 0.0822’” 0.!737’"0.25 5.33" 0.12
-6,067 (0.0610) (0.0597) (0.0617) -6,224 (0.0611) (0.0515) (0.0573) -5,697 (0.0615) (0.0719) (0.0722) (1.76) (4.87” )(0.03)
2 85 -0.0023 0.0590’” 0.1853” ’ 59 -0.0030 0.0567” ’ 0.1908” ’ 26 -0.0005 0.0644’’’ 0.1729” '0.02 0.17 1.62
1,570 (0.1891) (0.0788) (0.0600) 2,871 (0.0749) (0.0693) (0.0597) -1,382 (0.1169) (0.0983) (0.0601) (0.18) (0.02) (0.67)
3 85 -0.0107 0.0578*” 0.1669’" 59 -0.0097’ 0.0551"* 0.1659” ’ 26 -0.0132 0.0638” ’ 0.1693*’’0.04 0.31 0.07
27,315 (0.0773) (0.0656) (0.0540)38,896 (0.0383) (0.0358) (0.0379) 1,035 (0.1291) (0.1069) (0.0803)(0.13) (0.01) (0.15)
4 (largest) 83 -0.0158*” 0.0546"' 0.1686'" 58 -0.0158*” 0.0551’’’ 0.1618’” 25 -0.0157 0.0535’’’ 0.1844’"0.00 0.02 3.47*
490,965 (0.0503) (0.0431) (0.0516)694,499 (0.0286) (0.0209) (0.0392) 18,,766 (0.0819) (0.0728) (0.0713) (0.01) (0.07) (1.96)
Differences Across Inventory Change Quintiles
Parametric test 2.21* 0.14 1.60 1.91 0.25 3.45*** 0.69 0.37 0.17
Non-parametric test (19.49***) (0.34) (5.71) (12.31**) (2.34) (7.89*) (6.33) (2.72) (0.39)
’significant at a level o f  a  = 10% ’’significant at a level o f a  = 5% ’’’significant at a level o f  a  = 1%
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Table 38 This table reports estimates of bid-ask spread components across inventory change quintiles. This table uses a NLLS 
estimation procedure to estimate the Huang and Stoll (1997) model, shown as equations (1) and (2), for each firm on the Paris Bourse 
during the November - December 1995 period. Results are shown on an overall basis, as well as for each group of stocks that trade 
with and without an assigned market maker. This table presents the results without using a bunching procedure in which successive 
transactions at identical prices are combined into one larger trade. Individual stocks are assigned into one of five groups based 
accumulated inventory change during the September - October 1995 period. Parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank 
sums tests are performed to test differences across inventory change quintiles and across groups of stocks with and without an 
assigned market maker. The non-parametric test is reported in parentheses.
Overall without an assigned market maker with an assigned market maker tests of difference
inv. change number a P n number a P n number a P n  a P n
group of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.)
avg. $ change.
0 (smallest) 84 -0.0185” 0.0617’" 0.2694’"  68 -0.0150"’ 0.0545"' 0.2674’" 16 -0.0335 0.0922” 0.2779” ’0.94 2.54 1.45
-168,711 (0.0687) (0.0860) (0.03 1 5)-198,630 (0.0453) (0.0488) (0.0293) -41,554 (0.1290) (0.1704) (0.0396) (3.08') (4.39’’)(0.42)
1 84 0.0043 0.0794” ’ 0.2736’” 37 0.0172 0.0619’" 0.2680’" 47 -0.0059 0.0932’’’ 0.2780’’’0.88 1.70 0.57
-5,664 (0.1121) (0.1100) (0.0598) -5,478 (0.1120) (0.1073) (0.0496) -5,810 (0.1123) (0.1112) (0.0670) (0.35) (2.44) (1.86)
2 84 -0.0119 0.0738*" 0.2755"’ 45 -0.0103 0.0617'" 0.2787'" 39 -0.0137 0.0877’" 0.2718’"0.0I 0.70 0.25
446 (0.1622) (0.1421) (0.0626) 381 (0.1070) (0.1026) (0.0505) 520 (0.2102) (0.1776) (0.0748) (0.00) (1.00) (0.01)
3 84 -0.0158 0.0652"’ 0.2743’“ 61 -0.0133 0.0609’" 0.2700” ’ 23 -0.0225 0.0766"* 0.2858’”0.12 0.44 1.49
12,748 (0.1053) (0.0969) (0.0528) 14,271 (0.0965) (0.0946) (0.0456) 8,707 (0.1279) (0.1039) (0.0684) (0.28) (1.46) (2.40)
4 (largest) 84 -0.0105" 0.0497"’ 0.2498"’ 82 -0.0102’ 0.0494"’ 0.2493’’’ 2 -0.0211 0.0619 0.2697" 0.10 0.27 0.77
501,407 (0.0481) (0.0333) (0.0325)510,358 (0.0486) (0.0334) (0.0327) 134,439 (0.0207) (0.0328) (0.0123)(0.15) (0.42) (1.31)
Differences Across Inventory Change Quintiles
Parametric test 0.58 1.10 3.92’’’ 1.14 0.34 4.75*" 0.12 0.07 0.17
Non-parametric test (6.36) (1.41) (25.77*") (5.98) (1.55) (18.87*") (2.33) (0.10) (1.08)
’significant at a level o f  a  = 10% "significant at a level o f a  = 5% ’’’significant at a level o f a  = 1%
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Table 39 This table reports estimates of bid-ask spread components across inventory change quintiles. This table uses a NLLS 
estimation procedure to estimate the Huang and Stoll (1997) model, shown as equations (1) and (2), for each firm on the Paris Bourse 
during the November - December 1995 period. Results are shown on an overall basis, as well as for each group of stocks that trade 
with and without an assigned market maker. This table presents the results using a bunching procedure in which successive 
transactions at identical prices are combined into one larger trade. Individual stocks are assigned into one of five groups based 
accumulated inventory change during the September - October 1995 period. Parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank 
sums tests are performed to test differences across inventory change quintiles and across groups of stocks with and without an 
assigned market maker. The non-parametric test is reported in parentheses.
Overall without an assigned market maker with an assigned market maker tests o f difference
inv. change number a P n  number a P n number a P n a P n
group of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) of firms (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.)
avg. S change. avg. $ change. avg. $ change.
0 (smallest) 83 -0.0240“ * 0.0671“ * 0.2703'** 58 -0.0161*** 0.0543*“ 0.2669” ’ 25 -0.0425’ 0.0967*’’ 0.2781***2.14 3.75’ 1.26
-170,080 (0.0761) (0.0929) (0.0417)-230,180 (0.0416) (0.0448) (0.0286) ■30,648 (0.1232) (0.1530) (0.0625) (3.71*)(4.34")(3.37’)
1 84 0.0035 0.0731*“ 0.2689“ ' 59 0.0064 0.0583'" 0.2651'" 25 -0.0030 0.1080’’’ 0.2779***0.14 4.64" 0.95
-6,067 (0.1052) (0.0987) (0.0548) -6,224 (0.1041) (0.0920) (0.0473) -5,697 (0.1095) (0.1071) (0.0699) (0.00) (3.62’)(1.46)
2 85 -0.0073 0.0710*" 0.2847**' 59 -0.0118 0.0661’" 0.2881’" 26 -0.0029 0.0820" 0.2771***0.19 0.25 0.83
1,570 (0.1445) (0.1360) (0.0513) 2,871 (0.1205) (0.1213) (0.0476) -1,382 (0.1905) (0.1669) (0.0593) (0.64) (0.07) (0.05)
3 85 -0.0094 0.0601*" 0.2612*" 59 -0.0087 0.0522’" 0.2575"’ 26 -0.0109 0.0781" 0.2697***0.01 1.24 1.09
27,315 (0.1139) (0.0990) (0.0497) 38,896 (0.0530) (0.0519) (0.0325) 1,035 (0.1926) (0.1620) (0.0758) (0.00) (0.87) (2.79*)
4 (largest) 83 -0.0155* 0.0584*'* 0.2573'** 58 -0.0126" 0.0510’" 0.2456’’’ 25 -0.0223 0.0755"’ 0.2845"’0.28 2.94* 11.97’**
490,965 (0.0767) (0.0603) (0.0500)694,499 (0.0460) (0.0293) (0.0362) 18,766 (0.1226) (0.0997) (0.0657) (0.23) (2.52)( 13.20’")
Differences Across Inventory Change Quintiles
Parametric test 0.77 0.35 3.79"* 0.70 0.38 9.21*" 0.35 0.24 0.16
Non-parametric test (9.43*) (0.80) (17.50***) (8.10*) (1.96) (27.47***) (3.75) (0.69) (0.33)
‘significant at a level o f a  = 10% “ significant at a level o f a  = 5% “ 'significant at a level o f  a  = 1
inventory holding cost component estimates between those firms with and those without 
an assigned market maker within individual inventory accumulation quintiles. When 
comparing across groups with and without assigned market makers, Tables 36 and 38 use 
all the observations in determining the ranking of individual stocks into quintiles. As 
reported in Table 38, when the NLLS estimation procedure is used, the inventory holding 
cost component differs statistically between the two groups o f stocks with and without an 
assigned market maker only in the smallest quintile with the most negative change in 
inventory accumulation. For this category, the inventory holding cost component is 
almost twice as large for those stocks with an assigned market maker and this difference 
is statistically significant at a level of 5% using a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank scores 
test. This significance does not show up in any other quintile using the NLLS estimation 
method nor in any quintile using the GMM estimation method.
In Tables 37 and 39 the quintiles were formed within each group o f  stocks with 
and without an assigned market maker. As shown in Table 37, when using the GMM 
estimation procedure, a significantly larger inventory cost component estimate is found 
for firms with an assigned market maker in the second most negative inventory change 
quintile. The significance o f the difference is at a level o f  5% for the parametric and non- 
parametric tests. As shown in Table 39, when NLLS estimates are used there are 
statistically significant estimates found in the two extreme change quintiles as w'ell as the 
second most negative inventory change quintile. The two most negative inventory 
change quintiles have parametric and non-parametric tests that are statistically significant 
at levels o f 1% and 5% in each quintile. The most negative inventory accumulation
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quintile has the parametric test o f difference significant at a level o f 1% while the non- 
parametric test is significant at a level of 5%. The opposite levels of significance are 
found in the second most negative inventory change quintile. The most positive 
inventory change quintile has a significance that is only at a level o f  10% for the 
parametric test.
In all three of these quintiles the coefficient estimate for the inventory holding 
cost is larger for the stocks with an assigned market maker. This indicates that there is a 
higher cost for firms with an assigned market maker that is especially noticeable when 
there are large changes in inventory, particularly when inventory is depleted. This 
difference again rejects hypothesis three (H3) but it adds some information, indicating 
that the inventory changes (particularly depletion) may impact on stocks with an assigned 
market maker since the market maker is required to maintain a presence in the market at 
all times.
From these tables it is also interesting to note that the adverse selection 
component coefficient estimates are statistically significantly different than zero only for 
those stocks without an assigned market maker and only at the extreme quintiles. This is 
intuitively appealing since it is in these quintiles where the value o f information may be 
more important since the inventory levels are changing. Unfortunately it is in these 
quintiles with the significant adverse selection component coefficients where the 
coefficient is negative and not economically meaningful.
4.4.S. Sum m ary
The GMM method o f estimation is shown to be more appropriate than the NLLS 
method o f  estimation since the residuals exhibit serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. 
The GMM estimation procedure has the effect of correcting for heteroskedasticity that
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may be caused by discrete price data. The market structure hypotheses are tested by 
comparing the coefficient estimates of the bid-ask spread components across the two 
market structures. The resulting coefficient estimates indicate that the adverse selection 
component does not differ between the group o f stocks that trade with and without an 
assigned market maker either on an overall basis or when controlling for differences in 
volume. No differences across coefficient estimates for the adverse selection component 
are found across the volume levels, indicating that even when controlling for market 
structure, volume as a whole does not impact on the adverse selection component. The 
lack o f cross-sectional difference on the effect o f the total volume of a stock indicates 
that large or small volume stocks do not give a predisposition to higher adverse selection 
costs. This suggests that earlier literature on cross-sectional differences may be 
measuring trade-specific adverse selection.
The inventory holding cost component has contradictory results that are 
dependent on the use of the bunching procedure where successive transactions at 
identical prices are condensed into one larger trade. When bunching is not used then the 
group o f stocks with an assigned market maker has a larger inventory holding cost 
component, suggesting that the assigned market maker is compensated for holding 
inventory. With bunching, however, the overall estimate o f the inventory holding cost 
component increases, but for these estimates there is no statistically significant difference 
between the group of stocks with and without an assigned market maker. This can be 
explained by controlling for volume. When volume is controlled and the bunching is not 
performed, no statistical difference is found between the group of stocks with and without 
an assigned market maker. There is some limited statistical difference between the two
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groups in the middle volume quintile when the bunching procedure is used. Although 
intuitively pleasing, there is only limited evidence that the inventory holding cost 
component is larger for those stocks with an assigned market maker.
The order processing cost component is found to be smaller for those stocks that 
have an assigned market maker. This overall finding is consistent with extant literature 
that finds that the order processing cost component is smaller on NYSE compared to 
NASDAQ. The finding in this chapter suggests that the differences are not due to 
exchange costs. The results suggest that the differences may be a result o f the different 
market structures. Another possibility is that the results are a result o f the stocks that 
trade in those two structures.
Inventory accumulation is calculated over a two-month period and there are some 
statistically significant differences in the inventory holding cost component in the 
subsequent two months across quintiles formed from the initial two-month inventory 
accumulation. When all stocks are used in the inventory accumulation rankings, a 
difference is found in the most negative inventory accumulation quintile where the 
inventory holding cost component is almost twice as large for the group o f stocks with an 
assigned market maker. When the ranking is done within each group o f stocks with or 
without an assigned market maker, then the inventory cost component coefficient is 
larger for those firms with an assigned market maker and there are statistically significant 
differences in the extreme quintiles. This indicates that inventory changes (especially 
depletion) may impact on stocks with an assigned market maker to a greater extent than 
the other stocks. This may be because the assigned market maker is required to stay in 
the market.
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4.5. Execution Cost Results
Four measures of (one-way) trade execution costs are estimated and reported in 
Table 40. These include quoted bid-ask half-spread, effective bid-ask half-spread (which 
accounts for execution inside the quotes), the price impact (which measures trades’ 
average information content) and realized bid-ask half-spread (which measures average 
price reversals after trades and market-making revenue net o f  information costs). These 
measures are explained fully in section 4.3.2. These estimates are shown on an overall 
basis as well as in each group of stocks with and without an assigned market maker.
Since the hypothesis that trading costs equal zero is o f  little practical interest, standard 
errors or t-statistics for the individual estimates are not reported. As explained in section 
4.3.2., a two-stage estimation procedure is used to calculate the execution costs. First, 
daily mean execution costs are calculated for each stock. Comparisons on an overall 
basis and between groups of stocks with and without an assigned market maker use these 
daily means in a parametric ANOVA test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank scores 
test. A bunching procedure, where successive transactions at identical prices are 
combined into one larger trade, is also used and estimates and tests o f differences are also 
provided after performing this procedure. Following the overall analysis, each individual 
trade execution measure is analyzed across price groups. The price groups are 
determined by using the first transaction price in the trading period and then ranking the 
stocks into five groups.
4.5.1. Quoted Half-Spread
The quoted half-spread is a measure o f one-half of the round-trip execution costs 
if  trades are executed at the quotes. As shown in Table 40, using all observations, the
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Table 40 This table reports estimates o f trade execution costs. This table estimates the 
Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) trade execution costs, shown in equations (3), (4),
(5), and (6), for each firm on the Paris Bourse during the September - December 1995 
period. The mean results are presented both on an overall basis and for stocks with and 
without an assigned market maker. A bunching procedure in which successive 
transactions at identical prices are combined into one larger trade is used in Panel B but is 
not used in Panel A. A parametric ANOVA test and Wilcoxon rank scores test is used to 
test the difference in means between the groups o f stocks with and without an assigned 
market maker.
Overall w ithout an with an ANOVA W ilcoxon
assigned M M  assigned MM
PANEL A All Observations
Quoted Half-Spread 0.7558 0.5775 1.2342 6248.3 5665.4
Effective Half-Spread 0.3731 0.1629 0.5138 1649.5 2011.1'
Price Impact 0.0962 0.0759 0.1878 60.1*“ 35.4'
Realized Half-Spread 0.2769 0.0870 0.3260 416.8“ * 343.9'
PANEL B Observations with deletions due to Bunching
Quoted Half-Spread 0.7637 0.3008 1.0789 6207.1"* 5662.0'
Effective Half-Spread 0.3605 0.1619 0.4946 1640.2*“ 2004.0'
Price Impact 0.0597 0.0582 0.1144 17.4*“ 0.1
Realized Half-Spread 0.3009 0.1037 0.3802 487.1*** 412.8'
‘significant at a level of a  = 10% 
“ significant at a level of a  = 5% 
’“ significant at a level of a  = 1%
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mean quoted half-spread is 0.7558%. When the group o f stocks with and without an 
assigned market maker are compared, the quoted half-spread o f  the stocks with an 
assigned market maker is approximately twice as large (1.2342% versus 0.5775%). 
Parametric and non-parametric tests o f difference are significant at a level o f  1%. When 
the bunching procedure is performed, the mean quoted half-spread increases slightly to 
0.7637% and the difference between stocks with and without an assigned market maker 
remains at a multiple slightly greater than two (1.2456% versus 0.5868%, respectively).
Since the two groups of stocks have different characteristics, the effect o f  the 
stock’s price level is analyzed in Table 41. On an overall basis, the quoted half-spread 
declines as the price o f the stock increases. This occurs for all stocks, as well as in the 
group o f stocks without an assigned market maker. The group o f  stocks with an assigned 
market maker has a monotonically decreasing quoted half-spread except for the largest 
price group. This pattern is present with and without bunching. In all price groups, the 
quoted half-spread is approximately two and one-half times larger for the stocks with an 
assigned market maker versus those without an assigned market maker. Using 
parametric and non-parametric tests, the difference between the means is statistically 
significant at a level o f 1% in all the price groups. For hypothesis six (H6), the null is 
rejected for the quoted half-spread trade execution cost measure. On an overall basis, and 
in each price group, the quoted half-spread is larger for those stocks with an assigned 
market maker by a multiple o f approximately two and one-half.
4.5.2. Effective Half-Spread
The effective half-spread measure may be expected to be less than the quoted 
half-spread since trades can occur inside the quoted bid and ask prices and the measure
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Table 41 This table reports estimates of trade execution costs for quoted half-spreads 
across price groups. This table estimates the quoted half-spread, shown in equation (3), 
for each firm on the Paris Bourse during the September - December 1995 period. The 
mean results are presented both on an overall basis and for stocks with and without an 
assigned market maker. Each stock is assigned into one o f five price groups based on the 
price of the stock at the beginning o f the period. A bunching procedure in which 
successive transactions at identical prices are combined into one larger trade is used in 
Panel B but is not used in Panel A. A parametric ANOVA test and Wilcoxon rank scores 
test is used to test the difference in means between the groups o f stocks with and without 
an assigned market maker.
average Overall 
price
PANEL A All Observations
Group 0 -  smallest price
61.15 1.0003
Group I
183.85 0.8350
Group 2
311.70 0.7964
Group 3
466.39 0.6382
Group 4 - largest price
1384.85 0.5263
PANEL B Observations with deletions due to 
Group 0 - smallest price
61.07 1.0076
Group 1
184.77 0.8486
Group 2
312.56 0.7942
Group 3
466.57 0.6523
Group 4 - largest price
1385.10 0.5330
’significant at a level of a  = 10% 
’’significant at a level of a  = 5% 
’’’significant at a level of a  = 1%
without an with an ANOVA Wilcoxon 
assigned MM assigned MM
0.7390 1.7144 1896.6*”  1362.0*”
0.6047 1.3647 15792*”  1565.5*”
0.6173 1.1592 941.6” * 967.1*”
0.5560 0.8762 456.0*”  634.6*”
0.4030 1.0162 1848.6*”  1301.6*”
Bunching
0.7483 1.7260 1887.6*** 1357.6***
0.6262 1.3781 1492.7*”  1504.3**’
0.6048 1.1740 10452*”  1055.5*”
0.5738 0.8836 419.4*”  588.5*”
0.4109 1.0239 1821.5*”  1285.8*”
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itself is a function o f the post-trade price. As shown on an overall basis in Table 40, the 
effective half-spread is similar with and without bunching. Without bunching, the 
effective half-spread is 0.3731%, while with bunching, the effective half-spread is 
0.3605%. When the stocks are split into those with and without an assigned market 
maker, the stocks without an assigned market maker have an effective half-spread that is 
approximately 0.29% with or without bunching. The stocks with an assigned market 
maker have an effective half-spread that is twice as large at approximately 0.58% as the 
effective spread o f the stocks without an assigned market maker. This difference is 
statistically significant at a level o f 1% using parametric and non-parametric tests o f  
difference.
The stocks are also divided into price quintiles based on the price o f the first 
transaction in the trading period. These estimates are reported in Table 42. Using all 
observations without bunching, the effective half-spread measure is monotonically 
decreasing from 0.4809% to 0.2629%. This pattern is also present when the bunching 
procedure is performed.
Table 42 also shows that the group of stocks with an assigned market maker has 
an effective half-spread that is consistently more than twice as large as the effective half­
spread for the group o f stocks without an assigned market maker. The pattern across the 
price quintiles differs slightly between the groups o f stocks with and without an assigned 
market maker. For those stocks with an assigned market maker, there is a monotonic 
decline in the effective half-spread, for all the price quintiles except for the largest price 
quintile. This pattern is the same irrespective o f the use o f the bunching procedure. For 
the group o f firms without an assigned market maker, there is a monotonic decline in all
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Table 42 This table reports estimates o f trade execution costs for the effective half­
spreads across price groups. This table estimates the effective half-spread, shown in 
equation (4), for each firm on the Paris Bourse during the September - December 1995 
period. The mean results are presented both on an overall basis and for stocks with and 
without an assigned market maker. Each stock is assigned into one of five price groups 
based on the price o f  the stock at the beginning o f the period. A bunching procedure in 
which successive transactions at identical prices are combined into one larger trade is 
used in Panel B but is not used in Panel A. A parametric ANOVA test and Wilcoxon rank 
Scores test is used to test the difference in means between the groups o f stocks with and 
without an assigned market maker.
average Overall without an with an ANOVA Wilcoxon
price assigned MM assigned MM
PANEL A All Observations
Group 0 - smallest price
61.15 0.4809 0.3636 0.8017 435.2*** 477.4*“
Group 1
183.85 0.4141 0.2958 0.6864 497.4*“  692.9*“
Group 2
311.70 0.3899 0.3201 0.5314 173.9*“  304.3*“
Group 3
466.39 0.3256 0.2871 0.4372 158.1*“  239.5*“
Group 4 - largest price
1384.85 0.2629 0.2127 0.4625 395.8*“  329.0***
PANEL B Observations with deletions due to Bunching
Group 0 - smallest price
61.07 0.4646 0.3534 0.7726 417.2*“  448.1***
Group 1
184.77 0.4038 0.2934 0.6665 454.2*“  652.0*“
Group 2
312.56 0.3725 0.2989 0.5203 203.7*“  331.6***
Group 3
466.57 0.3167 0.2790 0.4280 159.4*“  253.2*’*
Group 4 - largest price
1385.10 0.2525 0.2031 0.4512 399.5*“  344.1**’
‘significant at a level of a  = 10% 
“ significant at a level of a  = 5% 
“ ‘significant at a level of a  = 1%
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the price quintiles except for the second price quintile. This pattern, too, is similar 
whether bunching is or is not used.
The mean effective half-spread is approximately twice as large for the group of 
stocks with an assigned market maker in each o f the price quintiles. This difference is 
statistically significant at a level o f 1% using both parametric and non-parametric tests. 
For hypothesis six (H6) the null is rejected for the effective half-spread trade execution 
cost measure. On an overall basis, and in each price quintile, the effective half-spread is 
twice as large for those stocks with an assigned market maker.
4.5.3. Price Impact
Price impact provides a measure o f trades’ information content thirty minutes 
after the trade. Since stocks with an assigned market maker that is required to maintain a 
presence in the market may be more susceptible to informed traders, they may be 
compensated with larger bid-ask spreads. This difference will be more visible using the 
price impact measure, since the effect is measured after the trade. Table 40 provides an 
overall estimate o f the price impact to be 0.0962% using all observations and 0.0597% 
when the bunching procedure is used. When the bunching procedure is not used, the 
stocks with an assigned market maker have a mean price impact of 0.1527% which is 
approximately two times larger than the mean price impact o f 0.0752% for those stocks 
without an assigned market maker. When the bunching procedure is used the stocks with 
an assigned market maker have a mean price impact of 0.0906% which is also 
approximately two times larger than the mean price impact of 0.0483% for those stocks 
without an assigned market maker. Without using the bunching procedure, the difference 
between the means in the two groups is statistically significant at a level of 1% using both
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parametric and non-parametric tests of difference. When the bunching procedure is used 
the parametric test remains statistically significant at a level o f 1%, however, the non- 
parametric test shows no statistically significant difference between the two groups.
Table 43 reports the price impact across price quintiles. The mean price impact is 
largest for those stocks in the smallest price quintile, and smallest for those stocks in the 
largest price quintile, but the middle three quintiles are very similar. Without using the 
bunching procedure, the mean price impact is two and one-half times larger for the 
smallest price group, but this multiple declines to only one and one-half times larger for 
the largest price group. The statistical significance between the group o f stocks with and 
without an assigned market maker is at a level of 1% for the smallest three price 
quintiles, but this level is not maintained for the larger price quintiles. The second largest 
price quintile has statistically significant differences at a level o f  5% using the parametric 
test and at a level o f 10% using the non-parametric test. When using the parametric test, 
the largest price quintile has no statistically significant difference, while the non- 
parametric test is significant only at a level of 10%.
When the bunching procedure is used, there is very little statistically significant 
differences between the means of the groups of stocks with and without an assigned 
market maker. None of the price quintiles have significant non-parametric test statistics. 
The smallest price quintile has a parametric test statistic that is significant at a level of 
1%. Also, the middle quintile has a parametric test statistic that is significant at a level of 
10%.
For hypothesis six (H6) the null is not rejected for the price impact trade 
execution cost measure. Although there are some statistically significant differences in
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Table 43 This table reports estimates o f  trade execution costs for the price impact across 
price groups. This table estimates the price impact, shown in equation (5), for each firm 
on the Paris Bourse during the September - December 1995 period. The mean results are 
presented both on an overall basis and for stocks with and without an assigned market 
maker. Each stock is assigned into one o f five price groups based on the price o f the 
stock at the beginning of the period. A bunching procedure in which successive 
transactions at identical prices are combined into one larger trade is used in Panel B but is 
not used in Panel A. A parametric ANOVA test and Wilcoxon rank scores test is used to 
test the difference in means between the groups o f stocks with and without an assigned 
market maker.
average Overall without an with an ANOVA Wilcoxon
price assigned MM assigned MM
PANEL A AH Observations
Group 0 - smallest price
61.15 0.1461 0.1048 0.2589 26.3"* 8.4*"
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 3
183.85 0.0995 0.0762 0.1531 11.1 8.4
311.70 0.1067 0.0829 0.1547 10.9 10.1
466.39 0.0841 0.0749 0.1110 4.2 3.4
Group 4 - largest price
1384.85 0.0475 0.0426 0.0673 2.1 3.0*
PANEL B Observations with deletions due to Bunching 
Group 0 - smallest price
61.07 0.0983 0.0723 0.1703 9.9*" 0.1
Group 1
184.77 0.0548 0.0473 0.0725 1.2 1.0
Group 2 
Group 3
312.56 0.0726 0.0587 0.1004 3.7 0.4
466.57 0.0530 0.0464 0.0726 2.2 0.0
Group 4 - largest price
1385.10 0.0219 0.0216 0.0229 0.0 0.0
‘significant at a level of a  = 10%
"significant at a level of a  = 5%
" ‘significant at a level of a  = 1%
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the small price quintiles, this significance is not present in the large price quintiles nor 
when the bunching procedure is used.
4.5.4. Realized Half-Spread
The realized half-spread is equivalent to the effective half-spread less the price 
impact. It measures the price reversals after trades and represents the market-making 
revenue net of losses to better informed traders. Table 40 reports that the overall realized 
half-spread is 0.2769% when the bunching procedure is not used and 0.3009% with 
bunching. The realized half-spread is approximately two times larger for those stocks 
with an assigned market maker compared to those stocks without an assigned market 
maker. The difference between the stocks with and without assigned market makers is 
statistically significant using both parametric and non-parametric tests.
Table 44 reports the realized half-spread across price quintiles. On an overall 
basis, the realized half-spread is monotonically declining with price irrespective of 
whether the bunching procedure is used. These patterns are mirrored in each individual 
group o f stocks with and without an assigned market maker, except for the largest price 
quintile for stocks with an assigned market maker. For the stocks with an assigned 
market maker, the realized half-spread in the largest price quintile is slightly larger than 
the mean in the second largest quintile.
Examining those observations with and without the bunching procedure shows 
that the difference between the mean realized half-spread in the groups with and without 
an assigned market maker in all ten price quintiles is statistically significant at a level o f  
1% using both parametric and non-parametric tests. For hypothesis six (H6) the null is 
rejected for the realized half-spread trade execution cost measure. On an overall basis,
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Table 44 This table reports the estimates o f trade execution costs for the realized half­
spreads across price groups. This table estimates the realized half-spread, shown in 
equation (6), for each firm on the Paris Bourse during the September - December 1995 
period. The mean results are presented both on an overall basis and for stocks with and 
without an assigned market maker. Each stock is assigned into one o f  five price groups 
based on the price of the stock at the beginning of the period. A bunching procedure in 
which successive transactions at identical prices are combined into one larger trade is 
used in Panel B but is not used in Panel A. A parametric ANOVA test and Wilcoxon rank 
scores test is used to test the difference in means between the groups o f stocks with and 
without an assigned market maker.
average Overall without an with an ANOVA Wilcoxon
price assigned MM assigned MM
PANEL A All Observations
Group 0 - smallest price
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4 - largest price
61.15 0.3348 0.2587 0.5428 84.4 80.1
183.85 0.3146 0.2196 0.5332 149.3*" 151.8*’*
311.70 0.2833 0.2372 0.3766 35.3 41.2
466.39 0.2415 0.2123 0.3262 37.6 41.0
1384.85 0.2154 0.1701 0.3952 144.5*** 55.5
PANEL B Observations with deletions due to Bunching 
Group 0 - smallest price
61.07 0.3663 0.2811 0.6023 95.6 102.2
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4 - largest price
significant at a level of a  = 10% 
"significant at a level of a  = 5% 
’"significant at a level of a  = 1%
184.77 0.3490 0.2461 0.5941 160.7*** 154.7’
312.56 0.2999 0.2402 0.4198 57.2*" 60.6*
466.57 0.2637 0.2326 0.3554 39.5*" 48.4*
1385.10 0.2306 0.1814 0.4283 163.9*" 70.9
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and in each price group, the realized half-spread is larger for those stocks with an 
assigned market maker by a multiple o f approximately two.
4.5.5. Summary
Four measures o f execution costs are estimated following Bessembinder and 
Kaufman (1997). A two-stage estimation process is used whereby daily means are 
calculated for each stock and then these means are used to calculate overall means and 
means for the group of stocks with and without an assigned market maker. The 
difference between these two groups is then tested with a parametric ANOVA test and a 
non-parametric Wilcoxon rank scores tests.
All four trade execution cost measures are larger for stocks with an assigned 
market maker and show a difference between the groups. When the bunching procedure 
is not used, the average quoted bid-ask half-spread is 66 basis points larger (1.2342% 
versus 0.5775), the effective bid-ask half-spread is 30 basis points larger (0.5885% versus 
0.2930%) and the price impact is 8 basis points larger (0.1527% versus 0.0752%). The 
realized bid-ask half-spread is also larger by 22 basis points (0.4357% versus 0.2178%).
The null hypotheses o f a similar trade execution cost measure in the group of 
stocks with and without an assigned market maker is rejected for three o f the four 
measures. The hypothesis is not rejected for the price impact measure. Although there 
are some differences, when the price impact is examined across stock price quintiles, 
there is limited statistical difference for the measure in the largest two price quintiles. 
Additionally, there is very little statistically significant difference for price impact in any 
price quintile when the bunching procedure is used.
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These results do not confirm the findings o f Huang and Stoll (1996) and 
Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997). These two articles attributed differences between 
NYSE and Nasdaq to the market structure. Comparisons between groups o f stocks with 
and without an assigned market maker on the Paris Bourse are much cleaner since other 
unassigned market makers are present in both groups. This allows a better comparison 
than between NYSE and Nasdaq, since the effect o f the assigned market maker is 
determined without the institutional differences inherent in a comparison of a specialist 
market with a multiple dealer market. The results show that quoted, effective and 
realized half-spreads are all larger for stocks that trade with an assigned market maker.
4.6. Conclusion
This essay examines estimates o f the components o f the bid-ask spread and trade 
execution costs across two trading systems that coexist on the Paris Bourse. Literature 
regarding the adverse selection component is contradictory: Affleck-Graves, Hedge and 
Miller (1994) find lower adverse selection costs on Nasdaq, while Jones and Lipson 
(1997) find a higher adverse selection component. Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) 
find no difference in their measure o f adverse selection, the price impact measure, when 
comparing the NYSE and Nasdaq. Data from the Paris Bourse is unable to clarify the 
contradictory findings with respect to the adverse selection component. In estimates o f 
the bid-ask spread components, the adverse selection component is found to be similar in 
the group with and without an assigned market maker. In estimates o f the execution 
costs, the price impact measure is also found to be similar for the group of stocks with 
and without an assigned market maker.
The actual estimate o f the adverse selection component varies from being 
insignificantly different from zero to negative five percent. While a negative adverse
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selection component is economically questionable, it does suggest that adverse selection 
plays a minor role in determining the bid-ask spread. These estimates are much lower 
than those by De Jong, Nijman and Roell (1996). Their findings were based on a small 
sample o f  stocks during a much earlier time period before the reforms on the Paris 
Bourse. Additionally, they use models with two component spread decompositions that 
ignore inventory holding costs and this may affect the determination of the adverse 
selection component.
The inventory holding cost component is found to be larger for those firms with 
an assigned market maker when bunching o f  successive transactions with identical prices 
into one larger trade is not done. This indicates that the assigned market maker faces an 
identifiable cost of maintaining an inventory and adding liquidity by standing ready to 
buy and sell the stock. This larger inventory holding cost component is a partial 
justification o f the larger trade execution costs that are found for those stocks with an 
assigned market maker. Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) suggest that higher volatility 
on (size-matched) Nasdaq firms versus NYSE firms may also contribute to higher 
inventory holding costs. This higher volatility for stocks with an assigned market maker 
was confirmed on the Paris Bourse in chapter three (essay one) of this dissertation. On 
average, stocks with an assigned market maker face trade execution costs that arc much 
larger than for stocks without an assigned market maker.
The third theoretical component o f the bid-ask spread is the order processing 
costs, and, as a percentage, these costs were lower on stocks with an assigned market 
maker. Since this is the remainder from the other components, it is not surprising there is 
a difference given the larger inventory holding cost component for stocks with an 
assigned market maker.
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The inventory holding cost component difference is further analyzed by looking 
at the prior period inventory buildup. A difference is found between the groups o f firms 
with and without an assigned market maker only in the group of stocks with the largest 
decline in inventory. For this group, the inventory cost component is found to be twice as 
large for those stocks with an assigned market maker. This is intuitively pleasing since in 
this situation the assigned market maker would be more likely to manage inventory 
compared to market makers that can exit and cease trading. The inventory accumulation 
procedure is further validated by noting that the adverse selection component is 
statistically significant in only those extreme quintiles where the largest inventory 
changes occurred in the prior period.
Trade execution cost results indicate that larger average trading costs are faced by 
those traders o f stocks with an assigned market maker. Quoted, effective and realized 
half-spreads are all approximately twice as large for stocks with an assigned market 
maker. This is in contrast to the findings by Huang and Stoll (1996) and Bessembinder 
and Kaufman (1997) that showed Nasdaq stocks (with multiple market makers) generally 
had larger trading costs than those facing traders of NYSE stocks (with a single 
specialist). The estimates and comparison across groups of stocks with and without an 
assigned market maker on the Paris Bourse avoids the institutional differences that are 
inherent in the comparison by Huang and Stoll (1996) and Bessembinder and Kaufman 
(1997). The specialist on NYSE is the only market maker, and with the NYSE rule 
enforcement procedures and close monitoring, those specialists may be held more 
accountable than if there were other market makers on the same exchange competing for 
order flow. This comparison using Paris Bourse data involves stocks that all have 
unassigned market makers that are free to enter or exit trading. Thus, the effect on the
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assigned market maker (or specialist) is cleaner since it is not mitigated by a lack o f 
competing market makers. The results show that stocks traded with an assigned market 
maker face higher trade execution costs on the Paris Bourse.
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CHAPTER 5 
ESSAY THREE:
SPECIALIST FIRMS AND INTRADAY PRICE FORMATION
5.1. Introduction
Some of the most puzzling empirical findings are intraday patterns in volume, 
volatility, bid-ask spreads and prices (see Wood, Mclnish and Ord (1985), Stoll and 
Whaley (1990), Mclnish and Wood (1992), Brock and Kleidon (1992) and Lee, Mucklow 
and Ready (1993)). Patterns are puzzling since they appear to contradict the efficient 
market hypothesis in that they provide exploitable risk-free profit opportunities. On the 
NYSE, a U-shaped pattern has been found for volume, volatility, and bid-ask spreads. 
Also, there exists a systematically large end o f day price rise and large final transaction 
return. One potential explanation involves the specialist’s ability to capitalize on trader’s 
inelastic demand at the end of the day. This may contribute to the higher volume, 
volatility, bid-ask spread and price. Another explanation is the suggestion that the end o f 
day price rise may be due to window-dressing. According to these explanations the 
specialist is in a key role to take advantage of the inelastic demand and/or to allow a last 
minute price change.
These explanations can be tested by examining differences across specialists. 
Expertise in assessing inelastic demand may enable the specialist to seize the opportunity 
to profit in these situations. This expertise is not likely to be similar across specialist 
firms since specialist firms have been found to have differences that manifest themselves 
in transitory volatility, trading continuity, execution costs and inventory holding costs11.
11 See Corwin (1996), Bamea (1974), Coughenour and Deli (1996) and Cao, Choe and Hatheway (1997).
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In this chapter, the price formation characteristics of volume, volatility, the bid- 
ask spread, end of day returns and depth are examined across specialist firms.
Differences across individual specialists within a specialist firm may also provide clues to 
the reasons for any patterns in price formation characteristics. Depth has not been 
examined in detail in existing literature and is one characteristic that the specialist can 
alter that may affect the patterns in prices, volume, volatility and bid-ask spread. Patterns 
in depth changes may differ when specialists use different strategies and these patterns 
may be related to individual specialists and/or specialist firms.
The volume o f a stock may impact on that stock’s importance to a specialist 
because of the effect on the specialist’s revenue. The specialist may treat stocks 
differently depending on volume and this may manifest itself in patterns in price 
formation characteristics. This could have implications on whether stocks o f a certain 
volume level are positively or negatively affected by listing on an exchange that uses 
specialists. Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) find that specialist participation on the NYSE 
varies from less than 10% to over 60%. They find specialist trading rises with non-block 
trading but declines with block trading. Furthermore, they find specialists are more 
active in smaller trades and are more likely to provide liquidity when the spread widens.
Inventory accumulation may also affect price formation characteristics.
Specialists may react differently to inventory accumulation or depletion and this may be 
discernible in price formation characteristics.
These issues are investigated in order to better explain the role and impact of 
specialists on price formation patterns. Hypotheses are developed in Section 5.2. and the 
sample and methodology are detailed in Section 5.3. The results are explained in Section
5.4. and conclusions are given in Section 5.5.
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5.2. Hypotheses
Intraday price formation, as evidenced by patterns in volume, volatility, bid-ask
spreads, depth and returns at the end of the day, should be uniform under the null
hypothesis o f a random walk or sub-martingale, if  they are unrelated to characteristics of
the specialists or if  the specialists are all operating similarly. This suggests that
differences among specialist firms may result in differing patterns in the price formation
characteristics. Testing of similarity or difference can be carried out for each o f  these
characteristics and the hypotheses can be expressed as follows:
Hlo: The price formation characteristic observed is the same for all the specialist 
firms.
HI a: The price formation characteristic observed is not the same for all the 
specialist firms.
To further examine this issue, the differences within specialist firms can be 
considered. Some firms have many individual specialists while others have only a few 
individual specialists. The post and panel location can be used to determine the 
individual specialist that is assigned to each stock. If characteristics o f the specialist firm, 
such as capitalization or risk tolerance, influence the price formation characteristics then 
there should be no differences between individual specialists that are members o f the 
same firm. If the expertise of the individual specialist influences the price formation 
characteristic then there should be differences between individual specialists that are 
members o f the same firm. Individual prospective specialists learn the procedures first 
by working behind the panel in clerical support positions similar to an apprentice. It is 
only after much training and membership in the specialist partnership as well as 
membership on the exchange that the specialist will become active. This long period
156
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
before trading where the specialist firm procedures are learned suggests individual
specialists in the same firm will possess similar trading mannerisms. The specific
hypotheses are as follows:
H2o-' The price formation characteristic observed is the same for all individual 
specialists in each specialist firm.
H 2 a -' The price formation characteristic observed is not the same for all individual 
specialists in each specialist firm.
Some specific stocks may be more profitable than others and as such they may 
gamer more attention from each specialist. This, in turn, may indicate that these stocks 
are more likely to be o f interest to the specialist and to be affected by differences between 
specialists even though the actual participation rate may be lower due to higher volume. 
Profitability is likely related to volume since higher volume stocks represent more 
opportunities to capture the bid-ask spread. If  the patterns differ between stocks based on 
volume then this may indicate the volume o f a stock influences the resulting price 
formation characteristics. If a price formation characteristic is larger for low volume 
stocks then this may be the natural result o f compensating for not being able to capture 
large quantities of the bid-ask spread. Conversely, larger price formation characteristics 
for high volume stocks may indicate that the price formation characteristics are a result o f 
the high volume and ability of the specialist to capitalize on that volume. This may 
indicate that there exists some cross-subsidization from the more active to less active 
stocks12. No systematic differences between high and low volume stocks would indicate 
that volume is not a factor that influences the behavior or ability o f the specialist to 
impact on the price formation characteristics. The hypotheses are as follows:
12 Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996) identify an understanding on the NYSE that frequently 
traded stocks will subsidize infrequently traded stocks.
1 5 7
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H3(> Patterns in price formation characteristics observed in stocks o f each 
specialist firm are not affected by the level o f volume in the stocks.
H3A: Patterns in price formation characteristics observed in stocks o f each 
specialist firm are affected by the level o f  volume in the stocks.
The next hypothesis involves the end o f day price rise. I f  specialists are
influencing the end-of-day price rise then the quotes will likely adjust in advance o f the
final transaction. This ability to adjust the bid-ask spread may be apparent in those
specialist firms with expertise in assessing inelastic demand. The hypotheses is as
follows:
H4o: Adjustment o f the bid-ask quotes in advance of the final transaction o f the 
day is similar across specialist firms.
H4A: Adjustment o f the bid-ask quotes in advance of the final transaction o f the 
day differs across specialist firms.
The accumulation of share inventory during the day may also play a role in the 
intraday price formation since some specialist firms may be better able to withstand 
inventory accumulations (because o f lower risk aversion or higher capitalization). This 
ability may be evidenced in price formation characteristics. The hypotheses are as 
follows:
H5o: Price formation characteristics are affected by inventory accumulation 
during the trading day.
H5A: Price formation characteristics are not affected by inventory accumulation 
during the trading day.
5.3. Sample and Method of Testing
Patterns in intraday price formation characteristics are examined through the use 
o f the New York Stock Exchange’s (NYSE) Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database. The 
May 1995 CD-ROM is used to extract prices and quotes throughout the day. All trades
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and quotes with non-positive prices or volume/depth are deleted. Ail trades with an error 
or correction code are deleted. Ail transactions with a 50% price change as compared to 
the previous price are deleted. Only those stocks that are defined as common stocks or 
preferred stocks are included in the analysis.
Specialist data is obtained from the NYSE Specialist Directory for May 1995. The 
Directory is a monthly report prepared by the NYSE, listing specialist firms operating on 
the Exchange and specialist assignments for all NYSE-listed securities. The directory 
includes the security, specialist firm, and the post and panel location o f each security. 
There are 37 specialist firms operating in May 1995, handling 2,439 securities. One 
additional specialist firm was operating in May 1995 but is excluded because there are a 
limited number of observations and that specialist firms ceased operations in June 1995.
In order to compare the end o f day price rise across trading groups, simple 
statistics will be used to obtain the mean returns. As in chapter 3, the return calculation 
will be shown in simple percentage terms so that the magnitude of the return can be 
easily interpreted. The time-weighted bid-ask spread and depth are weighted by the 
number o f seconds the quotes are outstanding during each half-hour interval. The 
opening quotes are usually from a prior period, except in the case of the first half-hour 
period, where no quotes are used until the first quote after the opening transaction. For 
the interval after 4:00, the final quotes of the day are considered to be outstanding for 
only one second.
Price formation characteristics will be tested across groups under both a 
parametric and non-parametric framework. A simple analysis o f variance framework will 
provide the method of testing that breaks the total variance of the sample into that
159
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attributable to within and that attributable to between groups. This method of testing 
relies on assessing the difference in size between the groups and within the groups to 
determine if  the underlying population means are equal. The non-parametric method of 
testing will be performed using the Wilcoxon rank sums test whereby returns are ranked 
and these ranks are summed and compared to a distribution that has no difference in the 
means. Again, the larger the difference the more likely the two groups are not from the 
same population.
5.4. Results
The differences across and within specialist firms are examined by observing 
numerous price formation characteristics. The results o f  these tests are organized by 
hypothesis.
5.4.1. Differences Across Specialist Firms
The null o f hypothesis one (HI) is that the price characteristic is the same for all 
the specialist firms. In the following subsections volume, volatility, the bid-ask spread, 
end o f day returns, and depth are used to test the hypothesis. With the exception o f the 
end o f day returns, each o f the price characteristics may vary during the day, and in order 
to better identify the impact o f the specialist firms, the price formation characteristics 
examined are both reported on an overall basis and by isolating the characteristic within 
each half-hour interval during the trading day.
5.4.1.1. Volume
Trading volume is examined and reported in Table 45. The mean number of 
transactions each half-hour is 2.6, with an average volume of 598,900 shares (reported as 
5,989 hundred-lot shares). The trading day is broken down into half-hour intervals and
160
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Table 45 This table reports the volume within each thirty minute interval across specialist firms. The mean number of transactions, 
the mean total share volume (in hundred-lots) and the mean percentage of each day’s total share volume are reported in aggregate and 
for each specialist firm. A parametric ANOVA test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums test are conducted to test for differences 
across specialist firms and across trading intervals.
Overall overall 9:30- 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00-
10:00 10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30
mean # trans. 2.6 3.0 3.3 3.1 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.7 3.1 3.5 0.5
mean tot. vol. 5,989 7,035 7,904 7,386 6,932 5,891 5,760 4,984 4,599 4,973 5,504 6,008 6,819 7,953 2,109
mean % day’s vol. 6.4 7.5 7.5 7.8 7.2 6.8 6.1 5.9 6.4 7.4 8.0 9.2 11.2 2.9
Specialist # 
20
mean it trans. 2.8 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.8 3.1 3.5 3.8 0.5
mean tot. vol. 6,542 6,693 8,655 8,650 8,394 6,022 6,476 4,720 5,862 4,627 6,395 6,204 7,440 9,056 2,394
mean % day’s vol.
34
mean it trans.
6.5 8.0 7.7 8.4 7.0 6.9 5.8 6.7 5.9 7.3 7.4 9.2 10.4 2.8
1.9 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.1 1.9 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.6 0.4
mean tot. vol. 5,590 6,419 6,479 6,397 8,315 4,965 9,142 4,788 3,581 4,912 4,373 4,301 5,880 7,029 1,676
mean % day’s vol.
104
mean # trans.
6.3 8.0 7.5 7.8 6.8 8.1 6.1 5.8 5.8 7.1 8.3 9.0 10.6 2.7
1.6 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.2 0.3
mean tot. vol. 2,729 3,125 3,097 3,148 2,947 2,644 2,567 2,607 2,641 2,117 2,768 2,818 3,473 3,446 803
mean % day’s vol. 6.3 6.7 6.7 7.6 7.5 7.1 5.8 6.2 6.4 8.3 8.4 9.5 11.2 2.4
137
mean # trans. 3.9 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.5 4.0 3.7 3.1 3.0 3.3 3.7 4.1 4.6 5.1 0.6
mean tot. vol. 9,635 12,741 12,220 12,344 11,565 10,034 8,921 7,267 7,721 7,861 8,420 9,949 10,637 12,165 3,040
mean % day's vol. 7.2 7.7 8.0 8.3 6.6 6.7 5.8 6.0 5.9 7.5 8.3 8.6 10.4 2.9
202
mean # trans. 2.9 3.6
00 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.1 3.5 3.9 0.6
mean tot. vol. 7,961 9,592 9,861 11,694 9,119 7,585 7,052 6,034 5,874 6,616 6,853 7,862 8,991 11,002 3,324
mean % day’s vol. 7.1 8.1 8.0 7.8 6.5 6.5 5.4 5.4 6.8 7.0 7.8 8.9 11.7 3.0
210
mean tt trans. 3.2 3.9 4.3 3.9 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.5 2.7 3.2 3.4 3.9 4.3 0.5
mean tot. vol. 7,764 9,424 10,941 10,357 8,681 6,968 7,392 6,843 5,347 5,501 7,627 8,343 8,457 10,137 2,684
mean % day's vol. 7.1 8.0 8.1 7.9 7.0 6.6 5.6 5.4 6.5 7.2 8.2 8.9 10.7 2.7
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(Table 45 continued)
overall 9:30-
10:00
10:00-
10:30
10:30-
11:00
11:00-
11:30
11:30
12:00
Snecialist # 
215
mean # trans. 2.7 2.9 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.8
mean tot. vol. 5,654 5,704 7,223 6,835 6,919 5,998
mean % day’s vol. 6.2 7.6 7.7 7.5 7.2
240
mean # trans. 1.6 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.6
mean tot. vol. 3,494 4,121 4,895 4,288 3,959 3,182
mean % day’s vol. 5.5 6.7 7.6 8.2 6.8
298
mean U trans. 3.5 4.0 4.5 4.2 4.0 3.6
mean tot. vol. 8,978 10,316 12,538 11,590 10,540 8,928
mean % day's vol. 6.1 7.6 7.8 8.2 7.7
364
mean # trans. 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.1
mean tot. vol. 3,783 4,411 3,815 3,950 4,522 2,990
mean % day’s vol. 6.6 7.2 6.7 6.2 5.9
403
mean # trans. 3.1 3.5 3.9 3.6 3.6 3.2
mean tot. vol. 6,143 7,110 7,921 7,305 7,292 5,870
mean % day's vol. 5.7 7.5 7.3 8.3 7.5
501
mean # trans. 2.9 3.4 3.8 3.5 3.3 3.0
mean tot. vol. 6,701 8,120 8,693 7,838 7,646 6,964
mean % day's vol. 6.2 7.5 7.4 7.6 7.3
520
mean # trans. 2.5 3.0 3.3 3.0 2.9 2.6
mean tot. vol. 5,462 5,824 7,237 6,603 5,839 5,070
mean % day's vol. 6.3 7.2 7.1 7.3 6.3
12:00-
12:30
12:30-
1:00
1:00-
1:30
1:30-
2:00
2:00-
2:30
2:30-
3:00
3:00-
3:30
3:30-
4:00
4:00-
4:30
2.5
5,321
6.9
2.1
4,642
6.0
2.0
4,358
6.2
2.4
5,132
7.0
2.6
5,093
7.4
2.8
5,888
7.8
3.3
6,371
9.0
3.7
8,129
11.2
0.5
1,535
2.5
1.5
3,416
7.2
1.3
2,616
6.1
1.3
3,085
5.8
1.6
3,222
7.0
1.5
3,462
8.0
1.6
3,652
8.0
1.8
3,291
9.2
2.3
4,742
10.9
0.4
989
2.9
3.3
9,093
6.6
2.8
7,818
6.6
2.8
6,186
5.6
3.0
7,707
6.6
3.4
8,221
6.8
3.6
8,641
7.9
4.0
9,728
8.5
4.5
11,074
10.9
0.6
3,305
3.0
1.9
5,714
7.6
1.5
2,671
6.2
1.5
4,320
7.4
1.5 
2,986
7.5
1.8
2,798
5.5
2.1
4,380
9.7
2.5
4,676
10.9
2.5 
4,175
9.6
0.4
1,553
2.9
2.9 
5,654
6.9
2.5
5,013
6.2
2.4
4,800
5.6
2.7
5,097
6.2
3.0 
5,787
8.0
3.2
6,076
7.9
3.8 
7,702
9.9
4.2
8,567
10.2
0.5
1,802
2.8
2.7 
6,239
6.8
2.3
5,641
5.9
2.4
5,481
6.1
2.5
5,292
6.1
2.9
6,316
7.6
3.2
6,786
7.9
3.6
7,750
9.3
3.9
8,521
11.3
0.5
2,530
3.0
2.3 
4,584
6.3
1.9
4,347
5.4
1.9
4,446
5.3
2.1
4,611
6.4
2.4
4,929
7.8
2.7
6,308
8.1
3.0
7,370
9.6
3.3
6,925
13.0
0.5
2,380
3.9
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(Table 45 continued)
Soecialist # 
551
overall 9:30-
10:00
10:00-
10:30
10:30-
11:00
11:00-
11:30
11:30
12:00
mean U trans. 2.7 3.3 3.5 3.2 3.1 2.7
mean tot. vol. 5,966 7,968 8,659 7,900 6,675 5,521
mean % day’s vol. 
1010
6.6 7.1 7.2 7.9 7.6
mean it trans. 1.9 1.8 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.1
mean tot. vol. 4,426 5,268 5,984 5,112 7,043 6,439
mean % day’s vol.
1027
4.5 5.6 6.1 7.6 7.8
mean it trans. 2.0 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.3 1.9
mean tot. vol. 4,782 6,622 7,144 4,803 5,328 4,699
mean % day's vol.
1034
6.9 8.8 7.3 8.2 6.4
mean U trans. 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1
mean tot. vol. 1,527 1,642 1,759 1,554 1,448 2,053
mean % day’s vol.
1148
5.9 6.2 7.0 6.3 8.5
mean tt trans. 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.1 2.1 1.8
mean tot. vol. 3,545 4,011 4,605 4,142 3,887 3,632
mean % day’s vol. 
1225
6.4 7.8 8.1 7.8 7.2
mean tt trans. 2.2 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.2
mean tot. vol. 5,440 6,216 7,322 6,073 6,358 5,885
mean % day's vol.
1227
6.5 7.6 7.7 8.0 7.3
mean tt trans. 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.0
mean tot. vol. 4,553 5,634 6,152 5,275 5,527 4,384
mean % day's vol. 6.6 7.6 7.4 7.5 7.0
12:00-
12:30
12:30-
1:00
1:00-
1:30
1:30-
2:00
2:00-
2:30
2:30-
3:00
3:00-
3:30
3:30-
4:00
4:00-
4:30
2.4
5,082
7.0
2.0
5,116
5.5
2.1
4,267
5.9
2.3 
5,168
6.4
2.7
5,514
7.5
2.9
5,713
8.0
3.3
6,228
9.9
3.6
7,882
11.2
0.4
1,834
2.2
1.8
3,188
5.6
1.5 
3,607
6.5
1.5
3,438
5.9
1.7 
3,502
7.7
1.9
2,709
9.5
2.0
3,320
8.3
2.4
5,332
10.8
2.7
5,700
11.6
0.3
1,319
2.3
1.7 
4,004
5.8
1.6
3,011
6.4
1.7
4,192
7.0
1.8
5,386
5.8
2.1
5,537
7.2
1.9
3,575
7.3
2.3
4,079
7.5
2.8
5,999
11.4
0.4
2,571
3.9
0.8
1,758
6.3
0.7
943
6.6
0.7
1,257
5.3
0.8
1,328
5.9
0.9
1,393
7.2
1.0
1,468
7.9
1.1
1,369
9.3
1.4
2,955
15.2
0.2
453
2.5
1.6
3,052
5.3
1.4
2,638
5.9
1.4
2,903
5.6
1.4 
3,044
6.4
1.7
3,171
7.6
1.9
3,969
8.2
2.1
4,181
9.7
2.6
5,084
11.0
0.4
1,314
3.1
2.1
6,375
7.2
1.7
3,963
6.3
1.7
4,316
6.4
1.8
5,131
6.0
2.2
4,662
6.7
2.3 
5,836
8.3
2.5 
5,496
8.6
3.0
6,957
11.3
0.4
1,572
2.1
1.8
4,315
6.5
1.6
4,090
6.1
1.5 
3,215
5.6
1.7
3,798
6.1
1.9
4,087
7.4
2.2
4,728
8.4
2.4
5,515
9.2
2.7
5,674
11.3
0.5
1,350
3.1
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(Table 45 continued)
Soecialist # 
1229
overall 9:30-
10:00
10:00-
10:30
10:30-
11:00
11:00-
11:30
11:30 
12:00
mean # trans. 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.1
mean tot. vol. 2,286 2,456 2,468 3,165 2,271 2,227
mean % day’s vol. 
1266
5.5 6.9 7.1 7.9 6.5
mean # trans. 2.7 3.4 3.6 3.2 3.2 2.8
mean tot. vol. 5,681 6,657 6,599 6,858 6,555 5,211
mean % day’s vol. 
1280
6.7 7.7 8.2 7.1 7.2
mean # trans. 1.6 1.7 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.7
mean tot. vol. 2,883 2,601 3,319 3,069 3,459 2,894
mean % day’s vol.
1341
5.7 7.9 8.8 7.8 7.8
mean # trans. 2.3 2.9 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.4
mean tot. vol. 5,321 6,762 7,924 5,608 5,664 4,909
mean % day's vol.
1418
6.1 7.3 7.0 8.1 6.8
mean # trans. 3.2 4.0 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.3
mean tot. vol. 8,653 11,058 11,753 10,234 9,444 8,601
mean % day’s vol. 
1679
7.5 8.6 7.4 7.5 7.1
mean # trans. 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.4
mean tot. vol. 6,752 8,637 8,878 7,886 7,724 7,295
mean % day’s vol.
1687
5.6 6.5 6.9 7.4 7.3
mean # trans. 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.1
mean tot. vol. 5,240 5,815 6,757 6,415 5,731 5,477
mean % day's vol. 5.7 6.8 7.2 7.5 7.5
12:00-
12:30
12:30-
1:00
1:00-
1:30
1.1
1,930
6.8
1.0
1,884
6.5
0.8
2,095
5.7
2.6
5,771
6.1
2.2
4,873
5.5
2.2
4,463
6.5
1.5
2,463
6.1
1.4
2,803
6.2
1.2
2,181
5.4
2.2
5,124
6.8
1.8
3,938
5.7
1.8
4,820
6.0
3.0
7,868
6.8
2.6
8,522
6.2
2.5
6,087
5.4
2.2
6,738
6.9
2.0
6,615
7.2
1.7
5,103
5.6
1.9
5,683
7.5
1.6
4,148
6.3
1.6
3,637
5.8
1:30-
2:00
2:00-
2:30
2:30-
3:00
1.1
2,301
7.8
1.1
1,922
7.9
1.2
1,906
8.4
2.4
5,324
7.6
2.6
5,169
8.2
2.8
5,368
6.9
1.4
2,732
6.7
1.7
2,622
6.5
1.8
3,604
8.7
2.0
5,310
6.2
2.2
4,897
7.6
2.5
5,406
8.3
2.9
6,477
6.3
3.0
7,401
6.8
3.4
9,611
8.0
1.9 
5,722
5.9
2.3 
6,012
7.3
2.4
5,818
7.8
1.7
4,474
6.2
1.9
4,657
7.7
2.3
5,129
9.2
3:00-
3:30
3:30-
4:00
4:00-
4:30
1.4
3,748
9.0
1.6
2,968
11.5
0.3
663
2.4
3.2
6,401
8.4
3.8
8,486
11.2
0.5
1,798
2.7
2.0
3,152
8.9
2.4
4,577
10.8
0.4
892
2.7
2.7
4,835
7.9
3.2
7,058
12.4
0.5
2,241
3.8
3.8
9,093
8.2
4.3
11,729
10.6
0.6
3,271
3.7
2.8
7,616
10.9
3.2
8,469
11.8
0.4
2,017
2.8
2.4
5,823
8.8
2.8
7,782
10.7
0.4
1,837
3.0
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(Table 45 continued)
Specialist # 
1726
overall 9:30-
10:00
10:00-
10:30
10:30-
11:00
11:00-
11:30
11:30
12:00
mean U trans. 3.1 3.0 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.2
mean tot. vol. 7,674 7,206 9,782 9,627 8,800 7,814
mean % day’s vol. 
1746
5.7 7.6 7.7 7.9 7.1
mean U trans. 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8
mean tot. vol. 3,769 4,776 5,085 4,775 4,333 4,409
mean % day’s vol.
1903
6.9 8.2 7.5 7.3 7.9
mean # trans. 2.5 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.4
mean tot. vol. 4,929 5,844 6,066 5,235 5,584 4,518
mean % day’s vol. 
1910
6.5 6.9 6.5 7.4 6.8
mean # trans. 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
mean tot. vol. 1,279 1,376 1,419 1,291 1,367 1,577
mean % day’s vol. 
1941
5.7 7.1 6.9 7.1 7.0
mean # trans. 2.9 3.4 3.7 3.5 3.4 2.9
mean tot. vol. 6,706 7,166 9,472 9,015 7,839 6,032
mean % day's vol.
1966
6.9 8.0 8.0 7.5 6.9
mean # trans. 2.6 3.1 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.8
mean tot. vol. 7,888 9,978 11,111 9,711 8,843 7,291
mean % day’s vol. 
2022
6.3 6.8 7.2 7.1 7.9
mean # trans. 2.3 2.6 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.2
mean tot. vol. 4,970 4,969 7,465 5,974 5,771 4,267
mean % day’s vol. 5.5 6.9 7.6 8.4 6.3
12:00-
12:30
12:30-
1:00
1:00-
1:30
3.0
7,595
7.3
2.5
6,284
5.8
2.5
7,665
6.3
1.6
3,884
6.9
1.3
3,332
5.8
1.3
2,419
5.1
2.4
4,786
6.8
2.2
5,174
7.4
1.9
3,778
5.8
0.8
1,501
6.3
0.7
1,029
6.7
0.7
1,118
6.0
2.6
6,114
7.0
2.2
4,934
5.6
2.3
4,599
5.5
2.4
6,768
7.0
2.1
6,622
7.3
2.0
5,662
6.2
2.2
4,697
6.5
1.8
3,717
6.3
1.7
3,280
6.0
1:30-
2:00
2:00-
2:30
2:30-
3:00
2.7
6,280
6.5
3.1
6,624
7.5
3.4
8,465
7.7
1.4
3,238
5.4
1.5
3,364
6.5
1.7 
3,191
8.7
2.0
3,795
5.9
24
4,631
7.2
2.6
4,525
7.8
0.7
1,015
6.3
0.8
1,216
7.7
0.9
1,120
7.9
2.4
5,865
6.2
2.8
6,265
7.8
3.2
6,732
7.8
2.2
6,426
7.1
2.5 
7,990
7.6
2.8
7,490
7.2
1.9 
4,271
5.9
2.2
5,335
6.8
2.6
4,666
8.5
3:00-
3:30
3:30-
4:00
4:00-
4:30
3.8
8,353
8.6
4.4
10,166
11.3
0.6
2,773
2.9
1.8
3,289
7.9
2.3
5,294
11.9
0.5
1,381
3.8
3.4 
7,238 
11.3
3.4 
5,701 
11.0
0.4
2,135
2.7
0.9
1,296
8.5
1.3
1,783
12.7
0.3
804
4.1
3.5
7,210
8.7
3.9
10,156
11.3
0.5
2,490
2.9
3.2
8,956
8.7
3.5
10,460
10.6
0.5
3,131
3.0
2.8
6,075
9.0
3.1
7,009
12.0
0.5
2,080
4.4
(table con'd)
R
eproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright 
ow
ner. 
Further 
reproduction 
prohibited 
w
ithout 
perm
ission.
(Table 45 continued) 
overall 9:30- 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00
10:00 10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00 12:30
Specialist # 
2090
mean # trans. 2.3 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.2
mean tot. vol. 5,473 7,072 7,572 6,336 6,141 4,610 5,484
mean % day’s vol. 7.2 8.0 7.3 7.5 7.8 6.7
3011
mean # trans. 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.1
mean tot. vol. 2,400 2,244 3,046 2,583 2,442 2,842 2,527
mean % day’s vol. 6.0 7.7 7.3 7.3 8.2 6.5
3174
mean # trans. 2.7 3.2 3.5 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.5
mean tot. vol. 5,756 7,257 7,501 7,721 5,872 5,553 4,906
mean % day’s vol. 6.8 7.6 7.9 8.3 7.3 6.5
Tests of Difference of Mean % Day’s Volume Across Specialist Units
ANOVA 2.8"' 2 .1 '"  1.7’" 1.2 1.5" 1.3
Wilcoxon 428.5'" 370.4'" 333.6'" 283.2'" 210.3'" 255.4’
'significant at a := 10%, ’’significant at a  = 5%, ’’’significant at a  = 1%
12:30-
1:00
1:00-
1:30
1:30-
2:00
2:00-
2:30
1.9
3,738
5.8
1.8
4,208
5.7
2.1
4,751
6.5
2.3
5,295
7.0
1.0
2,031
6.6
1.0
1,838
6.7
1.0
2,220
6.5
1.1
2,671
6.8
2.2
4,048
5.6
2.2
4,360
5.9
2.4
5,328
6.9
2.7
5,336
6.5
2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00-
3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30
2.4 2.7 3.3 0.5
5,410 6,154 7,751 2,104
7.5 8.6 11.8 2.5
1.2 1.4 1.7 0.3
2,443 2,800 3,300 616
8.2 8.7 11.0 2.9
2.9 3.3 3.5 0.5
5,674 7,273 7,518 2,235
7.9 9.0 10.7 3.0
2 .0 '"  1.4' 1.6" 1.7'" 1.0 2 .9" ' 1.8'" 3.2 '"
212.1"' 297.1"’ 290.8’”  217.5'" 183.1’"  189.9"’ 128.2'" 581.5’"
the mean number of transactions and mean total volume is reported for each interval. 
Additionally, the mean percentage of the day’s volume is reported for each interval.
Since the average volume differs across specialist firms, this measure allows a more 
appropriate comparison across specialist firms. The mean percentage is calculated by 
dividing the number o f shares traded each half hour by the total volume each day for each 
stock and then averaging the percentage across all stocks within an individual specialist 
firm.
First, on an overall basis, each half-hour interval is examined and a J-shaped 
pattern in volume is found. The interval with the largest mean percentage of day’s 
volume is the 3:30-4:00 interval, immediately preceding the close. There is some volume 
reported after the close, but this amount is very small.
Each specialist firm is examined to determine if  the intradaily J-shaped pattern 
occurs consistently across the specialist firms. O f the 37 specialist firms detailed in 
Table 45, 35 have the 3:30-4:00 half-hour as the interval with the largest mean 
percentage of the day’s volume, ranging from 10.4% to 15.2%. For the other two 
specialist firms, numbers 364 and 1903, the 3:00-3:30 interval has the largest mean 
percentage o f the day’s volume.
The first half-hour interval (9:30-10:00) has a slightly smaller mean percentage o f 
the day’s volume as compared to the second half-hour interval (10:00-10:30). This is 
true on an overall basis, as well as for each of the 37 specialist firms. This may be 
partially due to the opening procedures followed by the NYSE, since the opening trade of 
the stock may be delayed. On an overall basis, this pattern also holds for the mean
167
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volume in the first two half-hour intervals. For individual specialist firms, 33 o f the 37 
have the same pattern in mean volume.
When the number o f transactions and actual volume are examined across the 
trading day, similar patterns are observed as when the mean percentage o f the day’s 
volume is examined with one exception. The rise in the percentage of the day’s volume 
at the end o f the day is much larger than the number of transactions or the volume in 
these periods might indicate. This suggests that the rise in percentage at the end o f the 
day may be driven by stocks with lower volume, that perhaps have a majority o f their 
trading during that period in the day. For stocks with low volume, a few more shares 
traded at the end of the day will not impact the mean number o f transactions and mean 
volume as much as they will impact the mean percentage o f the day’s volume.
The mean percentage volume is examined across the specialist firms in each half- 
hour interval and tests of difference show that, while a similar pattern exists, the actual 
percentage volume differs significantly between the specialist firms. In all fourteen half- 
hour intervals during the trading day, the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums tests 
indicate that the differences in the mean percentage o f the day’s volume across specialist 
firms is statistically significant at a level of 1%. The parametric ANOVA test for each of 
the fourteen half-hours indicates that in only nine o f the individual half-hours do the 
specialist firms have a mean percentage of the day’s volume that is significantly different 
at a level o f 1%. These half-hours are concentrated at the beginning (first three half- 
hours) and end (last three half-hours) of the trading day with the intervals within the 
11:00 until 3:00 time period with varying levels o f  significance and three half-hour 
intervals with no statistically significant differences.
168
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These results indicate that hypothesis one (HI) for volume is rejected and that 
volume as a percentage o f the day’s volume differs among the specialist firms. This is 
especially true during the beginning and the end o f the trading day and specifically during 
the first three and last three half-hour trading intervals. The differences may be 
attributable to stock characteristics, however, the lack of differences during the middle o f 
the day suggest that during the beginning and end o f the day the specialists may manage 
their volume in different way. For example, specialists may alter the bid-ask spread and 
this may have an effect on when the transactions are filled.
§.4.1.2. Volatility
Volatility is examined in Table 46 by using two measures. One measure of 
volatility is the high minus the low share price o f  transactions divided by the mean share 
price during each trading interval. A second measure is the standard deviation o f changes 
in successive midpoints o f the bid-ask spread. First, on an overall basis, the patterns 
across the half-hour intervals o f the trading day are similar but not identical. The high 
minus low (HML) measure and the standard deviation (STD) measure both have reverse- 
J shapes during the day. The change in volatility between successive intervals is much 
less pronounced for the STD measure, with the exception o f the change between the first 
two and the last two trading intervals. The HML measure peaks in the 3:30-4:00 interval, 
and then is very small in the 4:00-4:30 interval, while the STD measure has a large rise 
from the 3:30-4:00 interval to the 4:00-4:30 interval peak. For the STD measure, there is 
a large drop from the 9:30-10:00 interval to the 10:00-10:30 interval. Since these two 
measures are similar but not identical, both measures are used to examine the differences 
among specialist firms.
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Table 46 This table reports volatility within each thirty minute interval across specialist firms. Volatility is reported (in percent) 
using two measures. One measure calculates volatility as the difference between the high and the low share prices divided by the 
mean share price (H-L)/P for each half-hour. Volatility is also reported as the standard deviation of the change in successive 
midpoints of the bid-ask spread. This is done on an overall basis as well as for each specialist firm. A parametric ANOVA test and a 
non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums test are conducted to test if there is a difference between the specialist firms and trading intervals.
Overall
overall 9:30-
10:00
10:00-
10:30
10:30-
11:00
11:00-
11:30
11:30-
12:00
12:00-
12:30
12:30-
1:00
1:00-
1:30
1:30-
2:00
2:00-
2:30
2:30-
3:00
3:00-
3:30
3:30-
4:00
4:00-
4:30
(H-L)/P 0.325 0.460 0.423 0.377 0.353 0.328 0.302 0.271 0.262 0.276 0.300 0.318 0.343 0.402 0.025
standard dev. 
Specialist #
20
0.310 0.442 0.342 0.313 0.290 0.284 0.273 0.273 0.262 0.262 0.270 0.267 0.269 0.277 0.384
(H-L)/P 0.283 0.375 0.343 0.336 0.310 0.302 0.255 0.228 0.228 0.244 0.262 0.276 0.322 0.343 0.034
standard dev. 
34
(H-L)/P
0.227 0.307 0.253 0.232 0.216 0.205 0.203 0.200 0.200 0.197 0.207 0.200 0.211 0.213 0.255
0.314 0.429 0.353 0.378 0.337 0.298 0.301 0.268 0.221 0.262 0.348 0.294 0.315 0.428 0.042
standard dev. 
104
0.341 0.433 0.358 0.332 0.324 0.314 0.321 0.304 0.321 0.315 0.330 0.300 0.286 0.384 0.432
(H-L)/P 0.284 0.381 0.368 0.314 0.287 0.295 0.272 0.258 0.237 0.277 0.274 0.257 0.289 0.338 0.020
standard dev. 
137
0.311 0.416 0.323 0.338 0.271 0.281 0.295 0.280 0.266 0.267 0.285 0.274 0.296 0.283 0.373
(H-L)/P 0.424 0.666 0.508 0.474 0.494 0.399 0.366 0.394 0.365 0.343 0.374 0.427 0.473 0.506 0.048
standard dev. 
202
0.331 0.503 0.358 0.294 0.311 0.280 0.314 0.289 0.273 0.297 0.299 0.265 0.281 0.294 0.451
(H-L)/P 0.307 0.406 0.399 0.362 0.348 0.308 0.293 0.282 0.243 0.278 0.286 0.312 0.319 0.352 0.017
standard dev. 
210
0.243 0.324 0.262 0.250 0.223 0.219 0.223 0.225 0.210 0.210 0.218 0.211 0.227 0.227 0.297
(H-L)/P 0.333 0.451 0.445 0.372 0.352 0.327 0.306 0.280 0.278 0.291 0.307 0.336 0.341 0.440 0.020
standard dev. 
215
0.270 0.345 0.286 0.285 0.260 0.268 0.245 0.247 0.236 0.233 0.259 0.243 0.250 0.244 0.301
(H-L)/P 0.313 0.426 0.406 0.404 0.331 0.323 0.284 0.256 0.248 0.253 0.282 0.293 0.330 0.421 0.008
standard dev. 
240
0.291 0.399 0.417 0.346 0.251 0.245 0.253 0.243 0.215 0.223 0.246 0.232 0.253 0.260 0.376
(H-L)/P 0.343 0.762 0.518 0.400 0.301 0.337 0.324 0.215 0.279 0.301 0.297 0.325 0.326 0.342 0.021
standard dev. 0.721 1.019 0.846 0.680 0.700 0.640 0.581 0.453 0.413 0.627 0.910 0.718 0.673 0.550 0.922
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(Table 46 continued)
overall 9:30- 
10:00
Specialist #
298
(H-L)/P 0.327 0.463
standard dev. 0.294 0.376
364
(H-L)/P 0.319 0.476
standard dev. 0.257 0.341
403
(H-L)/P 0.326 0.450
standard dev. 0.228 0.329
501
(H-L)/P 0.316 0.466
standard dev. 0.289 0.419
520
(H-L)/P 0.335 0.483
standard dev. 0.495 1.140
551
(H-L)/P 0.248 0.358
standard dev. 0.206 0.286
1010
(H-L)/P 0.346 0.507
standard dev. 0.338 0.434
1027
(H-L)/P 0.274 0.360
standard dev. 0.230 0.309
1034
(H-L)/P 0.299 0.523
standard dev. 0.283 0.334
1148
(H-L)/P 0.458 0.709
standard dev. 0.652 0.947
0:00-
0:30
10:30-
11:00
11:00-
11:30
11:30-
12:00
0.437
0.317
0.400
0.310
0.358
0.287
0.331
0.273
0.443
0.293
0.414
0.274
0.357
0.253
0.296
0.254
0.401
0.247
0.378
0.235
0.383
0.217
0.354
0.222
0.413
0.304
0.369
0.285
0.341
0.268
0.333
0.276
0.452
0.450
0.425
0.447
0.404
0.335
0.347
0.269
0.313
0.219
0.289
0.221
0.264
0.196
0.234
0.188
0.425
0.346
0.413
0.332
0.396
0.349
0.341
0.323
0.396
0.258
0.286
0.233
0.297
0.260
0.248
0.244
0.416
0.358
0.389
0.298
0.293
0.238
0.328
0.252
0.651
0.717
0.530
0.719
0.553
0.604
0.459
0.564
12:00-
12:30
12:30-
1:00
1:00-
1:30
1:30-
2:00
2:00-
2:30
2:30-
3:00
3:00-
3:30
3:30-
4:00
4:00-
4:30
0.326
0.281
0.284
0.275
0.260
0.260
0.288
0.262
0.305
0.259
0.300
0.263
0.345
0.247
0.372
0.277
0.030
0.350
0.229
0.235
0.194
0.233
0.312
0.232
0.306
0.219
0.276
0.229
0.305
0.217
0.330
0.232
0.404
0.223
0.032
0.291
0.292
0.205
0.275
0.200
0.254
0.202
0.281
0.191
0.293
0.198
0.320
0.196
0.356
0.206
0.396
0.208
0.026
0.267
0.278
0.255
0.249
0.261
0.260
0.247
0.262
0.244
0.296
0.250
0.316
0.269
0.336
0.261
0.404
0.277
0.023
0.319
0.327
0.412
0.248
0.588
0.305
0.391
0.258
0.341
0.281
0.265
0.320
0.405
0.347
0.276
0.384
0.386
0.016
0.704
0.237
0.186
0.204
0.186
0.214
0.184
0.203
0.174
0.237
0.172
0.231
0.187
0.253
0.181
0.325
0.184
0.016
0.264
0.301
0.291
0.302
0.313
0.264
0.283
0.266
0.266
0.306
0.308
0.336
0.319
0.403
0.309
0.422
0.312
0.047
0.479
0.220
0.216
0.163
0.183
0.261
0.174
0.261
0.189
0.268
0.207
0.265
0.212
0.295
0.209
0.372
0.216
0.020
0.240
0.193
0.266
0.238
0.227
0.170
0.225
0.194
0.237
0.244
0.231
0.249
0.303
0.298
0.208
0.425
0.275
0.071
0.374
0.483
0.499
0.324
0.653
0.379
0.537
0.310
0.559
0.365
0.559
0.414
0.529
0.483
0.565
0.549
0.568
0.021
0.804
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(Table 46 continued)
overall 9:30- 
10:00
Specialist ft
1225
(H-L)/P 0.280 0.440
standard dev. 0.324 0.467
1227
(H-L)/P 0.327 0.426
standard dev. 0.288 0.390
1229
(H-L)/P 0.339 0.348
standard dev. 0.323 0.469
1266
(h-lvp 0.386 0.519
standard dev. 0.305 0.541
1280
(H-L)/P 0.322 0.414
standard dev. 0.282 0.377
1341
(H-L)/P 0.414 0.586
standard dev. 0.298 0.370
1418
(H-L)/P 0.379 0.552
standard dev. 0.351 0.495
1679
(H-L)/P 0.264 0.340
standard dev. 0.279 0.337
1687
(H-L)/P 0.291 0.361
standard dev. 0.328 0.408
0:00-
0:30
10:30-
11:00
11:00-
11:30
11:30-
12:00
0.388
0.341
0.323
0.307
0.292
0.290
0.267
0.283
0.439
0.325
0.373
0.289
0.355
0.272
0.327
0.277
0.352
0.364
0.380
0.315
0.318
0.319
0.322
0.285
0.561
0.319
0.377
0.304
0.382
0.245
0.373
0.246
0.434
0.318
0.364
0.282
0.344
0.289
0.346
0.345
0.499
0.317
0.491
0.302
0.434
0.283
0.461
0.307
0.505
0.364
0.436
0.403
0.384
0.330
0.378
0.323
0.311
0.315
0.270
0.302
0.276
0.283
0.267
0.263
0.358
0.358
0.316
0.344
0.273
0.316
0.293
0.296
2:00-
2:30
12:30-
1:00
1:00-
1:30
1:30-
2:00
2:00-
2:30
2:30-
3:00
3:00-
3:30
3:30-
4:00
4:00-
4:30
0.264
0.273
0.226
0.288
0.213
0.283
0.223
0.287
0.261
0.255
0.266
0.271
0.283
0.290
0.343
0.303
0.015
0.462
0.311
0.253
0.277
0.254
0.281
0.239
0.270
0.247
0.323
0.251
0.326
0.239
0.343
0.251
0.398
0.252
0.026
0.373
0.334
0.265
0.345
0.267
0.273
0.239
0.329
0.259
0.361
0.255
0.382
0.278
0.384
0.289
0.386
0.250
0.071
0.473
0.367
0.254
0.338
0.275
0.287
0.244
0.285
0.216
0.365
0.234
0.378
0.248
0.445
0.231
0.563
0.249
0.018
0.438
0.303
0.239
0.286
0.227
0.172
0.217
0.308
0.220
0.311
0.209
0.290
0.242
0.333
0.245
0.431
0.244
0.016
0.259
0.392
0.282
0.337
0.291
0.399
0.253
0.356
0.261
0.339
0.266
0.406
0.278
0.456
0.270
0.502
0.286
0.019
0.340
0.361
0.315
0.317
0.316
0.286
0.311
0.335
0.304
0.363
0.284
0.420
0.296
0.376
0.320
0.469
0.307
0.025
0.414
0.252
0.265
0.274
0.253
0.229
0.246
0.236
0.253
0.258
0.248
0.244
0.244
0.297
0.253
0.336
0.251
0.022
0.320
0.268
0.286
0.265
0.302
0.279
0.321
0.245
0.322
0.261
0.302
0.294
0.302
0.338
0.304
0.376
0.310
0.028
0.333
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(Table 46 continued)
overall 9:30-
10:00
10:00-
10:30
10:30-
11:00
11:00-
11:30
11:30-
12:00
oecialist # 
1726
(H-L)/P 0.341 0.472 0.470 0.410 0.397 0.372
standard dev. 0.269 0.373 0.290 0.288 0.265 0.257
1746
(H-L)/P 0.330 0.488 0.380 0.401 0.324 0.355
standard dev. 0.363 0.598 0.381 0.365 0.321 0.288
1903
(H-L)/P 0.305 0.447 0.381 0.313 0.356 0.315
standard dev. 0.302 0.497 0.312 0.277 0.267 0.276
1910
(H-L)/P 0.203 0.305 0.246 0.199 0.214 0.203
standard dev. 0.325 0.384 0.384 0.348 0.315 0.326
1941
(H-L)/P 0.341 0.479 0.465 0.381 0.383 0.304
standard dev. 0.320 0.562 0.368 0.298 0.293 0.286
1966
(H-L)/P 0.292 0.407 0.380 0.348 0.303 0.292
standard dev. 0.276 0.341 0.300 0.256 0.295 0.254
2022
(H-L)/P 0.316 0.500 0.462 0.413 0.332 0.276
standard dev. 0.414 0.572 0.532 0.354 0.449 0.461
2090
(H-L)/P 0.466 0.596 0.629 0.582 0.564 0.484
standard dev. 0.418 0.562 0.512 0.417 0.403 0.388
3011
(H-L)/P 0.323 0.420 0.448 0.368 0.368 0.307
standard dev. 0.358 0.417 0.372 0.352 0.333 0.361
12:00-
12:30
12:30-
1:00
1:00-
1:30
1:30-
2:00
2:00-
2:30
2:30-
3:00
3:00-
3:30
3:30-
4:00
4:00-
4:30
0.311
0.242
0.270
0.231
0.255
0.236
0.321
0.240
0.321
0.237
0.317
0.232
0.327
0.233
0.424
0.247
0.032
0.330
0.328
0.317
0.289
0.329
0.221
0.304
0.274
0.311
0.283
0.352
0.324
0.331
0.339
0.285
0.435
0.343
0.035
0.367
0.290
0.254
0.259
0.245
0.221
0.241
0.266
0.252
0.292
0.247
0.309
0.245
0.322
0.262
0.358
0.251
0.017
0.418
0.182
0.319
0.138
0.311
0.186
0.279
0.147
0.289
0.175
0.292
0.188
0.267
0.214
0.294
0.316
0.288
0.023
0.357
0.319
0.262
0.279
0.232
0.260
0.240
0.278
0.239
0.310
0.228
0.363
0.244
0.393
0.253
0.422
0.267
0.032
0.490
0.279
0.250
0.247
0.232
0.230
0.247
0.238
0.250
0.313
0.255
0.297
0.248
0.324
0.248
0.344
0.259
0.018
0.354
0.263
0.373
0.326
0.357
0.199
0.378
0.256
0.342
0.274
0.356
0.275
0.323
0.359
0.313
0.419
0.348
0.008
0.494
0.506
0.378
0.360
0.317
0.381
0.307
0.426
0.323
0.402
0.353
0.426
0.347
0.425
0.375
0.533
0.344
0.051
0.588
0.304
0.313
0.268
0.342
0.271
0.319
0.283
0.342
0.294
0.337
0.316
0.356
0.314
0.357
0.382
0.353
0.022
0.381
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(Table 46 continued)
overall 9:30- 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00-
10:00 10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30
Specialist U 
3174
(H-L)/P 0.261 0.384 0.324 0.306 0.267 0.270 0.225 0.193 0.220 0.238 0.238 0.270 0.281 0.326 0.025
standard dev. 0.241 0.306 0.282 0.240 0.210 0.210 0.203 0.211 0.302 0.224 0.205 0.204 0.191 0.238 0.289
Tests o f Difference
fH-LVP
ANOVA 49.1*" 5.1*" 5.5*" 5.7*" 7.1"* 4.0"* 5.6*" 4.3*** 4.1*** 3.0*** 3.1"* 5.1"* 5.1"* 5.9*" 1.9"*
Wilcoxon 2649.5*"274.1*" 282.1*** 296.4*" 326.3**’ 263.9*" 217.9"’ 209.5*" 210.8*** 231.2**’ 186.5’" 265.8’’’ 273.6"* 229.1’’* 75.5’"
standard dev.
^  ANOVA 128.4*" 25.5'" 9.4’"  8.2"* 10.2*" 9.3"* 8.1*” 8.3*’* 5.1"* 8.6’*’ 12.2’’* 9.3**’ 8.2’"  8.9’’’ 15.9"’
Wilcoxon 5341.4’"998.8’" 625.2’’’ 417.0"’ 415.4’" 369.4*" 385.3’*’ 384.3*’* 432.0*" 364.1’’’ 436.4’’’ 382.7’*’ 411.8’’’ 464.2*" 651.4’’’
'significant at a  = 10%, "significant at a  = 5%, ‘"significant at a  = 1%
For the HML measure, the dramatic decline from the 3:30-4:00 interval to the 
4:00-4:30 interval is robust across all 37 specialist firms. This is likely due to the small 
number of transactions that are reported after the close. The large rise in the STD 
measure between the same two intervals is exhibited in all 37 specialist firms. This may 
indicate that the quotes reported after the close have a midpoint that differs greatly from 
that occurring before the close. Since the quotes are reported after trading, the specialist 
does not have to honor these quotes and this measure of volatility in this interval may not 
be accurate. This phenomenon may then be best explained as being related to the end of 
day price rise or end-of-day effect.
When the two measures of volatility are examined within each specialist firm 
there are statistically significant differences found across the half-hour trading intervals 
in most o f the specialist firms. Only two specialist firms, specialist numbers 240 and 
3011, do not have statistically significant differences across the STD measure when using 
a parametric ANOVA test. For both of these specialist firms, the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank sums test is statistically significant at a level o f 1%. The differences 
across the specialist firms are examined within each half-hour trading interval using both 
measures o f volatility. In all cases, the parametric ANOVA and the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank sums tests are statistically significant. The level o f significance is at a 
levels of 1 % .
These results indicate that hypothesis one (HI) for volatility is rejected and that 
volatility using either measure differs among the specialist firms. The patterns are found 
to be similar between the two measures, but not identical. The STD measure peaks in the 
4:00-4:30 interval, while the HML measure peaks during the 3:30-4:00 interval. Over the 
entire trading day, the STD measure is shown to have less pronounced successive
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changes between half-hour intervals when compared to the HML measure. The 
exception is the first two intervals and last two intervals that have very large differences 
when the STD measure is used.
5.4.13. Bid-Ask Spread
The percentage bid-ask spreads across half-hour intervals and across specialist 
firms are reported in Table 47. On an overall basis, each successive half-hour period 
during the trading day has a declining bid-ask spread except for the last two half-hour 
intervals that exhibit a slight increase. The individual half-hour periods have mean 
percentage bid-ask spreads that are statistically significantly different both parametrically 
and non-parametrically at significance levels o f  1%.
Examining the pattern in each specialist firm shows that the percentage bid-ask 
spread in the first interval o f the day (9:30-10:00) is the largest o f  all the half-hour 
intervals for all 37 specialist firms. The same conclusion can not be made at the end o f 
the day. In the final two intervals, the 3:30-4:00 interval and the 4:00-4:30 interval 
contain the larger percentage bid-ask spread for 22 and 15 specialist firms, respectively. 
The final two intervals do not necessarily contain the peak late afternoon percentage bid- 
ask spread. In some cases the 2:30-3:00 or the 3:00-3:30 interval has a larger percentage 
bid-ask spread. While the percentage bid-ask spread at the beginning o f the day is 
consistently large, the pattern near the end o f the trading day is not robust across 
specialist firms.
The percentage bid-ask spread is compared in each half-hour interval across the 
specialist firms and found to be statistically significantly different in all the intervals 
using both parametric and non-parametric tests. The larger percentage bid-ask spreads at
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Table 47 This table reports the bid-ask spread within each thirty minute interval across specialist firms. The time-weighted
percentage bid-ask spread (% BAS) is reported within each thirty minute interval. This is done on an overall basis as well as for each
specialist firm. Parametric ANOVA tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums tests are conducted to test for differences across 
specialist firms and across trading intervals.
overall 9:30- 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00-
10:00 10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30
Overall
% BAS 2.468 3.152 2.796 2.597 2.508 2.458 2.414 2.379 2.349 2.335 2.328 2.324 2.319 2.335 2.353
Specialist #
20
% BAS 1.726 2.160 1.953 1.816 1.791 1.717 1.682 1.645 1.635 1.619 1.615 1.610 1.612 1.600 1.778
34
% BAS 2.840 3.550 3.170 2.962 2.843 2.837 2.804 2.750 2.739 2.723 2.699 2.625 2.619 2.659 2.882
104
% BAS 2.912 3.751 3.332 3.078 2.976 2.896 2.862 2.768 2.753 2.752 2.766 2.766 2.703 2.765 2.721
137
% BAS 2.628 3.277 2.869 2.712 2.683 2.590 2.526 2.526 2.502 2.516 2.534 2.503 2.479 2.528 2.636
202
% BAS 2.247 2.832 2.499 2.338 2.250 2.220 2.186 2.138 2.139 2.127 2.154 2.134 2.145 2.187 2.193
210
% BAS 2.080 2.563 2.336 2.197 2.115 2.087 2.063 2.030 1.992 1.980 1.965 1.956 1.976 1.979 1.950
215
% BAS 2.543 3.329 2.963 2.665 2.561 2.532 2.487 2.453 2.431 2.404 2.430 2.407 2.416 2.389 2.256
240
% BAS 2.657 3.449 2.996 2.752 2.751 2.647 2.671 2.620 2.508 2.493 2.449 2.470 2.496 2.509 2.505
298
% BAS 2.416 2.959 2.674 2.520 2.487 2.421 2.399 2.366 2.344 2.318 2.274 2.278 2.270 2.288 2.311
364
% BAS 2.481 3.394 2.857 2.540 2.473 2.474 2.388 2.327 2.317 2.322 2.293 2.312 2.316 2.343 2.506
403
% BAS 2.512 3.171 2.839 2.595 2.503 2.488 2.461 2.433 2.413 2.395 2.392 2.382 2.387 2.393 2.417
501
% BAS 2.523 3.143 2.839 2.672 2.567 2.540 2.494 2.454 2.423 2.393 2.398 2.398 2.375 2.371 2.349
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the beginning of the day suggest that all specialist firms face more uncertainty at that 
point than later in the trading day, possibly because of the lack o f trading overnight and 
the risk o f adverse information.
These results indicate that hypothesis one (HI) for the percentage bid-ask spread 
is rejected and the pattern is not similar across specialist firms. The overall percentage 
bid-ask spread across half-hour trading intervals is larger at the beginning of the day with 
a gradual decline during the trading day. Generally, the intraday pattern is similar across 
specialist firms, but is not identical at the end of the day. Some specialist firms have a 
peak in the final trading interval while others have a peak in the second-last trading 
interval. In a few other specialist firms the peak is slightly earlier in the trading day. The 
tests o f difference across the specialist firms show statistically significant differences 
across each of the half-hour periods, but this may be partially explained as a function of 
the characteristics o f stocks held by the specialist firm since a stock’s price impacts on 
the percentage bid-ask spread. Nevertheless, the patterns differ across the specialist firms 
and it can be concluded that the percentage bid-ask spread is not the same for all the 
specialist firms.
5.4.1.4. End of the Trading Day Returns
The final return across specialist firms is reported in Tables 48 and 49. Table 48 
examines the final return irrespective o f the timing of the final two transactions. Table 49 
requires that the final transaction occur after 3:45 pm while the previous transaction price 
used to calculate the return is the last transaction that occurred before 3:45 pm.
The overall final transaction return reported in Table 48 is 0.0785% and is 
statistically significant at a level o f 1%. Of the 37 specialist firms, 28 are statistically
180
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T able 48 This table reports the final intraday transaction return across specialist firms. 
Mean final intraday transaction returns (in percentages) are reported for May 1995 for 
each specialist firm. Parametric ANOVA tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums 
tests are conducted to test for differences across specialist firms.
Specialist Return
20 0.0608'
34 0.0908'
104 0.0296
137 0.0958'
202 0.0461'
210 0.0753'
215 0.0883'
240 0.0180
298 0.0730'
364 0.1701'
403 0.0272'
501 0.0833'
520 -0.0166
551 0.0463'
1010 -0.0109
1027 0.0263
1034 0.0898
1148 0.1143'
1225 0.0489'
1227 0.0953'
1229 0.1523'
1266 0.2520'
1280 0.1281'
1341 0.0386'
1418 0.1011'
1679 0.0733'
1687 0.0482'
1726 0.0941'
1746 0.0427
1903 0.0458
1910 0.1648'
1941 0.1814'
1966 0.0376
2022 0.1305
2090 0.1259'
3011 0.1328'
3174 0.0649
overall 0.0785
ANOVA 2.2*“
Wilcoxon 53.8“
‘significant at a  = 10%, “ significant at a  = 5%, “ ‘significant at a  = 1%
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Table 49 This table reports the final fifteen minute return across specialist firms. Final 
fifteen minute return (in percent) is reported for May 1995 for each specialist firm. 
Parametric ANOVA tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums tests are conducted to 
test for differences across specialist firms.
Specialist Return
20 0.0589“
34 * . _•••0.1495
104 0.0774“
137 0.0264
202 0.0776*“
210 0.1057“ '
215 0.0952’“
240 0.0062
298 0.0702’”
364 0.1445”
403 0.0527
501 0.0748’”
520 0.0506
551 0.0775“
1010 0.0434
1027 0.0483
1034 0.3601’”
1148 0.1212*
1225 0.0591“
1227 0.0739“
1229 0.0561
1266 0.3274*“
1280 -0.0224
1341 0.0422’
1418 0.0607
1679 0.0750’“
1687 .  . . .  .«•« 0.1130
1726 0.1329
1746 0.0662
1903 0.0606“
1910 0.1610’
1941 0.1237
1966 0.1160’“
2022 0.1624“ ’
2090 0.1670“
3011 0.0723
3174 0.0858*"
overall 0.0851**’
ANOVA 1.9’’’
Wilcoxon 47.4’
’significant at a  = 10%, “ significant at a  = 5%, ’“ significant at a  = 1%
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significant with positive means. There are 18 specialist firms that have significance 
levels of 1%, five with significance levels o f 5% and five with significance levels o f 
10%.
Tests o f difference across the specialist firms show that the final transaction 
returns are statistically significantly different using both parametric and non-parametric 
tests. The non-parametric test is significant at a level o f 5% while the parametric test is 
statistically significant at a level of 1%.
When the final fifteen minute return is examined, on an overall basis, the mean 
return is 0.0851% and this is statistically significant at a level o f 1%. O f the 37 specialist 
firms, 16 are positive and statistically significantly different from zero at a level o f  1%. 
Positive means are also found for eight specialist firms with a statistical significance of 
5% and three specialist firms with a statistical significance of 10%. The differences 
across the specialist firms is slightly less than that for the final transaction return in Table 
48. The non-parametric test is statistically significant at a level o f 10%, while the 
statistical significance of the parametric test remains at a level o f 1%.
These results indicate that hypothesis one (HI) for the final transaction return is 
rejected both for the final transaction return irrespective o f the timing o f the final 
transaction and for the final fifteen minute return. In all cases, when the individual return 
for a specialist firm is significantly different from zero, it is positive. The final 
transaction return is not the same across the specialist firms. This suggests that some 
specialist firms may be undertaking actions that result in a positive and significant final 
transaction return, while others do not. This suggests that whatever is causing the 
positive final transaction return may be related to specialist firm characteristics.
183
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5.4.1.5. Depth
The time-weighted depth o f the bid and ask quotes is examined across specialist 
firms and reported in Table 50. On an overall basis, the mean ask depth is 40.5, or 4,050 
shares and the mean bid depth is 43.1 or 4,310 shares. For 12 o f the specialist firms, the 
overall ask depth is larger than the bid depth. For 24 specialist firms the reverse is true, 
and for one specialist firm the mean bid and ask depth are equal. On an overall basis, 
when the half-hour intervals during the trading day are examined, the bid depth is larger 
than the ask depth in each half-hour interval throughout the day. This is not true for the 
individual specialist firms. For the 12 specialist firms with overall means that have a 
larger mean ask depth, most o f the half-hour intervals also have a larger mean ask depth. 
But in a few individual half-hour periods have larger mean bid depths. This general 
consistency is also true for the 24 firms that have a larger mean bid depth.
The overall intradaily pattern o f mean ask and bid depths shows a low ask and bid 
depth at the beginning o f the day. The depth levels increase during the day and peak 
immediately before the close. A test o f the difference among the means across the 
individual half-hour trading intervals shows that the depths across the half-hour intervals 
are statistically significantly different using both parametric and non-parametric tests. 
This is confirmed for both the ask and the bid depth.
The ask and bid depths are also examined individually across half-hour intervals 
for each individual specialist firm. O f the 37 specialist firms, 36 have ask depths that are 
statistically significant (both parametrically and non-parametrically at a level o f  1%) 
across the half-hour intervals. For the bid depths, there are 35 specialist firms that have 
statistically significant (both parametrically and non-parametrically at a level o f  1%)
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Table 50 This table reports depth within each thirty minute interval across specialist firms. The time-weighted bid and ask depth (in 
hundred-lots) is reported within each thirty minute interval. This is done on an overall basis as well as for each specialist firm. A
Overall
Ask Depth 
Bid Depth
Specialist #
20
Ask Depth 
Bid Depth 
34
Ask Depth 
Bid Depth 
104 
Ask Depth 
Bid Depth 
137 
Ask Depth 
Bid Depth 
202 
Ask Depth 
Bid Depth 
210 
Ask Depth 
Bid Depth 
215 
Ask Depth 
Bid Depth
a non-i
overall 9:30- 10:00- 10:30-
10:00 10:30 11:00
40.5 15.2 28.7 35.2
43.1 18.5 30.7 37.2
50.5 21.9 35.4 43.4
65.2 34.5 48.5 53.6
44.0 17.2 31.6 36.7
50.8 19.4 34.7 44.3
40.7 14.0 23.5 32.4
35.4 11.1 23.2 30.9
65.4 22.6 51.0 64.8
66.7 26.2 51.4 62.6
40.4 13.6 28.8 35.8
46.1 17.7 31.0 36.6
40.6 14.7 30.7 37.5
50.1 26.5 39.2 45.8
31.2 14.5 24.6 27.8
37.3 19.9 28.9 33.7
11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30-
11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00
39.7 42.6 44.8 46.5
42.4 45.1 46.9 48.7
46.5 50.1 54.3 53.7
54.8 58.4 67.5 70.9
42.6 46.9 46.1 50.7
51.5 52.4 53.4 60.8
36.0 41.8 45.9 47.5
35.5 37.1 37.6 40.2
63.4 69.1 79.0 77.4
63.3 70.0 76.4 73.9
40.0 42.2 45.3 47.8
43.9 47.6 52.1 54.4
40.5 42.7 46.6 46.6
48.2 52.2 56.7 58.4
30.6 32.6 33.4 34.1
38.4 39.2 40.3 40.5
1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30-
1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00
47.0 47.8 48.3 48.3
50.0 50.8 51.3 51.4
56.4 56.8 59.3 56.8
74.6 76.1 73.1 74.3
47.6 54.2 58.9 52.5
59.4 61.8 67.5 63.8
49.1 50.4 49.5 53.8
43.3 43.0 44.0 44.2
72.7 72.4 71.8 74.6
73.9 77.7 81.3 81.9
46.6 44.0 46.0 46.7
57.5 53.6 53.4 54.8
48.4 50.5 49.5 51.6
58.6 59.0 59.7 62.8
35.4 38.4 37.6 36.8
42.0 41.9 42.0 43.6
o 0 1 3:30- 4:00-
30 4:00 4:30
48.1 47.6 24.5
51.2 50.1 26.4
55.5 53.5 58.7
76.7 73.0 72.2
51.6 55.3 20.4
57.8 61.4 18.9
49.9 51.5 20.6
43.2 42.0 17.7
79.9 83.6 28.2
83.2 81.8 25.6
47.9 46.6 31.6
51.7 50.8 36.2
49.6 45.9 10.1
60.4 58.3 13.1
38.8 36.4 14.3
44.8 43.8 21.3
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(Table 50 continued)
overall 9:30- 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30-
10:00 10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00
Specialist #
240
Ask Depth 33.6 14.0 26.0 28.1 32.2 34.8
Bid Depth 35.4 13.1 24.5 28.8 37.3 39.1
298
Ask Depth 27.7 13.6 23.3 27.4 28.9 27.9
Bid Depth 33.0 18.2 26.0 29.2 33.4 33.8
364
Ask Depth 53.7 20.7 39.4 47.8 62.2 59.3
Bid Depth 51.0 19.1 33.1 43.3 51.2 52.6
403
Ask Depth 30.8 15.4 23.1 28.7 32.6 33.5
Bid Depth 36.4 22.9 31.0 35.8 38.6 40.6
501
Ask Depth 35.8 12.7 23.7 26.8 32.2 37.3
Bid Depth 36.2 13.8 24.4 27.1 33.2 37.1
520
Ask Depth 29.0 12.4 19.2 21.8 21.4 26.6
Bid Depth 31.8 14.7 18.9 20.8 27.3 29.2
551
Ask Depth 32.1 13.8 22.0 25.6 30.5 35.4
Bid Depth 46.3 27.4 34.0 39.0 45.0 51.0
010
Ask Depth 29.6 12.3 19.6 25.1 29.6 27.7
Bid Depth 27.2 12.3 22.4 22.4 24.6 27.1
027
Ask Depth 77.5 27.3 74.3 79.8 95.1 92.1
Bid Depth 62.9 21.2 54.6 59.7 73.6 68.4
12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00-
12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30
34.9 37.6 40.9 42.4 43.8 42.7 42.4 40.6 8.2
42.3 41.4 39.7 43.2 44.1 43.1 42.8 43.2 9.6
28.9 30.1 29.0 31.1 34.5 36.2 36.7 33.8 5.2
33.9 37.0 35.5 38.2 41.4 42.3 43.6 41.1 7.3
59.2 63.4 58.1 62.3 60.4 61.7 59.7 60.3 33.4
58.0 57.8 61.4 59.8 59.3 57.9 59.9 59.8 36.2
35.8 35.7 37.3 36.3 36.1 34.8 35.5 36.3 8.6
41.4 41.2 42.8 40.8 41.1 40.5 41.3 39.6 10.3
38.2 39.8 41.9 41.9 42.4 43.0 41.6 42.5 33.6
39.3 40.8 43.3 44.7 43.4 42.0 41.0 41.7 31.6
29.2 31.6 32.4 36.9 40.7 37.5 34.1 37.3 22.3
32.5 37.9 37.1 35.9 39.7 38.4 39.2 37.6 34.0
35.6 39.2 38.9 40.1 39.1 41.1 40.1 37.7 7.8
47.4 50.4 55.2 57.2 57.0 57.3 58.2 53.0 13.3
28.4 28.4 36.2 35.8 40.3 40.0 43.7 40.7 4.5
31.2 28.0 34.0 31.9 36.2 37.3 34.1 31.5 5.1
90.1 95.6 82.4 78.4 79.1 73.2 74.1 74.6 62.6
61.7 64.2 66.4 77.3 66.5 68.0 73.2 71.6 48.7
(table con'd)
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(Table 50 continued)
overall 9:30- 10:00- 10:30- 11:00- 11:30- 12:00- 12:30- 1:00- 1:30- 2:00- 2:30- 3:00- 3:30- 4:00-
10:00 10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00 12:30 1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30
Specialist #
3011
Ask Depth 31.4 9.6 18.3 24.4 24.6 29.3 33.4 34.4 36.9 35.4 31.7 33.8 36.4 32.1 56.4
Bid Depth 28.9 9.1 15.8 21.4 21.3 25.8 30.5 31.4 33.7 34.1 32.0 31.6 31.6 28.9 53.3
3174
Ask Depth 34.6 12.4 20.3 22.5 29.8 35.9 38.1 41.1 40.6 41.8 44.0 41.3 40.8 43.8 28.8
Bid Depth 35.4 17.5 24.1 28.3 34.6 39.5 42.5 42.6 37.0 36.3 37.1 37.2 41.3 43.5 31.1
Tests of Difference
Ask Depth
ANOVA 79.8*” 3.0” * 6.4“ ’ 8.5’" 8.1” ’ 1.2’"  1.6’"  1.1’’’ 5.8’’’ 5.9’’’ 5.1’"  5.6’’’ 5.9” ’ 6.1’”  24.9“
Wilcoxon 2792’’’ 160.5’’’ 205.2’’* 208.3’’’ 194.4"’ 191.1’"  201.6*" 195.2"’ 191.1’" 205.3’" 200.9*" 208.2’’* 202.0’" 194.1"’ 2831.6'
Bid Depth
ANOVA 63.8’"  4.4"’ 5.0"’ 5.8’"  4.9’" 5.1’"  5.5’" 5.3’" 5.3’" 5.6’’’ 5.2"’ 5.7”* 5.4"’ 5.4’" 23.7“
Wilcoxon 3268’" 226.2"’ 262.5’"  247.3’"  222.2’" 217.6’"  225.5” ’ 230.3’"  221.6"’ 227.8’" 241.5’" 243.1’" 238.3"’ 225.8’" 2831.7'
’ significant at a  = 10%, ’* significant at a  = 5%, ’’’ significant at a  = 1%
depths across the half-hour intervals. One specialist firm has a statistically significant 
difference using a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums test but the parametric ANOVA 
test is not statistically significant.
The first half-hour mean depth is the smallest mean depth during the day for all 
37 specialist firms. The decline in the depth levels from the 3:30-4:00 interval to the 
4:00-4:30 interval is common to 35 of 37 specialist firms when the ask depth is examined 
and 36 of 37 specialist firms when the bid depth is considered.
The overall difference in mean depths across specialist firms within each half- 
hour interval is statistically significant both parametrically and non-parametrically at a 
level o f 1% for both the bid depth and the ask depth.
These results indicate that hypothesis one (H I) is rejected both for the bid depth 
and the ask depth. The time-weighted depth in each period differs between the specialists 
when each half-hour interval is examined. The patterns throughout the day indicate that 
the depth increases following the opening, and the depth declines near the close. A larger 
mean depth is found for the bid depth in twice as many individual specialist firms. 
Whether the bid or the ask depth is larger, appears to be consistent across the day for 
most o f the specialist firms. This suggests that the relative ask and bid depth sizes may 
be influenced by specialist firms’ characteristics such as capitalization or risk aversion. 
5.4.I.6. Sum m ary
Hypothesis one (HI) is rejected for each o f  the price characteristics that are 
examined and there are clear differences across specialist firms. For volume, as 
measured by the percentage o f day’s volume that occurs in each half-hour trading 
interval, the percentage is found to differ among the specialist firms. This may indicate
190
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that different specialist management strategies result in altering the timing o f 
transactions. It may also indicate that certain types of traders are involved in specific 
stocks especially heavy near the close of trading. These two explanations are not 
mutually exclusive.
Volatility is measured in two ways, and both methods exhibit a re verse-J shape 
although the two methods have slightly different patterns in magnitude especially at the 
beginning and end o f the trading day. The volatility measures are found to differ across 
the specialist firms.
The bid-ask spread has a pattern o f  decline during the trading day, with some 
specialist firms showing an increase near the close. This pattern is not consistent in 
magnitude, especially at the end o f the day, and significant differences are found across 
the specialist firms.
The final transaction return and the final fifteen minute return have differences 
among the specialist firms. Significant difference are found parametrically, but non- 
parametric tests are at a lower level o f significance. The significant positive means o f the 
final return for some specialist firms and the insignificant means for the other specialist 
firms provides some support to the specialist explanations o f  the high end o f day return. 
Since only some o f the specialist firms exhibit this phenomenon it supports the 
suggestion that high returns are a technique for specialists to manage price or inventory.
The relative sizes o f the mean ask and mean bid depths differ across specialist 
firms, with the number o f specialist firms with a larger mean bid depth occurring twice as 
often as those specialist firms with a larger mean ask depth. The relative size is also 
consistent during the trading day. This may indicate that each specialist firm uses depth
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in a certain way that may be related to the specialist firm’s characteristics such as 
capitalization or risk aversion. The specialist, however, does not have complete control 
over depth. The quoted depth also includes public limit orders. The specialist only 
determines the minimum depth, therefore some of the differences across specialist firms 
may be attributable to the public limit orders for the specialist’s stocks.
5.4.2. Differences Within Specialist Firms
Hypothesis two (H2) examines whether the pricing characteristics within a 
specialist firm are similar across individual specialists. For each specialist firm the 
number of individual specialists is reported. The pricing characteristics examined are 
volatility, the bid-ask spread, the end o f day return and the ask and bid depths. The null 
o f  hypothesis two (H2) is that the pricing characteristic is the same for all individual 
specialists within an individual specialist firm. Each pricing characteristic is reported by 
taking the mean o f the pricing characteristic for each individual specialist within each 
specialist firm. Then the mean of all individual specialists as well as the minimum and 
maximum values within each specialist firm are reported. A comparison across the 
individual specialists within each specialist firm is made and the parametric ANOVA test 
results and the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums13 test results are reported.
5.4.2.1. Volatility
Volatility is examined using two separate measures and reported in Table 51. As 
explained in section 5.4.1.2., one measure o f volatility is the high minus the low share 
price of transactions divided by the mean share price during each trading interval. A 
second measure is the standard deviation of successive midpoints of the bid-ask spread.
13 The Wiicoxon rank scores test is used in the infrequent situation when only two individual specialists are 
compared.
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Table §1 This table reports the volatility within specialist firms. Volatility is reported 
(in percent) using two measures. One measure calculates volatility as the difference 
between the high and the low share prices divided by the mean share price (H-L)/P for 
each half-hour. Volatility is also reported as the standard deviation o f the change in 
successive midpoints o f the bid-ask spread. Stocks are divided in groups based on the 
individual specialist location (post and panel). Mean, minimum and maximum volatility 
for individual specialists are reported for each specialist firm. The number o f individual 
specialists within each specialist firm is reported. Parametric ANOVA and non- 
parametric Wilcoxon rank sums tests are conducted to test for differences across 
individual specialists within each specialist firm.
Mean Min Max ANOVA Wilcoxon
Specialist # (number of individual specialists)
20 ( 10)
(H-L)/P 0.235 0.102 0.437 72.0“ * 602.0***
standard dev. 0.215 0.136 0.305 56. T“ 694.8*“
34 (6)
(H-L)/P 0.315 0.235 0.365 3.0 120.6
standard dev. 0.353 0.271 0.535 88.8*“ 144.5*“
104 (9)
(H-L)/P 0.249 0.139 0.361 16.2 175.9
standard dev. 0.305 0.199 0.439 28.4*** 342.5***
137 (11)
(H-L)/P 0.399 0.238 0.767 47.7 392.5
standard dev. 0.317 0.187 0.866 93.9*“ 256.0*“
202 (16)
(H-L)/P 0.279 0.082 0.554 50.5*" 525.9
standard dev. 0.241 0.178 0.426 59.3“ * 1209.4*“
210 (16)
(H-L)/P 0.334 0.143 0.531 39.0 956.9
standard dev. 0.283 0.154 0.685 135.6*“ 1762.3*“
215 (15)
(H-L)/P 0.314 0.193 0.523 35.8*" 244.0
standard dev. 0.286 0.161 0.709 31.2*“ 1175.2*"
240 (6)
(H-L)/P 0.331 0.179 0.913 27.9* 129.0
standard dev. 0.739 0.147 3.116 114.9*" 283.0***
298 (14)
(H-L)/P 0.322 0.233 0.537 39.4 245.4
standard dev. 0.294 0.182 0.504 96.8"’ 1314.6*”
364 (5)
(H-L)/P 0.377 0.109 0.923 11.5*“ 45.7
standard dev. 0.257 0.185 0.307 41.0*“ 129.0*“
403 (18)
(H-L)/P 0.315 0.070 0.536 63.1* 1352.7
standard dev. 0.223 0.107 0.331 58.7*’* 1719.7*“
501 (37)
(H-L)/P 0.284 0.037 0.542 16.9 968.2
standard dev. 0.277 0.063 0.659 41.8“ ’ 3539.5*“
520 (5)
(H-L)/P 0.322 0.218 0.476 42.0* 182.3
standard dev. 0.430 0.194 1.036 32.9*“ 276.4*“
‘significant at a  = 10%, “ significant at a  = 5%, “ ’significant at a  = 1%
(table con'd)
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(Table 51 continued)
Specialist # (number of specialist posts)
Mean Min Max ANOVA Wilcoxon
551 (12)
(H-L)/P 0.232 0.146 0.334 16.2"' 348.3’"
standard dev. 0.197 0.116 0.314 50.4'" 776.3'"
1010 (3)
(H-L)/P 0.296 0.178 0.360 _ _  • • •7.9 29.6'"
standard dev. 0.342 0.333 0.360 1.3 11.2—
1027 (3)
(H-L)/P 0.284 0.263 0.322 2.9"' 12.1*"
standard dev. 0.236 0.202 0.301 45.1'" 236.3"*
1034 (1)
(H-L)/P 0.299 0.299 0.299 - -
standard dev. 0.283 0.283 0.283 - .
1148 (6)
(H-L)/P 0.418 0.188 0.727 35.1'" 76.7*"
standard dev. 0.630 0.200 1.668 94.1*" 495.3*"
1225 (5)
(H-L)/P 0.282 0.209 0.365 28.5 128.5*"
standard dev. 0.331 0.230 0.557 70.6 182.3*"
1227 (19)
(H-L)/P 0.306 0.096 0.484 13.0"* 245.7"*
standard dev. 0.288 0.144 0.614 78.5*" 1332.1*"
1229 (4)
(H-L)/P 0.324 0.234 0.363 3.9"* 39.4*"
standard dev. 0.322 0.262 0.391 24.0*" 112.7*"
1266 (7)
(H-L)/P 0.344 0.135 0.491 17.0**' . . .  _  • • •  338.2
standard dev. 0.317 0.172 0.566 57.4*" _ _ _ _  • • •  275.2
1280 (2)
(H-L)/P 0.339 0.283 0.395 32.0*" a m  .«•*23.7
standard dev. 0.313 0.232 0.395 109.8*** AM _ • • •32.0
1341 (6)
(H-L)/P 0.438 0.321 0.597 27.4*" 141.7*"
standard dev. 0.298 0.207 0.329 17.7*" 309.4'"
1418 (13)
(H-L)/P 0.355 0.224 0.574 17 .9 - 306.8"*
standard dev. 0.321 0.120 0.654 59.6*" 1184.1*"
1679 (8)
(H-L)/P 0.244 0.133 0.419 37.3"* 125.4*"
standard dev. 0.266 0.137 0.470 113.7*" 467.0’"
1687 (6)
(H-L)/P 0.275 0.198 0.407 39.6"* 186.8*"
standard dev. 0.325 0.236 0.482 70.0"* 371.9*"
1726 (11)
(H-L)/P 0.319 0.079 0.450 • *  * • • •13.9 205.4**'
standard dev. 0.265 0.135 0.434 97.2 1093.3*"
'significant at a  = 10%, "significant at a = 5%, "'significant at a  = 1%
(table con'd)
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(Table 51 continued)
Specialist # (number of specialist posts)
Mean Min Max ANOVA Wilcoxon
1746 (3)
(H-L)/P 0.337 0.293 0.388 10.6'" 17.4*"
standard dev. 0.383 0.269 0.551 97.2"* 434.5"*
1903 (15)
(H-L)/P 0.283 0.125 0.595 . . _•••41.8 507.1"*
standard dev. 0.295 0.147 0.642 49.1 818.3*"
1910 (4)
(H-L)/P 0.208 0.184 0.219 1.0 7.2*
standard dev. 0.358 0.229 0.663 280.6*" 582.7"*
1941 (11)
(H-L)/P 0.316 0.057 0.453 17.1*" 151.2*"
standard dev. 0.313 0.159 0.659 84.0*** 802.2’”
1966 (8)
(H-L)/P 0.234 0.000 0.371 6.4"* 114.5*"
standard dev. 0.251 0.124 0.373 39.0*** 818.9"*
2022 (11)
(H-L)/P 0.285 0.164 0.371 4.8*" 30.6*"
standard dev. 0.386 0.102 0.944 34.2*" 532.7"*
2090 (4)
(H-L)/P 0.455 0.355 0.535 13.8*" 64.7"*
standard dev. 0.415 0.323 0.564 41.1*" 77.8"*
3011 (2)
(H-L)/P 0.322 0.302 0.343 5.4" 60.6"*
standard dev. 0.360 0.342 0.377 7.6*" 118.9*”
3174 (9)
(H-L)/P 0.253 0.195 0.337 21.0*" 83.2"*
standard dev. 0.223 0.113 0.284 5.4*" 403.6*"
'significant at a  = 10%, "significant at a  = 5%, '"significant at a  = 1%
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For the 37 specialist firms examined, specialist number 1034 has only one 
individual specialist. Of the remaining 36 specialist firms the difference among the 
individual specialists within each of the specialist firms is statistically significant both 
parametrically and non-parametrically for both of the volatility measures at a level of 
significance o f 1 % with two exceptions. When using the volatility measure o f  the 
standard deviation o f successive midpoints o f  the bid-ask spread, specialist number 1010 
fails to reject the null hypothesis that the individual specialists all have the same 
volatility. When using the volatility measure o f the high minus low price all divided by 
the mean price, specialist number 1910 fails to reject the null hypothesis that the 
individual specialists all have the same volatility using a parametric test. When using a 
non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums test the null hypothesis was rejected but only at a 
level o f significance of 10%.
These results indicate that there are differences between individual specialists in 
almost all specialist firms and therefore hypothesis two (H2) is rejected. For both 
volatility measures there are significant differences in 34 o f the 36 specialist firms with 
more than one individual specialist.
5.4.2.2. Bid-Ask Spread
The percentage bid-ask spread is examined within specialist firms and the results 
are reported in Table 52. For the 36 specialist firms with more than one individual 
specialist, 34 specialist firms have parametric and non-parametric tests that indicate that 
there are statistically significant differences at significance levels o f 1% among the 
individual specialists within each of the specialist firms. For the two specialist firms, 
numbers 1746 and 3011, that do not fall in this category, the statistical significance is 1%
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Table 52 This table reports the bid-ask spread within specialist firms. The percentage 
bid-ask spreads (%BAS) are reported (in percent) for May 1995 by calculating the mean 
percentage bid-ask spread for each individual specialist within each specialist firm. 
Stocks are divided into groups based on the individual specialist location (post and 
panel). The mean, minimum and maximum bid-ask spreads for individual specialists are 
reported for each specialist firm. The number o f  individual specialists within each 
specialist unit is reported. Parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums 
tests are conducted to test for differences across individual specialists within each 
specialist firm.
% BAS Minimum Maximum ANOVA Wilcoxoi
% BAS % BAS
SDecialist # (number of individual specialists)
20(10) 1.7499 0.7030 4.3319 346.0’“ 3405.6*“
34(6) 2.9438 2.0666 4.9732 395.6*” 949.2*“
104 (9) 2.8828 1.0833 4.5726 282.1*“ 3162.9***
137(11) 2.5466 1.3182 4.6825 224.3’" 1420.8*“
202(16) 2.1087 1.1264 5.2967 248.4*** _ _ _ _ _ • • •  2056.8
210(16) 1.9993 0.8326 3.6410 418.1*“ 7545.2***
215(15) 2.5571 1.0156 6.7522 332.3**’ 4228.4*“
240 (6) 2.6095 1.5124 4.4996 203.9*“ 1654.9*“
298(14) 2.4717 1.3729 4.8056 229.3*" 3374.5*“
364(5) 2.4097 1.8666 3.1181 70.0*“ 963.2*“
403(18) 2.1968 0.8649 5.7891 251.8*“ 7475.7“ *
501(37) 2.4284 0.2334 5.7257 248.0*“ 11052“ *
520 (5) 2.4436 1.6709 3.0742 128.4*“ 538.4*“
551 (12) 1.7904 0.4777 3.4806 300.1*“ 1886.4"*
1010(3) 1.6768 1.3744 1.9190 138.7*** A A ***242.8
1027(3) 1.6274 1.5096 1.7982 24.7*“ . -  .  A « l«120.9
1034(1) 2.7931 2.7931 2.7931 - -
1148 (6) 3.7295 1.1948 9.3155 721.3*" 2077.1*”
1225 (5) 2.0970 1.5283 3.7015 538.8*“ 1455.7*“
1227(19) 2.6196 0.7938 6.8061 199.9*“ 6053.7*“
1229(4) 2.3595 1.9906 3.1222 119.6*“ 194.2*“
1266(7) 2.5940 1.3498 4.5528 196.1*“ 795.7*“
1280 (2) 2.4886 1.8196 3.1577 1369.4*“ 1558.7*“
1341(6) 2.3322 1.5864 4.1846 295.0*” 702.4
1418(13) 2.2845 0.8249 6.0477 370.5*’’ 6737.0“ *
1679(8) 1.8453 0.6406 2.5374 124.1*“ 1166.7*“
1687(6) 2.0420 1.6309 2.4836 129.5*" 762.8
1726(11) 2.3542 1.3698 4.9423 354.9**’ 1947.9’**
1746(3) 3.2117 2.1230 4.0502 161.5*" 5.2*
1903(15) 2.1380 0.8660 5.4760 259.0*"
_ _ ___
5028.2
1910(4) 2.4528 1.9083 3.0006 170.6*“ 262.1*“
1941 (11) 2.9989 1.1393 5.6698 163.3*“ 1405.5*“
1966 (8) 2.0329 0.8549 3.5220 277.6*" 1976.1*’*
2022(11) 2.4755 0.8179 6.4598 371.2*" _  _  _ _  _  • • •  2252.3
2090(4) 2.9721 2.4455 3.6695 104.7*“ 631.3*“
3011 (2) 2.7505 2.3289 3.1721 383.1*“ 5.8“
3174(9) 1.5760 5.9420 2.8960 313.9*“ 3119.3*“
significant at a  = 10%, “ significant at a  = 5%, ’“ significant at a  = 1%
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for the parametric test for both o f the specialist firms, while the non-parametric tests has 
significance levels o f 10% and 5% for the two firms, respectively.
Hypothesis two (H2) is rejected when using the percentage bid-ask spread 
because in almost all cases, within almost all of the specialist firms, there are statistically 
significant differences across the individual specialists.
S.4.2.3. E nd  of the T rading Day Returns
The final intraday transaction return is reported in Table 53 irrespective o f the 
timing o f the final two transactions. The final return is also reported in Table 54 by 
requiring that the final transaction occur after 3:45 pm and the prior price used to 
calculate the return is the last transaction that occurred before 3:45 pm.
Table 53 indicates that the final transaction return appears to be similar across the 
individual specialists within each specialist firm. O f the 36 specialist firms with at least 
one individual specialist, 27 have no statistically significant differences among the 
individual specialists within each individual specialist firm. Only three specialist firms 
have statistically significant differences using both parametric and non-parametric tests. 
Of the remaining six specialist firms, three have statistically significant differences 
according to parametric tests, while three have statistically significant differences 
according to non-parametric tests.
The final fifteen minute return in Table 54 appears to be robust across individual 
specialists within specialist firms, similar to the final transaction return in Table 53. O f 
the 36 specialist firms with at least one individual specialist, 27 have no statistically 
significant differences among the individual specialists within each individual specialist 
firm. Only three specialist firms have statistically significant differences using both
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Table 53 This table reports the final intraday transaction return within specialist firms. 
Mean final intraday transaction returns (in percent) are reported for May 1995 by 
averaging the mean final transaction return for individual specialists within each 
specialist firm. Stocks are divided into groups based on the individual specialist location 
(post and panel). Mean, minimum and maximum returns o f individual specialists are 
reported for each specialist firm. The number o f individual specialists within each 
specialist firm is reported. Parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums 
tests are conducted to test for differences across individual specialists within each 
specialist firm.
Return Minimum Maximum ANOVA Wilcoxon
Return Return
Specialist # (number of individual specialists)
20(10) 0.0407 -0.1000 0.1158 0.5 10.1
34 (5) 0.1162 -0.0730 0.2143 1.5 9.2’
104(9) -0.0290 -0.3960 0.1567 2.1" 20.6*
137(11) 0.0784 -0.0850 0.2426 0.6 6.8
202 (16) 0.0466 -0.0460 0.1587 1.4 23.4*
210(16) 0.0882 -0.0710 0.3132 1.2 33.8*'
215(15) 0.0871 0.0076 0.2576 0.9 16.3
240 (6) 0.0091 -0.1110 0.0923 0.4 6.3
298 (14) 0.0739 -0.0210 0.2145 1.4 15.4
364(5) 0.1316 -0.1790 0.4673 0.7 0.3
403 (18) 0.0156 -0.3430 0.1563 1.6* 29.5*'
501 (34) 0.0588 -0.3510 0.3608 0.7 35.4
520 (5) -0.0180 -0.0760 0.0632 0.5 5.7
551(11) 0.0281 -0.0750 0.0818 0.2 6.3
1010(3) 0.0172 -0.0290 0.0868 0.2 0.7
1027 (3) 0.0268 0.0077 0.0418 0.1 0.1
1034(1) 0.0898 0.0898 0.0898 - -
1148 (5) 0.1001 0.0000 0.2631 0.9 3.3
1225 (5) 0.0422 -0.0720 0.1293 3.5’” 14.8**
1227(19) 0.1055 -0.1990 0.4209 1.7" 18.9
1229 (4) 0.1371 -0.0220 0.3270 1.2 9.2
1266 (5) 0.2079 0.0351 0.4266 1.2 3.8
1280 (2) 0.1516 0.0767 0.2264 2.5 0.8
1341 (5) 0.0321 -0.0420 0.0693 0.2 1.8
1418(12) 0.0927 -0.0230 0.2230 0.6 17.9
1679 (8) -0.0080 -0.6170 0.1344 0.4 2.6
1687 (6) 0.0369 -0.0590 0.1619 1.4 9.7
1726(10) 0.0597 -0.4280 0.4780 3.0 20.1
1746(3) 0.0471 0.0179 0.0902 0.2 0.1
1903(15) 0.0509 -0.1050 0.2380 0.7 15.1
1910(4) 0.0635 -0.3540 0.4507 _2.8 4.5
1941 (11) 0.1461 -0.0200 0.4200 1.5 5.9
1966 (8) 0.5879 -0.1010 3.8462 1.6 6.3
2022 (8) 0.0254 -0.7670 0.4576 1.9 7.1
2090 (4) 0.1236 -0.0530 0.2839 1.6 1.9
3011 (2) 0.1301 0.0938 0.1664 0.9 3.2’
3174(8) 0.0701 -0.0060 0.1680 0.9 5.3
’significant at a = 10%, ” significant at a  = 5%, ’’’significant at a  = 1%
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Table 54 This table reports the final fifteen minute return within specialist firms. Mean 
final fifteen minute returns (in percent) are reported for May 1995 by averaging the mean 
final transaction return for individual specialists within each specialist firm. Stocks are 
divided into groups based on the individual specialist location (post and panel) and the 
mean return is calculated for each specialist. Mean, minimum and maximum returns o f 
individual specialists are reported for each specialist firm. The number of individual 
specialists within each specialist firm is reported. Parametric ANOVA and non- 
parametric Wilcoxon rank sums tests are conducted to test for differences across 
individual specialists within each specialist firm.
Return Minimum Maximum ANOVA Wilcoxon
Return Return
Specialist # (number of individual specialists)
20(10) 0.0642 -0.0280 0.2890 0.5 8.7
34(5) 0.1641 -0.0390 0.3065 1.4 6.9
104(9) 0.0588 -0.2980 0.4243 0.7 6.0
137(11) 0.0239 -0.1960 0.1525 0.6 9.0
202(16) 0.0832 -0.0250 0.1992 0.3 8.1
210(16) 0.1230 -0.0810 0.4715 1.6* 19.5
215(15) 0.1129 0.0014 0.4992 0.8 23.1*
240 (6) 0.0049 -0.0770 0.2156 1.4 8.6
298(14) 0.0757 -0.0280 0.2585 1.1 23.7*
364(4) 0.1098 -0.0030 0.4420 12.5"* 12.0*
403(17) 0.0464 -0.3350 0.2741 1.1 19.2
501(33) 0.0710 -0.1840 0.4871 0.9 27.2
520 (5) 0.0700 -0.0190 0.1763 1.1 7.2
551(10) 0.0650 -0.1210 0.2316 1.2 6.6
1010(3) 0.0798 0.0362 0.1637 0.1 0.5
1027(3) 0.1149 -0.0290 0.2016* 2.0 4.7*
1034(1) 0.3601 0.3601 0.3601 - -
1148 (4) 0.1240 0.0501 0.1781 0.1 0.3
1225(5) 0.0464 -0.1210 0.1662 3.7 15.3*
1227(18) 0.0840 -0.2210 0.3102 0.6 18.5
1229(4) 0.0067 -0.2640 0.1804 0.3 1.8
1266(5) 0.2531 0.0752 0.5770 1.4 3.2
1280(2) -0.0060 -0.0490 0.0367 0.4 0.1
1341 (5) 0.0473 -0.1500 0.1521 2.2* 7.3
1418(11) 0.0664 -0.0390 0.1912 0.4 6.6
1679(7) 0.0852 0.0415 0.2336 0.6 5.2
1687(6) 0.0888 -0.0790 0.3188 3.0" 9.1
1726(10) 0.1391 -0.0360 0.4692 2.9"* 14.0*
1746 (3) 0.0767 -0.0980 0.2961 2.1 2.1
1903 (15) 0.0535 -0.1050 0.3112 0.7 10.9
1910(4) 0.1134 -0.1310 0.3391 0.8 4.0
1941 (10) 0.0928 -0.2060 0.4163 1.2 2.9
1966 (5) 0.1154 0.0252 0.2110 1.0 4.7
2022 (6) 0.0325 -0.3430 0.2982 1.2 5.1
2090(4) 0.1566 0.0596 0.2349 0.4 3.6
3011 (2) 0.0761 0.0589 0.0933 0.1 0.1
3174 (8) 0.0886 0.0287 0.1930 0.5 1.6
'significant at a  = 10%, "significant at a  = 5%, "'significant at a  = 1%
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parametric and non-parametric tests, but only one o f these three is the same specialist 
firm that has statistically significant differences in Table 53. O f the remaining six 
specialist firms, three have statistically significant differences according to parametric 
tests, while three have statistically significant differences according to non-parametric 
tests.
These results indicate that there are no statistically significant differences across 
individual specialists within a majority o f the specialist firms. This therefore fails to 
reject hypothesis two (H2). This suggests that specialist firm characteristics may be 
driving the final transaction return since statistically significant differences across 
specialist firms are found and reported in Tables 48 and 49. Alternatively, low pwer o f 
the test could result in no statistically significant differences. Furthermore, economic 
differences appear to be similar.
5.4.2.4. Depth
Mean, minimum and maximum depths of individual specialists are reported for 
each specialist firm in Table 55. The mean individual specialist ask depth is greater than 
the mean individual specialist bid depth for 13 of the 37 specialist firms. For all 36 
specialist firms with more than one individual specialist, the parametric and non- 
parametric tests of difference between the individual specialists indicate the means are 
statistically significantly different at a level o f 1%.
This result indicates that hypothesis two (H2) is rejected for both the bid and ask 
depths. The bid and ask depth levels are not the same across individual specialists within 
a specialist firm. The relative sizes of the bid and ask depths varies across the individual 
specialists.
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Table 55 This table reports the depth within specialist firms. The time-weighted bid and 
ask depths (in hundred-lots) for May 1995 are calculated for each individual specialist 
within each specialist firm. Stocks are divided into groups based on the individual 
specialist location (post and panel). Mean, minimum and maximum depths o f individual 
specialists are reported for each specialist unit. The number o f individual specialists 
within each specialist unit is reported. Parametric ANOVA and non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank sums tests are conducted to test for differences across individual 
specialists within each specialist firm.
Depth Minimum Maximum ANOVA Wilcoxo
Depth Depth
Specialist # (number of individual specialists)
20 (10)
Ask Depth 51.1 25.2 99.5 41.8"’ 1144.3*"
Bid Depth 66.3 19.7 117.9 36.7’’* 1224.6” ’
34(6)
Ask Depth 41.5 14.8 134.8 231.9"’ 943.5*’*
Bid Depth 47.8 16.9 111.0 72.1’" 872.3’*’
104 (9)
Ask Depth 36.9 10.7 77.7 51.4*" 546.2*’*
Bid Depth 33.7 11.2 72.6 38.8*" 526.8***
137(11)
Ask Depth 66.1 18.4 114.2 39.4*" 454.6*"
Bid Depth 68.9 12.8 148.1 45.7’" 808.1*"
202 (16)
Ask Depth 41.9 10.0 72.7 39.1” * 769.4*"
Bid Depth 49.7 9.9 161.2 64.7*" 1043.9*’*
210(16)
Ask Depth 34.4 9.0 111.0 93.7’" 1411.1***
Bid Depth 44.1 8.9 130.8 86.7*" 1636.2*’*
215(15)
Ask Depth 32.0 6.2 86.1 91.3’’* 1876.1*”
Bid Depth 38.0 7.0 106.9 127.6*’’ 2099.6*"
240 (6)
Ask Depth 35.5 14.0 73.8 97.3*’’ 601.2***
Bid Depth 37.7 9.9 91.8 145.6*" 612.0*’*
298(14)
Ask Depth 27.3 12.8 67.8 40.1*“ 494.5*’’
Bid Depth 31.4 13.1 79.9 53.2*” 887.7***
364(5)
Ask Depth 50.9 13.4 86.1 46.4*" 304.5*"
Bid Depth 47.2 12.5 94.8 75.8*" 261.6**’
403(18)
Ask Depth 31.4 8.7 75.0 53.4’” 1079.3*"
Bid Depth 32.8 6.9 94.5 77.1*” 1192.7*"
501(37)
Ask Depth 34.4 3.7 157.8 98.4’’* 2829.5*’’
Bid Depth 35.2 3.7 113.8 64.2*'* 3074.4***
520 (5)
Ask Depth 26.9 12.8 41.5 27.8” * 120.8’’*
Bid Depth 27.9 15.2 57.5 46.3’" 165.2*"
’significant at a  = 10%, "significant at a  = 5%, " ’significant at a  = 1%
(table con'd)
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(Table 55 continued)
Depth Minimum Maximum ANOVA Wilcoxon
Depth Depth
Specialist # (number of individual specialists) 
551(12)
Ask Depth 38.1 7.3 123.9 64.2’” 827.5***
Bid Depth 46.3 8.6 116.4 107.5*" 1221.4***
1010(3)
Ask Depth 30.8 23.5 41.9 22.7 61.6*’*
Bid Depth 27.4 21.5 37.4 22.9**’ 98.3*’*
1027(3)
Ask Depth 75.8 38.9 114.6 32.8 189.0*’’
Bid Depth 61.9 35.7 91.4 26.8 236.5***
1034(1)
Ask Depth 21.6 21.6 21.6 - •
Bid Depth 15.6 15.6 15.6 . .
1148 (6)
Ask Depth 45.6 13.8 64.7 28.3**’ 246.1***
Bid Depth 41.3 10.9 62.9 37.9” ’ 295.5***
1225 (5)
Ask Depth 26.3 17.4 51.0 43.9’** 149.1**’
Bid Depth 34.3 16.8 65.3 43.4*’* 117.3***
1227(19)
Ask Depth 40.1 5.8 92.8 57.1’’* 1538.7***
Bid Depth 43.6 7.7 129.6 75.5*’’ 1749.3” *
1229 (4)
Ask Depth 44.4 21.0 70.4 39.6*** 104.1” *
Bid Depth 53.2 26.8 100.5 64.4*’’ 30.1*”
1266(7)
Ask Depth 46.8 11.2 80.2 40.3*’’ 310.0*”
Bid Depth 49.4 10.8 91.7 32.0*’’ 225.8*”
1280(2)
Ask Depth 78.7 37.4 120.0 168.7*** 8.2*”
Bid Depth 66.2 36.8 95.5 114.6*’* 34.3*”
1341 (6)
Ask Depth 34.0 9.5 85.0 69.3**’ 528.7*”
Bid Depth 35.9 8.5 94.3 82.3**’ 502.6***
1418(13)
Ask Depth 36.8 8.1 67.7 19.9*** 242.7***
Bid Depth 37.0 6.1 93.6 42.6*** 206.8” *
1679(8)
Ask Depth 52.0 28.2 101.7 30.4*’’ 193.6’”
Bid Depth 44.8 28.1 71.0 13.9*** 186.9’”
1687(6)
Ask Depth 41.5 10.0 89.0 83.1*** 533.8***
Bid Depth 43.4 7.9 79.9 77.8*** 673.5’”
1726(11)
Ask Depth 38.1 13.3 107.8 94.0’*’ 1215.1*”
Bid Depth 39.2 13.5 96.5 75.2**’ 1329.9*”
’significant at a = 10%, ’’significant at a  = 5%, ’’’significant at a =  1%
(table con'd)
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(Table 55 continued)
Depth Minimum Maximum ANOVA Wilcoxon
Depth Depth
Specialist # (number of individual specialists)
1746(3)
Ask Depth 48.1 29.5 58.9 34.8"" 47.3""
Bid Depth 45.8 28.6 57.2 .  .  _ • • •40.5 38.4*"
1903(15)
Ask Depth 35.6 3.7 94.3 56.9 1300.7***
Bid Depth 39.7 5.0 102.2 a .81.2 1575.8*"
1910(4)
Ask Depth 55.2 32.0 68.9 20.6"" 132.2*’*
Bid Depth 51.3 34.6 66.0 17.6"" 36.4"*
1941 (11)
Ask Depth 54.0 21.0 77.1 _  _ _ • • •23.3 510.1"
Bid Depth 53.4 16.1 120.4 48.6 586.5*’*
1966 (8)
Ask Depth 28.0 2.2 55.1 .  _48.6 821.7***
Bid Depth 29.5 1.5 71.8 _ _ _ • • •59.3 962.7***
2022 (11)
Ask Depth 48.3 8.3 130.0 84.8"’ 474.9*"
Bid Depth 43.8 8.1 111.1 57.6"" 514.0*’’
2090(4)
Ask Depth 69.0 22.5 113.1 54.1"* 103.5***
Bid Depth 67.5 19.0 102.7 75.5"" 136.0*"
3011(2)
Ask Depth 29.7 14.2 45.2 113.1"* 273.7***
Bid Depth 27.9 19.4 36.4 41.5"" 242.3*"
3174(9)
Ask Depth 33.8 11.3 107.5 57.9"" 194.4*’*
Bid Depth 35.1 11.7 96.4 51.5"" 251.3*"
'significant at a  = 10%, "significant at a  = 5%, ""significant at a  = 1%
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5.4.2.5. Sum m ary
This section tests hypothesis two (H2) in order to determine if  there are 
differences across individual specialists within a specialist firm. For most o f the price 
characteristics examined there are statistically significant differences. For volatility, bid- 
ask spreads and depth there are statistically significant differences across individual 
specialists within a majority of the specialist firms. This suggests that these price 
formation characteristics may be a result o f individual specialist differences and not 
necessarily attributable to the specialist firms. For the final transaction return of the day 
and the final fifteen minute return, the hypothesis is not rejected. Statistical differences 
are found for only a minority of the specialist firms. This suggests that characteristics o f 
the specialist firm such as capitalization are related to the final returns during the trading 
day.
5.4.3. Level of Volume
The level of volume may be indicative of the level o f  profitability of stocks for 
specialists since it is through the actual capture of the bid-ask spread that a specialist firm 
earns revenue. Hypothesis three (H3) tests if the level o f  volume has an impact on the 
patterns observable in various price characteristics. The null hypothesis is that there is no 
difference between low and high volume stocks in various price formation characteristics. 
The price formation characteristics examined are the bid-ask spread, the final return, and 
the depths o f bid and ask quotes. The volume groups are determined by ranking the 
volume o f stocks within each individual specialist within each specialist firm, and then 
dividing the stocks into two groups at the median. The median is included in the sample 
and is not discarded.
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5.4.3.I. Bid-Ask Spread
The percentage bid-ask spread over the final half-hour o f trading is examined in 
Table 56. This corresponds to the 3:30-4:00 column in Table 47. The results indicate 
that for the percentage bid-ask spread there are statistically significant differences at a 
level o f 1% between the two volume groups in 25 o f the 37 specialist firms. O f these 25 
specialist firms, the percentage bid-ask spread is larger for the lower volume group in 23 
specialist firms.
O f the 12 specialist firms that did not have statistically significant differences at a 
level o f 1%, only one firm has no statistically significant differences in both the 
parametric and non-parametric tests. Three specialist firms have no non-parametric test 
significance while three specialist firms have no parametric test significance. The 
remaining four specialist firms have statistical significance in both parametric and non- 
parametric tests, however, the level of significance is at 5% or 10%. O f the 12 specialist 
firms that did not have the highest level of statistically significant differences, 7 have a 
larger bid-ask spread for stocks with low volumes.
The third hypothesis (H3) is rejected for the percentage bid-ask spread measure. 
The majority of specialist firms have a statistically significant difference between the two 
volume groups. In most cases the lower volume stocks have a larger percentage bid-ask 
spread. Since the higher volume stocks have a smaller percentage bid-ask spread this 
suggests that the higher volume stocks may not be fixlly compensating for the lower 
stocks’ lack of volume. They could still be higher than may occur without a specialist. 
Another possibility is that the lower volume stocks have a lower price and this may be 
driving the results.
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Table 56 This table reports the bid-ask spread in the final half-hour o f  trading across 
specialist firms and volume. The time-weighted percentage bid-ask spreads are reported 
within the final half-hour o f trading (from 3:30 pm - 4:00 pm) for May 1995. Stocks are 
divided into two groups within each specialist firm based on volume and the finzil half- 
hour percentage bid-ask spread is reported for each group. Parametric ANOVA test and 
non-parametric Wilcoxon rank scores tests are conducted to test for difference between 
the volume groups. Parametric ANOVA test and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums 
tests are conducted to test for difference between the specialist firms.
Specialist % Bid-Ask Spread low vol. stocks high vol. Stocks ANOVA Wilcoxon
% Bid-Ask Spread % Bid-Ask Spread
20 1.600 2.144 1.150 101.7'" 103.4"’
34 2.659 3.553 2.142 67.1'" 15.9'"
104 2.765 2.864 2.664 1.6 7.7’"
137 2.528 3.675 1.551 157.0*" 267.7'”
202 2.187 3.100 1.427 140.1’" 60.9*"
210 1.979 2.084 1.890 6.4" 1.8
215 2.389 3.338 1.565 147.5"' 273.7
240 2.509 2.550 2.473 0.1 25.7’"
298 2.288 3.201 1.467 168.7'" 184.8"’
364 2.343 2.198 2.508 2.3 11.2’”
403 2.393 3.295 1.593 110.1'" 203.5” '
501 2.371 3.319 1.522 487.9'" 723.5'"
520 2.394 3.129 1.755 53.6'" 24.4"'
551 1.764 2.200 1.356 67.3'" 107.0’"
1010 1.485 1.395 1.562 3.7' 12.1'"
1027 1.500 1.860 1.175 34.8’" 32.1*"
1034 2.906 4.058 1.919 95.0'" 66.8’"
1148 3.605 4.593 2.448 44.2'" 49.2
1225 1.995 2.409 1.604 43.6'" 22.2'"
1227 2.562 3.300 1.928 87.2” ' 165.8'"
1229 2.183 1.922 2.429 9.5*" 12.6'"
1266 2.365 2.614 2.145 5.6" 39.0'"
1280 2.125 2.256 1.994 4.3" 13.0
1341 2.318 2.786 1.918 26.2’" 1.1
1418 2.705 3.161 2.262 22.9'" 101.7'"
1679 1.844 2.097 1.630 26.7 .  . t *4.0
1687 1.917 2.029 1.819 7.9 '" 7.0'"
1726 2.243 2.947 1.564 117.3'" 161.7'"
1746 2.878 4.187 1.755 51.9'" 37.9'"
1903 2.140 2.747 1.594 71.1'” 42.6"’
1910 2.323 2.018 2.640 17.3'" 7.5'"
1941 3.026 4.051 2.043 91.4'" 171.2'"
1966 1.989 2.096 1.902 2.8' 37.5'"
2022 2.641 3.324 2.314 29.0'" 86.2
2090 2.754 2.753 2.755 0.0 0.0
3011 2.709 2.635 2.775 0.7 4.6"
3174 1.609 1.979 1.285 101.0'" 60.9'"
overall 2.335 2.929 1.813 1654.0*" 2389.2’"
ANOVA 22.0"' 18.1'" 32.0’"
Wilcoxon 1851.6"’ 972.9"’ 1810.5*"
'significant at a  = 10%, "significant at a  = 5%, '"significant at a  = 1%
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Although not shown, a lower mean price for stocks with higher volumes is 
confirmed. The higher price is, on average, only 18% higher which lessens the likely 
impact o f  price on the difference in the percentage bid-ask spread between the two 
groups. O f the 37 specialist firms, 32 specialist firms have a statistically significant 
difference between the price level o f the stocks in the two volume groups. O f the 32 
specialist firms, in 24 specialist firms the lower mean price is in the stocks with lower 
volume, while 8 specialist firms have a lower mean price in the higher volume stocks. 
This price effect may be a partial explanation, but it does not explain the entire difference 
since a lower price is not found in all the lower volume groups.
5.4.3.2. End of the T rading  Day Returns
The final transaction return is examined across the two volume groups in Table 
57. There are limited differences between the two volume groups. Only 8 o f the 37 
specialist firms have statistically significant differences in either the parametric and/or 
the non-parametric tests. O f these 8 firms, only two have any tests o f difference that have 
a level o f  statistical significance that is 1%. While this fails to reject the hypothesis that 
the two groups are the same, it is interesting to note that the statistical significance o f the 
difference across the specialist firms within each of the individual volume groups is not 
the same for the low and the high volume groups. The tests o f difference for the low 
volume groups are not statistically significant, while the tests o f difference for the high 
volume group are statistically significant at a level o f 1% for the parametric test and 10% 
for the non-parametric test.
Differences across volume groups and the final fifteen minute return are 
examined in Table 58. The number of specialist firms with statistically significant
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Table 57 This table reports the final intraday transaction return across specialist firms 
and volume. Mean final intraday transaction return (in percentages) is reported for May 
1995. Stocks are divided into two groups within each specialist firm based on volume 
and the final intraday transaction return is reported for each group. Parametric ANOVA 
tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank scores tests are conducted to test for differences 
between the volume groups. Parametric ANOVA tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon 
rank sums tests are conducted to test for differences across specialist firms.
Specialist Return low volume stocks high volume stocks ANOVA Wilcoxon
Return Return rank scores
20 0.0608'“ 0.0728“ * 0.0558“ 0.1 0.7
34 0.0908* 0.0495“ 0.1064” 0.3 0.4
104 0.0296 0.0504 0.0224 0.2 0.2
137 0.0958“ 0.2372“ 0.0441“ 5.2“ 6.2“
202 0.0461*“ 0.0742’“ 0.0330*" 1.5 0.5
210 0.0753 0.0347*** 0.0947*** 2.3 2.3
215 0.0883"* 0.1628"’ 0.0615“ 5.6“ 1.6
240 0.0180 0.0218 0.0162* 0.0 0.1
298 0.0730*** 0.1018 0.0614*** 1.4 0.1
364 0.1701*“ 0.3366 0.1153 3.8* 2.3
403 0.0272* 0.0305“ 0.0256*" 0.0 0.1
501 0.0833**’ 0.1500"’ 0.0592*“ 7.0*“ 0.5
520 -0.0166 0.0786 -0.0502“ 3.5* 0.6
551 0.0463* 0.0327* 0.0498*" 0.1 0.0
1010 -0.0109 -0.0692 0.0032 0.4 0.8
1027 0.0263 -0.0489 0.0647* 2.5 0.6
1034 0.0898 0.2042 0.0358 1.4 2.2
1148 0.1143“ 0.1310* 0.1078“ 0.0 0.0
1225 0.0489*" 0.0823*“ 0.0366*” 1.3 1.1
1227 0.0953’" 0.1138*** 0.0880*** 0.2 0.1
1229 0.1523“ 0.2840" 0.0932 2.0 1.5
1266 0.2520"* 0.3326**’ 0.2155“ 0.7 0.6
1280 0.1281*“ 0.1238“ 0.1303 0.0 0.2
1341 0.0386* 0.2066" -0.0409 7.2 3.8*
1418 0.1011*“ 0.0687*’* 0.1176“ 0.5 0.3
1679 0.0733*" 0.1405" 0.0500“ ’ 3.0* 0.6
1687 0.0482* 0.0240*“ 0.0600* 0.4 0.1
1726 0.0941*“ — •••0.0961 0.0932*" 0.0 0.0
1746 0.0427 0.0692" 0.0317* 0.1 0.3
1903 0.0458 0.0427 0.0470*’* 0.0 1.5
1910 0.1648“ 0.0403*** 0.2009*’ 0.8 0.0
1941 0.1814*“ 0.1057*** 0.2080“ 1.1 3.6*
1966 0.0376 0.1038“ 0.0201** 0.7 0.0
2022 0.1305*** 0.2159 0.0833 1.9 0.0
2090 0.1259“ 0.1097“ 0.1328**’ 0.0 0.0
3011 0.1328**’ 0.1181" 0.1399*“ 0.1 0.8
3174 0.0649**’ 0.0079*" 0.0876*" 3.8* 2.6
overall 0.0785*" 0.0995*“ 0.0700*’* 7.0*“ 0.5
ANOVA 2.2 1.1 2.3***
Wilcoxon 53.8 38.9 47.8*
’significant at a  = 10%, “ significant at a  = 5%, “ 'significant at a  = 1%
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Table 58 This table reports the final fifteen minute return across specialist firms and 
volume. Final fifteen minute return (in percent) is reported for May 1995. Stocks are 
divided into two groups within each specialist firm based on volume and the final fifteen 
minute return is reported for each group. Parametric ANOVA tests and non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank scores tests are conducted to test for differences between the volume 
groups. Parametric ANOVA tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums tests are 
conducted to test for differences across specialist firms.
Specialist Return low volume stocks high volume stocks ANOVA Wilcoxon
Return Return rank scores
20 0.0589" 0.0940*” 0.0510* 0.4 0.0
34 0.1495"’ -0.0233" 0.1827" 1.9 2.3
104 0.0774" 0.0172 0.0884 0.5 0.2
137 0.0264 0.1515“ 0.0048" 1.5 3.9"
202 0.0776'" 0.0826*" 0.0759*" 0.0 0.4
210 0.1057*" 0.0693*" 0.1181*" 1.1 0.2
215 0.0952"* 0.1173*’’ 0.0897" 0.2 0.3
240 0.0062 0.0058 0.0063’ 0.0 0.3
298 0.0702’" 0.1197” * 0.0589’’’ 1.8 0.0
364 0.1445" 0.3346*" 0.1175 1.4 1.3
403 0.0527*" 0.0758" 0.0457’" 0.5 0.0
501 0.0748’" 0.1431*" 0.0620*** 2.9* 0.9
520 0.0506 -0.0091 0.0645" 0.7 0.4
551 0.0775" 0.0695* 0.0788*’’ 0.0 0.5
1010 0.0434 -0.0481 0.0611 0.6 1.0
1027 0.0483 -0.1959 0.1106’ 5.9" 2.5
1034 0.3601"* 0.6188 0.2027 2.8* 2.4
1148 0.1212* 0.1489’ 0.1162" 0.0 1.3
1225 0.0591" 0.0692*" 0.0569 0.0 0.0
1227 0.0739" 0.0990’" 0.0678*" 0.2 0.1
1229 0.0561 0.2607" -0.0047 1.2 1.6
1266 0.3274*" 0.1929*" 0.3640" 0.8 0.6
1280 -0.0224 -0.0442" -0.0169 0.0 0.0
1341 0.0422’ 0.0660" 0.0367 0.1 0.0
1418 0.0607 0.0579*" 0.0617" 0.0 0.0
1679 0.0750"* 0.1358” 0.0616"* 1.1 0.6
1687 0.1130"* 0.1154**’ 0.1123’ 0.0 0.6
1726 0.1329 0.1006*" 0.1413"* 0.3 0.2
1746 0.0662 0.0930" 0.0615* 0.0 0.2
1903 0.0606" 0.0571 0.0615’** 0.0 0.3
1910 0.1610* 0.0587*" 0.1786" 0.2 0.0
1941 0.1237*" 0.1901*" 0.1101” 0.7 7.7**’
1966 0.1160"* 0.0737" 0.1204" 0.2 0.2
2022
_ . _ _ „ • • • 0.1624 0.1556*" 0.1641 0.0 1.0
2090 0.1670" -0.0641** _ _ _ _ _ ••• 0.2268 3.1* 3.3*
3011 0.0723 0.0589" 0.0770*" 0.0 0.0
3174 0.0858*" 0.0151*" 0.1023*" 2.0 2.3
overall 0.0851"* 0.0930*" 0.0832 0.4 2.3
ANOVA 1.9*" 0.6 2.1"*
Wilcoxon 47.4* 29.9 51.0*
'significant at a  = 10%, "significant at a  = 5%, '"significant at a  = 1%
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differences between the two volume groups are less numerous than in Table 57. Only 6 
o f  the 37 specialist firms have any statistically significant differences between the two 
volume groups.
Hypothesis three (H3) fails to be rejected for the final transaction return and the 
final fifteen minute return. This indicates that the level o f volume does not play a role in 
the return at the end o f the day. Some literature suggests that the end o f day price rise is 
related to the specialist, however, these results indicate that the final returns do not appear 
to be related to the level of volume o f the stocks. This table does clarify the differences 
between the specialist firms that is examined in an overall basis in section 5.4.1.4. since 
statistically significant differences across the specialist firms are found only in those 
stocks that have a volume above the median.
S.4.3.3. Depth
The bid and ask depths are examined for stocks with high and low volume and the 
results are reported in Table 59. On an overall basis, the depth is larger for those stocks 
in the higher volume group. The difference is statistically significant at a level o f  1% for 
both the parametric and non-parametric tests. O f the 37 specialist firms, 13 have 
statistically significant differences at a level o f 1% between the two groups for both the 
bid and the ask depth. As may be expected, in each of these specialist firms the higher 
volume stocks have a greater depth than the lower volume stocks.
The other 24 specialist firms exhibit interesting patterns. In 10 o f the specialist 
firms the higher volume stocks have larger bid and ask depths, however, the statistical 
significance of the tests are not at a level o f 1% for all parametric and non-parametric 
tests. In four o f the specialist firms there are no statistically significant differences in the
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Table 59 This table reports the depth in the final half-hour o f trading across specialist 
firms and volume. The time-weighted bid and ask depth (in hundred-lots) is reported 
within the final half-hour of trading (from 3:30 pm -  4:00 pm) for May 1995. Stocks are 
divided into two groups within each specialist firm based on volume and the final half- 
hour percentage bid-ask spreads are reported for each group. Parametric ANOVA tests 
and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank scores tests are conducted to test for differences 
between the volume groups. Parametric ANOVA tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon 
rank sums tests are conducted to test for differences across specialist firms.
Specialist Depth low volume stocks high volume stocks ANOVA Wilcoxon
Depth Depth
Overall
Ask Depth 24.5 15.5 32.5 259.5"* 504.0*"
Bid Depth 26.4 19.1 32.8 145.3*" 328.9*’*
Snecialist #
20
Ask Depth 58.7 42.7 72.0 8.4"* mam •••28.3
Bid Depth 72.2 43.4 96.1 17.1**’ 23.2
34
Ask Depth 20.4 8.8 27.2 5.8** 34.7*"
Bid Depth 18.9 8.5 25.1 5.8" 26.3*"
104
Ask Depth 20.6 14.1 27.2 4.3" 5.9"
Bid Depth 17.7 10.3 25.3 7.8*" 3.7*
137
Ask Depth 28.2 11.5 42.6 15.5*** 51.2—
Bid Depth 25.6 11.0 38.1 15.4*** 38.6*"
202
Ask Depth 31.6 14.1 46.5 27.0*" 67.2*"
Bid Depth 36.2 22.6 47.8 11.9**’ 36.9*"
210
Ask Depth 10.1 5.2 14.3 24.5"* 43.5*"
Bid Depth 13.1 11.1 14.7 1.5 32.7*"
215
Ask Depth 14.3 17.9 11.1 6.3" 1.3
Bid Depth 21.3 27.1 16.2 5.8" 0.2
240
Ask Depth 8.2 8.1 8.3 0.0 1.4
Bid Depth 9.6 13.6 6.1 6.2" 4.4"
298
Ask Depth 5.2 4.3 6.1 6.1" 41.8—
Bid Depth 7.3 7.0 7.5 0.2 11.9*"
364
Ask Depth 33.4 24.5 43.5 3.2* 4.0*
Bid Depth 36.2 26.3 47.4 3.7* 0.2
403
Ask Depth 8.6 5.3 11.6 16.4*" 65.8*"
Bid Depth 10.3 7.6 12.6 5.1" 62.1*"
501
Ask Depth 33.6 17.6 48.1 62.8 114.5—
Bid Depth 31.6 17.9 44.1 56.9*" 117.9*"
significant at a  = 10%, "significant at a  = 5%, ‘"significant at a  = 1% (table con'd)
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(Table 59 continued)
Specialist Depth low volume stocks high volume stocks ANOVA Wilcoxon
Depth Depth
Soecialist #
520
Ask Depth 22.3 20.9 23.5 0.2 3.5*
Bid Depth 34.0 48.8 21.0 00 • • 0.5
551
Ask Depth 7.8 6.6 8.9 3.3* 7.9*"
Bid Depth 13.3 10.6 15.8 2.8* 3.3*
1010
Ask Depth 4.5 4.7 4.4 0.0 0.1
Bid Depth 5.1 3.6 6.5 3.1* 2.5
1027
Ask Depth 62.6 63.7 61.6 0.0 2.0
Bid Depth 48.7 56.5 41.8 0.5 4.2"
1034
Ask Depth 6.9 4.8 8.7 1.6 0.1
Bid Depth 6.5 5.1 7.6 0.7 0.6
1148
Ask Depth 10.8 7.1 15.0 5.2" 6.0
Bid Depth 11.4 9.7 13.5 0.8 0.7
1225
Ask Depth 13.7 8.7 18.6 4.1" 1.7
Bid Depth 16.2 19.2 13.3 1.1 0.6
1227
Ask Depth 7.8 5.7 9.6 10.9'" 20.4*"
Bid Depth 8.3 6.4 9.9 11.8'" 15.9*"
1229
Ask Depth 10.2 6.8 13.3 5.4" 14.7"*
Bid Depth 9.8 7.0 12.4 4.5" 18.9*"
1266
Ask Depth 54.4 48.6 59.5 0.8 0.6
Bid Depth 46.0 44.6 47.2 0.1 0.6
1280
Ask Depth 24.7 5.9 43.5 9.4*" 13.9’"
Bid Depth 19.3 5.7 32.8 14.7'" 16.6'"
1341
Ask Depth 33.7 22.4 43.3 6.6" 1.4
Bid Depth 36.5 23.4 47.8 6.5" 0.9
1418
Ask Depth 15.8 9.6 21.8 16.9"* 42.7***
Bid Depth 16.7 8.3 25.0 19.0*" 42.6*"
1679
Ask Depth 41.1 15.9 62.7 21.2 54.5*"
Bid Depth 41.2 18.8 60.4 21.8 23.3*"
1687
Ask Depth 35.6 19.0 50.1 16.3*" _ _ 30.3
Bid Depth 33.2 21.0 44.0 8.6*" 21.9
'significant at a  = 10%, '*significant at a  = 5%, "'significant at a  = 1%
(table con’d)
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(Table 59 continued)
Specialist Depth low volume stocks high volume stocks 
Depth Depth
ANOVA
Soecialist #
1726
Ask Depth 18.0 18.2 17.7 0.0
Bid Depth 22.1 22.5 21.6 0.0
1746
Ask Depth 10.2 9.9 10.5 0.1
Bid Depth 9.6 11.5 8.0 3.0*
1903
Ask Depth 39.5 24.8 52.8 18.4*”
Bid Depth 49.7 34.8 63.1 11.2***
1910
Ask Depth 52.3 31.7 73.8 . A -•••10.7
Bid Depth 53.4 35.1 72.6 _ _•••7.8
1941
Ask Depth 38.8 22.9 54.1 26.7*’*
Bid Depth 42.7 30.1 54.8 9.6***
1966
Ask Depth 6.0 3.0 8.5 17.2***
Bid Depth 5.8 4.2 7.1 6.6**
2022
Ask Depth 25.3 17.2 29.2 4.0”
Bid Depth 28.4 22.7 31.1 1.4
2090
Ask Depth 63.0 40.7 81.9 5.7”
Bid Depth 68.7 51.5 83.2 3.6’
3011
Ask Depth 56.4 11.1 97.3 22.2***
Bid Depth 53.3 17.5 85.8 16.1 —
3174
Ask Depth 28.8 22.8 34.0 1.9
Bid Depth 31.1 33.5 29.0 0.3
Wilcoxon
Tests o f  Difference
Ask Depth
ANOVA 24.9*** 16.9*** 16.9***
Wilcoxon 2832*** 1311*** 1851*“
Bid Depth
ANOVA 23.7’*’ 11.2*** 17.6***
Wilcoxon 2832*** 1287**’ 1843**’
‘significant at a  = 10%, ’’significant at a  = 5%, ’’’significant at a  = 1%
1 . 1
1.8
0.8
5.2**
15.8
9.9
39.3 
27.7
74.4 
67.6
40.1
36.4
• • •
• • •
• • •  
•  • •
• • •
• • •
Ml
11.6
2 .8*
3.6*
0.7
4.9
2.3
2.6
0.7
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depth levels o f the two groups. In specialist firm number 215 the lower volume stocks 
have a greater depth, but only the parametric tests are statistically significant. In 
specialist firm 240 the ask depth o f the two groups is not statistically significantly 
different, however, the bid depth is greater and this difference is statistically significant at 
a level o f 5% for both the parametric and non-parametric tests. Specialist numbers 520, 
1010 and 1746 have ask depths that are very similar, but the bid depth is much larger for 
the lower volume group o f stocks and this difference is statistically significant.
Hypothesis three (H3) is rejected for 23 of the specialist firms and for these firms 
the larger volume group o f stocks has a larger bid and ask depth. The pattern in the other 
14 specialist firms suggest that there are differences in depth and the way depth is used 
by specialist firms. For some o f the specialist firms the lower volume group o f  stocks 
have a greater depth level, especially bid depth. The hypothesis can be rejected since 
there are some differences between the two groups, however, the differences are not 
robust and this may indicate that specialist firms are using depth in different ways.
5.4.3.4. Summary
This hypothesis examines the effect o f  volume on various price characteristics. 
The results show that the bid-ask spread is larger for lower volume stocks and this 
indicates that the higher volume stocks are not subsidizing lower volume stocks. The 
higher price o f  lower volume stocks is only a partial explanation o f the higher bid-ask 
spreads. The final returns do not differ across the volume groups. This indicates that the 
end o f the day price rise explanations that involve the specialist are not related to the 
level o f volume. For a majority o f the specialist firms, the depth measures are found to 
differ between the two volume groups, however, a minority o f  specialist firms have
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patterns that are significant and opposite to the majority. This is the most interesting 
finding in this section and suggests that specialist firms have a variety of ways to use 
depth.
5.4.4. Adjustment of Quotes Near the End of the Day Across Specialist Firms
The final transaction of the day generates a return that has been found to be large 
in many previous studies. Hypothesis four (H4) investigates whether the changes that 
occur immediately preceding the final quotes are the same across specialist firms. The 
effect on the bid-ask spread is the focus of this hypothesis, however, the bid and the ask 
prices are also examined separately to more fully explain how the bid-ask spread is 
altered. Table 60 reports the change in the percentage bid-ask spread at the end o f  the 
day between the final two quotes. On an overall basis, the percentage bid-ask spread 
increases by 0.4249% between the final two quotes o f the trading day. This increase is 
consistent across specialist firms, however, the magnitude varies. Tests of difference are 
statistically significant at a level o f 1% using both parametric and non-parametric tests.
The percentage change in bid price decreases on an overall basis by 0.1764%, 
while the ask price increases by 0.2475%. O f the 37 specialist firms, 35 have a 
statistically significant bid price decline and 36 have a statistically significant ask price 
increase. The difference across the specialist firms is statistically significant at a  level o f 
1% using a non-parametric test, but is insignificantly different using a parametric test.
These results indicate that hypothesis four (H4) is rejected since the change in the 
percentage bid-ask spread does differ across the specialist firms. The consistent change 
in the bid and ask price indicates that the null of hypothesis four (H4) can not be rejected. 
Most o f  the specialist firms report a  similar adjustment and parametric tests fail to find 
any statistically significant difference across the specialist firms.
216
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 60 This table reports the final quote adjustment across specialist firms. This table 
reports the percent change in the % bid-ask spread and the percent change in the bid and 
ask price between the final two transactions o f the trading day. A parametric ANOVA 
test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums test are conducted to test for differences 
across specialist firms.
Specialist Change in 
Percentage 
Bid-Ask Spread
% Change 
in Bid Price
% Change 
in Ask Price
20 0.2303**’ -0.1087 0.1208***
34 0.3740*“ -0.2137*** 0.1590***
104 0.5769*’’ -0.2828 0.2921**’
137 0.3886*’* -0.1682 0.2082*’’
202 0.4772’** _ _ _ _ .lit-0.2355 0.2411“ *
210 0.2085*** _ , . , .••• -0.1014 0.1061*“
215 0.4293*’’ -0.1966 0.2320’**
240 0.8716*’’ -0.3710 0.5315*”
298 0.3869*** 0.2193 0.5957
364 0.5914*’* -0.2926 0.2992***
403 0.3663*** -0.1863 0.1798*“
501 0.3195**’ 0.0219 0.3359*’*
520 0.5258’*’ -0.2852*“ 0.2398**’
551 0.3089*’* -0.1412*“ 0.1671**’
1010 0.2434*** -0.1087“ 0.1382*
1027 0.4104*“ -0.1994*“ 0.2121“ *
1034 1.6750*’* -0.8156 0.8590*’’
1148 0.4583“ * a A . •••-0.2671 0.2022“
1225 0.6373*“ -0.2885*“ 0.3519*“
1227 0.4160**’ -0.2117*” 0.2031**’
1229 0.5365*" -0.2779*“ 0.2619*“
1266 0.3668*’* -0.1882*“ 0.1789*“
1280 0.5455*“ -0.2668“ * 0.2782*“
1341 0.3611*“ -0.1783“ ’ 0.1805“ ’
1418 0.4217*" -0.2240 0.1980*“
1679 0.5673*" -0.2778*“ 0.2897*“
1687 0.5161*’* -0.2509 0.2678*“
1726 0.4084*“ -0.2673*“ 0.1358“
1746 0.3752*“ -0.1783*“ 0.1969*“
1903 0.3335*’* -0.1747“ * 0.1575*’*
1910 0.7851*“ -0.4031*“ 0.3784*“
1941 0.3618*“ -0.1708*“ 0.1900***
1966 0.4393*“ -0.2210“ ’ 0.2185*“
2022 0.5636” * -0.2660*“ 0.2998*“
2090 0.5203**’ -0.2447*“ 0.2753*“
3011 0.8170*“ -0.4267*“ 0.3897” *
3174 0.3167*** -0.1563*“ 0.1604**’
overall 0.4249*’* -0.1764 0.2475***
ANOVA 5.8*’’ 1.1 0.8
Wilcoxon 227.9*“ 211.6*“ 215.9“ *
'significant at a  = 10%, “ significant at a  = 5%, ’“ significant at a  = 1%
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5.4.5. Effect of Inventory Accumulation
Accumulated inventory may play a role in the intraday price formation because of 
a specialist firm’s ability to withstand a build-up or decline in inventory. Madhavan and 
Sofianos (1998) suggest specialists are more likely to buy when their inventory is low 
and sell when their inventory is high. They also suggest specialist involvement increases 
when the bid-ask spread widens. The effect o f  inventory accumulation on the bid-ask 
spread is uncertain. In this section, the short-term impact o f inventory changes is 
examined. The null o f hypothesis five (H5) is that accumulated inventory has no effect 
on price formation characteristics. The price formation characteristics that are examined 
are the bid-ask spread, the returns at the end o f the trading day and volatility at the end of 
the day.
Inventory accumulation is done by assigning the direction o f trade for each 
transaction based on Lee and Ready’s (1991) procedure. The inventory changes are then 
accumulated during the trading day before 3:30 and then the resulting totals are ranked 
into five groups.
5.4.5.I. Bid-Ask Spread
The percentage bid-ask spread during the 3:30-4:00 time interval is reported 
across inventory accumulation quintiles in Table 61. On an overall basis, the percentage 
bid-ask spread exhibits an inverted U-shape. This may be explained as a result o f low- 
volume low-priced stocks having little inventory changes and thus being concentrated in 
the middle quintiles.
The patterns across the inventory accumulation quintiles within each specialist 
firm are examined for the 32 o f the 37 specialist firms that have statistically significant 
differences across the quintiles. O f these specialist firms, 6 have their peak in the second
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Table 61 This table reports the bid-ask spread in the final half-hour o f trading across 
inventory accumulation quintiles and specialist firms. The time-weighted percentage bid- 
ask spreads (% BAS) are reported in the final half-hour o f trading (3:30 pm - 4:00 pm) 
for May 1995. The bid-ask spreads are reported in groups based on inventory 
accumulation quintiles. Inventory accumulation quintiles are formed by assigning the 
direction of trade for each transaction before 3:30 pm based on Lee and Ready’s (1991) 
procedure and then accumulating inventory. The inventory changes for each day are 
then ranked into five groups. Parametric ANOVA tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon 
rank sums tests are conducted to test for difference across the inventory accumulation 
quintiles and across the specialist firms.
Overall Inventory Accumulation Group
jecialist Bid-Ask 1 2 3 4 5 ANOVA Wilcoxon
Spread low (negative) medium high (positive)
20 1.778 1.208 2.379 2.022 2.185 1.182 11.5"* 64.4"*
34 2.882 2.316 2.609 3.442 3.019 2.174 11.8"* 26.6*’*
104 2.721 2.007 3.234 3.338 3.014 1.847 34.7"* 105.9"*
137 2.636 1.574 2.713 4.905 2.524 1.176 63.2"* 339.6” *
202 2.193 1.458 1.933 4.050 1.721 1.359 69.1"* 96.2*"
210 1.950 1.329 2.116 3.107 1.891 1.303 87.5"* 323.0***
215 2.256 1.400 2.439 3.824 2.382 1.233 74.4"* 447.7*”
240 2.505 1.562 3.414 3.228 2.899 1.434 13.4"* 119.0***
298 2.311 1.521 2.194 4.279 1.940 1.297 80.5 321.5***
364 2.506 2.656 2.439 2.693 0.6 0.9
403 2.417 1.525 2.052 4.246 2.069 1.279 56.9"* 146.1***
501 2.349 1.421 2.872 3.193 2.588 1.290 101.2*** 691.6***
520 2.443 1.668 2.704 3.526 2.190 1.775 14.3"* 62.5’’’
551 1.812 1.299 2.500 2.123 2.310 1.206 24.5*** 94.7"*
1010 1.616 1.761 1.532 1.532 1.478 1.764 1.8 8.4*
1027 1.466 1.369 1.550 1.588 1.563 1.238 3.4" 13.1"
1034 2.255 2.043 2.331 2.201 2.499 2.210 0.9 4.9
1148 3.707 2.406 3.773 5.335 3.235 2.464 18.8"* 40.9*"
1225 2.072 1.617 2.336 2.744 2.127 1.532 21.8*** 91.7*"
1227 2.572 1.813 2.723 3.557 2.558 1.767 25.6"* 119.1*"
1229 2.305 2.318 2.631 2.121 3.263 2.041 5.4*" 24.2"*
1266 2.420 2.008 2.900 2.869 3.019 1.395 11.7*” 97.3"*
1280 2.386 1.732 2.665 2.847 2.879 1.807 18.0"* 81.0"*
1341 2.179 1.900 2.686 2.268 2.441 2.011 3.7"* 11.5"
1418 2.470 1.741 3.602 2.754 3.187 1.452 29.8"* 169.9’*’
1679 1.793 1.583 2.059 1.748 2.151 1.582 9.8"* 58.9’"
1687 1.886 1.689 2.001 2.116 2.059 1.567 11.6*" 73.5*"
1726 2.438 1.904 2.662 3.169 2.539 1.397 21.1 '" 151.4*’’
1746 3.134 1.861 3.021 5.790 3.025 1.739 21.8"* 84.3*’*
1903 2.086 1.534 1.991 3.070 1.983 1.298 30.7*** 115.4"’
1910 2.377 1.990 2.503 2.621 2.387 2.162 2.7" 12.4"
1941 3.252 1.496 3.472 5.719 2.777 1.367 74.7*** 257.3*"
'significant at a  = 10%, "significant at a  = 5%, " ’significant at a  = 1%
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(Table 61 continued)
Overall Inventory Accumulation Group
Specialist Bid-Ask 1 2 3 4 5 ANOVA Wilcoxon
Spread low (negative) medium high (positive)
1966 1.863 1.582 2.586 1.986 2.247 1.412 15.3*“ 56.6*“
2022 2.637 3.026 2.594 2.463 1.7 3.9
2090 2.879 2.193 3.148 3.423 3.454 2.174 8.8’“ 67.5’“
3011 2.532 2.250 2.847 3.367 2.201 1.926 13.1’“ 41.4’*’
3174 1.642 1.392 1.776 2.140 1.655 1.169 27.7 79.5*“
overall 2.353 1.677 2.520 3.214 2.367 1.526 692.8 3268.2*’*
ANOVA _ _ • • •2.2 20.6 8.4” * 21.4“ * 9.9 25.6"’
Wilcoxon . 1 *53.8 776.1’“  361.7- 942.1’" 498.4*“ 1003.0*“
’significant at a  = 10%, “ significant at a  = 5%, “ ’significant at a  = 1%
inventory accumulation quintile, 5 have their peak in the fourth inventory accumulation 
quintile and 2 1 have their peak in the middle inventory accumulation quintile. This 
indicates that a smaller bid-ask spread, rather than a shift in the bid-ask spread, may be 
used by specialists in order to manage inventory changes.
The difference in the percentage bid-ask spread between the two extreme quintiles 
may be of interest since the low-volume, low-price explanation for the inverted U-shaped 
pattern suggests price levels will be less important in the extreme quintiles. Although not 
shown, this explanation is tested by examining the average stock price in each inventory 
accumulation quintile. On an overall basis the average price exhibits a U-shape and the 
mean prices are statistically significantly different across the inventory accumulation 
quintiles. When the individual specialist firms are examined, 35 o f the 37 specialist firms 
exhibit the same U-shape.
220
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
For the 32 specialist firms with statistically significant differences across the 
inventory accumulation quintiles a comparison of the relative sizes o f the percentage bid- 
ask spread is made between the two extreme inventory accumulation quintiles. O f the 32 
specialist firms, 27 (5) specialist firms have percentage bid-ask spreads that are larger in 
the extremely negative (positive) inventory accumulation quintile. A larger percentage 
bid-ask spread may indicate a reduced desire to be competitive and encourage trades.
This is consistent with a decline in inventory since the specialist must maintain a positive 
level of inventory and therefore may wish to discourage trades that would reduce 
inventory further.
The patterns indicate that hypothesis five (H5) is rejected when the percentage 
bid-ask spread is examined across inventory accumulation quintiles. Inventory 
accumulation impacts on the bid-ask spread, possibly because o f a high correlation 
between high-volume high-price stocks and inventory accumulation. The relative size o f 
the percentage bid-ask spread between the two extreme inventory accumulation quintiles 
indicates that a larger bid-ask spread occurs when inventory is depleted.
5.4.S.2. End of the Trading Day Returns
The final intraday transaction return irrespective o f the timing o f the final two 
transactions is reported in Table 62 and the final fifteen minute return is reported in Table 
63. The final intraday transaction return shows a statistically significant difference across 
the inventory accumulation quintiles, with the pattern roughly equivalent to an inverted 
U-shape. Quintiles 4 and 5, the two quintiles that represent the largest accumulation of 
inventory, have the lowest mean final transaction return. Quintile 1, the quintile with the 
largest inventory decline has the next largest final intraday transaction return, while the 
remaining two quintiles have a much larger final transaction return.
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O f the 37 specialist firms, only eight specialist firms have differences across the 
inventory accumulation quintiles that are statistically significant both parametrically and 
non-parametrically. These eight specialist firms do not have patterns that match the 
overall pattern. The most noticeable difference is that for three o f the specialist firms, the 
mean final transaction return for quintile 5 is negative. In only one o f these three 
specialist firms is the return statistically significant.
Differences across specialist firms are also tested within each inventory 
accumulation quintile. Only the high inventory accumulation quintile (quintile 5) has 
differences across the specialist firms that are statistically significant both parametrically 
and non-parametrically. This suggests the high end of day return may be related to 
inventory management by the specialist.
When the final fifteen minute return is examined in Table 36, the overall pattern 
differs from the final intraday transaction return. On an overall basis, the pattern across 
the inventory accumulation quintiles is statistically significant at a level o f  1% both 
parametrically and non-parametrically. However, the middle quintile has a mean final 
fifteen minute return that is not statistically different from zero. Furthermore, only two 
specialist firms out o f 37 have differences across the inventory accumulation quintiles 
that are statistically significant both parametrically and non-parametrically. The 
statistically significant differences that were observed in Table 36 across specialist firms 
in quintile 5 are now only statistically significant using a non-parametric test. This 
suggests that the significance o f the results in Table 36 are being driven by final 
transactions that occur near the close of trading.
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Table 62 This table reports the final intraday transaction return across inventory 
accumulation quintiles and specialist firms. Mean final intraday transaction returns (in 
percent) are reported for May 1995. Each day’s return is divided into groups based on 
inventory accumulation quintiles. Inventory accumulation quintiles are formed by 
assigning the direction o f trade for each transaction before 3:30 pm based on Lee and 
Ready’s (1991) procedure and then accumulating inventory. The inventory changes for 
each day are then ranked into five groups and the final intraday transaction return is 
reported for each group. Parametric ANOVA tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank 
sums test are conducted to test for difference across the inventory accumulation quintiles 
and across specialist firms. Inventory Accumulation Group
Specialist Overall 1 2 3 4 5 ANOVA Wilcoxon
Return low (negative) medium high (positive)
20 0.0608*“ 0.0558*” 0.1865 -0.0015*“ 0.0549*** 0.0206** 1.9 8.5*
34 0.0908* 0.1603* 0.2644“ 0.0303“ -0.1522 0.1142 2.1* 5.3
104 0.0296 0.0154 0.2860 -0.0367 0.0222 -0.0460 4.5“ * 14.0***
137 0.0958“ 0.0440 0.0952 0.2405“ 0.1554“ 0.0446“ 0.8 3.5
202 0.0461’** 0.0145*** 0.0812 0.1046 -0.0091*” 0.0733*** 1.7 8.9*
210 0.0753 0.0979*” 0.0934*“ 0.1859*“ 0.0040 0.0506 1.9 9.5“
215 0.0883“ * 0.0729 0.1473 0.1741*“ 0.0713*” 0.0443“ 1.4 1.1
240 0.0180 0.0787 0.1169 -0.2466 -0.0526 0.0616* 2.0* 4.1
298 0.0730*“ 0.0547 0.1404 0.0910*” 0.0462*“ 0.0656*“ 1.1 5.1
364 0.1701“ * 0.0949 0.4331 0.3767*** 0.0738*“ 0.0734 2.4* 6.4
403 0.0272’ 0.0791 0.1122 -0.0514* -0.0430“ 0.0015*” 4.0*“ 11.7“
501 0.0833“ ’ 0.0324 0.1673 0.2467*’* 0.0513*”
_ _ . •••0.0521 5.2*“ 6.6
520 -0.0166 0.0333 -0.0552 -0.0064 -0.0169 -0.0449“ 0.3 2.7
551 0.0463* 0.0725 0.1699 0.0336* -0.0828* 0.0292*“ 1.9 5.5
1010 -0.0109 0.0054 0.0257 -0.0593 0.0062 -0.0384 0.1 0.7
1027 0.0263 0.0620 0.0454 -0.0950 -0.0480 0.0831* 0.8 2.0
1034 0.0898 0.0076 0.4896 -0.0492 0.0434 0.0072 2.1’ 9.0*
1148 0.1143“ 0.1815 0.2412 0.1310” 0.0769’ -0.0091“ 0.9 3.2
1225 0.0489“ * 0.0753 0.1008 0.1247*“ 0.0159*“ -0.0186*“ 2.2* 10.7“
1227 0.0953*** 0.1277 0.2223 0.1334*’* 0.0422*** 0.0153’** 2.4“ 14.6*“
1229 0.1523“ 0.0206 0.3479 0.4064“ -0.0024“ 0.1155 1.6 2.6
1266 0.2520*“ 0.1578 0.4969 1.1104*” -0.0461*“ 0.0527** 7.6*“ 9.7
1280 _ - _ — „ ••• 0.1281 0.1019 0.1967 0.3304’*’ -0.0307“ 0.1400 1.2 3.3
1341 0.0386* 0.0245 0.0480 0.3844* -0.0423“ -0.0563 2.4“ 8.9*
1418 0.1011"* 0.1067 0.1988 0.2679*“ 0.0109*’* 0.0302“ 1.7 7.5
1679 0.0733*“ 0.0927 0.2002 0.0873*“ -0.0545“ 0.0333 2.9 7.9*
1687 0.0482* 0.0562 0.0638 -0.0087* 0.1670*“ -0.0125* 1.4 3.2
1726 0.0941*“ 0.0709*“ 0.1719 0.1385 0.1015’“ 0.0402*** 1.0 0.7
1746 0.0427 0.0486 -0.1182 0.3652 -0.0740” 0.0870* 1.8 6.7
1903 0.0458 0.0180 0.0751 0.0753 0.0601
_ _ _ . ••• 
0.0323 0.1 0.4
1910 0.1648“ 0.0896“ 0.1723 0.5889 -0.0523"’ 0.0935“ 1.8 • « »*• 13.2
1941 0.1814*“ 0.0646 0.3292 0.6985“ 0.0313*“ 0.1084” 5.6*“ 6.6
1966 0.0376 0.0166 0.1034 0.0872 -0.0681“ 0.0674“ 0.5 0.7
2022 0.1305“ * 0.1512*“ 0.2477 -0.0200 0.1641*** 0.0891 0.7 1.7
2090 0.1259“ 0.1340“ 0.0623“ 0.1286 0.2381 0.0760 0.3 1.3
3011 0.1328” ’ 0.1521 0.1543 0.1835 0.1457“ 0.0634**’ 0.3 1.3
3174 0.0649**’ 0.0714 0.1883 -0.0195“ * 0.0295” ’ 0.0419*“ 2.7 8.8*
overall 0.0785*** 0.0700*“ 0.1566*“ 0.1578*“ 0.0294“ 0.0405
_ _ _ •••25.2 83.3’**
ANOVA 2.2*” 1.2 1.2 1.6* 0.9 1.4“
Wilcoxon 53.8“ 32.0 43.4 37.8 24.8 55.5“
‘significant at a  = 10%, “ significant at a  = 5%, ’“ significant at a  = 1%
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Table 63 This table reports the final fifteen minute return across inventory accumulation 
quintiles and specialist firms. Final fifteen minute returns (in percent) are reported for 
May 1995. Stocks are divided into five groups within each specialist firm based on 
inventory accumulation. Inventory accumulation quintiles are formed by assigning the 
direction o f trade for each transaction before 3:30 pm based on Lee and Ready’s (1991) 
procedure and then accumulating inventory. The inventory changes for each day are then 
ranked into five groups. Parametric ANOVA tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank 
sums test are conducted to test for difference across the inventory accumulation quintiles 
and across specialist firms. Inventory Accumulation Group
Specialist Overall 1 2 3 4 5 ANOVA Wilcoxon
Return low (negative) medium high (positive)
20 0.0589” 0.0606*** 0.1363“ * -0.0761*“ 0.1415*** 0.0087“ 1.4 6.3
34 0.1495*“ 0.0913 0.4331 0.2229* 0.0132“ 0.1284“ 1.3 3.2
104 0.0774“ 0.1043 0.2923 0.0385 -0.0722 0.0667 1.5 3.0
137 0.0264 -0.0062 -0.0365 -0.1673“ 0.1542“ 0.0521“ 0.8 1.3
202 0.0776” * 0.0153 0.1405*“ 0.1110*** 0.0279*** 0.1276 1.8 7.0
210 0.1057*“ 0.1230 0.1371 0.1041*“ 0.0828*** 0.0880’*’ 0.2 3.3
215 0.0952*“ 0.0974 0.1418 -0.0486*** 0.0979*’’ 0.0953“ 0.6 3.1
240 0.0062 0.0126 -0.0241 -0.0411 -0.1115* 0.0651 0.5 2.5
298 0.0702*” 0.0328 0.1117 0.1499*’’ 0.0745*“ 0.0740*** 0.8 1.1
364 0.1445“ 0.1016 0.4115 0.0000 0.0457*“ 0.1080 1.0 3.6
403 0.0527*“ 0.0749 0.1585 0.0563* -0.0354“ 0.0404 2.1* 5.8
501 0.0748*“ 0.0120 0.1774 0.0894*** 0.0907*“ 0.0730*“ 1.9 2.1
520 0.0506 0.0734 0.0566 -0.1476 0.0227 0.0775“ 0.6 1.9
551 0.0775“ 0.0849 0.2138 -0.7150* 0.0337* 0.1080*“ 5.5“ ’ 4.4
1010 0.0434 0.0994 0.0155 -0.2360 0.0699 0.0349 0.5 3.3
1027 0.0483 0.1214 0.0537 -0.1693 -0.2040 0.1537* 1.8 5.0
1034 0.3601**’ 0.1366 1.0950 0.0421 0.0332 0.1131 4.0*"
. _ 10.8
1148 0.1212* 0.2592 0.0695 -0.6272“ 0.1279* 0.1131“ 1.6 3.8
1225 0.0591“ 0.1025 0.1556 0.1223*“ -0.0025*“
 ̂ « •••-0.0051 1.7 5.0
1227 0.0739” 0.1257 0.2471 -0.0535*“
. . . . .*•( -0.0348 0.0444*’’ 2.2* 9.5"
1229 0.0561 0.0739 0.2178 0.3192” -0.1148” -0.0815 0.5 4.5
1266 0.3274*“ 0.2150 0.8789 1.2482*“ 0.2517*** 0.1028“ 4.4*** 3.4
1280 -0.0224 -0.0427 -0.0628 -0.6112*“ -0.2246" 0.2097 3.0“ 7.3
1341 0.0422* 0.0661 0.0554 0.1597* -0.0194" 0.0155 0.3 0.7
1418 0.0607 0.0992 -0.0565 0.0189*** 0.1265*“ 0.0471" 0.6 2.1
1679 0.0750*“ 0.0892 0.1793 0.0751*** 0.0026“ 0.0449“ * 0.9 2.6
1687 0.1130*” 0.0381 0.3131 0.1504* 0.0995*“ 0.1286* 1.2 4.0
1726 0.1329*" 0.0757 0.2353 0.3802*’* 0.0606*“ 0.1309’’* 2.0* 7.4
1746 0.0662 -0.0122 -0.0317 0.5741 0.0375“ 0.1338* 0.7 2.5
1903 0.0606“ 0.0530 0.0580 -0.1477 0.1196 0.0704*“ l.l 1.4
1910 0.1610* 0.1826 0.2778“ 0.1665*“ -0.0429“ 0.1791 0.3 2.6
1941 0.1237*“ 0.0617 0.3035 0.3561**’ -0.0086*’’ 0.1561“ 2.0* 6.5
1966 0.1160**’ 0.0388 0.1652 -0.0247 0.2209“ 0.1349“ 0.9 0.5
2022 0.1624*“ 0.1434 0.2738 0.0930*** -0.1032**’ 0.2728 1.5 6.8
2090 0.1670“ 0.1924 0.3734 0.0158“ 0.4142“ -0.0142*’’ 1.5 5.5
3011 0.0723 0.0518 0.2304 0.3680*’’ 0.0221“ -0.0335“ 1.0 2.0
3174 0.0858**’ 0.0508 0.1129 0.1686*** 0.0706*“ 0.0994*** 3.8* 2.6
overall 0.0851*“ 0.0726 0.1687*“ 0.0653 0.0555’** 0.0800**’ 8.6*" 24.6’’’
ANOVA 1.9**’ 1.2 1.5“ 0.8 0.9 1.3
Wilcoxon 47.4* 32.6 38.5 26.4 24.6 54.2“
‘significant at a  = 10%, “ significant at a  = 5%, “ ’significant at a  = 1%
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The results indicate that inventory accumulation plays a role in the final 
transaction return since there are some significant differences across the inventory 
accumulation quintiles. The role is reduced when the final intraday transaction return is 
defined as the final fifteen minute return indicating that the significance is being driven 
by transactions near the close. Nevertheless, hypothesis five (H5) is rejected for the final 
intraday transaction return since there are significant differences across the specialist 
firms in the inventory accumulation quintile that represents the largest inventory 
accumulation. This indicates that specialist firms differ in the way that they handle 
inventory accumulation and how this impacts on the final transaction return.
5.4.5.3. Volatility
Volatility across inventory accumulation quintiles and specialist firms is reported 
in Table 64. As explained in section 5.4.1.2., one measure o f volatility is the high minus 
the low share price all divided by the mean share price (HML). A second measure used 
to measure volatility is the standard deviation o f changes in successive midpoints of the 
bid-ask spread (STD).
The overall patterns differ between the two volatility measures. The HML 
volatility measure exhibits a U-shape pattern, while the STD volatility measure exhibits 
an inverted U-shape pattern. For both patterns the differences across the inventory 
quintiles are statistically significant at a level o f  1% both parametrically and non- 
parametrically.
The level o f significance is repeated for all 37 specialist firms for the STD 
volatility measure and for 35 specialist firms using the HML volatility measure. The U- 
shaped pattern for the HML volatility measure is found in 33 o f the 35 specialist firms
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that have significant differences across the inventory accumulation quintiles. The 
inverted U-shape for the STD volatility measure is also robust across the specialist firms, 
however, the peak varies between the middle three quintiles, with the lowest volatility 
consistently in the two extreme quintiles.
Differences across the specialist firms within each of the inventory accumulation 
quintiles are shown to be statistically significant at a level of 1% both parametrically and 
non-parametrically for both measures o f volatility. These patterns indicate that volatility 
may be affected by inventory accumulation during the day. The null o f hypothesis five 
(H5) is therefore rejected.
5.4.S.4. Sum m ary
The inventory accumulation during the day affects the bid-ask spread, final 
transaction return and volatility. The differing patterns across the inventory accumulation 
quintiles for the bid-ask spread suggests that the middle quintiles may contain some 
stocks that are more likely to have a higher bid-ask spread due to a lower price and this is 
confirmed by observing the average price. The final transaction return is shown to differ 
across specialist firms only in the inventory accumulation quintile with the largest 
accumulation. The significance is lost when the final fifteen minute return is examined, 
indicating that returns near the close o f trading may be being used by specialist firms in 
their inventory management. Volatility patterns across the inventory accumulation 
quintiles are robust across specialist firms, however the magnitudes differ and volatility 
measures themselves are contradictory. The bid-ask bounce may be responsible for this 
discrepancy. Large percentage changes may be occurring in the quintiles with the largest 
inventory changes, but these quintiles may not have a large standard deviation o f changes 
in successive midpoints o f  the bid-ask spread.
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Table 64 This table reports the volatility in the final half-hour o f trading across 
inventory accumulation quintiles and specialist firms. Volatility is reported (in percent) 
using two measures. One measure calculates volatility as the difference between the high 
and the low share prices divided by the mean share price (H-L)/P. Volatility is also 
reported as the standard deviation o f the change in successive midpoints o f  the bid-ask 
spread. Stocks are divided into five groups within each specialist firm based on 
inventory accumulation. Inventory accumulation quintiles are calculated by assigning the 
direction o f trade for each transaction before 3:30 pm based on Lee and Ready’s (1991) 
procedure and then accumulating inventory. The inventory changes for each day are then 
ranked into five groups. Parametric ANOVA tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank 
sums test are conducted to test for difference across the inventory accumulation quintiles 
and across specialist firms.
Specialist Overall 1
Inventory Accumulation 
2 3
Group
4 5 ANOVA Wilcoxon
Return low (negative) medium high (positive)
20
(H-L)/P 0.283 0.292 0.245 0.207 0.358 0.314 31.1 660.0"*
std dev. 0.227 0.194 0.261 0.231 0.234 0.218 15.6 34.5*"
34
(H-L)/P 0.314 0.305 0.271 0.249 0.361 0.383 8.6 183.0
std dev. 0.341 0.333 0.421 0.314 0.406 0.335 20.6 29.0
104
(H-L)/P 0.284 0.356 0.265 0.172 0.288 0.336 38.7 559.8*"
std dev. 0.311 0.288 0.387 0.299 0.377 0.246 28.9 91.6*"
137
(H-L)/P 0.424 0.402 0.486 0.314 0.501 0.416 17.5 903.9*"
std dev. 0.331 0.216 0.460 0.452 0.347 0.182 77.1 91.5**’
202
(H-L)/P 0.307 0.356 0.250 0.188 0.338 0.400 105.4 _ _ • • •947.3
std dev. 0.243 0.219 0.261 0.266 0.231 0.236 13.1 . .  . • • •19.3
210
(H-L)/P 0.333 0.348 0.329 0.275 0.367 0.346 15.9 1061.3"*
std dev. 0.270 0.206 0.292 0.371 0.278 0.203 141.5 328.8***
215
(H-L)/P 0.313 0.336 0.311 0.248 0.315 0.353 20.6 1148.7*"
std dev. 0.291 0.201 0.313 0.480 0.287 0.177 59.7 387.2*"
240
(H-L)/P 0.343 0.279 0.382 0.535 0.213 0.308 5.7 289.9***
std dev. 0.721 0.182 1.098 1.693 0.445 0.190 43.4 195.1*"
298
(H-L)/P 0.327 0.374 0.291 0.195 0.368 0.408 118.7 1618.2***
std dev. 0.294 0.229 0.338 0.399 0.280 0.226 158.5 292.8**’
364
(H-L)/P 0.319 0.314 0.375 0.242 0.314 0.347 4.0 102.8
std dev. 0.257 0.285 - 0.249 - 0.259 7.0 _ _ _ • • •27.2
403
(H-L)/P 0.326 0.403 0.300 0.222 0.308 0.397 109.2 1602.0
std dev. 0.228 0.211 0.271 0.237 0.247 0.181 53.0 115.9"’
501
(H-L)/P 0.316 0.332 0.302 0.245 0.342 0.361 45.0 2420.8
std dev. 0.289 0.199 0.395 0.341 0.332 0.195 217.5 895.6*"
'significant at a  = 10%, "significant at a  = 5%, ‘"significant at a  = 1%
(table con'd)
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(Table 64 continued)
Inventory Accumulation Group
Specialist Overall
Return
1
low (negative)
2 3
medium
4 5 ANOVA Wilcoxon 
high (positive)
520
(H-L)/P 0.335 0.327 0.339 0.234 0.362 0.414 18.6*" 346.6"*
std dev. 0.495 0.223 0.347 1.353 0.326 0.228 51.5 240.4
551
(H-L)/P 0.248 0.297 0.229 0.157 0.236 0.321 45.4*" 776.9***
std dev. 0.206 0.146 0.284 0.228 0.288 0.144 139.9*" 260.0***
1010
(H-L)/P 0.346 0.427 0.295 0.183 0.227 0.600 61.3*" 218.9*"
std dev. 0.338 0.272 0.364 0.383 0.315 0.359 8.1'" 43.7*"
1027
(H-L)/P 0.274 0.345 0.284 0.137 0.242 0.360 24.2*" 152.2
std dev. 0.230 0.189 0.251 0.243 0.217 0.244 6.2*** 41.8*"
1034
(H-L)/P 0.299 0.405 0.308 0.170 0.271 0.340 6.6*" 38.7"*
std dev. 0.283 0.227 0.316 0.291 0.316 0.264 4.1 '" 6.8
1148
(H-L)/P 0.458 0.532 0.409 0.370 0.438 0.540 4.8 400.5
std dev. 0.652 0.455 1.043 0.479 0.945 0.563 26.8 78.1
1225
(H-L)/P 0.280 0.318 0.286 0.203 0.270 0.324 23.3 367.4
std dev. 0.324 0.223 0.329 0.548 0.314 0.207 92.6 186.8
1227
(H-L)/P 0.327 0.320 0.314 0.271 0.349 0.379
. .  . • •• . .  , , .•«« 
16.1 1044.6
std dev. 0.288 0.254 0.374 0.277 0.342 0.225 _ _ _••• . __ - t i t83.2 153.7
1229
(H-L)/P 0.339 0.388 0.260 0.210 0.295 0.543 -  _ _••• _ tt t25.5 222.2
std dev. 0.323 0.318 0.460 0.277 0.450 0.314 AM M ••• MM M***32.7 50.9
1266
(H-L)/P 0.386 0.418 0.373 0.361 0.369 0.409 1.2 345.2"'
std dev. 0.305 0.251 0.355 0.367 0.368 0.176 37.5*" 125.5*"
1280
(H-L)/P 0.322 0.302 0.346 0.250 0.332 0.380 5.4 209.7
std dev. 0.282 0.189 0.306 0.360 0.352 0.204 25.3*" 71.6*"
1341
(H-L)/P 0.414 0.428 0.369 0.293 0.362 0.620 38.9*" 361.9*"
std dev. 0.298 0.274 0.374 0.279 0.379 0.301 17.1*** 162.5***
1418
(H-L)/P 0.379 0.373 0.351 0.354 0.364 0.451 6.8 893.9
std dev. 0.351 0.293 0.498 0.338 0.450 0.244 56.3*" 243.5*"
1679
(H-L)/P 0.264 0.290 0.270 0.170 0.232 0.359 39.4 369.8
std dev. 0.279 0.255 0.341 0.220 0.366 0.231 101.7*" 304.3"*
1687
(H-L)/P 0.291 0.316 0.270 0.179 0.323 0.363
MM . t t t  - _ _ . l i t33.3 555.0
std dev. 0.328 0.303 0.345 0.350 0.372 0.267 18.0 13.6
1726
(H-L)/P 0.341 0.363 0.351 0.261 0.330 0.403 21.0 555.4
std dev. 0.269 0.234 0.317 0.320 0.274 0.190 89.4"* 141.5*"
'significant at a  = 10%, "significant at a  = 5%, '"significant at a =  1%
(table con'd)
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(Table 64 continued)
Specialist Overall 
Return
Inventory Accumulation Group 
1 2  3 4
low (negative) medium
5 ANOVA Wilcoxon 
high (positive)
1746 
(H-L)/P 
std dev. 
1903 
(H-L)/P 
std dev. 
1910 
(H-L)/P 
std dev. 
1941 
(H-L)/P 
std dev. 
1966 
(H-L)/P 
std dev. 
2022 
(H-L)/P 
std dev. 
2090 
(H-L)/P 
std dev. 
3011 
(H-L)/P 
std dev. 
3174 
(H-L)/P 
std dev.
0.330
0.363
0.305
0.302
0.203
0.325
0.341
0.320
0.292
0.276
0.316
0.414
0.466 
0.4 IS
0.323
0.358
0.261
0.241
0.309
0.257
0.304
0.233
0.235
0.263
0.356
0.204
0.336
0.281
0.283
0.497
0.545
0.312
0.359
0.330
0.299
0.201
0.299
0.327
0.381
0.341
0.185
0.277
0.331
0.394
0.265
0.370
0.347
0.000
0.450
0.422
0.302
0.375
0.246
0.275
0.291
0.632
0.173
0.391
0.117
0.394
0.261
0.492
0.187
0.219
0.280
0.395
0.352
0.630
0.233
0.451
0.158
0.267
0.328
0.339
0.320
0.330
0.197
0.302
0.366
0.291
0.316
0.379
0.342
2.479
0.526
0.443
0.369
0.376
0.291
0.298
0.422
0.258
0.346
0.199
0.281
0.264
0.392
0.206
0.356
0.260
0.329
0.325
0.457
0.284
0.352
0.259
0.313
0.167
7.9
69.2'
57.3'
53.1'
10.4'
30.6'
18.7'
121 . 1'
2 1 .r
36.9'
1.5
75.7'
8 .2 ' 
51.1'
8 .0'
24.4'
48.7'
12. 6 '
248.2
127.8“
1000.3*
413.9“
124.1“
67.4“
952.3“
16.1“
451.3“
374.7*'
266.6“
18.8*'
381.3“
57.2“
155.6*'
34.7“
582.0*'
348.4*'
OVERALL
(H-L)/P 0.325 0.348 0.314 0.242 0.338 0.381 479.6*** 21881*
std dev. 0.227 0.243 0.374 0.366 0.335 0.227 573.9***2249.0’'
Tests of Difference
(H-LVP
ANOVA 49.1 
Wilcoxon 2650
•  • •  
• • •
21.6
889.4*
14.6
432.6*
12.2
328.5*
18.2
852.6*
25.8
1041.7’
standard dev.
ANOVA 49.1*** 54.0*** 40.0*** 99.7*** 54.4*** 85.2*
Wilcoxon 2650*** 2266.5*** 754.4*** 2250.6*** 1196.3*" 2931.1*
'significant at a  = 10%, significant at a  = 5%, ‘"significant at a  = 1%
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5.5. Conclusion
Patterns are confirmed across volume, volatility, percentage bid-ask spreads, and 
end o f day returns as well as bid and ask depths. This chapter finds that statistically 
significant differences exist across specialist firms. A reverse J-shape pattern is found for 
volume and differences across specialist firms are found at the beginning and end o f the 
trading day. Volatility exhibits a U-shaped pattern during the trading day. The 
percentage bid-ask spread is found to be largest immediately following the open and 
declines throughout the trading day with a late afternoon peak that is smaller than that at 
the open. There is much variation between specialist firms in the timing of the late 
afternoon peak. For some specialists, final returns are found to be positive and 
statistically significant, while for others the final return is not statistically significant.
This gives support to specialist explanations involving the high end o f day transaction 
price rise, and indicates that the phenomenon may be related to specialist firm 
characteristics. The relative size o f the ask and bid depths differs between specialist 
firms, with twice the number o f specialist firms with a larger mean bid depth. This 
relative size is consistent during the trading day and may indicate that each specialist firm 
uses depth in a certain way that may be related to the specialist firm ’s characteristics such 
as capitalization or risk aversion.
This chapter also contributes to the literature by examining some o f the same 
price formation characteristics across individual specialists within each specialist firm. 
Differences are found across individual specialists for most specialist firms when 
volatility, percentage bid-ask spreads and depths are examined. No differences are found 
within specialist firms when the final transaction return is examined. This suggests that 
price formation characteristics that vary within specialist firms may be attributable to
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individual specialists, and price formation characteristics that are robust across individual 
specialists within a specialist firm are attributable to specialist firm characteristics such as 
risk aversion and capitalization.
The level of volume has been suggested as a possible source o f differences since 
higher volume stocks may gamer more attention from the specialist because of the 
increased activity and the increased opportunity to profit by capturing the bid-ask spread. 
No difference across volume groups are found for the end o f day return suggesting 
specialist explanations involving the end o f day prices rise are not related to the volume 
o f a stock. The percentage bid-ask spread is found to be larger for lower volume stocks 
indicating that specialists are capturing bid-ask spreads from these stocks possibly 
because o f the reduced volume. This could indicate that cross-subsidization is not 
necessarily decreasing the percentage bid-ask spread for these low volume stocks. 
Competing explanations involving stock price effects on the percentage bid-ask spread 
are shown to provide only a partial explanation. Depths are also compared across volume 
groups and very different patterns in separate specialist firms indicate that there are 
myriad ways that depth may be being used by specialist firms.
The method of adjusting bid-ask quotes in advance o f the final trade is examined 
across specialist firms to test for differences between specialist firms that may indicate 
some expertise at the specialist firm level in assessing inelastic demand. The only 
difference in the adjustment of quotes near the end of the trading day is shown to be in 
the magnitude of the bid-ask spread. Most specialist firms decrease the bid price and 
increase the ask price between the final two quotes of the day.
The effect of inventory accumulation on the percentage bid-ask spread is difficult 
to determine since the impact of price confounds the impact o f  inventory accumulation
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quintiles. The limited inventory change middle three quintiles are shown to have the 
higher prices and thus higher percentage bid-ask spreads. A comparison o f the two 
extreme quintiles shows that the most negative accumulation quintile has a larger 
percentage bid-ask spread than the quintile with the largest positive inventory 
accumulation. This indicates that the specialist may be less competitive in attracting 
orders once inventory is depleted since a positive inventory level must be maintained. 
Examining inventory accumulation and the final transaction returns shows that only those 
stocks in the inventory quintile with those stocks with the largest inventory accumulation 
by the specialist have differences across specialist firms. This indicates that the price rise 
at the end of the day may be effected by the specialist to increase the value o f the 
accumulated inventory or may be a method to induce more buy orders the following day. 
Examining volatility over accumulated inventory quintiles results in conflicting findings 
based on the volatility measure used. The extreme quintiles with the largest inventory 
changes have the largest volatility when using the transaction prices, yet when using the 
midpoint of the bid-ask spread the lowest volatility occurs in the extreme quintiles. This 
may indicate that the bid-ask spread bounce may be responsible for some o f the observed 
patterns in volatility.
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CHAPTER 6 
ESSAY FOUR:
MARKET ON CLOSE ORDER RULE CHANGE AND INTRADAY PRICE 
FORMATION ACROSS SPECIALIST FIRMS
6.1. Introduction
Volatility differences between trading and non-trading periods (identified by 
French and Roll (1986)), and the high end o f trading day transaction return (identified by 
Harris (1989)) suggest that the closing price deserves specific examination. Harris 
(1989) indicates that closing prices may not consistently represent “true” stock values. 
This is particularly disturbing given the high degree o f  importance placed on closing 
prices, not only for valuation, but also for information dissemination and use in academic 
studies.
NYSE rule 116.40 sets forth procedures to facilitate the handling o f market-on- 
close (MOC) orders. This rule was changed on June 5, 1995. Before this date, MOC 
orders were constrained only on expiration days14. On expiration days (usually the third 
Friday o f the month), MOC orders in any stock related to a strategy involving derivative 
index products were required to be entered by 3:40 pm and no cancellation or reduction 
of any MOC order in any o f these stocks was permitted after 3:40 pm. After the cut-off 
time any order imbalances o f 50,000 or more shares in a group of pilot stocks15 would be 
published and additional MOC orders were allowed to offset this published imbalance. If 
no imbalance was published (e.g. less than a 50,000 share imbalance) then no additional
14 The term “expiration” days refers to the last trading day before the one day a month that standardized 
contracts in derivative products (such as stock index futures, stock index options and options on stock index 
futures) expire, and the last trading day of each calendar quarter when quarterly index expiration (“QLX”) 
options expire.
1 Pilot stocks consist of the 50 most highly capitalized Standard & Poors (“S&P”) 500 stocks, any 
component stocks of the Major Market Index not included therein, and the 10 highest weighted S&P 
MidCap 400 stocks.
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MOC orders were allowed after 3:40 pm. This policy has not changed for expiration 
days; however, after June 5 traders in all stocks were required to input MOC orders by 
3:50 pm on non-expiration days. The same group of pilot stocks is used for non­
expiration days as expiration days. For those pilot stocks with order imbalances o f  
50,000 shares or more, the order imbalance is published as soon as practicable after 3:50 
pm in order to facilitate additional orders to offset the imbalance. The details regarding 
the restrictions on market on close orders are detailed in Appendix B.
If the pilot stocks have order imbalances of at least 50,000 shares then the 
imbalance will be published after the MOC entry deadline and compensating MOC 
entries will be allowed. Pilot stocks are chosen based on the market values of all stocks 
fifteen days in advance of that month’s expiration day. The list varies only minimally 
from month to month. On the day of the rule change, June 5, 1995, the pilot stocks in 
effect for the previous expiration Friday (May 19,1995) became the pilot stocks for non­
expiration days as well. The June expiration Friday fell on June 16 and the pilot stocks 
were unchanged from the previous month with the exception of one stock. Franklin 
Resources Inc. replaced Cabletron Systems Inc. on the MidCap pilot stocks list. For the 
purposes o f this study both o f these stocks will be excluded from the pilot and non-pilot 
stock groups. Appendix C lists the pilot stocks.
If the MOC orders are balanced at the close then the final transaction occurs at the 
price o f the last sale just prior to the close o f trading in that stock. If there is an 
imbalance, then the imbalance is executed against the bid or ask, depending on the 
direction of the imbalance. An imbalance o f buy (sell) orders is executed against the ask 
(bid). The price o f the remaining orders is the same price as that of the imbalance
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portion. The specialist pairs off the remaining orders, absorbs the imbalance and these 
transactions are identified as stopped stock.
The stated reason for the rule change is to minimize excess market volatility that 
may be associated with large-size MOC orders that are entered very near the close. The 
rule change is expected to minimize volatility by preventing a last-minute influx or 
disappearance o f MOC orders which could potentially add to volatility at the close. The 
earlier cut-off time for MOC orders also allows sufficient time to attempt to offset large 
imbalances that may be published if  they are both large enough (at least 50,000 shares) 
and in a pilot stock. This rule change does not prevent last minute orders from being 
entered, but the orders may or may not be executed at the closing price.
The focus o f this essay is the effect o f the change in NYSE closing procedure on 
both the day-end price rise and volatility. Additionally, the group of individual pilot 
stocks are separately examined to determine if  the requirement to publish large 
imbalances in these stocks alters the effect o f the rule change on the end o f  day pricing or 
volatility.
6.2. Hypotheses
The hypotheses involve examining the day end price rise and volatility both 
before and after the implementation of the NYSE MOC rule change. Even though this 
was not the intended purpose of the rule change, the objective o f reducing volatility may 
have an impact on the end of day price rise documented by Harris (1989). The first 
hypothesis is as follows:
Hlo: The end of the day price rise is the same both before and after the MOC rule
change.
HI a:. The end of the day price rise is reduced after the MOC rule change.
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The stated objective of the rule change, to reduce the volatility at the close, is 
tested by examining the immediate effectiveness o f the rule change as evidenced by 
volatility. The second hypothesis is as follows:
H2o: Volatility is the same before and after the MOC rule change.
H2A:. Volatility is reduced after the MOC rule change.
The group o f pilot stocks with order imbalances greater than 50,000 shares have
the imbalances published and additional offsetting MOC orders are allowed to be entered.
The effectiveness of publishing order imbalances is examined by comparing the pilot
stocks with the non-pilot stocks. The third hypothesis is as follows:
H3o: The end of the day price rise and volatility for the entire period and changes 
in the end of day price rise and volatility following the NYSE MOC rule change 
are the same for pilot stocks and non-pilot stocks.
H3a : The end o f the day price rise and volatility for the entire period and changes 
in the end of day price rise and volatility following the NYSE MOC rule change 
are lower for pilot stocks than for non-pilot stocks.
6.3. D ata and M ethod of Analysis
Data is from May and June 1995 and includes all transactions and quotes on the 
NYSE provided by the TAQ (trades and quotes) database. The analysis excludes those 
stock issues for which an identifiable specialist firm is not available from the NYSE 
Specialist Directory. It also excludes those security issues that are not classified as either 
a common stock issue or a preferred stock issue. Transactions that are identified as 
corrections, or have a condition code or gl27 code16 are also excluded. Of the 2,849,367 
transactions in May and 2,816,842 transactions in June, after filters are applied there 
remain 1,819,387 transactions in May and 1,875,681 transactions in June.
16 These codes represent abnormal trades such as cash sales, bunched trades, or rule 127 trades that are 
executed as a block position.
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In order to test the first hypothesis, final intraday transaction returns are 
calculated for all eligible NYSE stocks. The returns are reported for the final transactions 
o f  the trading day similar to Harris (1989). In addition to the final intraday transaction, 
the returns are examined over the final fifteen minutes o f trading. The return is 
calculated from the price of the last transaction that occurred at least fifteen minutes 
before the close o f trading. Both the final intraday transaction return and the final fifteen 
minute return require that a transaction occur during the final fifteen minutes o f  trading. 
This ensures that the final transaction is captured near the close o f trading and reduces the 
impact o f infrequently traded stocks that may have a final transaction that occurs earlier 
in the trading day.
The effect on volatility is assessed first by examining the standard deviation of 
returns calculated using the change in successive midpoints o f the bid and ask quotes for 
each quote change during the last half-hour of trading each day. Volatility is also 
examined in the last half-hour of trading by calculating the difference between the high 
and low transaction share prices divided by the mean share price during that trading 
interval. In order to compare the pre- and post-rule change periods, the return and 
volatility characteristics for each stock are tested for similarity using an ANOVA test. 
Additionally, non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums or rank scores tests are performed to 
alleviate any concerns about distributional assumptions that may affect the ANOVA test.
The group o f pilot stocks contains the 50 highest capitalized stocks on the S&P 
500 as well as the top ten capitalized firms on the MidCap 400. Additionally, a reduced 
sample o f pilot stocks are selected and compared with non-pilot stocks which are 
matched to minimize differences in liquidity and capitalization between the samples.
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This ensures the comparison made between pilot and non-pilot stocks is appropriate and 
captures only the effect of the publication of order imbalances. This reduced sample is 
created by using the lowest ten capitalization pilot stocks matched to similarly capitalized 
non-pilot stocks.
6.4. Results
The differences between the pre- and post-rule change periods are first reported in 
section 6.4.1. by examining the price rise at the end o f the trading day. Final intraday 
transaction returns and final fifteen minute returns are examined using the entire sample. 
Volatility at the end of the trading day, using the two measures described in section 6.3., 
is examined in section 6.4.2., also using the entire sample Stocks are divided into pilot 
and non-pilot stocks and the end of day price rise and volatility are examined and the 
results o f  this testing are reported in section 6.4.3. The reduced sample o f pilot stocks is 
also used to better control for capitalization and liquidity differences and the results of 
this testing are reported in section 6.4.4. A summary o f the results is provided in section
6.4.5.
6.4.1. Price Rise a t the End of the T rading Day
The final intraday transaction return is used to determine if  there is a difference 
before and after the NYSE MOC rule change on June 5, 1995. Table 65 reports that, on 
an overall basis, the final intraday transaction return for the entire period is 0.0981%, 
with 0.0960% before June 5 and 0.1009% after June 5. There is no statistically 
significant difference between the return in the two periods using either the parametric 
ANOVA test or the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank scores test.
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Table 65 This table reports the final intraday transaction returns across specialist firms. 
Mean final intraday transaction returns (in percentages) are reported for the entire May- 
June 1995 period for NYSE stocks. The returns are also divided into the period before 
and after the NYSE rule change on June 5, 1995. A parametric ANOVA test and a non- 
parametric Wilcoxon rank scores test are conducted to test for differences between the 
two periods. A parametric ANOVA test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums test 
are conducted to test for differences across specialist firms.
Specialist Entire Period Pre-06/05/95 Post-06/05/95 ANOVA Wilcoxon
Return Return Return
20 0.0653 0.0637**’ 0.0674’ 0.01 0.30
34 _ , __ _«(• 0.1225 0.1171“ 0.1294“ 0.02 0.34
104 0.0333 0.0103 0.0573 1.12 0.88
137 0.0950“ * 0.0988“ 0.0899" 0.02 0.07
202 0.0717*“ 0.0593*’* 0.0876“ * 1.30 0.16
210 0.0881" 0.0933*** 0.0818*“ 0.19 0.03
215 0.0622*“ 0.0692"* 0.0526“ 0.32 2.16
240 0.1596* 0.0995 0.2423* 0.70 0.31
298 0.0638*“ 0.0672*** 0.0592*“ 0.11 0.85
364 0.1048“ 0.1839*" 0.0219 2.69 4.99*’
403 0.0554"’ 0.0351" 0.0819*“ 3.35“ 6.75*“
501 0.0912*** 0.0876*" 0.0957*’’ 0.14 0.18
520 0.0431 0.0014 0.0938“ 3.00* 1.89
551 0.0748*" 0.0453 0.1080*“ 2.47 0.06
1010 0.0396 0.0258 0.0604 0.14 0.01
1027 0.0839“ 0.0579 0.1161* 0.64 0.04
1034 0.1647“ 0.1806 0.1432 0.05 0.06
1148 0.1299 0.1170* 0.1482“ 0.12 0.12
1225 0.0823*" 0.0590*" 0.1099**’ 2.12 0.48
1227 0.1539*** 0.1547’“ 0.1529*’* 0.00 0.02
1229 _ , __ . ••• 0.1791 0.2110“ 0.1372 0.29 0.19
1266 0.2678*“ 0.2779*“ 0.2550" 0.03 0.53
1280 0.1178*“ 0.1484" 0.0747 0.73 0.72
1341 0.0594* 0.0933“ 0.0186 1.36 0.35
1418 0.1137**’ 0.1303*“ 0.0917“ 0.58 0.03
1679 0.1070*** 0.0675“ 0.1525*“ 3.62’ 2.53
1687 0.0901*** 0.1017*** 0.0740* 0.31 0.71
1726 0.1113*“ 0.1301*“ 0.0859’" 1.24 1.18
1746 0.0059 0.0752“ -0.0870* 8.51“ ’ 6.88***
1903 0.0719 0.0528 0.0936*“ 0.60 1.16
1910
_ _ _ _ . ••• 
0.3061 0.3286**’ 0.2761“ 0.10 0.15
1941 0.1405 0.1783*“ 0.0888“ 1.70 2.90*
1966 0.0979*“ 0.0964“ 0.0999" 0.00 0.02
2022 0.1216*“ 0.1793*“ 0.0460 3.09* 2.30
2090
* . __ _••• 0.1935 0.1537“ 0.2458*" 0.63 0.84
3011 0.2230’** 0.1101** 0.3602’’* 6.30 0.48
3174 — . . - a••• 0.1194 0.1111*“ 0.1295’“ 0.34 0.19
overall 0.0981*" 0.0960**’ 0.1009*“ 0.30 0.14
ANOVA 3.35*“ 2.23*“ 2.44*“
Wilcoxon 63.54*“ 54.01“ 51.91**
‘significant at a  = 10%, “ significant at a  = 5%, ‘“ significant at a  = 1%
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Hypothesis one (HI) is also examined for each specialist firm. Differences across 
specialist firms have been found when examining stock volatility (Bamea (1974), 
inventory holding costs (Coughenour and Deli (1996)), execution costs (Cao, Choe and 
Hatheway (1997)) and trading costs (Corwin (1997)). Table 65 divides the final intraday 
return by specialist firm and reports the overall return and the return in each sub-period. 
The significance o f a t-test comparing the return with zero is also provided. For the 37 
specialist firms active during the two-month period, only two have returns in the period 
before and after the rule change that have statistically significant differences at a level o f  
1% using a parametric ANOVA test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank scores test. Six 
other specialist firms have significant differences between the two periods using either 
the parametric or the non-parametric test. O f these eight specialist firms, three have a 
higher mean return in the period following the rule change.
Differences in the final intraday return across the specialist firms are tested on an 
overall basis and both before and after the rule change. In all cases the parametric 
ANOVA and the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums tests indicate that there are 
significant differences across the specialist firms.
The final fifteen minute return is also used to determine if  there is a difference in 
the mean between the period before and after the NYSE rule change on June 5, 1995. 
Table 66 reports that the mean final fifteen minute return is 0.0906% over the entire 
period. The mean final fifteen minute return is 0.0869% before the rule change and 
increases to 0.0941% after the rule change. The difference, however, between these two 
means is not statistically significant.
For four specialist firms there is a statistical difference between the means of the 
final fifteen minute returns before and after the rule change using both a parametric
240
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 66 This table reports the final fifteen minute returns across specialist firms. Mean 
final fifteen minute returns (in percentages) are reported for the entire May-June 1995 
period for NYSE stocks. The returns are also divided into the period before and after the 
NYSE rule change on June 5,1995. A parametric ANOVA test and a non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank scores test are conducted to test for differences between the two periods. 
A parametric ANOVA test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums test are conducted 
to test for differences across specialist firms.
Specialist Overall Pre-06/05/95 Post-06/05/95 ANOVA Wilcoxon
Return Return Return
20 0.0461” 0.0601** 0.0264 0.62 0.53
34 0.1549 0.1419 0.1719*’* 0.16 0.28
104 0.0561” 0.0774** 0.0340 0.81 1.89
137 0.0258 0.0274 0.0239 0.00 0.99
202 0.0787*” 0.0751 0.0833*” 0.08 0.00
210 0.0870*” 0.1000” * 0.0709**’ 0.97 0.56
215 0.0989'** 0.0966*** 0.1001*” 0.03 2.51
240 0.1609* 0.1159 0.2232 0.39 0.63
298 0.0924*” 0.0690*** 0.1222**’ 4.13*** 2.20
364 0.0819” 0.1407*’ 0.0186 2.43 1.86
403 0.0744 0.0590**’ 0.0966*” 1.63 2.52
501 0.0922*** 0.0790’*’ 0.1092*** 1.72 2.01
520 0.1019” * 0.0545 0.1502’” 3.42* 4.79”
551 0.0854*** 0.0767*** 0.0957*” 0.24 0.28
1010 0.0563 0.0411 0.0747 0.17 0.38
1027 0.0798” 0.0562 0.1174* 0.57 0.06
1034 0.2307*** 0.3499*** 0.0827 2.51 1.73
1148 0.0854* 0.1021 0.0648 0.15 0.25
1225 0.0591*” 0.0503** 0.0702*” 0.31 0.51
1227 0.1003*** 0.0737*’* 0.1326’” 2.10 0.62
1229 0.1353” 0.0879 0.1827*” 0.65 1.89
1266 0.2016*** 0.3046*’* 0.0583 5.30 3.42*
1280 0.0217 -0.0131 0.0663 0.74 1.36
1341 0.0455 0.0428 0.0490 0.01 0.17
1418 0.1095*” 0.0664* 0.1618’” 3.68’ 1.16
1679 0.0641*” 0.0841*” 0.0400 1.15 1.19
1687 0.0970” * 0.1203*** 0.0695* 0.93 0.02
1726 0.1040*“ 0.1353 0.0647* 2.54 4.83”
1746 0.0514 0.0629 0.0387 0.07 0.19
1903 0.0932 0.0668*” 0.1250*” 1.72 0.61
1910 0.1467**’ 0.1383’ 0.1567” 0.03 0.15
1941 0.1255’** 0.1206 0.1304” * 0.03 0.12
1966 0.0896*” 0.1293” * 0.0351 3.08*
_ • •
5.40
2022 0.0833* 0.1516” ’ -0.0029 3.02* 2.97*
2090 0.1373*** 0.1774 0.0902 0.82 1.38
3011 0.1263*** 0.0716 0.1947*” 1.81 0.06
3174 0.0933**’ 0.0875*” 0.1000*” 0.14 0.03
overall 0.0906” * 0.0869*” 0.0941*” 0.63 0.01
ANOVA 1.48” 1.64*’* 1.32*
Wilcoxon 37.63 48.65* 44.52
'significant at a  = 10%, "significant at a  = 5%, '"significant at a  = 1%
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ANOVA test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank scores tests. Three other specialist 
firms have statistically significant differences using either the parametric or the non- 
parametric test. In four o f the seven firms there is an increase in the final fifteen minute 
return following the rule change.
When all the specialist firms are compared, the differences are limited. Using the 
final fifteen minute return for the entire period, the differences across the firms are 
statistically significant using the parametric ANOVA test. When the period before and 
after the rule change are individually examined, only the period before the rule change 
has significant differences across the specialist firms and only using the parametric 
ANOVA test.
The rule change on June 5, 1995 has little, if  any, effect on the price rise at the 
end o f the day. Tables 65 and 66 indicate that the final intraday transaction return and the 
final fifteen minute return exhibit no differences on an overall basis and limited 
differences when specialist firms are individually examined. This fails to reject 
hypothesis one (HI) that the end of day price rise is the same in the period before and 
after the rule change.
6.4.2. Volatility at the End of the Trading Day
Volatility, as reported in Table 67, measures volatility as the standard deviation of 
changes in successive midpoints of the bid and ask quotes during the final half-hour of 
trading. On an overall basis, volatility is 0.716%, with volatility slightly larger in the 
period before the NYSE MOC rule change (0.721% versus 0.709%). A parametric 
ANOVA test finds no statistical difference between the two periods. However, a non- 
parametric Wilcoxon rank scores test finds that the difference is statistically significant at 
a level o f 1%.
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Table 67 This table reports the volatility (standard deviation) across specialist firms. 
Volatility over the final half-hour o f trading as measured by the standard deviation (in 
percent) of changes in successive midpoints of the bid-ask spread across specialist firms 
is reported for the entire May-June 1995 period and the period before and after the NYSE 
rule change on June 5, 1995. Parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank 
sums tests are conducted to test for differences between the groups.
Specialist Entire Period Pre-06/05/95 Post-06/05/95 ANOVA Wilcoxon
Volatility Volatility Volatility
20 0.493 0.503 0.482 0.62 0.01
34 0.682 0.680 0.684 0.01 2.18
104 0.712 0.667 0.767 0.92 0.09
137 0.753 0.767 0.735 0.21 0.27
202 0.531 0.573 0.479 1.21 0.50
210 0.544 0.556 0.529 0.97 0.25
215 0.646 0.651 0.640 0.11 0.64
240 1.156 1.291 0.992 1.61 2.09
298 2.545 1.796 3.469 - ____ •  •4.87 0.10
364 0.534 0.560 0.503 2.78* 1.98
403 0.487 0.495 0.477 0.87 2.52
501 0.600 0.612 0.587 1.25 0.01
520 0.870 0.987 0.726 2.11 0.04
551 0.448 0.441 0.458 0.13 3.80*
1010 0.598 0.664 0.519 10.08**’ 5.97“
1027 0.441 0.444 0.437 0.05 2.89*
1034 0.579 0.581 0.576 0.01 0.51
1148 1.026 1.164 0.856 3.31* 0.43
1225 0.701 0.719 0.680 0.35 2.65
1227 0.557 0.563 0.549 0.56 0.10
1229 0.674 0.688 0.656 0.59 0.00
1266 0.764 0.825 0.691 1.04 1.20
1280 0.636 0.668 0.596 3.34* 3.82*
1341 0.578 0.599 0.553 2.47 0.56
1418 0.660 0.672 0.645 0.42 1.83
1679 0.532 0.533 0.530 0.02 0.13
1687 0.618 0.632 0.600 1.35 2.78*
1726 0.532 0.544 0.518 1.52 3.12*
1746 0.717 0.785 0.633 4.98 8.66*“
1903 1.023 1.381 0.586 1.57 1.65
1910 0.612 0.631 0.587 1.35 0.00
1941 0.726 0.746 0.702 0.94 1.40
1966 0.568 0.566 0.570 0.02 0.08
2022 0.640 0.627 0.657 0.64 4.82**
2090 0.812 0.850 0.766 2.47 0.04
3011 0.685 0.686 0.684 0.00 0.00
3174 0.532 0.541 0.520 0.49 0.10
overall 0.716 0.721 0.709 0.08 _  •••9.54
ANOVA 10.69“ * 3.01“ * 11.9“ *
Wilcoxon 1276.7“ ’ 727.0“ * 596.1“ *
‘significant at a  = 10%, “ significant at a  = 5%, “ ‘significant at a  = 1%
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O f the thirty-seven individual specialist firms, three firms have statistically 
significant differences at a level o f one percent using both the parametric ANOVA test 
and the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank scores test. For eight other specialist firms, either 
the parametric or the non-parametric test is significant. O f these eleven specialist firms 
with significant differences between the two periods, eight firms experience a  decline in 
volatility following the rule change.
Examining the differences across the thirty-seven specialist firms indicates that 
there are differences across the specialist firms when the entire period is examined and 
within the period before and after the rule change. Parametric ANOVA tests and non- 
parametric Wilcoxon rank sums tests indicate that the differences across specialist firms 
are statistically significant at a level o f  1%. This indicates that the specialist firms do not 
all exhibit a similar volatility, and consequently, the effect o f the rule change is better 
examined on an individual specialist firm basis for this period. Differences may also be a 
result o f  stock characteristics and the time period.
Another measure o f volatility is also used in this analysis. Table 68 measures 
volatility as the difference between the high and low share price during the final half-hour 
of trading, divided by the mean share price during that period. The mean volatility 
during the entire period is 0.483%. There is an increase in volatility after the rule change 
from 0.472% to 0.497%. This difference is statistically significant at a level o f 1% using 
both a parametric and non-parametric test.
Examining the thirty-seven individual specialist firms indicates that four have 
statistically significant differences between the period before and after the rule change
244
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 68 This table reports the volatility (difference) across specialist firms. Volatility 
during the final half-hour o f trading, as measured by the difference between the high and 
low share price divided by the mean share price, is reported (in percent) across specialist 
firms for the entire May-June 1995 period and the period before and after the NYSE rule 
change on June 5, 1995. Parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums 
tests are conducted to test for differences between the groups.
Specialist Entire Period Pre-06/05/95 Post-06/05/95 ANOVA Wilcoxon
Volatility Volatility Volatility
20 0.411 0.394 0.437 2.05 4.36"'
34 0.525 0.542 0.504 0.57 0.00
104 0.423 0.413 0.434 0.55 1.12
137 0.629 0.624 0.635 0.05 2.19
202 0.438 0.434 0.444 0.23 0.79
210 0.479 0.313 0.474 0.15 0.24
215 0.493 0.480 0.511 1.50 3.95"
240 0.493 0.427 0.580 1.81 0.57
298 0.461 0.437 0.495 8.75 10.29"'
364 0.486 0.507 0.464 0.57 0.58
403 0.480 0.467 0.499 2.26 0.25
501 0.462 0.463 0.462 0.00 2.35
520 0.492 0.447 0.544 3.00' 2.35
551 0.370 0.365 0.377 0.19 1.61
1010 0.542 0.499 0.609 3.70' 3.58’
1027 0.388 0.388 0.387 0.00 1.09
1034 0.485 0.483 0.487 0.00 0.11
1148 0.642 0.682 0.593 2.14 0.51
1225 0.422 0.412 0.434 0.80 0.06
1227 0.505 0.492 0.523 1.48 1.93
1229 0.473 0.443 0.508 1.04 2.29
1266 0.630 0.643 0.613 0.15 0.01
1280 0.535 0.527 0.545 0.12 0.01
1341 0.520 0.533 0.504 0.41 0.79
1418 0.570 0.547 0.599 1.63 3.71'
1679 0.393 0.386 0.402 0.35 0.03
1687 0.429 0.423 0.437 0.21 0.81
1726 0.494 0.511 0.473 1.64 4.76"
1746 0.485 0.483 0.486 0.00 0.20
1903 0.445 0.419 0.478 5.00" 1.52
1910 0.378 0.358 0.406 0.96 2.46
1941 0.524 0.508 0.546 0.91 0.14
1966 0.461 0.469 0.449 0.22 0.00
2022 0.585 0.532 0.654 3.38' 0.33
2090 0.699 0.654 0.752 2.23 2.67
3011 0.443 0.402 0.499 4.28" 7.40"*
3174 0.398 0.380 0.421 3.77’ 5.38"
overall 0.483 0.472 0.497 16.50'" 25.76'"
ANOVA 13.18'" 8.88 5.66'"
Wilcoxon 425.02'" 277.59'" 195.11'"
'significant at a  = 10%, "significant at a  = 5%, "'significant at a  = 1%
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using both a parametric and non-parametric test o f differences. A further seven specialist 
firms have statistically significant differences using either a parametric or a non- 
parametric test. Ten o f these eleven specialist firms with statistically significant 
differences exhibit an increase in volatility following the rule change.
This measure o f volatility also exhibits differences across the specialist firms in 
the entire period and the period before and after the rule change. Both parametric 
ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums tests are statistically significant at 
levels of 1% in tests of difference across the specialist firms. This indicates that 
specialist firms do not have a similar volatility.
The two measures o f volatility contradict each other. For the standard deviation 
o f changes in the midpoint o f the bid-ask spread, eight of the eleven specialist firms with 
statistically significant differences between the two periods experience a decline in 
volatility. Using the difference between the high and low share price divided by the 
mean share price, ten o f the eleven specialist firms with statistical significance experience 
an increase in volatility between the two periods. Of all the specialist firms with 
statistically significant differences in Tables 67 and 68, four firms are statistically 
significant in both tables. O f these four, three specialist firms are in agreement regarding 
the direction o f change between the period before and after the rule change. For 
specialist firms 298 and 2022, there is an increase in the volatility measure between the 
two periods. For firm 1726 there is a decrease following the rule change. For firm 1010, 
the standard deviation measure o f volatility shows a decrease, while the other volatility 
measure indicates volatility increases following the rule change.
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Given these limited differences between the two periods the hypothesis that there 
is a reduction in volatility following the rule change is concluded for nine of the thirty- 
seven specialist firms. For the remaining twenty-eight specialist firms, hypothesis two 
(H2) fails to be rejected and it is concluded that the volatility is similar in the period 
before and after the rule change.
6.4.3. Pilot Stocks
Pilot stocks versus non-pilot stocks are examined for each of the two measures o f 
the final return and each o f the two measures o f volatility.
6.4.3.1. Price Rise at the End of the Trading Day
Table 69 examines the final intraday transaction return divided into pilot and non­
pilot stocks. As shown in Panel A, the overall mean for non-pilot stocks is 0.0996%, 
while the mean for the pilot stocks is 0.0404%. This difference is statistically significant 
at a level o f 1% using a parametric ANOVA test. Of the thirty-seven specialist firms, 
only twelve firms have pilot stocks with a sufficient number of final transaction 
observations. For eleven o f these twelve specialist firms, the final return is lower for the 
pilot stocks. However, of these twelve specialist firms, only two have statistically 
significant differences between pilot and non-pilot stocks. The mean return for pilot 
stocks is larger for specialist firm 298 and this difference is statistically significant using 
a non-parametric test. For firm 3174, the mean final transaction return for pilot stocks is 
smaller and this difference is statistically significant using both a parametric and a non- 
parametric test.
Panel B examines only the pilot stocks and shows the mean final intraday 
transaction return for the period before and after the NYSE MOC rule change. On an 
overall basis the mean return after the rule change is slightly larger (0.0417% versus
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Table 69 This table reports the final intraday transaction returns across specialist firms 
and pilot stocks. Mean final intraday transaction returns (in percentages) are reported for 
the entire May-June 1995 period and the period before and after the NYSE rule change 
on June 5, 1995. Parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums tests are 
conducted to test for differences between the groups.
PANEL A - PILOT VERSUS NON-PILOT STOCKS
Specialist Entire Period 
Return
Non-Pilot Stocks 
Return
Pilot Stocks 
Return
ANOVA Wilcoxon
20 0.0653"* 0.0653*** _ - _
34 0.1225*” 0.1225*” - - -
104 0.0333 0.0333 - - .
137 0.0950*“ 0.0966*” 0.0697*** 0.05 1.77
202 0.0717*** 0.0717*” - - •
210 0.0881*” 0.0908"* 0.0414** 0.73 0.02
215 0.0622*” 0.0622*” - - -
240 0.1596* 0.1596* - - -
298 0.0638*” 0.0619*** 0.1123*** 0.67 4.26**
364 0.1048” 0.1048” - - -
403 0.0554*’* 0.0573*” 0.0233** 0.39 0.19
501 0.0912**’ 0.0928*” 0.0371** 0.74 0.41
520 0.0431 0.0442 0.0237 0.03 0.15
551 0.0748*’* 0.0748*” - -
1010 0.0396 0.0396 - - -
1027 0.0839** 0.0839” - - •
1034 0.1647” 0.1647” - - -
1148 0.1299**’ 0.1299*” - - -
1225 0.0823**’ 0.0823” * - - -
1227 0.1539*” 0.1580*” 0.0436* 1.15 0.49
1229 0.1791*” 0.1791” * - - -
1266 0.2678**’ 0.2678’” - - -
1280 0.1178**’ 0.1178*” - - -
1341 0.0594” 0.0594” - - -
1418 0.1137*” 0.1197*** 0.0159 0.94 0.86
1679 0.1070**’ 0.1070"’ - - •
1687 0.0901*“ 0.0901*” - - -
1726 0.1113’“ 0.1131*” 0.0529* 0.27 0.04
1746 0.0059 0.0059 - - -
1903 0.0719” 0.0735*” 0.0185 0.13 0.58
1910 0.3061**’ 0.3061*” - - -
1941 0.1405*” 0.1405*** - - -
1966 0.0979’*’ 0.1012’” 0.0422 0.18 0.07
2022 0.1216*” 0.1216*’* - - _
2090 0.1935*” 0.1935*” - - _
3011 0.2230 0.2230’*’ - . _
3174 0.1194*" 0.1310’** 0.0184 4.67** 7.63’”
overall 0.0981*” 0.0996*”  0.0404*”
ANOVA 3.35*” 3.29*”  1.93** 
Wilcoxon 63.54*’* 66.94*”  23.08**
’significant at a  = 10%, “ significant at a  = 5%, ’’’significant at
4.57***
a  = 1%
0.24
(table con'd)
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(Table 69 continued)
PA N E L  B - P IL O T  ST O C K S - P re  an d  Post Ju n e  5 .1995
Specialist Entire Period Pre-06/05/95 Post-06/05/95 ANOVA Wilcoxon
Return Return Return
20 - - - . -
34 - - - - -
104 - - - - -
137 0.0697*** 0.0709** 0.0684** 0.00 0.41
202 - - - - -
210 0.0414** 0.0605*** 0.0184 1.71 3.01*
215 - - - - -
240 - - - - -
298 0.1123*** 0.1362*** 0.0845** 1.27 1.07
364 - - - - -
403 0.0233** 0.0077 0.0414*** 2.72 2.41
501 0.0371** 0.0456** 0.0270 0.36 0.61
520 0.0237 0.0224 0.0251 0.00 0.05
551 - - - - -
1010 - - - - -
1027 - - - - -
1034 - - - - -
1148 - - - - -
1225 - - - - -
1227 0.0436* 0.0261 0.0666 0.62 0.19
1229 - - - - -
1266 - - - - -
1280 - - - - -
1341 - - - - -
1418 0.0159 -0.0017 0.0362 0.55 0.21
1679 - - - - -
1687 - - - - -
1726 0.0529* 0.0340 0.0706** 0.38 0.88
1746 - - - - -
1903 0.0185 0.0250 0.0107 0.13 0.31
1910 - - - - -
1941 - - - - -
1966 0.0422 0.0260 0.0617 0.46 0.20
2022 - - - - -
2090 - - - - -
3011 - - - - -
3174 0.0184 0.0136 0.0243 0.13 0.00
overall 0.0404*** 0.0394*** 0.0417*** 0.04 0.53
ANOVA 1.93** 1.90” 0.67
Wilcoxon 23.08** 21.58” 10.07
’significant at a  = 10%, ’’significant at a  = 5%, ’’’significant at a  = 1%
(table con'd)
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(Table 69 continued)
PA N E L  C  - N O N -PILO T STO C K S - P re  an d  Post Ju n e  S. 1995
Specialist Entire Period Pre-06/05/95 Post-06/05/95 ANOVA Wilcoxo
Return Return Return
20 0.0653"* 0.0637*** 0.0674* 0.01 0.30
34 0.1225*" 0.1171" 0.1294" 0.02 0.34
104 0.0333 0.0103 0.0573* 1.12 0.88
137 0.0966*" 0.1004" 0.0914" 0.02 0.08
202 0.0717*’* 0.0593’*’ 0.0876*" 1.30 0.16
210 0.0908*" 0.0952*** 0.0854**’ 0.12 0.02
215 0.0622*” 0.0692’’* 0.0526" 0.32 2.16
240 0.1596* 0.0995 0.2423* 0.70 0.31
298 0.0619**’ 0.0647*" 0.0582*** 0.07 0.60
364 0.1048" 0.1839’** 0.0219 2.69 4.99*
403 0.0573’" 0.0367" ^ J -  t i t0.0845 3.12* 5.69*
501 0.0928*” 0.0888*" 0.0978*’* 0.16 0.10
520 0.0442 0.0002 0.0981" 3.00’ 2.03
551 0.0748*" 0.0453 0.1080*’* 2.47 0.06
1010 0.0396 0.0258 0.0604 0.14 0.01
1027 0.0839’* 0.0579 0.1161* 0.64 0.04
1034 0.1647" 0.1806 0.1432 0.05 0.06
1148 0.1299*" 0.1170* 0.1482** 0.12 0.12
1225 0.0823*” 0.0590” * 0.1099*** 2.12 0.48
1227 0.1580"* _ . __ .«*t0.1596 0.1560*’* 0.01 0.01
1229 0.1791*” 0.2110" 0.1372 0.29 0.19
1266 0.2678*” 0.2779’" 0.2550” 0.03 0.53
1280 0.1178*’’ 0.1484" 0.0747 0.73 0.72
1341 0.0594*’ 0.0933" 0.0186 1.36 0.35
1418 0.1197*** 0.1378*" 0.0954" 0.63 0.01
1679 0.1070*” 0.0675’** 0.1525*" 3.62* 2.53
1687 0.0901*” 0.1017"* 0.0740* 0.31 0.71
1726 0.1131*’’ 0.1325*** 0.0864**’ 1.27 1.49
1746 0.0059 0.0752" -0.0870* 8.51***
- - _ t 
6.88
1903 0.0735*** 0.0537 0.0961*" 0.61 1.33
1910 0.3061*" 0.3286 0.2761" 0.10 0.15
1941 0.1405*" 0.1783*** 0.0888" 1.70 2.90*
1966 0.1012**’ 0.1003" 0.1022" 0.00 0.04
2022 0.1216’" _ ________0.1793 0.0461 3.09* 2.30
2090 0.1935*" 0.1537" 0.2458*" 0.63 0.84
3011 0.2230*" 0.1101" 0.3602"* 6.30 0.48
3174 0.1310’" 0.1222*" 0.1418*" 0.31 0.23
overall 0.0996*“ 0.0974*** 0.1025*” 0.33 0.06
ANOVA 3.29*" 2.20*** 2.39***
Wilcoxon 66.94"* 54.42" 54.10”
’significant at a  = 10%, "significant at a  = 5%, " ’significant at a  = 1%
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0.0394%), however the difference is not statistically significant. For individual specialist 
firms, only one of the twelve specialist firms has a statistically significant difference 
between the two periods. Firm 210 shows a decline following the rule change, but the 
difference is only statistically significant at a level o f 10% using a non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank scores test.
The difference across the specialist firms is apparent on an overall basis and in the 
period before the rule change. Using a parametric ANOVA test and a non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank sums test indicates that the differences across the specialist firms are 
significant at a level of 5% in the entire period and in the period before the rule change. 
For the period following the rule change, the difference is not statistically significant.
This suggests that the rule change may influence the final return for the pilot stocks.
Since the pilot stocks must publicize order imbalances, this may be influencing the final 
intraday return and resulting in a similarity across specialist firms.
For non-pilot stocks, as shown in Panel C, the overall final transaction return 
increases slightly from 0.0974% to 0.1025% following the rule change. This difference 
is not statistically significant. Of the thirty-seven specialist firms, eight firms have 
statistically significant differences between the period before and after the rule change. 
The individual specialist firms that are significant are the same firms that are significant 
in Table 65. Four of the eight firms show a decrease in the mean return.
The differences among the specialist firms are also examined in Panel C o f Table 
69. The differences across the specialist firms remain statistically significant as in Table 
65, however, the non-parametric measure is slightly reduced in significance from 1% to 
5% in the individual periods before and after the rule change.
251
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The final fifteen minute return is examined across pilot and non-pilot stocks in 
Table 70. On an overall basis, as shown in Panel A, the mean final fifteen minute return 
is lower for pilot stocks, however, this difference is not statistically significant. O f the 
thirty-seven specialist firms, twelve firms have pilot stocks that have a sufficient number 
o f observations to be included in the analysis. Only two o f these firms have statistically 
significant differences between pilot and non-pilot firms. Firm 137 has a much larger 
final fifteen minute return for pilot stocks and the difference is statistically significant at a 
level o f 10% using a non-parametric test. Firm 3174 has a much lower final fifteen 
minute return for pilot stocks and the difference is statistically significant at a level o f  5% 
using a non-parametric test.
The mean final fifteen minute return is examined across specialist firms and 
differences are statistically significant for non-pilot stocks. Using a parametric test, the 
level o f significance is 5%, but there is no statistically significant difference using a non- 
parametric test. Also, there is no statistically significant differences across specialist 
firms for pilot stocks using either parametric or non-parametric tests.
Pilot stocks are examined separately in Panel B. The final fifteen minute return 
declines following the rule change from 0.0659% to 0.0598%, but the difference is not 
statistically significant. When the twelve individual specialist firms are examined, only 
one firm shows statistically significant differences in the mean final fifteen minute return 
between the two periods. Firm 298 shows a decline in the mean final fifteen minute 
return and this difference is statistically significant at a level o f 5% using a parametric 
test and at a level o f  10% using a non-parametric test. There are no differences noted 
across the specialist firms when they are compared during the entire period, or in the 
period before or after the rule change.
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Table 70 This table reports the final fifteen minute returns across specialist firms and 
pilot stocks. Mean final fifteen minute returns (in percentages) are reported for the entire 
May-June 1995 period and the period before and after the NYSE rule change on June 5, 
1995. Parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums tests are conducted 
to test for differences between the groups.
PANEL A - PILOT VERSUS NON-PILOT STOCKS
Specialist Overall
Return
Non-Pilot Stocks 
Return
Pilot Stocks 
Return
ANOVA Wilcoxon
20 0.0461“ 0.0461“ » . _
34 0.1549"’ 0.1549 - - -
104 0.0561“ 0.0561“ - - -
137 0.0258 0.0188 0.1413** 0.99 3.81*
202 0.0787*“ 0.0787” ’ - - -
210 0.0870“ ’ 0.0876’*’ 0.0751*** 0.04 0.15
215 0.0989“ ’ 0.0989*“ - - -
240 0.1609’ 0.1609’ - - -
298 0.0924’“ 0.0917“ * 0.1128*** 0.08 0.50
364 0.0819“ 0.0819“ - - -
403 0.0744’“ 0.0770” * 0.0279 0.55 0.21
501 0.0922” ’ 0.0923*** 0.0895*** 0.00 1.20
520 0.1019’“ 0.1019’’* 0.1023** 0.00 1.00
551 0.0854’“ 0.0854“ ’ - - -
1010 0.0563 0.0563 - - -
1027 0.0798“ 0.0798“ - - -
1034 0.2307"’ 0.2307” * - - -
1148 0.0854’ 0.0854’ - - -
1225 0.0591*” 0.0591” ’ - - -
1227 0.1003“ * 0.1035’“ 0.0250 0.58 0.05
1229 0.1353“ 0.1353“ - - -
1266 0.2016’” 0.2016“ ’ - - -
1280 0.0217 0.0217 - - -
1341 0.0455 0.0455 - - -
1418 0.1095 0.1167*** -0.0025 1.31 1.93
1679 0.0641’“ 0.0641“ ’ - - -
1687 0.0970’” 0.0970” ’ - - -
1726 0.1040*’’ 0.1034“ * 0.1252* 0.03 0.42
1746 0.0514 0.0514 - - -
1903 0.0932’*’ 0.0947” * 0.0372 0.18 0.00
1910 0.1467“ ’ 0.1467” * - - -
1941 0.1255’’’ 0.1255” * - - -
1966 0.0896*“ 0.0894’“ 0.0934 0.00 0.23
2022 0.0833’ 0.0833* - - -
2090 0.1373“ * 0.1373“ * - - -
3011 0.1263’’’ 0.1263“ * - - -
3174 0.0933’”
_  .  _ _ •• • 
0.1026 0.0136 2.59 4.54**
overall
ANOVA
Wilcoxon
0.0906“ ’
1.48“
37.63
0.0913’“
1.50“
41.21
0.0630***
1.52
13.45
1.04 0.15
‘significant at a  = 10%, “ significant at a = 5%, “ ’significant at a  = 1%
(table con'd)
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(Table 70 continued)
PA N EL B - P ILO T STO C K S - P re  a n d  Post Ju n e  S. 1995
Specialist Entire Period Pre-06/05/95 Post-06/05/95 ANOVA Wilcoxon
Return Return Return
20 _ _ _
34 - _ . _ •
104 - _ - - •
137 0.1413** 0.1258* 0.1592 0.08 0.16
202 - - - - _
210 0.0751*** 0.0793** 0.0700 0.03 0.11
215 - . . _ •
240 - - - - _
298 0.1128*** 0.1879*** 0.0335 4.76” 3.71*
364 - - - - -
403 0.0279* 0.0176 0.0394 0.19 0.79
501 0.0895*** 0.0902** 0.0885** 0.00 0.02
520 0.1023** 0.0973 0.1083** 0.02 0.09
551 - - - .
1010 - _ - . _
1027 - - . _
1034 - - •
1148 - - . _ -
1225 - - - - .
1227 0.0250 0.0173 0.0394 0.12 0.03
1229 - - _
1266 - _ -
1280 - . _ _
1341 - - - .
1418 -0.0025 0.0019 -0.0076 0.01 0.00
1679 - . - .
1687 - - - _ .
1726 0.1252* 0.0893 0.1571 0.25 0.07
1746 - - - _
1903 0.0372 0.0714 -0.0022 0.83 1.24
1910 - - _ _ .
1941 - . . _ _
1966 0.0934 0.0945 0.0921 0.00 0.35
2022 - - - .
2090 - . •
3011 - - - - _
3174 0.0136 0.0150 0.0120 0.00 0.24
overall 0.0630*** 0.0659*** 0.0598*** 0.08 0.74
ANOVA 1.52 1.08 0.85
Wilcoxon 13.45 13.25 7.39
’significant at a  = 10%, ’’significant at a  = 5%, ’"’significant at a  = 1%
(table con'd)
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(Table 70 continued)
PA N EL C  - N O N -PILO T ST O C K S  - P re  an d  Post Ju n e  5. 1995
Specialist Entire Period Pre-06/05/95 Post-06/05/95 ANOVA Wilcoxon
Return Return Return
20 0.0461“ 0.0601“ 0.0264 0.62 0.53
34 0.1549“ ’ 0.1419**’ 0.1719’“ 0.16 0.28
104 0.0561“ 0.0774“ 0.0336 0.81 1.89
137 0.0188 0.0216 0.0154 0.01 0.94
202 0.0787*“ 0.0751“ * 0.0833*“ 0.08 0.00
210 0.0876” * 0.1011*“ 0.0710*“ 0.94 0.45
215 0.0989’*’ 0.0960’’’ 0.1027**’ 0.03 2.51
240 0.1609* 0.1159 0.2232 0.39 0.63
298 0.0917*“ 0.0653*** 0.1256’** 4.99** 3.40*
364 0.0819“ 0.1407“ 0.0186 2.43 1.86
403 0.0770*“ 0.0601*’’ 0.0999*** 1.58 2.14
501 0.0923*“ 0.0784*" 0.1098*“ 1.74 2.05
520 0.1019” ’ 0.0518 0.1524*“ 3.40’ 4.67*
551 0.0854*’* 0.0767 0.0957“ * 0.24 0.28
1010 0.0563 0.0411 0.0747 0.17 0.38
1027 0.0798“ 0.0562 0.1174* 0.57 0.06
1034 0.2307*” 0.3499*’* 0.0827 2.51 1.73
1148 0.0854* 0.1021 0.0648 0.15 0.25
1225 0.0591*“ 0.0503“ 0.0702*” 0.31 0.51
1227 0.1035*“ 0.0762*“ 0.1364*“ 2.03 0.68
1229 0.1353“ 0.0879 0.1859**’ 0.65 1.89
1266 0.2016*’’ 0.3054*“ 0.0667 5.30 3.42*
1280 0.0217 -0.0131 0.0663 0.74 1.36
1341 0.0455 0.0428 0.0490 0.01 0.17
1418 0.1167*” 0.0704* 0.1730” * 3.83* 1.31
1679 0.0641*** 0.0841” ’ 0.0400 1.15 1.19
1687 0.0970*” 0.1203*“ 0.0695* 0.93 0.02
1726 0.1034*“ 0.1365*** 0.0614* 2.73* 5.13*
1746 0.0514 0.0629 0.0387 0.07 0.19
1903 0.0947*“ 0.0665**’ 0.1287*“ 1.85 0.85
1910 0.1467*" 0.1383* 0.1567“ 0.03 0.15
1941 0.1255“ * 0.1219“ * 0.1304*“ 0.03 0.12
1966 0.0894*“ 0.1315*“ 0.0309 3.13’ 5.53*
2022 0.0833* 0.1512” ’ -0.0020 3.02’ 2.97*
2090 0.1373*”
.  . _ __ . til0.1774 0.0902 0.82 1.38
3011 0.1263*” 0.0716 0.1947*** 1.81 0.06
3174 0.1026*“ 0.0960*" 0.1103*“ 0.15 0.12
overall 0.0913*’’ 0.0877*“ 0.0958*** 0.83 0.00
ANOVA 1.50“ 1.60“ 1.37*
Wilcoxon 41.21 46.20 48.05*
‘significant at a  = 10%, “ significant at a  = 5%, ’“ significant at a  = 1%
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The non-pilot stocks, as shown in Panel C, have a mean final fifteen minute return 
that increases following the rule change from 0.0877% to 0.0958%, but this difference is 
not statistically significant. O f the thirty-seven specialist firms, seven firms show a 
statistically significant difference between the periods before and after the rule change. 
These results are similar to Table 66. Four o f the seven firms show an increase in the 
final fifteen minute return following the rule change.
The differences across the specialist firms for non-pilot stocks in Panel C are 
statistically significant in the entire period, as well as when the period before and after the 
rule change are separately examined. The parametric test is statistically significant in all 
periods at a level o f 5 to 10%, while the non-parametric test is only statistically 
significant at a level of 10% in the period following the rule change.
These results indicate that pilot stocks have an overall end o f day price rise that is 
smaller than non-pilot stocks when the final intraday return is examined. When the final 
fifteen minute return is examined there are only limited differences between the pilot and 
non-pilot stocks. When the period after the rule change is examined, there are no 
statistically significant differences in the final intraday transaction return across the 
specialist firms. This indicates that the publication of order imbalances for pilot stocks 
may be reducing the differences in the final intraday transaction return across the 
specialist firms. In comparisons between the period before and after the rule change, 
neither pilot nor non-pilot stocks show statistically significant differences between the 
periods. This indicates that, in aggregate, the impact on the end of day price rise 
following the rule change is not affected by whether the stock is a pilot stock. This
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rejects hypothesis three (H3) for the end o f day price rise since differences are found 
between pilot and non-pilot stocks, however, this does not reject the second part o f  the 
hypothesis that there are differences in the effect of the rule change on pilot versus non­
pilot stocks.
6.4.3.2. Volatility a t the End of the T rad ing  Day
Two measures o f volatility are used to compare pilot and non-pilot stocks. In 
Table 71 volatility is measured as the standard deviation o f changes in successive 
midpoints o f the bid-ask spread. As shown in Panel A, the volatility for non-pilot stocks 
is much larger than the volatility for pilot stocks (0.728% versus 0.244%). This 
difference is statistically significant at a level of 1% using parametric and non-parametric 
tests o f difference. Twenty-three o f the thirty-seven specialist firms have pilot stocks that 
have a sufficient number o f observations to be included. This is a larger number o f  firms 
than for the returns at the end o f the trading day since the volatility measure uses an 
entire half-hour o f transactions. There is therefore a lower likelihood o f not having any 
observations in a half-hour compared to the fifteen minute period used by the return 
measures. O f these twenty-three firms, all show a statistically significant difference 
between the non-pilot and pilot stocks using either parametric and/or non-parametric 
tests.
There are differences across the specialist firms in the entire period when all the 
stocks are examined and when the pilot and non-pilot stocks are examined separately. 
Parametric and non-parametric tests indicate that the differences are statistically 
significant at a level o f 1%.
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Table 71 This table reports the volatility (standard deviation) across specialist firms and 
pilot versus non-pilot stocks. Volatility over the final half-hour o f trading as measured 
by the standard deviation (in percent) o f changes in successive midpoints o f  the bid-ask 
spread across specialist firms is reported for May-June 1995 and the period before and 
after the NYSE rule change on June 5, 1995. Parametric ANOVA and non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank sums tests are conducted to test for differences between the groups.
PANEL A - PILOT VERSUS NON-PILOT STOCKS
Specialist Overall
Return
Non-Pilot Stocks 
Return
Pilot Stocks 
Return
ANOVA Wilcoxon
20 0.493 0.502 0.237 13.76*** 26.57*”
34 0.682 0.682 - - -
104 0.712 0.727 0.171 3.12* 96.86*’*
137 0.753 0.769 0.246 6 .7 6 - 64.48*"
202 0.531 0.531 - - -
210 0.544 0.559 0.170 29.02*** 150.54*”
215 0.646 0.654 0.227 14.44"* 40.30***
240 1.156 1.156 - - -
298 2.545 2.602 0.204 0.94 79.89*”
364 0.534 0.544 0.122 14.34*** 53.72***
403 0.487 0.500 0.170 45.78” * 221.98***
501 0.600 0.611 0.260 30.44” * 277.78*’’
520 0.870 0.888 0.155 1.62 48.80*”
551 0.448 0.454 0.169 2.62 44.41***
1010 0.598 0.598 - - -
1027 0.441 0.441 - - -
1034 0.579 0.579 - - -
1148 1.026 1.026 - - -
1225 0.701 0.701 - - -
1227 0.557 0.571 0.157 68.46*” 187.63*”
1229 0.674 0.690 0.144 21.04*” 68.09***
1266 0.764 0.712 2.881 25.99*** 0.80
1280 0.636 0.636 - - -
1341 0.578 0.578 - - -
1418 0.660 0.675 0.270 14.37 55.01"*
1679 0.532 0.548 0.127 40.72*” 121.77*"
1687 0.618 0.625 0.245 14.23*” 28.98*"
1726 0.532 0.545 0.122 48.51*” 128.39***
1746 0.717 0.717 - - -
1903 1.023 1.061 0.158 0.32 200.74*"
1910 0.612 0.612 - - -
1941 0.726 0.733 0.216 6.53” 36.32*"
1966 0.568 0.590 0.252 21.08*" 43.54*"
2022 0.640 0.664 0.208 29.56” * 117.17*"
2090 0.812 0.812 - - -
3011 0.685 0.685 - - -
3174 0.532 0.550 0.157 31.10- 133.52***
overall 0.716
ANOVA 10.69*’* 
Wilcoxon 1276.7*** 
'significant at a  = 10%, *
0.728
10.66**’ 
1176.7’*’ 
’significant at a  = 5%,
0.244
3.04*** 
427.73” ' 
’“ significant at
14.80*”
cc= 1%
2159.3*"
(table con'd)
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(Table 71 continued)
PA N E L  B - P IL O T  STO CK S - P re  and Post J u n e  5 . 1995
Specialist Entire Period Pre-06/05/95 Post-06/05/95 ANOVA Wilcoxon
Return Return Return
20 0.237 0.259 0.209 4.08 4.07
34 - - - - -
104 0.171 0.166 0.177 0.33 1.18
137 0.246 0.160 0.353 3.08* 7.72
202 - - - - -
210 0.170 0.175 0.163 0.62 0.15
215 0.227 0.238 0.212 1.79 1.65
240 - - - - -
298 0.204 0.239 0.162 5.13“ 5.38**
364 0.122 0.133 0.109 1.28 0.61
403 0.170 0.134 0.214 1.21 0.59
501 0.260 0.305 0.204 0.47 0.71
520 0.155 0.151 0.162 0.72 0.36
551 0.169 0.217 0.111 0.66 0.04
1010 - - - - -
1027 - - - - -
1034 - . _ - -
1148 - - _ - -
1225 - - _ - -
1227 0.157 0.166 0.145 1.12 1.34
1229 0.144 0.149 0.138 0.96 0.56
1266 2.881 4.867 0.427 0.82 0.65
1280 - - _ - -
1341 - - - - -
1418 0.270 0.289 0.246 1.71 1.29
1679 0.127 0.122 0.134 0.65 1.49
1687 0.245 0.251 0.238 0.10 0.01
1726 0.122 0.125 0.119 0.20 0.24
1746 - - - - -
1903 0.158 0.166 0.149 1.73 1.63
1910 - - - - -
1941 0.216 0.279 0.137 1.17 2.47
1966 0.252 0.258 0.245 0.34 0.18
2022 0.208 0.187 0.233 0.55 4.87“
2090 - - . - -
3011 - - - - -
3174 0.157 0.148 0.167 1.21 3.74*
overall 0.244 0.284 0.194 1.05 2.30
ANOVA 3.04*“ 2.86"* 1.20
Wilcoxon 427.73*” 261.89“ * 190.43***
‘significant at a  = 10%, “ significant at a  = 5%, ’“ significant at a =  1%
(table con'd)
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(Table 71 continued)
PA N E L  C  - N O N -P IL O T  S T O C K S  - P re  and  P o st J u n e  S. 1995
Specialist Entire Period Pre-06/05/95 Post-06/05/95 ANOVA Wilcoxon
Return Return Return
20 0.502 0.511 0.492 0.52 0.01
34 0.682 0.680 0.684 0.01 2.18
104 0.727 0.681 0.784 0.92 0.06
137 0.769 0.786 0.747 0.30 0.06
202 0.531 0.573 0.479 1.21 0.50
210 0.559 0.571 0.543 0.94 0.19
215 0.654 0.659 0.649 0.09 0.55
240 1.156 1.291 0.992 1.61 2.09
298 2.602 1.834 3.550 4.88 0.26
364 0.544 0.570 0.512 2.75* 1.97
403 0.500 0.510 0.488 1.24 2.77’
501 0.611 0.622 0.599 1.01 0.05
520 0.888 1.008 0.740 2.11 0.05
551 0.454 0.445 0.464 0.16 3.70*
1010 0.598 0.664 0.519 10.08*** 5.97
1027 0.441 0.444 0.437 0.05 2.89*
1034 0.579 0.581 0.576 0.01 0.51
1148 1.026 1.164 0.856 3.31* 0.43
1225 0.701 0.719 0.680 0.35 2.65
1227 0.571 0.577 0.563 0.51 0.06
1229 0.690 0.705 0.673 0.59 0.00
1266 0.712 0.724 0.697 0.19 1.06
1280 0.636 0.668 0.596 3.34* 3.82*
1341 0.578 0.599 0.553 2.47 0.56
1418 0.675 0.687 0.661 0.37 1.53
1679 0.548 0.550 0.546 0.03 0.22
1687 0.625 0.639 0.607 1.33 2.76*
1726 0.545 0.556 0.530 1.54 3.20*
1746 0.717 0.784 0.633 4.98 8.66***
1903 1.061 1.433 0.605 1.56 1.97
1910 0.612 0.631 0.587 1.35 0.00
1941 0.733 0.752 0.709 0.86 1.25
1966 0.590 0.587 0.593 0.03 0.03
2022 0.664 0.651 0.680 0.54 4.87"
2090 0.812 0.850 0.766 2.47 0.04
3011 0.685 0.686 0.684 0.00 0.00
3174 0.550 0.560 0.537 0.53 0.02
overall 0.728 0.732 0.723 0.05 9.02
ANOVA 10.66"* 3.00*** 11.89***
Wilcoxon 1176.7*" 658.18*** 565.61*"
‘significant at a  = 10%, "significant at a  = 5%, ‘"significant at a  = 1%
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Panel B separately examines pilot stocks in the period before and after the NYSE 
MOC rule change. The overall volatility declines slightly after the rule change from 
0.284% to 0.194%, but the difference is not statistically significant. For five o f the 
twenty-three specialist firms there are differences noted between the period before and 
after the rule change for pilot stocks. For three o f these five firms, the volatility increases 
following the rule change.
When the differences across specialist firms are examined, there is no statistically 
significant difference in the period after the rule change using a parametric test. In the 
period before the rule change, the parametric test is significant at a level o f 1%. This 
indicates that, following the rule change, pilot stocks have a similar volatility using a 
parametric test o f difference. The non-parametric test is significant at a level o f  1% in 
the period before and after the rule change. This may be because the publication o f order 
imbalances for the pilot stocks reduces the differences in volatility.
Panel C examines non-pilot stocks and shows that there is a marginal decline in 
volatility for non-pilot stocks from 0.732% to 0.723% following the rule change. The 
difference is statistically significant at a level of 1% using a non-parametric Wilcoxon 
rank scores test, however, the magnitude is not economically meaningful. The solely 
significant non-parametric test is similar to Table 67. The number o f individual specialist 
firms with significant differences between the period before and after the rule change is 
slightly larger in Table 71 Panel C compared to Table 67 (twelve versus ten). Eight of 
the twelve specialist firms show a decline in volatility.
When the mean volatility o f the specialist firms are all compared, the differences 
are statistically significant using parametric and non-parametric tests. For the entire 
period, and for the period before and after the rule change, the differences are statistically
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significant at a level o f  1% using the parametric ANOVA test and the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank sums test.
Table 72 presents an analysis based on the second measure o f volatility. Quite 
different from the first measure o f volatility, in this table, volatility is measured as the 
difference between the high and low share price divided by the mean share price during 
the final half-hour of the trading day. There are fewer number o f observations in this 
table than when using the other measure of volatility since this measure requires at least 
two different transactions in the half-hour period. The other measure of volatility only 
requires a change in the midpoint o f the bid and ask quotes from those outstanding at the 
beginning o f the period.
A comparison between pilot and non-pilot stocks, as shown in Panel A, indicates 
that the volatility is marginally lower for pilot stocks (0.479% versus 0.483%). This 
difference is statistically significant at a level of 1% using a non-parametric test. There 
are thirteen specialist firms with pilot stocks that have an observed value for volatility for 
pilot stocks. O f these thirteen firms, ten show statistically significant differences between 
the pilot and non-pilot stocks. In all ten finns differences are significant using non- 
parametric tests and in two of these firms the differences are corroborated by significant 
parametric tests.
When the mean volatility measures are compared across the specialist firms, there 
are statistically significant differences noted using parametric and non-parametric tests. 
Examined separately, pilot and non-pilot stocks both show differences between specialist 
firms at a level of 1% using parametric and non-parametric tests.
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Table 72 This table reports the volatility (difference) across specialist firms and pilot 
versus non-pilot stocks. Volatility during the final half-hour o f trading as measured by 
the difference between the high and low share price divided by the mean share price is 
reported (in percent) across specialist firms for May-June 1995 and the period before and 
after the NYSE rule change on June 5, 1995. Parametric ANOVA and non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank sums tests are conducted to test for differences between the groups.
PANEL A - PILOT VERSUS NON-PILOT STOCKS
Specialist Overall
Return
Non-Pilot stocks 
Return
Pilot Stocks 
Return
ANOVA Wilcoxon
20 0.411 0.411 - - -
34 0.525 0.525 - - -
104 0.423 0.423 - - -
137 0.629 0.625 0.735 0.75 24.74*”
202 0.438 0.438 - - -
210 0.479 0.479 0.464 0.06 13.67*”
215 0.493 0.493 0.454 0.07 1.19
240 0.493 0.493 - - -
298 0.461 0.462 0.423 0.39 0.93
364 0.486 0.486 - - -
403 0.480 0.481 0.457 0.16 10.72
501 0.462 0.464 0.395 1.45
_  *  .»«•9.00
520 0.492 0.496 0.373 0.60 2.40
551 0.370 0.370 - - -
1010 0.542 0.542 - - -
1027 0.388 0.388 - - -
1034 0.485 0.485 - - -
1148 0.642 0.642 - - -
1225 0.422 0.422 - - -
1227 0.505 0.509 0.354 3.22* 3.93
1229 0.473 0.473 - - -
126 6 0.630 0.630 - - -
1280 0.535 0.535 - - -
1341 0.520 0.520 - - -
1418 0.570 0.565 0.707 1.68 28.80***
1679 0.393 0.393 - - -
1687 0.429 0.429 - - -
1726 0.494 0.489 0.743 5.41” 21.31*”
1746 0.485 0.485 - - -
1903 0.445 0.445 0.421 0.05 8.14*”
1910 0.378 0.378 - - -
1941 0.524 0.524 - - -
19 66 0.461 0.457 0.552 0.62 17.13*”
2022 0.585 0.585 - - -
2090 0.699 0.699 - - -
3011 0.443 0.443 - - -
3174 0.398 0.397 0.404 0.03 11.84*”
overall 0.483
ANOVA 13.18*** 
Wilcoxon 425.02*** 
‘significant at a  = 10%, *'
0.483
12.69*** 
391.35*’* 
significant at a  = 5%,
0.479
12.61*** 
122.00*”  
’“ significant at
0.03 
a  = 1%
154.66*”
(table con'd)
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(Table 72 continued)
PANEL B - PILOT STOCKS - Pre and Post June 5. 1995
Specialist Entire Period Pre-06/05/95 Post-06/05/95 ANOVA Wilcoxo
Return Return Return
20 . _ _ _ _
34 - - - - -
104 - - - - -
137 0.735 0.682 0.796 0.81 0.01
202 - - - - -
210 0.464 0.457 0.472 0.09 1.44
215 0.454 0.464 0.444 0.03 2.29
240 - - - - -
298 0.423 0.460 0.380 1.57 1.55
364 - - - - -
403 0.457 0.492 0.416 2.78* 1.51
501 0.395 0.420 0.369 1.42 4.06*
520 0.373 0.421 0.314 1.81 1.18
551 - - - - -
1010 - - - - -
1027 - - - - -
1034 - - - - -
1148 - - - - -
1225 - - - - -
1227 0.354 0.413 0.284 3.68* 7.38’
1229 - - - - -
1266 - - - - -
1280 - - - - -
1341 - - - - •
1418 0.707 0.696 0.719 0.05 0.35
1679 - - - - -
1687 - - - - -
1726 0.743 0.787 0.696 0.54 0.58
1746 - - - - -
1903 0.421 0.448 0.389 0.57 3.74*
1910 - - - - -
1941 - - - - -
1966 0.552 0.586 0.510 0.98 3.98*
2022 - - - - -
2090 - - - - -
3011 - - - - -
3174 0.404 0.409 0.399 0.04 0.03
overall 0.479 0.495 0.461 2.63 3.48*
ANOVA 12.61*** 4.73*** 9.14***
Wilcoxon 122.00 48.83*** 85.95***
‘significant at a  = 10%, “ significant at a  = 5%, ‘“ significant at a  = 1%
(table con'd)
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(Table 72 continued)
PA N EL C  - N O N -PIL O T  ST O C K S - P re  and  Post Ju n e  5. 1995
Specialist Entire Period Pre-06/05/95 Post-06/05/95 ANOVA Wilcoxon
Return Return Return
20 0.411 0.394 0.437 2.05 4.36“
34 0.525 0.542 0.504 0.57 0.00
104 0.423 0.413 0.434 0.55 1.12
137 0.625 0.622 0.629 0.02 2.03
202 0.438 0.434 0.444 0.23 0.79
210 0.479 0.484 0.474 0.17 0.17
215 0.493 0.480 0.512 1.52 3.99“
240 0.493 0.427 0.580 1.81 0.57
298 0.462 0.437 0.498 9.50’“ 11.04*“
364 0.486 0.507 0.464 0.57 0.58
403 0.481 0.466 0.502 2.66 0.37
501 0.464 0.464 0.464 0.00 2.65
520 0.496 0.448 0.551 3.20* 2.75’
551 0.370 0.365 0.377 0.19 1.61
1010 0.542 0.499 0.609 3.70* 3.58*
1027 0.388 0.388 0.387 0.00 1.09
1034 0.485 0.483 0.487 0.00 0.11
1148 0.642 0.682 0.593 2.14 0.51
1225 0.422 0.412 0.434 0.80 0.06
1227 0.509 0.493 0.528 1.79 2.24
1229 0.473 0.443 0.508 1.04 2.29
1266 0.630 0.643 0.613 0.15 0.01
1280 0.535 0.527 0.545 0.12 0.01
1341 0.520 0.533 0.504 0.41 0.79
1418 0.565 0.542 0.594 1.57 3.28*
1679 0.393 0.386 0.402 0.35 0.03
1687 0.429 0.423 0.437 0.21 0.81
1726 0.489 0.506 0.468 1.57 4.85“
1746 0.485 0.483 0.486 0.00 0.20
1903 0.445 0.419 0.479 5.16“ 1.62
1910 0.378 0.358 0.406 0.96 2.46
1941 0.524 0.508 0.546 0.91 0.14
1966 0.457 0.465 0.447 0.18 0.00
2022 0.585 0.532 0.654 3.38* 0.33
2090 0.699 0.654 0.752 2.23 2.67
3011 0.443 0.402 0.499 4.28“ 7.40**’
3174 0.397 0.378 0.423 3.96“ 5.42“
overall 0.483 0.472 0.498 17.28’“ 26.29*“
ANOVA 12.69’“ 8.62 5.43’“
Wilcoxon 391.35’“ 259.90’“ 179.88“ ’
‘significant at a  = 10%, “ significant at a  = 5%, “ ’significant at a  = 1%
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Panel B reports the mean volatility for pilot stocks on an overall basis and in the 
period before and after the rule change. The overall mean volatility declines from 
0.495% to 0.461% following the rule change. The difference is statistically significant at 
a level of 10% using a non-parametric test. O f the thirteen specialist firms with pilot 
stocks, five show a statistically significant difference between the period before and after 
the rule change. All five of these firms exhibit a decrease in volatility.
The mean volatility is compared across specialist firms and differences across the 
specialist firms are found in both the period before and after the rule change. Parametric 
and non-parametric tests indicate that there are statistically significant differences at a 
level o f  1% across the specialist firms.
Non-pilot stocks are examined in Panel C. The results are similar to Table 68. A 
slight increase is found in the overall volatility measure after the rule change (0.498% 
versus 0.472%). This is found to be statistically significant using parametric and non- 
parametric tests. The same eleven individual specialist firms as in Table 68 are found to 
exhibit statistically significant differences between the period before and after the rule 
change. Only one of the eleven specialist firms shows a decline in the volatility 
following the rule change.
When the mean volatility is compared across specialist firms the difference is 
found to be significant in the period before and the period after the rule change. In both 
periods the parametric ANOVA test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sums test are 
statistically significant at a level o f 1%. Using this difference measure of volatility, a 
similar level of volatility is not observed across the specialist firms.
The results show that both measures o f volatility are not the same across pilot and 
non-pilot stocks. The standard deviation measure shows a volatility level that is much
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lower for pilot stocks, and the difference is statistically significant. The difference 
measure o f  volatility is only slightly lower for pilot stocks but the difference between 
pilot and non-pilot stocks is statistically significant. The volatility for pilot stocks 
declines following the rule change, but this decline has only mild statistical significance. 
For non-pilot stocks there are conflicting findings. Using the difference measure o f 
volatility shows a statistically significant increase following the rule change. Using the 
standard deviation measure o f volatility shows a slight decline that is only statistically 
significant with a non-parametric test. These results reject hypothesis three (H3) since 
the volatility o f pilot stocks is lower than that o f non-pilot stocks and there is a significant 
decline following the rule change.
6.4.4. Reduced Sample of Pilot Stocks
A reduced sample of pilot stocks is used to examine both measures of returns at 
the end o f the day and both measures o f volatility at the end o f the day. The reduced 
sample is formed by using the ten lowest capitalization pilot stocks and matching with the 
nearest capitalization non-pilot stocks. A minimum number o f transactions is required 
near the end o f the day to be included in the reduced sample.
6.4.4.I. Price Rise at the End of the Trading Day
Table 73 reports the final intraday transaction for the reduced sample o f pilot and 
non-pilot stocks. The overall final intraday return is 0.0531%. This is approximately 
half the size o f the overall final intraday return when all the stocks are examined. The 
pilot stocks have a final intraday return that is slightly smaller than the final intraday 
return for non-pilot stocks, however the difference is not statistically significant. There is 
no statistically significant difference between the pilot and non-pilot stocks in either the 
period before or the period after the NYSE MOC rule change.
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T able 73 This table reports the final intraday transaction returns using a matched 
sample. Mean final intraday transaction returns (in percentages) are reported in the May- 
June 1995 period for a matched sample o f the ten lowest capitalization pilot stocks and 
the closest capitalization non-pilot stocks. The return is reported for each o f  the groups 
o f pilot and non-pilot stocks for the overall period and for the period before and after the 
NYSE rule change on June 5, 1995. A parametric ANOVA test and a non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank scores test are conducted to test for differences between the two periods 
and between pilot and non-pilot stocks.
Entire Period Pre-06/05/95 Post-06/05/95 ANOVA Wilcoxon
Return Return Return
All Stocks 0.0531"* 0.0507*" 0.0559*** 0.10 0.67
Non-Pilot Stocks 0.0582*" 0.0672"* 0.0479" 0.57 4.21**
Pilot Stocks 0.0484*** 0.0306**
 ̂  ̂ _ • • •
0.0633 1.56 0.60
ANOVA 0.35 2.12 0.35
Wilcoxon 0.15 2.36 1.58
‘significant at a  =: 10%, "significant at a  = 5%, " ‘significant at a  = 1%
For the entire reduced sample of stocks, the mean final intraday transaction return 
increases after the rule change, however, the difference is not statistically significant.
The non-pilot stocks show a decline following the rule change from 0.0672% to 0.0479% 
and this difference is statistically significant at a level o f  5% using a non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank scores test. The pilot stocks show an increase in the final intraday 
transaction return, however the difference is not statistically significant.
Table 74 uses a reduced sample to calculate the final fifteen minute return for 
pilot and non-pilot stocks. The overall return is 0.0691%. This is lower than the overall 
final fifteen minute return using all stocks (0.0906%) reported in Table 66. In the 
reduced sample, the return for the entire period is higher for pilot stocks (0.0767% versus
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Table 74 This tale reports the final fifteen minute returns using a matched sample.
Mean final fifteen minute returns (in percentages) are reported in the May-June 1995 
period for a matched sample of the ten lowest capitalization pilot stocks and the closest 
capitalization non-pilot stocks. The return is reported for each of the groups o f pilot and 
non-pilot stocks for the overall period and for the periods before and after the NYSE rule 
change on June 5, 1995. A parametric ANOVA test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank 
scores test are conducted to test for differences between the two periods and between 
pilot and non-pilot stocks.
Entire Period Pre-06/05/95 Post-06/05/95 ANOVA Wilc<
Return Return Return
All Stocks 0.0691 0.0642*" 0.0749*” 0.14 0.09
Non-Pilot Stocks 0.0609’" 0.0718’** 0.0479 0.31 1.81
Pilot Stocks 0.0767"’ 0.0571” 0.0991*" 1.12 0.75
ANOVA 0.30 0.16 1.27
Wilcoxon 0.11 0.74 2.10
‘significant at a  =: 10%, "significant at a  = 5%, " ’significant at a  = 1%
0.0609%), although the difference is not statistically significant. The final fifteen minute 
return for pilot stocks in the period before the rule change is smaller than that for non­
pilot stocks, but the difference also is not significant. In the period after the rule change, 
pilot stocks have a larger final fifteen minute return, but the difference is also not 
statistically significant. For all the reduced sample stocks, there is no statistical 
difference between the period before and after the rule change. This is also true 
separately for pilot and non-pilot stocks.
The results indicate that the price rise at the end of the day is similar across pilot 
and non-pilot stocks. A statistically significant decline in the price rise following the rule 
change is significant using a non-parametric test when the final intraday transaction
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return measure is used. However, no decline is observed for the reduced sample o f pilot 
stocks. These results for the reduced sample fail to reject hypothesis three (H3) that there 
is similar behavior for pilot and non-pilot stocks following the rule change.
6.4A.2. Volatility at the End of the Trading Day
Volatility as measured by the standard deviation o f successive midpoints o f the 
bid-ask spread in the final half-hour of trading is reported for the reduced sample in Table 
75. The overall volatility is 0.236%. This is smaller than the overall volatility (0.716%) 
reported for all stocks in Table 67. No statistical difference is found between the pilot 
and non-pilot stocks in the entire period, nor separately in either o f the periods before or 
after the NYSE MOC rule change. When the volatility is compared before and after the 
rule change, no difference is found between these two periods for the entire reduced stock 
sample, nor for the pilot nor the non-pilot stocks.
Table 75 This table reports the volatility (standard deviation) using a matched sample. 
Volatility over the final half-hour o f trading as measured by the standard deviation (in 
percent) o f changes in successive midpoints o f the bid and ask quotes is reported in the 
May-June 1995 period for a matched sample of the ten lowest capitalization pilot stocks 
and the closest capitalization non-pilot stocks. The volatility is reported for the entire 
period and for the periods before and after the NYSE rule change on June 5, 1995. A 
parametric ANOVA test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank scores test are conducted to 
test for differences between the two periods and between pilot and non-pilot stocks.
Entire Period 
Volatility
Pre-06/05/95
Volatility
Post-06/05/95
Volatility
ANOVA Wilcoxon
All Stocks 0.236 0.224 0.251 1.21 0.63
Non-Pilot Stocks 0.249 0.234 0.267 0.63 0.40
Pilot Stocks 0.224 0.215 0.236 0.66 0.25
ANOVA
Wilcoxon
1.01
0.71
1.26
0.32
0.38
0.49
'significant at a  = 10%, "significant at a  = 5%, "'significant at a  = 1%
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Volatility is also measured as the difference between the high and low price 
divided by the mean price in the final half-hour of trading. This measure is reported for 
the reduced sample o f stocks in Table 76. The volatility for the entire reduced sample is 
calculated to be 0.488%. This is slightly larger than the volatility for all stocks calculated 
to be 0.483% as shown in Table 68. The pilot stocks in the reduced sample have a larger 
volatility on an overall basis (0.548% versus 0.428%). This is also true in the period 
before the rule change (0.546% versus 0.416%) and the period after the rule change 
(0.549% versus 0.441%). The difference between pilot and non-pilot stocks is 
statistically significant using parametric and non-parametric tests. The level of 
significance for both tests is 1% over the entire period and in the period before the rule 
change. The level o f  significance falls to 5% for both tests in the period after the rule 
change.
Table 76 This table reports the volatility (difference) using a matched sample. Volatility 
during the final half-hour o f trading as measured by the difference between the high and 
low share price divided by the mean share price is reported (in percent) in the May-June 
1995 period for a matched sample of the ten lowest capitalization pilot stocks and the 
closest capitalization non-pilot stocks. The volatility is reported for the entire period and 
for the period before and after the NYSE rule change on June 5, 1995. A parametric 
ANOVA test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank scores test are conducted to test for 
differences between the two periods and between pilot and non-pilot stocks.
Entire Period Pre-06/05/95 Post-06/05/95 ANOVA Wilcoxon
Volatility Volatility Volatility
All Stocks 0.488 0.482 0.496 0.24 0.06
Non-Pilot Stocks 0.428 0.416 0.441 0.57 0.05
Pilot Stocks 0.548 0.546 0.549 0.00 0.06
ANOVA 19.56*** 14.14*’* 6.36“
Wilcoxon 13.01**’ 6.63*** 6.58“
‘significant at a  = 10%, “ significant at a  = 5%, ‘“ significant at a  = 1%
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These results indicate that the measure of volatility impacts on the observed 
differences. For the reduced sample o f stocks, when the standard deviation measure of 
volatility is used, no differences are found between pilot and non-pilot stocks and 
between the period before and after the rule change. When the difference measure of 
volatility is used, the pilot stocks show a significantly larger volatility during the entire 
period as well as before and after the rule change. Using the difference measure fails to 
find any differences between the period before and after the rule change for either pilot or 
non-pilot stocks. These results for the reduced sample fail to reject hypothesis three (H3) 
since pilot stocks are shown to have a larger volatility using only the difference measure 
o f volatility. Also, the rule change is shown to have no effect on either pilot or non-pilot 
stocks.
6.4.5. Conclusion
This chapter examines the effect of the NYSE MOC rule change on June 5, 1995. 
The intended effect o f the rule change is to reduce volatility at the end o f  the day and this 
may also have an impact on the well-documented price rise at the end o f  the trading day. 
In this chapter, it is shown that there is no effect on the price rise when all the stocks are 
examined in aggregate. This chapter shows that for the group o f pilot stocks that 
publicize order imbalances, the overall end of day price rise is lower. This may be a 
function o f the capitalization and liquidity of the stocks in this category, and a reduced 
sample of stocks that match on capitalization shows that the characteristics may be 
driving the comparison. No decline in the price rise following the rule change is found 
on an aggregate basis.
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Two measures of volatility are used in this chapter. One measure is the standard 
deviation o f changes in successive midpoints o f  the bid-ask spread during the final half- 
hour o f trading. A second measure is the difference between the high and low share price 
during the last half-hour o f trading all divided by the mean share price during this period. 
In aggregate, the two measures come to different conclusions. When individual specialist 
firms are examined then it is clear that the differences are driven by significant 
differences in separate specialist firms. The relative size of volatility in the period before 
and after the rule change agrees for most o f the specialist firms that have significant 
differences using both volatility measures. The volatility is shown to decline in nine o f 
the thirty-seven specialist firms. Additionally, pilot stocks are shown to have a much 
lower volatility than non-pilot stocks. A mildly significant volatility decline is also 
observed in pilot stocks when examined in aggregate. When a reduced sample is 
examined that controls for differences in capitalization and liquidity, the two measures o f 
volatility have conflicting results. The standard deviation measure exhibits no difference, 
but the other volatility measure indicates that the pilot stocks in this sample have a larger 
volatility than non-pilot stocks. For the reduced sample, no differences are noted 
between the period before and after the rule change.
The rule change is found to affect some specialists more than others. This 
suggests that some specialists may be more likely to be affected by the factors that the 
rule is trying to correct. One possible example is the additional influx o f  orders near the 
close. Some specialists may be able to quickly fill the orders, while other specialists may 
be slower to respond and, thus, any orders near the close would have to be made as 
market on close orders. For these slower specialists, the additional market on close 
orders could cause an imbalance and impact the closing price for stocks by that specialist.
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This may explain why some specialists are disproportionately impacted by the NYSE 
MOC rule change.
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION
7.1. Synopsis of Major Findings
This dissertation investigates different trading mechanisms, focusing on 
comparing specialist versus multiple dealer markets. The purpose o f the dissertation is to 
better understand the impact o f these trading mechanisms on intraday price formation and 
the components o f the bid-ask spread. Price formation patterns are o f  interest because 
previous findings of empirical regularities appear to contradict efficient markets. The 
components o f the bid-ask spread are of interest since they provide an indication o f  costs 
facing traders o f stocks on the different market structures.
This dissertation uses data from the Paris Bourse to provide insight into the effect 
o f different market structures. The simultaneous trading in two market structures on the 
Paris Bourse isolates the effect o f the specialist by removing institutional differences that 
plague comparisons across exchanges. In Chapter 3, price formation patterns on the Paris 
Bourse are found to be similar to known patterns on other exchanges. Comparing stocks 
on the Paris Bourse that are traded with and without an assigned market maker 
demonstrates the impact of the assigned market maker, or specialist, on the various price 
patterns. Assigned market makers are shown to exacerbate the end o f  day price rise on 
the Paris Bourse. The larger price rise for stocks with an assigned market maker implies 
that the explanations for the end of day price rise that center on the specialist have some 
validity. The specialists do not fully explain this phenomenon since the effect is also 
present when there is no assigned market maker. The finding that one third o f the end o f 
day return is subsequently reversed overnight demonstrates the temporary nature o f  a
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portion of the end o f day price rise. This is consistent with Hatheway’s (1994) 
explanation that the end o f day price rise is done by the specialist in order to extract 
information at the open the following morning.
Stock volatility and bid-ask spreads are found to be larger for those shares traded 
on the Paris Bourse with an assigned market maker. This is contradictory to research 
using data from North American markets that show a decline in the bid-ask spread when 
the trading location of shares move from Nasdaq, a multiple dealer market, to the NYSE 
and ASE, two exchanges with specialists. Moves between these exchanges do not, 
however, provide clean comparisons since there are institutional differences across these 
exchanges. For example, the strict NYSE monitoring and enforcement procedures may 
curtail the activities o f the specialists on this exchange.
Chapter 3 also shows that trades that occur off the exchange have some 
peculiarities in the patterns observed. There may be some attempt to utilize cross-trades 
to influence the closing price since a larger proportion o f  cross-trades occurs at the end of 
the trading day. Additionally, when the last transaction is a cross trade, the percentage of 
the final transaction return that is reversed overnight is 55%. The procedures surrounding 
transactions that occur off the exchange vary for exchanges around the world, with the 
Paris Bourse allowing prices to marginally differ outside prevailing quotes. This practice 
appears to exacerbate the end o f day price rise.
In Chapter 4 the trade execution costs are estimated for the two market structures 
on the Paris Bourse. Prior empirical work is contradictory as to the impact o f the 
specialist on the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. Two separate 
methods o f estimating the adverse selection component using data from the Paris Bourse 
were both unable to resolve the conflicting findings.
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A larger inventory holding cost component is found for those stocks with an 
assigned market maker on the Paris Bourse. This confirms that specialists face an 
identifiable cost o f maintaining inventory and, in turn, that cost is passed on in the form 
o f a larger inventory holding cost component o f  the bid-ask spread.
Higher trading costs are found for those stocks that trade with an assigned market 
maker. The quoted, effective and realized bid-ask spreads are all approximately twice as 
large for stocks with an assigned market maker. Again, this is contradictory to findings 
on North American markets. This suggests that the comparisons in earlier empirical 
research are limited to conclusions about the specific exchanges and not the market 
structure, since the Paris Bourse findings are based on a much cleaner comparison.
This dissertation also examines the effect o f long-term inventory changes on the 
inventory holding cost component. Inventory changes are calculated and ranked over 
two months and then the effect on the trading costs in the subsequent two months is 
examined. Large changes in inventory are found to have twice as large an impact on the 
inventory holding cost component o f those stocks that have an assigned market maker. 
Additionally, depletion of inventory is found to have a larger impact on the inventory 
holding cost component than when there is a large build up o f inventory.
In Chapter 5, the market structure issue is also examined by looking at individual 
specialist firms on the NYSE and noting differences across these firms. Consistent 
intraday patterns are found for volume and volatility. The pattern in the bid-ask spread is 
consistently large immediately after the open for all specialist firms, however, there is 
some variation noted in the late afternoon peak. Likewise, the end of day returns are not
277
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
consistently large for all specialists, suggesting that the final intraday transaction price 
rise may be related to the individual specialist. The bid and ask depths also show 
considerable variation across specialist firms, with twice as many firms having a 
consistently larger bid depth.
Differences within specialist firms across individual specialists are observed when 
examining volatility, percentage bid-ask spreads and depths. No differences are noted 
within a specialist firm when the final intraday transaction return is examined. This 
suggests that there is some consistency within a specialist firm in the use o f the final 
intraday transaction return in managing end of day prices.
Cross-subsidization o f stocks within a specialist firm is examined by dividing 
stocks into groups based on the level o f  volume in the stock. No differences are noted in 
the end of day price rise between these two groups, indicating that the end o f day price 
rise is not systematically occurring for stocks with a certain volume. The percentage bid- 
ask spread is found to be larger for lower volume stocks suggesting that specialists are 
capturing larger bid-ask spreads from these stocks. This implies that cross-subsidization 
from high to low volume stocks is not sufficient to keep the percentage bid-ask spreads 
low for these low volume stocks. As an alternative explanation, these stocks may have 
lower prices and the price effect may be influencing the percentage bid-ask spread. This 
is tested, but the prices only provide a partial explanation for the higher bid-ask spreads.
Inventory accumulation is also examined using the NYSE stocks, but this is done 
on a short term basis in contrast to the long term effects observed on the Paris Bourse. 
Using NYSE data, inventory is accumulated from the open until 3:30 pm and then the 
percentage bid-ask spread is examined in the final half-hour. Higher bid-ask spreads are
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found in the middle three quintiles, indicating that the specialist may be less competitive 
in attracting orders for the stocks with minimal inventory changes. In comparing the two 
extreme quintiles, the inventory depletion quintile has a larger percentage bid-ask spread 
then the quintile with the large inventory build up. This indicates the specialist may be 
less competitive in attracting orders when inventory is depleted, possibly because a 
positive inventory must be maintained. Differences in final transaction returns across 
specialist firms are only noted for those stocks with the largest inventory accumulation. 
This suggests that the price rise at the end o f the day may be effected by the specialist in 
order to increase the value o f inventory’ or may be a method to induce more orders the 
following day.
The effect on end o f day prices and volatility o f the change in the market on close 
rule on the NYSE is examined in Chapter 6. Minimal differences are found for the end o f 
day price rise. Volatility, however, is shown to decline in nine o f  the thirty-seven 
specialist firms. The reduction in volatility in only some specialist firms following the 
rule change may indicate that specialists’ ability to deal with a large influx o f orders may 
not be consistent. This rule change institutes specific procedures and, thus, has the effect 
o f eliminating any differences across specialist firms in the ability to dispose o f large 
orders.
The handling o f the NYSE MOC orders appears to be indicative o f the 
arrangement on the NYSE that may help to explain the differences observed across 
exchanges that are not necessarily attributable to the market structure. As shown by the 
data from the Paris Bourse, using a specialist results in many patterns that could indicate 
that the specialist is acting like a monopolist. The findings from the Paris Bourse data
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provide a  clean comparison that suggests other factors may be impacting market structure 
comparisons across North American exchanges.
7.2. Future Work
This dissertation has provided a detailed investigation o f the specialist and 
multiple dealer market structures and their impacts on both intraday price formation and 
the components of the bid-ask spread. Further follow up work can continue with an 
extended data set that examines the impact o f the change in closing procedures on the 
Paris Bourse. Also, an expanded data set would enable testing o f the robustness o f the 
findings across specialist firms, since conclusions about differences across specialist 
firms may be specific to the time period under study.
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APPENDIX A: PARIS BOURSE TRADING GROUP INDICATOR
Trading Name
Group # Description
11 Multiple Dealer A Reglement Mensuel
High liquidity stocks traded on the Reglement Mensuel on a continuous basis
15 Multiple Dealer A Reglement Mensuel
High liquidity stocks traded on the Reglement Mensuel on a continuous basis 
(index component stocks)
21 Multiple Dealer A Reglement Mensuel - foreign stocks
High liquidity foreign stocks traded on the RM on a continuous basis
16 Multiple Dealer A cash market
High liquidity stocks traded on the cash market on a continuous basis
22 Multiple Dealer A cash market - foreign stocks
High liquidity foreign stocks traded on the cash market on a continuous basis
31 Multiple Dealer A cash market secondary issues
High liquidity secondary issues traded on the cash market on a continuous basis
32 Multiple Dealer A RM secondary issues
High liquidity secondary issues traded on the RM on a continuous basis
12 Single Market Maker B cash market
Medium liquidity stocks traded on the cash market on a continuous basis
17 Single Market Maker B cash market foreign
Medium liquidity stocks traded on the cash market on a continuous basis
13 Fixing A French stocks
Medium liquidity French stocks traded on a call market (2 fixings a day)
23 Fixing A Foreign stocks
Medium liquidity foreign stocks traded on a call market (2 fixings a day)
33 Fixing A secondary issues
medium liquidity secondary issues traded on a call market (2 fixings a day)
287
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX B: NYSE MARKET ON CLOSE ORDER RULE DESCRIPTIONS
Type o f stock 
Non-derivative related
Derivative related
Pilot stocks (derivative 
related)
Before June 5. 1995 
No restriction
20 minutes before close on 
expiration days (<3:39:59)
No limit on other days
20 minutes before close on 
expiration days (<3:39:59)
Publish imbalances over
50,000 shares
After June 5. 1995
10 minutes before close all 
days (<3:49:59)
20 minutes before close on 
expiration days (<3:39:59)
10 minutes before close on 
other days
20 minutes before close on 
expiration days (<3:39:59)
10 minutes early on non- 
expiration days (<3:49:59)
Publish imbalances over
50,000 shares
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APPENDIX C: LISTING OF JUNE 1995 PILOT STOCKS
Panel A: 50 most highly capitalized S&P 500 stocks including M ajor M arket Index 
Stocks
ABT Abbott Laboratories
AXP American Express Company
AHP American Home Products Corporation
AIG American International Group Inc.
T American Telephone and Telegraph
AIT Ameritech Corp.
AN Amoco Corporation
ARC Atlantic Richfield Company
BAC Bankamerica Corporation
BEL Bell Atlantic Corporation
BLS BellSouth Corporation
BA Boeing Company
BMY Bristol Myers Squibb Company
CHV Chevron Corporation
CCI Citicorp
ICO Coca-Cola Company
COL Columbia Healthcare Corp.
DOW Dow Chemical Company
DD Du Pont Company
EK Eastman Kodak Company
LLY Eli Lilly and Company
XON Exxon Corporation
FNM Federal National Mortgage Association
F Ford Motor Company
GE General Electric Company
GM General Motors Corporation
G Gillette Company
GTE GTE Corporation
HWP Hewlett-Packard Company
HD Home Depot Inc.
IBM International Business Machines Corp.
IP International Paper Company
JNJ Johnson and Johnson
MCD McDonalds Corporation
MRK Merck and Company Inc.
MMM Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing
MOB Mobil Corporation
MOT Motorola Inc.
NYN Nynex Corporation
PEP Pepsico Inc.
PFE Pfizer Inc.
MO Philip Morris Cos. Inc.
PG Procter and Gamble Company
RD Royal Dutch Petroleum Company
S Sears Roebuck Company
SBC Southwestern Bell Corporation
TX Texaco Inc.
UN Unilever N.V. Ord Shares
USW U.S. West Inc.
WMT Wal-Mart Stores Inc.
DIS Walt Disney Company
(appendix con'd)
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(Appendix C continued)
Panel B: 10 highest weighted S&P MidCap 400 stocks
AFL AFLAC Inc.
AOC AON Corp.
CMA Comerica Inc.
EMC EMC Corp.
FBS First Bank System Inc.
FFM First Financial Management Corp.
LSI LSI Logic Corp.
MS Morgan Stanley Group Inc.
ODP Office Depot Inc.
Panel C: Stocks that were added or deleted during June 1995
CS Cabletron Systems Inc.
BEN Franklin Resources Inc.
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